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Preface
The meetings of NCT-194 were held in Kansas City, Missouri on October 6-7, 2003. The Center 
for the Study of Rural America at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City served as the host 
institution. NCT-194 was formed at the expiration of NC-221 and before the approval of NC- 
1014. The purpose of the group was to conduct multi-state research on transitioning agricultural 
finance markets and to develop a proposal for a new multi-state research committee.
This publication contains the agenda and minutes from our meeting as well as the majority of the 
selected papers that were presented at the meeting. The annual meeting consisted of several 
sessions of selected research papers that reported on current research efforts as well as sessions 
designed to facilitate the development of the proposal for our new multi-state research project. I 
am happy to report that the project has been approved as NC-1014, Agricultural Finance Markets 
in Transition.
The executive committee consisted of Chair Matthew Diersen, Vice-Chair Brent Gloy, and 
Secretary Timothy Park. This committee selected the papers for presentation and organized the 
meetings. The group would like to thank Jason Henderson for his assistance in developing the 
agenda for the meeting as well as making arrangements to host the group. We would also like to 
thank invited speakers Mark Drabenstott, Ross Anderson, Gary Mazour, Don Macke, and David 
McGranahan for sharing their time and thoughts with the group.
Brent Gloy 
Vice-Chair 2002-2003
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AGENDA
Monday, October 6, 2003
8:00 -  8:15 Opening remarks from Chairman Matthew Diersen
8:15 -  9:00 Welcome and presentation on Major Challenges in Rural America, Mark Drabenstott, 
Vice President and Director, Center for the Study of Rural America, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City
9:00 -  10:00 Ross Anderson, Vice President of Credit, Agribank and member of FCS President’s 
Commission on Credit Risk: FCS approaches to assess, monitor, and manage credit 
risk
10:00 -  10:20 Break
10:20 -  11:20 Approaches to Evaluating Credit Risk
A. Issues in Credit Risk Assessment in Agricultural Credit Markets, R. Onyeaghala 
and P. Ellinger
B. Credit Risk Models: An Application to Agricultural Lending, A. Katchova and P 
Barry
C. Adapting Credit Risk Models to Agriculture, L. Zech and G. Pederson 
11:20 -  12:00 A Multi-State Approach to Assessing the Potential of Farm Savings Accounts
A. Overview of Alternative Farm Savings Account Programs and Multi-state Efforts 
to Evaluate Alternative Farm Savings Account Programs, B. Gloy, et al.
B. Results from Analyses of the Viability of and Benefits from Farm Savings 
Accounts for New York and Illinois, P. Ellinger, et al.
12:00 -  1:00 Lunch
1:00 -  1:50 The Intersection of Rural Communities and Finance: Research Needs and 
Opportunities in Rural America; Don Macke, Co-Director, Center for Rural 
Entrepreneurship; David McGranahan, Economic Research Service
1:50 -  2:50 Rural Economy: Farm Policy and Finance
A. The Impact of the Conservation Reserve Program on Farm Service and 
Recreation Establishments and Jobs, P. Sullivan, D. McGranahan, and C. 
Hallahan
B. Rural Small Business Finance: Evidence from the 1998 Survey of Small 
Business, C. Gustafson
C. Credit Counseling and Mortgage Termination by Low-Income Households: 
Evidence from a Mulit-State Counseling Program, V. Hartarska and C. 
Gonzalez-Vega
2:50 -  3:00 Break
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3:00 -  4:00 Farm Revenue Risk and Financial Institution Efficiency
A. Relationships among the Counter-Cyclical Program, Crop Revenue, and Crop Insurance 
Payments, B. Sherrick, R. Hauser, and G. Schnitkey
B. Risk Sharing and Incentives under Crop Insurance and External Equity Financing, S. Seo, D. 
Leatham, and P. Mitchell
C. Input Efficiency in Commercial Banks: A Normalized Quadratic Input Distance System, T. 
Marsh, A. Featherstone, and T. Garrett
4:00 -  4:10 Break
4:10 -  4:50 Credit Use and Availability
A. Analysis of Borrower and Lender Use of Interest Assistance on FSA Guranteed Farm Loans,
B. Ahrendsen, et al.
B. An Analysis of Market Segmentation in Farm Credit Markets, S. Koenig, C. Dodson, and J. 
Ryan.
Tuesday, October 7th
8:00 -  8:30 Business meeting and comments for administrative adviser
8:30 -  9:15 Break into groups to develop work plans and projects for each of the four proposed
objectives:
A. Determine the effects of changes in international competitive balance and federal and state 
policies affecting agriculture on the financial and economic performance of farms, 
agribusinesses and rural financial markets
B. Determine the effects of market, policy, and structural change in the agricultural and financial 
market sectors on the financial soundness, safety, and management of financial institutions 
that supply financial capital to agriculture
C. Evaluate the management strategies, capital needs, and financial performance required for the 
long-term sustainability of firms in the food and agribusiness sector
D. Final objective (currently under development and will likely include examining issues 
related to rural community development and finance)
9:15 -  10:00 Reports from groups on specific project ideas. Allow time for members to agree to 
participate in objectives whose breakout groups they did not attend.
10:00 -  10:15 Break
10:15 -  11:15 Financial Structure and Financial Management
A. The DuPont Profitability Analysis Model: An E-Learning Application and Evaluation, J. 
Melvin and M. Boehlje, C. Dobbins, A. Gray
B. Sustainable Growth Trends in U.S. Agriculture, C. Turvey and C. Escalante
C. Off-farm Income and Demand for Farm Capital Investment, C. Lagerkvist, H. Andersson, M. 
Campos, and K. Olson
11:15 -  12:00 Topics in Agricultural Finance
A. Evaluating USDA Forecasts of Farm Assets, T. Covey and K. Erickson
B. How Large is the Competitive Edge that U.S.-Based Futures Provide to U.S. Farmers? S. 
Lence
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MINUTES
Minutes of NCT-194 [NC221]
Agricultural Finance Markets In Transition 
Covering: October 2002 -  September 2003 
Annual Meeting: October 6-7, 2003
Administrative Advisor:
Dr. Eric Hoiberg 
Iowa State University 
Agriculture Administration 
Ames, IA 50011
Vice-Chair:
Dr. Brent Gloy 
Cornell University 
Department of Applied Economics 
and Management 
Ithaca, N.Y. 14853
Participants:
Peter Barry (University of Illinois), Ted Covey (Economic Research Service), Matt Diersen (South 
Dakota State University), Wayne Diveley (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City), Mark Drabenstott 
(Center for the Study of Rural America), Paul Ellinger (University of Illinois), Allen Featherstone 
(Kansas State University), Walter Gardiner (Farm Credit Administration), Brent Gloy (Cornell 
University), Cole Gustafson (North Dakota State University), Valentina Hartarksa (Auburn University), 
Jason Henderson (Center for the Study of Rural America), Eric Hoiberg (Iowa State University), Larry 
Janssen (South Dakota State University), Ani Katchova (University of Illinois), Juno Kim (Texas A&M 
University), Steve Koenig (Economic Research Service), Eddy L. LaDue (Cornell University), Carl 
Lagerkvist (Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences), Sergio Lence (Iowa State University), Zech 
Lyubov (University of Minnesota), David McGranahan (Economic Research Service), Don Macke 
(RUPRI), Tom Marsh (Kansas State University), Charles Moss (University of Florida), Raphael 
Onyeaghala (Southwest Minnesota State University), Timothy Park (University of Georgia), Glenn 
Pederson (University of Minnesota), Jill Phillips (University of Illinois), Lindon Robison (Michigan State 
University), Sangtaek Seo (Texas A&M University), Bruce Sherrick (University of Illinois), Patrick 
Sullivan (Economic Research Service), Chris Taggart (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City), Calum G. 
Turvey (Rutgers University), Stanton Ullerich (Buena Vista University), Christine Wilson (Purdue 
University).
Annual Meeting Minutes 
October 6-7, 2003
The 2003 Annual Meeting of NCT-194 [NC221] was held October 6 and 7 in Kansas City, Missouri at 
the headquarters of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. The meeting was called to order at 8:00 
A.M. on October 6 by Vice-Chairman Brent Gloy. The first two items were presentations by experts in 
rural and regional economic development trends from the Center for the Study of Rural America and a 
financial analyst from Farm Credit Services. A joint presentation on major challenges facing rural 
America by Mark Drabenstott, Vice President and Director and Jason Henderson, both of the Center for 
the Study or Rural America, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City initiated the sessions. Mark 
Drabenstott discussed strategies for the new economy which revolve around an emphasis on reinventing 
regions by building regional partnerships, identifying a unique competitive niche, and enriching a 
region’s supply of equity capital. Jason Henderson highlighted how the economic transformation of rural
Chair:
Dr. Matthew Diersen 
South Dakota State University 
Department of Economics 
Brookings, SD 57007
Secretary:
Dr. Timothy Park 
University of Georgia
Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics 
Athens, GA 30605
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America is influenced by the role of technology and the demand for recreation amenities and the 
emerging importance of service based industries as an economic cornerstone for these communities.
Rural communities are beginning to capture high-skill service industries and high-wage jobs by building 
on the quality of recreational and lifestyle amenities these areas possess and by upgrading the skill level 
of local businesses and the labor force.
Gary Mazour, Vice President of Credit for Farm Credit Services of America delivered a presentation on 
credit risk management focusing on the disclosure of information for assessing credit quality. Special 
emphasis was placed on emerging issues in the risk rating system and criteria for developing tools to 
assist in growing and managing the total loan portfolio. Ongoing research and scenario development on 
how to develop uniform methods to assess risk within and among institutions in the farm credit system 
were highlighted. A primary objective is to establish a risk rating model that complies with the guidelines 
in the Basel II and to establish definitions and objective criteria that are highly predictive over the 
business cycle.
The participants spent the rest of the morning and afternoon in 6 sessions of selected papers. The papers 
presented in these sessions addressed the objectives of NCT-194 [NC221] and were the products of the 
work of NC-221 members along with invited participants from government research groups and regional 
planning and development centers. A total of 15 papers were presented in the sessions. Nearly all of the 
papers were the product of several multi-state, multi-institution collaborations. An interactive presentation 
featured a cross disciplinary discussion between rural sociology perspectives and business entrepreneur 
viewpoints on the role of finance and capital in retaining and growing rural entrepreneurs and stimulating 
rural community growth.
The papers were grouped into sessions according to subject matter and involved participants in the project 
along with invited experts from research centers, rural sociologists from the Economic Research Service, 
and advanced graduate students. The first session addressed the general area of competing approaches to 
evaluating credit risk. The research presented during the second selected paper session examined multi­
state approaches that assess the viability of farm savings accounts. In the third session, two discussants 
outlined disciplinary approaches for defining and addressing the research needs for identifying and 
stimulating entrepreneurial opportunities in rural areas. The specific topics covered by these papers 
included:
Issues in Credit Risk Assessment in Agricultural Credit Markets
Credit Risk Models: An Application to Agricultural Lending 
Adapting Credit Risk Models to Agriculture
A Multi-State Approach to Assessing the Potential of Farm Savings Accounts
Multi-state Efforts to Evaluate Alternative Farm Savings Account Programs
Analyses of the Viability of and Benefits from Farm Savings Accounts: New York and Illinois
The Intersection of Rural Communities and Finance: Research Needs and Opportunities
Discussants: Don Macke, Co-Director, Center for Rural Entrepreneurship
David McGranahan, Economic Research Service
Rural Economy: Farm Policy and Finance
The Impact of the Conservation Reserve Program on Farm Service and Recreation Establishments and 
Jobs
Rural Small Business Finance: Evidence from the 1998 Survey of Small Business 
Credit Counseling and Mortgage Termination by Low-Income Households
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Farm Revenue Risk and Financial Institution Efficiency
Relationships among the Counter-Cyclical Program, Crop Revenue, and Crop Insurance 
Payments
Risk Sharing and Incentives under Crop Insurance and External Equity Financing 
Input Efficiency in Commercial Banks: A Normalized Quadratic Input Distance System
Credit Use and Availability
Analysis of Borrower and Lender Use of Interest Assistance on FSA Guaranteed Farm Loans 
An Analysis of Market Segmentation in Farm Credit Markets
On the second day of meeting the project adviser Dr. Eric Hoiberg reviewed the process that must be 
followed to revise the project for reauthorization and the reporting guidelines for completing the current 
project. Members were informed that the new NIMSS system must be used to submit the new proposal. 
Dr. Hoiberg also told that group that a proposal must include a statement of issues, justification, and 
objectives. In addition, a successful proposal should include a discussion of the methods, milestones, 
outreach, organization, and governance. Dr. Hoiberg encouraged the group to consider how they might 
broaden the scope or focus of the project and suggested incorporating alternative disciplinary approaches 
in specific objectives of the project. Participants reviewed progress during the past year in integrating 
multidisciplinary perspectives into the project and outlined goals for additional outreach efforts.
The participants adjourned to small group sessions to develop work plans and projects to align with each 
of the four proposed objectives. The objectives are directed at the following areas of emphasis:
(1) determine the effects of changes in international competitive balance and federal and 
state policies affecting agriculture on the financial and economic performance of farms, 
agribusinesses and rural financial markets
(2) determine the effects of market, policy, and structural change in the agricultural and 
financial market sectors on the financial soundness, safety, and management of financial 
institutions that supply financial capital to agriculture
(3) evaluate the management strategies, capital needs, and financial performance required for 
the long-term sustainability of firms in the food and agribusiness sector
(4) develop linkages between emerging issues in rural finance and development and the role 
of social capital and rural entrepreneurship. The plan is to develop a diverse cross state 
research initiative to measure the impact of social capital on the economic development 
and performance of agricultural and rural communities.
Participants discussed current and ongoing research and presentation outlets related to the project.
Charles Moss circulated for review a copy of the recently published book Government Policy and 
Farmland Markets (Iowa State Press, 2003) which incorporated research from project participants on a 
range of topic related to farmland values, government policies, capital markets and the role of 
urbanization, environmental quality, and rural amenities in farmland markets. The book is a timely and 
comprehensive look at farmland values oriented to a broad audience of government policy makers, 
lenders, agricultural economists, and decision makers in agribusiness.
Lindon Robison reported on emerging interdisciplinary contacts with other disciplines which can provide 
new perspectives for the analysis of rural finance issues. In the summer of 2003, eight past presidents of 
the American Agricultural Economic Association (AAEA) and the Rural Sociological Society (RSS) met 
in a mini-summit to discuss how to best benefit from the joint meetings of their respective associations. 
They agreed and supported the idea of using the social capital paradigm to bridge across the two 
disciplines and proposed papers for the Montreal joint meetings between the AAEA, RSS, and the
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Canadian Agricultural Economics Association (CAES) to illustrate this bridge. Principal paper sessions 
from the meetings included cross disciplinary presentations on social capital and a symposium on the 
productive areas of common ground between agricultural economists and rural sociologists. The project 
recognized the value of interdisciplinary approaches and is working to incorporate the implications of 
social capital into the revised project.
A principal paper session proposal will be prepared for the summer meetings of the American 
Agricultural Economics Association in Denver, Colorado. The session proposal will follow up on the 
ideas developed from these meetings on issues in agri-finance and social capital and would include three 
papers and one discussant. The first paper proposes to use multi-state data to examine if social capital 
developed by low-income borrowers through their church associations improves repayment of loans 
provided through partnerships with community church leaders. The second paper will examine if social 
capital can explain the lower rate of rural bank consolidations than their urban counterparts. Finally, the 
third paper assesses whether lower rates of return on farmland can be explained by attachment values. 
Contacts with the newly formed Institutional and Behavioral Economics section will be initiated to secure 
their endorsement of the proposed principal paper session and to develop expanded linkages for future 
project work.
The papers for the second day were grouped into two sessions. These sessions presented the work of 7 
authors and include collaborative work on off-farm income with a visiting professor from the Swedish 
University of Agricultural Sciences. The first session addressed issues in financial structure and financial 
management. The second set of papers examined current issues in agricultural finance.
Financial Structure and Financial Management
Sustainable Growth Trends in U.S. Agriculture 
Off-farm Income and Demand for Farm Capital Investment
Topics in Agricultural Finance
Evaluating USDA Forecasts of Farm Assets
How Large is the Competitive Edge that U.S.-Based Futures Provide to U.S. Farmers?
Date and Location of Next Year’s Meeting
The current chair will appoint a committee to determine a suitable location for the 2004 meeting and 
consult with the committee in identifying a set of locations for the meeting. Tentative plans are that the 
meeting will be held on October 4-5, 2004.
Current and Future Officers
The nomination committee plans to present nominations to the group for a new chairman, vice-chairman, 
and secretary with elections to be held in early 2004.
Submitted by:
Timothy Park 
NC-221 Secretary
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Credit Risk Models: An Application to Agricultural Lending
Ani L. Katchova and Peter J. Barry*
Abstract
Credit risk models are developed and used to estimate capital requirements for agricultural 
lenders under the New Basel Capital Accord. The theoretical models combine Merton’s 
distance-to-default approach with credit value-at-risk methodologies. Two applied models, 
CreditMetrics and KMV, are illustrated using farm financial data. Expected and unexpected 
losses for a portfolio of farms are calculated using probability of default, loss given default, and 
portfolio risk measures. The results show that credit quality and correlations among farms play a 
significant role in risk pricing for agricultural lenders.
Key words: credit risk, credit scoring, credit value-at-risk, debt, default, New Basel Accord.
* Ani L. Katchova is an assistant professor and Peter J. Barry is a professor in the Department of Agricultural and 
Consumer Economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The authors would like to thank Paul 
Ellinger and Dale Lattz for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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Recent advancements in the measurement and management of credit risk are emphasizing 
the use of frequency and severity of loan default concepts, in a Value-at-Risk (VaR) framework, 
to determine the economic capital needed by financial institutions to backstop these risks. The 
New Basel Accord to be implemented in 2006 is following this approach. The Accord will bring 
global capital regulation guidelines for financial institutions in line with industry best practice 
and offer institutions a range of approaches to meet regulatory capital requirements, 
commensurate with the institutions’ size, scope of operations, and available resources.
The goals of these advancements are to sharpen the precision and granularity (i.e. 
grouping of homogenous borrowers) of risk ratings, to relate these ratings more closely to capital 
needs and, where possible, to conserve costly holdings of institutional capital. In U.S. 
agriculture, for example, farmers provided nearly $20 billion of equity capital, loan loss reserves 
and insurance program assets in 2002 to ensure safety and soundness of the cooperative Farm 
Credit System, as well as pay about $36.7 million annually for the regulatory costs of the Farm 
Credit Administration (Barry). Reductions in excessive capital holdings (if the results show 
excessive capital) would free funds for other productive uses. Alternatively, increases in capital 
holdings (if results show insufficient capital) would increase the solvency of agricultural lenders.
It is widely recognized that data needed for measuring VaR credit risks are a limiting 
factor. Under the New Basel Accord, probabilities of default and loss given default can be 
measured using internal institutional data or obtained as external data. Using internal data 
requires a wide cross-section and lengthy time-series of loss and non-loss experiences to 
generate reliable default measures. The New Accord initially requires at least five years of data 
history, while clearly recognizing that longer series are preferred. In the absence of internal data, 
the use of external data requires that the quality of the institution’s loan portfolio and borrower 
characteristics are matched to those of an external source.1
Agricultural lending has several unique characteristics, which influence capital 
requirements. The agricultural sector is characterized by a lengthy production cycle which often 
leads to less frequent, seasonal payments of loans (Barry). The sector is capital intensive with 
more than 90% of total assets consisting of farm real estate and machinery. Financial 
performance of farms can be highly correlated, especially for farms with similar typology and 
close geographical location. Because financial institutions, especially agricultural lenders, 
usually do not hold random portfolios of loans, geographic and industry correlations lead to 
higher correlations in default and losses (Bliss).
The goals of this paper are to develop credit risk models that meet capital requirements 
for agricultural lenders under the New Basel Capital Accord and to estimate these models using 
farm-level data. The theoretical models will combine Merton’s option pricing approach and 
credit value-at-risk methodologies. These models will be estimated for the portfolio of all farms 
and also by grouping farms into different credit quality classes using two applied models, 
CreditMetrics and the KMV.
Credit Risk Models: An Application to Agricultural Lending
1 Alternative approaches include the use of the borrower’s data to determine “distance to default,” mark-to-market 
methods, mapping from external credit rating agencies, and borrower simulation models (Altman and Saunders; 
Crouhy, Galai, and Mark; Carey and Hrycay).
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Theoretical Models
The theoretical models are based on Merton’s option pricing approach and credit value- 
at-risk methodologies. In applying Merton’s model to agriculture, credit risk is driven by the 
dynamics of farm assets of the farmer-borrower. A probability of default and loss given default 
are calculated using the values of assets and debts. Capital requirements for financial institutions 
are calculated using credit VaR methodologies, which estimate probability distributions of credit 
losses conditional on portfolio composition (Sherrick, Barry, and Ellinger; and Barry et al.).
Merton’s Model
Following Merton, many finance studies have assumed that the value of firm’s assets 
follows a geometric Brownian motion. Similarly, Stokes and Brinch assume that land values 
(the most significant asset in agriculture) follow a geometric Brownian motion. Consistent with 
these studies, the value of farm assets is assumed to follow a standard geometric Brownian 
motion,
(1) 4 t = 4 c exp {(Mr -  /2)t + o x4 izt},
where A it is farm i’s assets at time t, and o 2 are the mean and variance of the instantaneous rate 
of return on farm i’s assets (dAit / A it), and zt ~N(0,1). The value of farm assets A it is lognormally 
distributed which implies that the log-asset returns rit follow a normal distribution.
Default occurs when a farmer misses a debt payment most likely due to a shortfall in cash 
flows. However, if the farm is solvent, i.e. the value of assets is greater than the value of debt, 
debt can be re-financed and liquidation avoided. Following other finance studies, default is 
assumed to occur at the end of the period when the value of farm assets A it is less than the value 
of farm debt D it (Crouhy, Galai, and Mark).2 The probability of default PDit, thus, is
(2) PDit = Pr [Ait <  D it].
After substituting equation (1) into equation (2) and simplifying, it follows that
(3) PDlt = Pr zt < —ln[Alt / Dit] + (Ut- o 2 / 2 )t
A t
■ N(-DDi,),
where
(4) DD,, ■ ln[Ait/ Dit] + (* - ° ’ /2)t
oM t
is called distance to default and N(-) is the standard normal cumulative density function (Crouhy, 
Galai, and Mark).
Figure 1 shows how the values of stochastic assets and deterministic debt evolve over 
time, with default occurring when the value of assets falls below the value of debt. The figure
2 This default condition is equivalent to technical bankruptcy in which the borrower has no equity remaining after all 
financial obligations are met.
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illustrates the distribution of the value of farm assets relative to debt obligations, the distance to 
default, and the probability of default. The distance to default depends on the margin of equity 
between asset and debt values as well as the expected growth and variance of asset returns. The 
shaded area is the probability of default (i.e. the probability that the value of assets will be less 
than the value of debt) which is a function of the distance to default.
The probability of default for each farm is calculated using the properties of the normal 
distribution as the probability that assets will fall below debt. The average probability of default, 
PD, is calculated as the weighted average of the probability of default for all farms, weighted by 
the debt for each farm. Instead of using this calculated statistical probability of default, several 
studies use the actual historical default rate calculated from historical data (Crouhy, Galai, and 
Mark). The historical default rate can be calculated as either the percent debt in default or as the 
percent farms in default. Lenders often report the percent debt in default because this measure 
reflects more directly the impact on capital and loan profitability. The two measures will not 
necessarily be similar if the average debt levels of defaulting farms differ substantially from 
those of non-defaulting farms. This study calculates both the statistical probability of default and 
the historical default rate.
Credit Risk and Capital Requirements Calculation
When measuring credit risk, two methods are commonly used to determine portfolio 
value (Garside, Stott, and Stevens). Under the NPV-based (net present value) method, the 
forward value of debt is determined using mark-to-market models as the sum of future debt 
payments discounted at the appropriate risk-adjusted discount rates for the respective rating 
classes (Crouhy, Galai, and Mark). Under the loss-based method, losses due to credit risk are 
calculated directly using historical data on defaults and loss given default. The NPV-based 
method is applicable to bond portfolios and large corporate portfolios where market trade data 
are available. However, most institutions use the loss-based method. Because the debt and 
equity claims of farm businesses are not traded in active secondary markets, the loss-based 
method is used here to calculate losses due to credit risk.
In case of default, the loan value is lost in full, part, or none depending on the quality of 
collateral pledged to secure the loan, the seniority of claims, possible loan guarantees, and 
administrative costs. In this paper, loss given default is calculated as the percentage shortfall of 
assets below debt,
(5) LGD't = D ^ f l ^
where LGDit is the loss given default for a defaulting farm i at the time of default t, Adt and Ddt
are the values of farm assets and debt, respectively, of a defaulting farm at the time of default, 
and h is the percent recovery cost for assets in default. The average loss given default for a 
portfolio, LGD, is calculated as the weighted average of the loss given default for defaulting 
farms, with weights being the debt in default.
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The expected loss is the probability of default PD times the loss given default LGD, 
expressed as a percent of the total debt of the portfolio. The dollar value for the expected loss 
per farm equals the percent expected loss times the value of farm debt, called exposure at default
EAD,
(6) EL = (PD)(LGD)(EAD).
Given that default is a binary variable, the average standard deviation of default SD for a
farm is
(7) SD = >/PD(1 -  PD) .
The standard deviation of default for a portfolio of farms is
(8) SDp = SD
' N N
TTwiws Pj
i=1 j=1
where wi is the weight of farm i in the portfolio and pij is the default correlation between farm i 
and farm j . Because the default correlation between two farms cannot be directly measured (as it 
would require repeated default observations over time), default correlations are often 
approximated by asset return correlations (Crouhy, Galai, and Mark). The farms in the portfolio 
are assumed to have a uniform distribution with an average weight of w, = 1/N, where N  is the 
number of farms in the portfolio. Assuming a uniform distribution, equation (8) can be further 
simplified as
(9) SDp = S D jN (1 / N)2 + 2(N (N - 1)/2)(1 / N )2p  = SD jP  + (1 - p ) / N  ,
where p is the average asset return correlation between farms. With similar exposure to all farms 
in the portfolio, portfolio risk depends on the number of farms in the portfolio N  and the asset 
return correlations between farms p .
Equation (9) is presented graphically in figure 2. The volatility of portfolio defaults is 
due to three factors: number of assets, concentration and correlation (Garside, Stott, and 
Stevens). Concentration refers to the relative proportion of debt for each farm in the credit 
portfolio. In this study, the value of debt for the most indebted farm in the sample does not 
exceed 2% of the value of total debt for the portfolio of farms. For such a portfolio with similar 
debt proportions, concentration risk is diversified away as the number of borrowers in the 
portfolio increases, i.e. SDp ^  SDyJp as N  .
Correlation describes the sensitivity of the portfolio to common fundamental factors. In 
large portfolios, systematic risk due to correlation dominates concentration risk. As a numerical 
example, it follows from equation (9) that if the asset return correlation is 10%, the volatility of 
default for a large portfolio of, say, 2,000 borrowers is about 30% of the average farm volatility 
of default.
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The unexpected loss is calculated from the tails of the credit risk distribution by 
determining a level of loss, UL(a), which will be exceeded with a specified probability a. The 
probability a reflects the risk tolerance of the lender. The unexpected loss (expressed as a 
percent of the total debt in the portfolio) is the product of the critical value associated with a 
probability a, N-1(a), the standard deviation of default for the portfolio, and the loss given 
default.3 The dollar value for the unexpected loss per farm equals the percent unexpected loss 
times the exposure at default (the value of farm debt),
(10) UL(a) = N-1(a) (SDP)(LGD)(EAD).
Credit risk is defined using the concepts of expected loss, EL, and unexpected loss, UL. 
The expected loss represents an average historical loss due to the average default rate (equation 
(6)) and is regarded as an anticipated cost of doing business. It is represented by the allowance 
for loan losses on the lender’s balance sheet and is often included as a cost in loan pricing. On 
the other hand, the unexpected loss represents a maximum loss at a desired solvency rate 
(equation (10)). The unexpected loss at the portfolio level reflects the volatility of default over 
time mainly due to correlation among farms in the portfolio. Economic capital is needed to 
cover unexpected losses UL(a) which will be exceeded with a probability a. Credit value-at-risk, 
VaR(l-a), is the sum of the expected loss and the unexpected loss,
(11) VaR(l-a) = EL + UL(a).
The credit VaR represents the total loss that will be exceeded with probability a  and 
therefore the needed total capital to backstop credit risk at a desired solvency rate (1-a).
Asset Return Correlation Model
Asset return correlations are used in calculating portfolio risk (equation (9)) and 
unexpected loss (equation (10)). Higher correlations among farm performances will lead to 
higher unexpected losses. Instead of calculating correlations between asset returns for individual 
borrowers, credit risk studies use factor models (Crouhy, Galai, and Mark). Correlations 
calculated from factor models are associated with lower sampling errors than individual asset 
return correlations and significantly reduce the number of correlations that need to be calculated 
(Crouhy, Galai, and Mark).4 A factor model imposes a structure on the asset return correlations 
and links them to one or more fundamental factors,
(12) r,t = a, + p , rmt + eu for i = 1... N,
where rit is the asset return for farm i at time t, rmt is the asset return at time t for the average 
“market” farm which in this study represents the fundamental factor, a, and p , are the coefficients 
to be estimated, and ei is the idiosyncratic risk factor which is not correlated with the 
fundamental factor or with the idiosyncratic risk factors of other farms. Using statistics
3 Using the normal distribution, the critical values, N-1(a), are 1.64, 2.33, and 2.58 at the 95%, 99%, and 99.5% 
confidence levels, respectively. Larger financial institutions tend to use a solvency rate of 99.97% reflecting a goal 
of an AA rating for the Standard & Poor’s methodology where the mean default rate is 0.03%.
4 For a portfolio with 1000 borrowers (N=1000), the number of different correlations to estimate is N(N-1)/2 = 
499,500. Using a factor model with K factors (in the single index model used in this paper, K=1), the number of 
parameters to be estimated is KN + K(K-1)/2 = 1000.
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formulas, the variance of individual asset returns var(rit), the covariance of asset returns cov(ri t , 
rjt), and correlation of asset returns among farms pij can be represented as
(13) var(rit) = a 2 = p 2 var(rmt) + var(e;),
(14) cov(rit, rjt) = ol} = p, pj var(rmt), and
(15) pj = Oij /  a  a  = Pi Pj var(rmt)/ [stdev(rrt)*stdev (rj t)].
In other words, a factor model represents the correlation among asset returns as the covariance of 
asset returns calculated from the factor model divided by the product of the individual standard 
deviations of the farm asset returns. The average correlation is calculated as the average of the 
individual correlations and used in equation (9).
Two Applied Credit Risk Models
This paper considers credit value-at-risk methodologies utilized by two vendor models. 
CreditMetrics was developed by J.P. Morgan and the KMV model was developed by the KMV 
Corporation, now called Moody’s KMV. Both models use Merton’s asset value model and 
further classify borrowers into several credit quality classes. The advantage of using credit 
quality classes is that the grouping of homogenous borrowers (called granularity) allows for 
more precise estimates of the probability of default and loss given default. The disadvantages of 
using credit quality classes are that the precision of assigning borrowers into different credit 
quality classes is lower and that a large number of observations is needed to obtain statistically 
valid results.
CreditMetrics and the KMV model make different simplifying assumptions regarding 
their credit quality classes. Unlike CreditMetrics which uses data from rating agencies with 
established credit quality classes, KMV uses endogenous models to group borrowers. 
CreditMetrics follows a mark-to-market credit migration approach and is based on migration 
between credit quality classes over time.5 The KMV is based on distance-to-default measures 
and expected default frequencies.
The CreditMetrics Model
CreditMetrics extends Merton’s model to include changes in credit quality. The 
CreditMetrics model is based on a credit migration analysis reflecting the migration of borrowers 
from one credit quality to another credit quality or to default within a given time horizon. The 
model uses a credit rating system, with credit quality classes, and a transition matrix reflecting 
the probabilities of migrating from one credit quality class to another class over time. The rating 
system and transition matrix are either provided by rating agencies such as Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s or developed by some large financial institutions using their own historical 
records. Because farms are not traded and are not rated by rating agencies, agricultural banks 
usually use a credit scoring approach to assign borrowers to credit quality classes (Splett et al.).
In this paper, a credit scoring approach is used to assign farmers into credit quality classes and to 
estimate a transition matrix reflecting the probabilities of migration between credit quality
5 The CreditMetrics approach in this study utilizes the migration concept but does not extend to the market value of 
non-tradable farm debt. In other words, as mentioned earlier, this study follows the loss-based method rather than 
the NPV-based method to analyze credit risk.
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classes over time (Barry, Escalante, and Ellinger). The analysis of Barry, Escalante, and Ellinger 
is extended by assigning farms to a default class if the value of their debt exceeds the value of 
their assets. The probability of default for every credit quality class is calculated as the 
probability of moving from the current credit quality class to the worst credit quality class, 
default. Loss given default and expected and unexpected loss are calculated for every credit 
quality class.
The KMV Model
The KMV model first derives a probability of default for every borrower and then groups 
borrowers into credit quality classes based on their derived probability of default. Using 
Merton’s model, the default process in the KMV model is assumed endogenous and occurs when 
the value of farm assets falls below the value of farm debt.6
A distance-to-default index, DDit, is calculated as the number of standard deviations 
between the mean of the distribution of the asset value and the debt value,
(16) D D A t -  D  
af  ,
where of  is the standard deviation of assets. Although the true values of farm assets change 
continuously over time, the asset values are measured discretely; hence, equation (16) is a 
discrete version of equation (4) (Crouhy, Galai, and Mark). Borrowers are grouped into several 
credit quality classes based on their distance to default. The probability of default (which is also 
called an expected default frequency) can be measured either as the statistical probability of 
default using the normal distribution or as the historical default rate for each credit quality class. 
Loss given default and the expected and unexpected loss are calculated for every credit quality 
class.
Data
Few lenders have reasonable time-series cross-sectional data on their borrowers’ loan 
performance and underwriting variables to be able to estimate credit risk models. Most lenders 
have to match their borrower data with external sources such as rating agencies data and stock 
and bond market data. In agriculture, data histories are short, claims on farms are not traded or 
rated by rating agencies, and the borrowers’ financial data are seldom updated on real estate 
loans. Alternative data sources, thus, are needed to estimate probabilities of default and loss 
given default. In this case, data from farm records (e.g. measures from balance sheets, income 
statements and cash flows) can be used to develop benchmark measures for credit risk models. 
Farm data for a given state or region are useful because a regional agricultural bank or a FCS 
institution would have borrowers with similar farm typology and characteristics.
Farm-level data are obtained from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) 
Association for 1995-2002. Consistent with Ellinger et al., only farms with asset values of at 
least $40,000 and gross farm returns of least $40,000 are included in the analysis. Farms with no
6 The KMV has observed from a sample of corporate firms that actual default occurs when the value of assets 
reaches approximately the value of short-term debt plus half of the value for long-term debt. If the KMV definition 
of default is used, the distance to default will be higher, and therefore, the capital requirements lower. This study 
follows the more conservative Merton’s definition of default.
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debt are excluded from the analysis as they will not be included in a lender’s portfolio. About 
2,000 farm operators are included in the data annually for the 8 years, which leads to 16,049 
farm observations. All these observations are used in subsequent analyses except when a 
specific condition requires a restriction in the sample size (these conditions will be discussed 
later).
Farms in default are defined as those with debt-to-asset ratios greater than one.7 There 
are 91 farms in default for 1995-2002. Compared to less leveraged groups of farms, farms in 
default are clearly in an unfavorable financial condition: they have the lowest net farm income of 
$14,802 and the lowest net worth of -$119,055 (table 1). Ellinger et al. found similar results.
The average farm has $1,054,499 in farm assets and $303,859 in farm debt (table 1).8 A 
debt-to-asset ratio for the average farm of 32.84% is calculated as the average debt-to-asset ratios 
across farms and over time.9 Figure 3 shows that the debt-to-asset ratio varied over the years, 
with the highest ratio occurring in 2001. The average standard deviation of assets was $148,437, 
calculated as the standard deviation for each farm then averaged across all farms. In agriculture, 
the variability in asset values is mostly due to variability in real estate values and agricultural 
income but it also includes deterministic changes such as acquisitions of real estate or machinery 
(often financed with deterministic changes in debt). Including both random changes in asset 
prices and changes in the levels of asset holdings is important because these are the sources of 
changes in asset values observed by lenders in their credit risk assessments. The variability of 
farm assets is used to calculate distance-to-default measures for each farm.
Results for the Portfolio of All Farms
The average probability of default was calculated as the statistical probability of default 
and as the historical default rate. A statistical probability of default was calculated for each farm 
using the properties of the normal distribution and the farm values for assets, debt, and standard 
deviation of assets. An average statistical probability of default of 2.474% was calculated as the 
weighted average of the probability of default for all farms, weighted by the debt for each farm 
(table 2). Because the statistical probability of default often differs from the actual historical 
default rate, credit risk studies often use the latter measure (Crouhy, Galai, and Mark). A 
historical default rate of 0.567% was calculated as the percent farms in default, which equals 91 
farms in default divided by 16,049 farm observations. Lenders, however, prefer to calculate the 
default rate as the percent debt in default (or the proportion of defaulted farms, weighted by farm 
debt), leading to a historical default rate of 0.785%. In figure 4, these default rates are calculated 
for every year in this study.
The loss given default was calculated for each defaulting farm as the percentage shortfall 
of recovered assets below debt using equation (5). An average loss given default of 35.458% 
was calculated as a weighted average loss given default for defaulting farms, with weights being
7 In practice, default could be defined by other values of debt-to-asset ratios, reflecting lenders’ perceptions of 
borrower viability and the costs of foreclosure. A sensitivity analysis is presented in a later section.
8 In this study, the total liabilities of a farm are referred to as debt.
9 The average values of assets and debt imply a debt-to-asset ratio that differs from the average of the debt-to-asset 
ratios.
15
the debt in default (table 2).10 In other words, on average 35.458% of the debt value is lost when 
a farm defaults. A 10% recovery cost for assets in default was assumed in the calculations of 
loss given default, based on Featherstone and Boessen, and Featherstone et al. These recovery 
costs include legal, personnel, property tax, title fees, advertising and other acquisition fees, and 
the time value of money (Featherstone and Boessen). The value of debt used to calculate loss 
given default includes the accrued interest on debt and the estimated accrued tax liability for real 
estate.
Instead of calculating the average loss given default across all years, the average loss 
given default can also be calculated for each year in the study. The median, first and third 
quartiles of loss given default were calculated for every year based on the loss given default for 
individual farms defaulting in that year. Figure 5 shows the average, median, and first and third 
quartiles of loss given default for 1995-2002. The average loss given default was highest in 
2001, similarly to the debt-to-asset statistics.
The expected loss was calculated as the historical (or statistical) default rate times the 
loss given default. Expected losses are 0.278% and 0.877% of the total debt in the portfolio, 
calculated using the historical and statistical default rates, respectively. When these percentages 
are multiplied by the average farm debt, the expected losses are $846 and $2,666 per farm using 
the historical and statistical default rates, respectively (table 2).
An estimate of the correlation of asset returns is needed to determine portfolio risk and 
unexpected loss. Following the theoretical model expressed in equation (1), asset returns are 
defined as the logarithm of end-year assets to beginning-year assets.11 Only farm records with 8 
years of continuous data are used to calculate asset return correlations among farms in the 
portfolio. Therefore, the sample size was restricted from about 2,000 farms a year to 321 farms a 
year (or 8*321=2,568 farm observations). The restriction of sample size was needed to produce 
a reliable estimate for the asset return correlation, however, a survivorship bias was also 
introduced because farms that default and exit farming will not be included in the analysis.
Although, in theory, asset return correlations can be calculated by taking correlations 
among all farms, such procedures are very computationally intensive. Instead, credit risk studies 
use factor models to calculate these correlations. Annual asset returns were calculated for the 
average or “market” farm, by averaging asset returns of the 321 farms for each year. A single 
factor model was estimated by regressing the time-series of asset returns for each farm on the 
time-series of asset returns for the average farm, producing 321 equations to be estimated. The (  
coefficients in the factor model, thus, measure the systematic risk of individual farms as related 
to the risk of the average “market” farm. These (  coefficients range from -4.91 to 10.24 with a 
mean of 1 (by identity) and a standard deviation of 1.6. Correlations among asset returns were 
calculated as the covariance of asset returns calculated from the factor model divided by the 
product of the individual standard deviations of the farm asset returns, according to equation (15) 
. An average correlation of 10.05% was calculated by averaging correlations among all farms.
Using equation (7), the standard deviation of default for a farm was calculated as 8.827% 
and 15.534% using the historical and statistical default rates, respectively (table 2). Using
10 Since loss given default is calculated only for defaulting farms, the sample size for this calculation is the 91 farms 
in default.
11 If asset returns are expressed as the percent change from beginning-year assets to end-year assets, the results 
remain similar.
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equation (9), the standard deviation of default for the portfolio was calculated as 2.799% and 
4.926% of the debt in the portfolio, using the historical and statistical default rates, respectively 
(table 2). The relatively low correlation (10.05%) still implies a substantial reduction in portfolio 
risk of about 30% relative to the average stand-alone risks in the portfolio.
Portfolio risk and loss given default determine the level of unexpected losses, based on a 
given risk tolerance. The unexpected losses were calculated using equation (10). Table 2 shows 
unexpected losses of 2.313% ($7,027 per farm) and 4.07% ($12,366 per farm) using the 
historical and statistical default rates, respectively, which will be exceeded with a=1% 
probability. Agricultural lenders can achieve a desired solvency rate of (1-a) = 99% by holding 
economic capital equal to the unexpected losses calculated above. Higher solvency rates (1-a) 
are associated with higher levels of unexpected losses (and thus higher level of needed economic 
capital). Figure 6 graphically shows the values of expected loss and the unexpected loss if they 
are based on annual data. The figure shows a considerable variation across years and 
demonstrates the importance of calculating expected and unexpected loss using longer time- 
series data.
The value-at-risk, VaR (99%) was calculated as the sum of expected and unexpected loss 
according to equation (11). The VaR (99%) represents a total capital of 2.591% of the total debt 
in the portfolio (or $7,873 per farm) and 4.947% of the total debt in the portfolio (or $15,032 per 
farm) using the historical and statistical default rates, respectively (table 2). This total capital is 
needed to protect against both expected and unexpected losses at a 99% solvency rate. 12
Sensitivity Analyses
This section describes the sensitivity analyses based on different assumptions about the 
definition of default, the distribution of farms in the portfolio, and the correlation among asset 
returns.
Definition o f Default
The models considered in this study assumed Merton’s definition of default, i.e. default 
occurs when the value of debt exceeds the value of assets. Under collateral based lending, 
however, default occurs when the loan value falls below the collateral value even if the borrower 
still has some equity. To test the robustness of previous results, default is now assumed to occur 
when debt exceeds 90% of the assets (while still assuming a 10% recovery cost for assets in 
default). The number of defaults increases to 170 farm observations and the probability of 
default increases to 1.642% of the debt in the portfolio (table 3).13 The loss given default, 
however, drops to 18.761% of the debt value for defaulting farms. The reason for the lower loss 
given default is that more farms are defaulting but they do so at a lower (90%) level of 
indebtedness. The expected loss is 0.308% of the debt in the portfolio or $936 per farm, the 
unexpected loss at the 99% solvency rate is 1.761% or $5,352 per farm, and the total loss or VaR 
at the 99% solvency rate is 2.069% or $6,288 per farm (table 3). These results are similar to the
12 Berkowitz and O ’Brien examined the accuracy of the VaR models by comparing the VaR forecasts with actual 
data on credit risk losses. They found that the VaR estimates tend to be conservative relative to the respective 
percentile of actual losses.
13 The rest of the analyses in this paper use the historical default rate although the statistical probability of default 
can also be used.
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results in the basic case and demonstrate that the Merton’s definition of default is a reasonable 
assumption.
Distribution o f Farms in the Portfolio
The correlation analysis assumed that farms are distributed uniformly in the lender’s 
portfolio with an average weight of wt = 1/N. The assumption of uniform distribution lead to the 
simplification of equation (8) to equation (9), where the average correlation was calculated as the 
simple average of the correlations among farms. Instead of assuming a uniform distribution,
equation (8) can be estimated using the actual farm weights, wi = Dt / ^ ^  Dt , which are the debt
of each farm as a proportion of the total debt in the portfolio. A weighted average correlation of 
10.58% is very similar to the simple average correlation of 10.05% (table 3). Therefore, these 
results show that assuming a uniform distribution of farms is reasonable. Although, from a 
farmer’s perspective, farms differ considerably with respect to their debt values, from a lender’s 
perspective, the value of debt for the most indebted farm in the portfolio did not exceed 2% of 
the total debt in the portfolio. Since agricultural lenders usually do not collect updated financial 
information if the loans are performing as dictated in the loan contract, correlations can be very 
challenging to calculate using only internal loan origination data. This study shows that if 
farmer-borrower data is matched with external farmer data, correlations can be calculated 
assuming a uniform distribution for these farms.
Correlation
An important strength of the methodology used in this paper is the consideration of the 
correlations among farm performances. While the expected losses are the same as the basic case, 
assuming that correlations are zero or one can have significant consequences for the necessary 
economic capital (unexpected losses). The unexpected losses at the 99% solvency rate are 
0.058% or $175 per farm for p=0, 2.313% or $7,027 per farm for p=10.05% (the actual case), 
and 7.293% or $22,160 per farm for p=1 (table 3). Thus, assuming zero correlations would lead 
to an undercapitalization of $6,852 per farm while assuming correlations of one would lead to an 
overcapitalization of $15,133 per farm in achieving a 99% solvency rate for a financial 
institution. These differences in required capital are significant and demonstrate the importance 
of incorporating correlations into credit risk models.
Results for the CreditMetrics and KMV Models
The results presented so far showed expected and unexpected losses for the sample of all 
farms. Agricultural lenders, however, emphasize granularity, i.e. the grouping of homogenous 
borrowers into credit classes, and seek to calculate capital needs for each class. Borrowers are 
grouped into credit classes based on their farm credit values for the CreditMetrics model and 
their distance-to-default for the KMV model. After these classes are determined and the 
probability of default is calculated, the calculations of expected and unexpected losses for each 
class follow the previously presented methodology.
The CreditMetrics model is based on migration analysis, where farmers migrate from one 
credit quality class to another credit quality class next year. Only farms with records available 
for two consecutive years were included in the migration analysis which reduced the sample size 
to 9,834 observations for 1995-2002. Credit quality classes were based on credit scoring values, 
consistent with banks’ current evaluation practices for farmers’ credit worthiness (Splett et al.).
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Five credit score classes were formed based on weighted measures of liquidity, solvency, 
profitability, repayment capacity, and financial efficiency (for more detail, see Splett et al.). The 
migration analysis in Barry, Escalante, and Ellinger is extended by adding a default class for 
farms with debt-to-asset ratio greater than 1. A migration matrix was estimated showing the 
migration of farmers from one credit quality class to another credit quality or default next year 
(table 4). The probability of default was calculated as the debt value for defaulted farms over the 
debt value for all farms starting in a given credit class. The results show that farms starting in 
credit class 1 have a probability of default of 0%, while farms starting in the worst credit class 5 
have a probability of default of 0.96% (table 4). These estimates of the probability of default 
were repeated in table 5 and used in the calculations of expected and unexpected loss for each 
credit class following the previously presented methodology. Table 5 shows the probability of 
default, loss given default, and the expected and unexpected loss by credit score class. The 
expected loss ranges from 0% of the portfolio debt for the best credit quality class to 0.428% for 
the worst credit quality class. The unexpected loss ranges from 0% of the portfolio debt for the 
best credit quality class to 3.226% for the worst credit quality class.
The KMV model is based on distance-to-default measures which reflect how far a farm is 
away from default, in other words, how many standard deviations assets are above debt (equation 
(16)). The farmers were grouped in classes based on their distances to default. In this study, 
groups are formed based on whether a farm is less than 0.1, between 0.1 and 1, between 1 and 2, 
and more than 2 standard deviations away from default.14 After the farms are classified based on 
their distances to default, the probability of default, loss given default, and the expected and 
unexpected loss are calculated for each distance-to-default class following the previous presented 
methodology. Farms that are at least 2 standard deviations away from default have a probability 
of default of 0.085% while farms that are less than 0.1 standard deviations away from default 
have a probability of default of 7.72% (table 6). The expected loss ranges from 0.02% for the 
best credit quality class to 3.017% for the worst credit quality class. The unexpected loss ranges 
from 0.516% for the best credit quality class to 7.736% for the worst credit quality class.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, credit risk models and farm-level data were used to estimate economic 
capital needed to protect against unexpected losses and allowances for losses needed to cover 
expected losses for agricultural lenders under the New Basel Capital Accord. The theoretical 
models combined Merton’s option pricing approach and credit value-at-risk methodologies.
These models are estimated for the portfolio of farms and then by grouping farms into different 
credit quality classes using CreditMetrics and the KMV.
Using farm financial data from Illinois, the expected losses on farm debt were calculated 
as 0.785% and 2.474% using the historical default rate and the statistical probability of default, 
respectively. The unexpected losses, which together with the expected losses will be exceeded 
with a 1% probability, were calculated as 2.313% and 4.07% using the historical default rate and 
the statistical probability of default. Sensitivity analyses were performed with different 
assumptions about the default definition, the distribution of farms, and the correlation among 
farm asset returns. Finally, the results from CreditMetrics and KMV models show that 
probabilities of default and expected and unexpected losses vary considerably from class to class. 
An important goal of the New Basel Accord is to increase the granularity of the risk ratings and *19
14 The New Basel Accord does not set the thresholds for these classes, therefore, financial institutions or other 
studies can pick their own thresholds for the distances-to-default classes.
19
to more closely relate these ratings and risk measures to the economic capital needs of financial 
institutions. Agricultural lenders could also extend the analysis presented in this paper to address 
capital needs for operating versus real estate loans by calculating default rates and loss given 
default for the two types of loans.
The New Basel Accord and the modern approaches to the measurement, modeling, and 
management of credit risks allow financial institutions to determine capital requirements based 
on the riskiness of their loan portfolios. However, most agricultural lenders lack a sufficient 
history of longitudinal borrower data. Long data histories are crucial because farm financial 
performance and correlation among farms vary over business cycles. Agricultural lenders can 
also match their borrower data with other existing databases of farmers based on geographical 
location and farm typology. At present, it is likely that historic series of farm-level data are 
easier to compile by universities or the government and are more readily available than loan- 
level performance data. Several high quality databases of farm-level data, such as the 
Agricultural and Resource Management Study data compiled by USDA, the Kansas State 
University farm record system, and the Illinois FBFM data used in this study, already exist and 
are used extensively for research analyses. Better data record gathering and keeping and 
evaluation of the riskiness of the loan portfolio will result in better estimation of the solvency of 
financial institutions. Over time, it is anticipated that larger institutions can compile more 
comprehensive data histories, although their risk measures will still need to be compared to those 
of peer institutions, rating agencies, and business performance systems.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Debt-to-Asset Number of Net Farm 
Groups Farm Obs. Income
Net Worth Assets Debt
D/A<0.2 5,192 $51,503 $1,123,387 $1,240,690 $117,303
0.2<D/A<0.4 5,299 $45,118 $762,359 $1,082,577 $320,218
0.4<D/A<0.7 4,745 $34,699 $441,169 $903,577 $462,408
0.7<D/A<1 722 $16,796 $127,626 $596,235 $468,609
D/A>1 a 91 $14,802 -$119,055 $301,824 $420,879
All Farms b 16,049 $42,657 $750,640 $1,054,499 $303,859
Notes: a Farms with D/A>1 are farms in default.
b The last row represents results for the average farm.
Table 2. Expected and Unexpected Losses for the Portfolio of Farms
Using Historical Using Statistical
Default Rate Probability of
Default
Probability of Default 0.785% 2.474%
Loss Given Default 35.458% 35.458%
Asset Return Correlation 10.050% 10.050%
St. Dev. of Default for a Farm 8.827% 15.534%
St. Dev. of Default for the Portfolio 2.799% 4.926%
Expected Loss a 0.278% 0.877%
$846 $2,666
Unexpected Loss (5%) b 1.628% 2.865%
$4,946 $8,704
Unexpected Loss (1%) b 2.313% 4.070%
$7,027 $12,366
Unexpected Loss (0.5%) b 2.561% 4.506%
$7,781 $13,693
Value-at-Risk (95%) c 1.906% 3.742%
$5,792 $11,370
Value-at-Risk (99%) c 2.591% 4.947%
$7,873 $15,032
Value-at-Risk (99.5%) c 2.839% 5.384%
$8,627 $16,359
Number of Farms in Default 91 91
Number of Farm Observations 16,049 16,049
Notes: a Losses are expressed as a percent of the total debt in the portfolio and as a dollar value per farm. 
b The unexpected losses will exceed UL(a) with a probability a.
c Value-at-Risk (VaR) is the sum of expected and unexpected losses. The VaR(1-a) represents the total capital 
needed to protect against both expected and unexpected losses at a (1- a ) solvency rate.
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Table 3. Sensitivity Analyses
Basic Default if Actual Correl = Correl =
Model a debt>
0.9*assets
farm
weights
0 1
Prob. of Default 0.785% 1.642% 0.785% 0.785% 0.785%
Loss Given Default 35.458% 18.761% 35.458% 35.458% 35.458%
Asset Return Correlation 10.050% 10.050% 10.580% 0.000% 100.000%
St. Dev. of Default for a 
Farm
8.827% 12.707% 8.827% 8.827% 8.827%
St. Dev. of Default for the 
Portfolio
2.799% 4.029% 2.871% 0.070% 8.827%
Expected Loss b 0.278% 0.308% 0.278% 0.278% 0.278%
$846 $936 $846 $846 $846
Unexpected Loss (5%) c 1.628% 1.240% 1.670% 0.041% 5.133%
$4,946 $3,767 $5,073 $123 $15,598
Unexpected Loss (1%) c 2.313% 1.761% 2.372% 0.058% 7.293%
$7,027 $5,352 $7,208 $175 $22,160
Unexpected Loss (0.5%) c 2.561% 1.950% 2.627% 0.064% 8.075%
$7,781 $5,926 $7,981 $194 $24,538
Value-at-Risk (95%) d 1.906% 1.548% 1.948% 0.319% 5.412%
$5,792 $4,703 $5,920 $969 $16,444
Value-at-Risk (99%) d 2.591% 2.069% 2.651% 0.336% 7.571%
$7,873 $6,288 $8,054 $1,021 $23,006
Value-at-Risk (99.5%) d 2.839% 2.258% 2.905% 0.342% 8.354%
$8,627 $6,862 $8,828 $1,040 $25,384
No. Farms in Default 91 170 91 91 91
No. of Farm Obs. 16,049 16,049 16,049 16,049 16,049
Notes: a The basic model is the same as the model using the historical default rate in table 2. 
b Losses are expressed as a percent of the total debt in the portfolio and as a dollar value per farm. 
c The unexpected losses will exceed UL(a) with a probability a.
d Value-at-Risk (VaR) is the sum of expected and unexpected losses. The VaR(1-a) represents the total capital 
needed to protect against both expected and unexpected losses at a (1- a ) solvency rate.
Table 4. Credit Score Migration Matrix (Used in the CreditMetrics Model) a b
Credit Rating Next Year
Current
Year
Credit
Score
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Default No.
of
Farm
Obs.
No. of 
Farms in 
Default
Class 1 54.70% 28.78% 12.39% 3.66% 0.46% 0.00% 2,732 0
Class 2 10.53% 41.01% 30.61% 13.83% 3.99% 0.03% 2,349 1
Class 3 3.14% 17.98% 38.95% 24.49% 15.03% 0.42% 2,444 9
Class 4 1.17% 12.51% 28.89% 32.88% 23.67% 0.89% 1,429 9
Class 5 0.07% 4.05% 20.48% 22.02% 52.42% 0.96% 880 10
Notes: a Classes are defined based on credit score values.
b The migration matrix shows the probabilities of migrating from class i in year t to class j  or default in year (t+1).
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Table 5. The CreditMetrics Model
Credit
Score
Classesa
No. of
Farm
Obs.
No. of 
Farms in 
Default
Prob. of 
Default b
Loss
Given
Default
Expected
Loss c
Unexpected 
Loss (1%) c,d
VaR
(99%) e
Class 1 2,732 0 0.000% - 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Class 2 2,349 1 0.030% 50.700% 0.015% 0.655% 0.671%
Class 3 2,444 9 0.421% 15.689% 0.066% 0.752% 0.818%
Class 4 1,429 9 0.888% 15.497% 0.138% 1.077% 1.215%
Class 5 880 10 0.960% 44.565% 0.428% 3.226% 3.654%
Notes: a Each farm is assigned into a class based on the value of its credit score. 
b The probability of default comes from the migration analysis in table 4. 
c Losses are expressed as a percent of the total debt in the portfolio. 
d The unexpected losses will exceed UL(a) with a probability a.
e Value-at-Risk (VaR) is the sum of expected and unexpected losses. The VaR(1-a) represents the total capital 
needed to protect against both expected and unexpected losses at a (1- a ) solvency rate.
Table 6. The KMV Model
Distance- 
to-Default 
Classes a
No. of
Farm
Obs.
No. of 
Farms in 
Default
Prob. of 
Default
Loss
Given
Default
Expected
Loss b
Unexpected 
Loss (1%) b,c
VaR
(99%) d
DD>2 12,545 3 0.085% 23.990% 0.020% 0.516% 0.536%
1<DD<2 1,608 5 0.340% 51.640% 0.176% 2.228% 2.403%
0.1<DD<1 802 12 2.524% 20.760% 0.524% 2.419% 2.943%
DD<0.1 1,094 71 7.720% 39.080% 3.017% 7.736% 10.753%
Notes: a Each farm is assigned into a class based on its value of distance-to-default. 
b Losses are expressed as a percent of the total debt in the portfolio. 
c The unexpected losses will exceed UL(a) with a probability a.
d Value-at-Risk (VaR) is the sum of expected and unexpected losses. The VaR(1-a) represents the total capital 
needed to protect against both expected and unexpected losses at a (1- a ) solvency rate.
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Figure 1. Probability Distribution of Asset Values and Distance-to-Default
Figure 2. Effects of Number of Farms and Correlation on Portfolio Risk
Number of Farms
Portfolio risk is the standard deviation of default for a portfolio of farms. Portfolio risk is a 
function of the number of farms in the portfolio and the asset return correlation among farms.
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Figure 3. Average Farm Debt and Assets and Debt-to-Asset Ratios
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Figure 4. Default Rates
26
Figure 5. Loss Given Default for Farm Debt
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Figure 6. Expected and Unexpected Losses
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Adapting Credit Risk Models to Agriculture
Abstract
A framework is identified for modeling credit risk in agriculture. A CreditRisk+ type 
model is deemed most suitable for agricultural lending. The CreditRisk+ model is modified to 
overcome its drawbacks by incorporating recent research that accounts for sector correlations and 
uses a more stable and accurate algorithm. The model is applied to AgStar Financial Services, 
ACA, a cooperative agricultural lender, in order to determine how such a lender may adapt this 
model for portfolio risk analysis and to make capital and portfolio management decisions. The 
model generates a loan loss distribution, which is used to derive the lender’s expected and 
unexpected losses for the overall portfolio and individual loans. The model shows that AgStar is 
more than adequately capitalized based on the parameters estimated using 1997-2002 data. Since 
AgStar’s capital position is lower than that of most other associations, this raises the issue of 
overcapitalization within the Farm Credit System.
Key words: agricultural credit, value-at-risk, credit risk models, economic capital, portfolio risk 
analysis, capital adequacy, portfolio management.
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Introduction
Applications of the modern portfolio management tools and concepts to agriculture are 
necessitated by overcapitalization and the need for better portfolio management in agricultural 
lending. Currently, the ratios of equity capital to assets for the combined Farm Credit System 
(FCS) banks and associations are well above minimum requirements, 15.25% at year-end 2000 
(Barry, 2001, p. 116). High capital ratios reflect the Farm Credit System's orientation on safety in 
recovering from the stress of 1980s but do not represent clearly established targets or calibration 
of risk tolerances (Barry, 2001).
The new credit risk models allow portfolio managers to quantify risk at both the portfolio 
and individual loan contributory level, which was not possible before. The models are used to 
estimate a lender’s probability density function for credit losses and to derive the amount of 
capital needed to support a lender’s losses. Thus, they offer a more informed setting of limits and 
reserves and a more consistent basis for economic capital allocation. These models may help 
agricultural lenders identify more risk efficient levels of economic capital.
Agricultural lenders are limited in their opportunity to simply apply the sophisticated credit 
models that have been developed for large commercial banks. Data limitations presents a bigger 
problem for FCS institutions than for commercial banks, which can use comparable historical data 
collected by ratings agencies such as Moody’s (Carty and Lieberman) or Standard & Poor’s 
(Brand and Bahar). They cannot rely on access to financial market data (stock prices, external 
credit ratings, historic default rates and volatility measures, or other market information published 
by rating agencies) from which to assess client risk. Rather, they must find ways to adapt the 
principles of these models to manage their loan portfolios. Besides these data issues, agricultural 
lenders must insure that credit model assumptions and conceptual approaches are appropriate for 
modeling credit risk in agriculture. Credit models have not been adapted to agricultural lending at 
this point because they are relatively new and quite technical; so they are not easily accessible to 
many practitioners, such as associations in the Farm Credit System. Agricultural lenders tend to 
fall behind their commercial counterparts in the level of sophistication of portfolio management 
tools. They do not have as many resources for developing rigorous models as commercial banks 
because they are smaller institutions, and also because they reduced personnel in response to the 
crisis of 1980s to minimize costs.
In an effort to adapt credit risk tools to agricultural lending, this study has the following 
objectives:
1. To identify a credit risk model suitable for agricultural lenders.
2. To provide guidance to agricultural lenders on using the model to evaluate capital
adequacy and to make portfolio management decisions.
The first objective includes examining the underlying assumptions and data needs of the 
existing credit risk models to analyze if they are suitable for modeling credit risk in agriculture. 
The most appropriate methodology is modified to adapt it to agricultural lending.
The second objective involves the application of the model to a representative Farm Credit 
System association, AgStar Financial Services, ACA. This objective includes appropriate 
parameterization of the model based on historical data consistently with the regulatory guidelines 
of the New Basel Capital Accord. The results show how an agricultural lender may adapt this 
model to evaluate capital adequacy and to conduct portfolio risk analysis.
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Loan Loss Characteristics
Lenders hold capital to protect themselves from the risks arising from their portfolios. 
Lenders distinguish three different types of capital: book capital, regulatory capital, and economic 
capital. Book capital consists of shareholders' equity and retained earnings. Regulatory capital 
refers to the capital requirement under the Basel Capital Accord. Economic capital is defined in 
terms of the risk of the assets, both on-balance-sheet and off-balance sheet. It is a measure of the 
financial resources required to meet unexpected losses over a given period (usually one year) with 
a given confidence level, such as 99.5%.
Economic capital is to cushion unexpected losses due the overall risks of conducting 
business, which are usually categorized into credit, market and operational risks. Credit risk, the 
focus of this paper, is the primary source of risk for a lender. It is the risk of loss from borrower 
defaults. Credit risk includes borrower's creditworthiness, transaction structure, loan maturity, and 
concentration risk. Market risk occurs due to possible losses in market values of assets. 
Operational risk results from internal processes, people and systems or from external events such 
as legal risk, computer failures, fraud, poor monitoring. Operational risk is often defined very 
broadly, encompassing all risks that are not incorporated into credit or market risks. Most lending 
institutions compute total economic capital as a summation of economic capital allocations for 
each type of risk.
Figure 1: Probability Density Function of Loan Losses
This study focuses on estimating the distribution of portfolio loan losses due to credit risk. 
A loan loss distribution is pictured in Figure 1. It is characterized by a fat tail on the right, since 
low losses have a lower bound of zero, but large losses may occur with low probabilities.
Expected losses are long-run average losses; thus, they are accounted for in loan pricing 
and covered by the loan loss reserve (often referred to as allowance for loan losses). They are 
associated with the mean of the loan loss distribution pictured on Figure 1. The key risk 
characteristics (inputs) of expected loss (EL) are the probability of default (PD), loss given default 
(LGD), exposure at default (EAD), and time horizon. The expected loss of a loan can be 
calculated as the exposure at default adjusted for probability of default and loss given default, i.e.
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EL = PD * LGD * EAD. Probability of default is the probability that a loss will occur over a 
given horizon. Loss given default is net of the recovery of losses in case of default. Both PD and 
LGD are usually represented in percentage terms. Exposure at default is the unpaid amount of 
loan at the time of default. The expected loss of a loan portfolio is equal to the sum of the 
expected losses of individual loans in the portfolio.
Unexpected losses are the maximum potential loss at a given level of confidence, usually 
99 to 99.99 percent. One hundred minus the confidence level is often referred to as the insolvency 
rate. Unexpected losses are not accounted for in pricing, and they require economic capital to 
cover the loss with the target insolvency rate. Economic capital (see Figure 1) is the selected tail 
percentile representing total amount of risk finds (often referred to as Value-at-Risk) less the 
expected losses covered by the loan loss reserve.
Extreme losses are associated with the area under the loss curve above the 99 to 99.99% 
level of confidence (see Figure 1). Events falling into this area happen so rarely that it is too 
costly to hold capital to insure against them.
The probability density functions (PDF) of loan losses for the whole portfolio vary among 
different portfolios, but they “tend to be highly skewed and leptokurtic” (Ong, p. 163). The shape 
of portfolio PDF is dependent on the portfolio composition: loan default probabilities, relative 
loan sizes, correlations of default between loans, and concentration by industry. Unexpected 
losses of a portfolio are a lot smaller than the sum of the individual unexpected losses because of 
diversification effects (low or negative correlation among unexpected defaults of different 
borrowers). Only a portion of each loan's unexpected loss contributes to the portfolio's total 
unexpected loss. The incremental risk that a single loan contributes to the portfolio is called the 
risk contribution. It depends on the correlation of default of a given loan with other loans and 
represents undiversified risk of a loan in the portfolio.
Basel Capital Accord
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is proposing to introduce new risk-based 
requirements for internationally active and other significant banks by the end of 2006. These will 
replace the relatively risk-invariant requirements in the current Accord. Lenders will be allowed 
to choose between the standardized approach and the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach, 
which can be either a "foundation" or "advanced" approach in the case of credit risk. Under the 
standardized approach, the previous uniform 100% risk weight for private obligors has been 
replaced by four weightings: 20%, 50%, 100%, and 150%, depending on the obligor’s risk rating. 
Under the foundation IRB approach, a bank develops its own PD for each borrower and relies on 
supervisory rules for the estimation of other risk components, LGD and EAD, which are calibrated 
using fairly conservative assumptions and historical data in commercial lending. Under the 
advanced IRB approach, bank develops its own estimates of PD, LGD, and EAD.
Model Selection
In the financial world, the four most prominent credit risk models are Portfolio Manager 
(KMV Corporation, released in 1993), CreditMetrics (RiskMetrics Group of J.P. Morgan, released 
in 1997), CreditRisk+ (Credit Suisse Financial Products, released in 1997), and 
CreditPortfolioView (McKinsey and Company, released in 1998). Table 1 shows the brief 
comparison of the models.
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Table 1: Summary of Major Credit Risk Models
Portfolio
Manager
Credit
Metrics
CreditPortfolio
View
Credit
Risk+
Approach Option-based Option-based Econometric Actuarial
Definition 
of risk
MTM or DM MTM MTM or DM DM
Risk
drivers
Asset values Asset values Macro factors Expected 
default rates
Data needs Asset values, 
asset value 
volatilities
Credit spreads, 
yields for risk 
ratings, asset 
value volatilities
Economic factors 
driving default rates, 
borrower sensitivities 
to economic factors
Default rates, 
default rate 
volatilities
Correlation 
of credit 
events
Multivariate 
normal asset 
returns
Multivariate 
normal asset 
returns
Factor loadings Correlation 
with expected 
default rate
Recent studies conclude that the models described above are similar in the underlying structure 
and produce almost identical results when they are parameterized consistently and the models are 
correctly specified (Koyluoglu and Hickman; Gordy (2000); Finger).
Based on agricultural loan data availability and the ability to satisfy model assumptions, 
CreditRisk+ is the most appropriate model for agriculture. Compared to other credit risk models, 
CreditRisk+ also has advantages of requiring relatively few inputs and being relatively easy to 
implement and computationally attractive (Crouhy et al., p.113).
CreditRisk+ Overview
Credit Suisse Financial Products' (CSFP) model CreditRisk+1 is based on the insurance 
approach that uses mortality analysis to model a sudden event of borrower default. No 
assumptions are made about the cause of default. Credit defaults occur as a sequence of events in 
such a way that it is not possible to forecast the exact time of any one default nor the exact total 
number of defaults. Default is modeled as a continuous random variable with a probability 
distribution. Default correlations in CreditRisk+ model are caused by background factors, such as 
the state of economy, which change the rates of default. Background factors may cause the 
incidences of default to be correlated, even though there is no causal link between them. Because 
the risk of default is assumed to fit certain distribution, it is possible to calculate the distribution of 
portfolio losses analytically.
1 CreditRisk+ is a trademark of Credit Suisse Financial Products, a subsidiary of Credit Suisse First Boston. 
CreditRisk+ methodology is freely released to the public. CSFP’s Internet site contains the technical document 
(CSFP) and a spreadsheet implementation of the model able to handle up to 4,000 exposures and 8 sectors.
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Figure 2: Model Structure
Figure 2 shows a brief overview of the model structure. The model inputs are exposures, 
default rates and their volatilities, and correlations of default between sectors (defined as industries 
in this study). The model inputs are exposures, default rates and their volatilities, and correlations 
of default between sectors (defined as industries in this study).
Since the release of the original model in 1997, several studies addressed various 
shortcomings of the model. Modifying the mathematical components of the model allows one to 
enhance the model to overcome its limitations while remaining within an analytical approach of 
the original model. This study improves the original CreditRisk+ model in two ways: by using an 
alternative algorithm that is more accurate, stable, and robust (according to Gordy, 2002), and by 
accounting for correlations between sectors (according to B* rgisser et. al).
Model Parameterization
AgStar Financial Services, ACA (Agricultural Credit Association) is a member-owned 
cooperative that provides credit and credit-related services to eligible shareholders for qualified 
agricultural purposes. After a recent merger with Farm Credit Services of Northwest Wisconsin, 
AgStar's assets are $2.3 billion, and the number of clients is approximately 15,000. AgStar 
operates in 69 counties in Minnesota and northwest Wisconsin.
Capital is the equity or ownership of stockholders in the assets of the institution. Capital in 
associations is derived from two primary sources -  investments by borrowers and retained 
earnings from operations. AgStar is well capitalized. On December 31, 2002, AgStar’s 
permanent capital ratio (permanent capital divided by risk-weighted assets) was 12.1%, much 
greater than the required minimum of 7% (AgStar Financial Services, ACA). "Permanent capital" 
is defined as at-risk stock and surplus capital (retained earnings). AgStar’s high capital ratios are 
lower than those of most other Farm Credit System lenders. For example, permanent capital ratios 
among the associations in the FCS Seventh district ranged from 11.8% to 34.4% and averaged 
14.7% at December 31, 2002 (AgriBank, FCB and the Seventh District Associations).
AgStar’s annual year-end data for 12/31/1997 -  12/31/2002 is used for deriving model 
parameters. The data is used to estimate economic capital requirements in 2003. The data
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includes various borrower, loan, and lease information. Loans and leases are collectively referred 
to as “loans” in the study.
Most of the parameters required by the model are the parameters required for the Internal 
Ratings-Based approach in the New Capital Accord. Basel recommendations for the IRB 
foundation approach for corporate exposures are used as guidance for the parameters where 
historical data is insufficient to provide precise parameter estimates.
Default Probabilities and Their Volatilities
Since a client's risk-rating grade represents his default probability, default probabilities and 
their deviations are calculated for each risk rating. Risk ratings range from highest quality (1) to 
loss (9). Acceptable risk ratings are 1 to 4, 5 is special mention, 6 to 8 are unacceptable ratings, 
and 9 is loss.
The New Capital Accord requires than all loans have a borrower risk rating assigned. 
However, AgStar currently does not require borrower risk ratings for clients with small loans. To 
insure that all loans have a risk rating, risk ratings are assigned to loans as follows: For the loans 
that have both customer risk rating and loan risk rating, customer risk rating is used (for 77.6% of 
loan volume). For the loans without customer-level risk rating, loan risk rating is used to 
approximate the borrower’s probability of default (for 13.3% of loan volume). For the loans 
without customer and loan risk rating, the credit score is mapped into a risk rating using AgStar’s 
guidelines (for 8.5% of loan volume). Finally, for the loans without any kind of risk rating or 
credit score, a risk rating of 3 is used, which assumes that these loans are of acceptable quality (for 
0.5% of loan volume). This is consistent with AgStar practices when non-rated loans are assigned 
to Acceptable-3 classification (Wilberding, 1999).
The IRB approach in the New Capital Accord requires that “A bank must estimate a one- 
year probability of default for each of its internal rating grades” (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, §270). Estimates of PD must represent a conservative view of a long-run average 
PD. AgStar’ s data is sufficient to satisfy Basel’s requirement of the minimum of 5 years of 
historical observations to estimate probability of default.
Table 2: Actual and Fitted Default Probabilities and Their Standard Deviations by Risk Rating
Risk Rating PD Historical St. Dev. Historical PD SmoothedSt. Dev. of PD Smoothed
1 0.118% 0.072% 0.169% 0.127%
2 0.518% 0.414% 0.386% 0.269%
3 0.974% 0.895% 0.884% 0.572%
4 2.037% 1.053% 2.021% 1.214%
5 4.985% 2.663% 4.621% 2.578%
6 11.925% 4.583% 10.567% 5.473%
7 19.073% 11.351% 24.167% 11.620%
8 100.000% 0.000% 100.000% 0.000%
9 100.000% 0.000% 100.000% 0.000%
Mean (Rated) 1.529% 0.523%
Mean (Total) 1.224% 0.373%
Mean (Non-rated) 0.983% 0.685%
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Using historical data series to calculate probabilities of default may be difficult, since 
annual frequency of observations does not allow for long time series. There may not be any 
defaults among obligors of high quality even in large samples. A zero default probability cannot 
be deduced from the fact that no defaults have been observed. A good way to estimate default 
probability for the risk ratings of highest quality that may not have any defaults in the sample and 
to smooth the estimates is to assume that default probability is a function of a risk rating. Default 
probabilities increase exponentially with the increase in risk ratings. This is a clue that a 
logarithmic transformation of the default probability is needed to fit a linear regression. After 
fitting OLS regression using the logarithm of PD as a response variable and risk rating as a 
predictor2, an exponential function is estimated that is used to calculate smoothed default 
probabilities: Ln(PD) = -7.211+0.827 * Risk Rating. The smoothed values are reported in Table 
2. Customers in risk ratings 8 and 9 are assigned default probability of 100% because all 
customers in these risk ratings are in default.
Default Rate Volatility
In Column 3 (Table 2) we report historical standard deviations of default rates. Standard 
deviations of default rates are modeled as a function of risk ratings. Standard deviations increase 
exponentially with risk ratings, similar to default probabilities. OLS regression is used to estimate 
the function: Ln(StDevPD) = -7.422 + 0.753 * Risk Rating.3
Risk Migration
The effect of risk migrations is included into the estimates of default rates and their 
volatilities.
Table 3: Average Annual Migration of Borrower Risk Ratings from 1997 to 2002
Rating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 89.39% 6.05% 3.03% 1.22% 0.18% 0.05% 0.07%
2 2.88% 87.54% 6.22% 2.66% 0.37% 0.24% 0.08%
3 1.27% 4.16% 83.85% 8.01% 1.66% 0.68% 0.37%
4 0.38% 1 .3 6% 5.21% 86.12% 4.54% 1.11% 1.26%
5 0.30% 0.35% 3.97% 12.76% 74.17% 4.01% 4.44%
6 0.33% 1.36% 9.53% 2.25% 82.08% 4.46%
7
8 
9
0.20% 5.57% 1.07% 3.72% 89.45%
Average historical risk-rating migrations are calculated based on annual AgStar's 
migrations in 1997-1998 through 2001-2002 (see Table 3). The first column shows customer risk 
rating in the beginning of the year. The other columns show the percentage of borrowers in each 
risk rating for the year-end. Only the customers that are not in default both in the beginning and
2 There are no outliers, influential observations, or problems with heteroscedasticity. The regression has a very good 
fit with R-square of 0.98.
3 There are no outliers, influential observations, or problems with heteroscedasticity. The regression has a very good 
fit with R-square of 0.95.
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the end of year are included in the migrations. Defaulted customers are already accounted for in 
the calculations of default rates and their volatilities.
Since past risk rating migration patterns are expected to continue in the future, 
probabilities of default and their standard deviations are adjusted by migrations. Default 
probability adjusted for migration is the sum of fitted default probabilities for the risk ratings (see 
Table 2) weighted by the percentages of clients in the risk ratings at the end of the period (Table 
3). For example, adjusted default probability for risk rating 1 is 0.169% * 0.8939 + 0.386% * 
0.0605+ 0.884% * 0.0303 + 2.021% * 0.0122 + 4.621% * 0.018 + 10.567% * 0.005 + 24.167% * 
0.007 = 0.257%. Default rate volatilities are adjusted in the same way.
Table 4: Probabilities of Default and their Standard Deviations Adjusted for Migrations and Used 
in the Model
Risk Rating PD Adj. St. Dev. Adj. PD Used St. Dev. Used
1 0.257% 0.178% 0.25% 0.25%
2 0.514% 0.340% 0.50% 0.40%
3 1.158% 0.712% 1.50% 1.00%
4 2.440% 1.404% 2.25% 1.50%
5 5.218% 2.826% 5.25% 3.00%
6 10.061% 5.192% 10.00% 5.00%
7 22.173% 10.693% 25.00% 10.00%
8 100.000% 0.000% 100.00% 0.00%
9 100.000% 0.000% 100.00% 0.00%
Adjusted probabilities of default and their volatilities are rounded for easier readability by 
model users (see Columns 4 and 5 in Table 4). Rounded default probabilities and their deviations 
are used as an input for the model.
Loss Given Default
Because of insufficient internal data to estimate LGD, the LGD rates in this study are 
based on the preliminary information from the Farm Credit System President’s Commission on 
Credit Risk that adapts the New Basel Capital Accord to agricultural lending (Anderson). There 
are four different LGD grades (see Table 5). When AgStar assigns LGD ratings to all of its loans 
in the future, internally assigned LGD ratings should be used in the model to provide consistency 
between the parameters used for regulatory purposes and the model. In this study, the assignment 
of loans to LGD ratings is done in accordance with Farm Credit System proposed guidelines. The 
assignments are sufficiently conservative to reflect the risks of collateral volatility and exposure 
volatility.
Table 5: Loss Given Default Rates
LGD % Loss
Rating Given Default
1 3.00%
2 20.00%
3 50.00%
4 75.00%
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LGD rating 1 is assigned to loans guaranteed by government agencies and to loans 
protected by credit derivatives. Loans with collateral-to-loan ratio over 150% are also included in 
this category. LGD rating 2 is assigned to loans with collateral-to-loan ratio between 100% and 
150%. Leases are also included in this category since the leased assets are returned to the lender 
in the event of default. LGD rating 3 is assigned to loans with collateral-to-loan ratio between 
50% and 100%. Short-term and intermediate-term loans without collateral information are also 
included in this category (unless they have LGD rating of 1 or 2). AgStar’s database contains 
collateral information on these types of loans only if they are adversely classified, even though 
many loans of these types have ample collateral. Placing these loans in LGD rating 3 is viewed as 
a reasonably conservative assumption. LGD rating 4 is assigned to unsecured loans and to loans 
with collateral-to-loan ratios below 50%. In assigning LGD grades, collateral-to-loan ratios 
include the unfunded commitment.
Sector Analysis
Sectors usually represent industry/geographic region combinations in credit risk models. 
Since most of AgStar's portfolio is regionally concentrated in southern Minnesota and western 
Wisconsin, borrowers' industries are assumed to have the most impact on portfolio diversification. 
Consistent with AgStar internal practices and to insure that there is an adequate number of 
borrowers in each industry to estimate default probabilities by industry, customers are assigned to 
the following industries: crops (mostly corn and soybeans), general farms (primarily crop and this 
industry assigned by default to small loans), dairy, swine, other livestock (primarily cattle and 
poultry), landlord, rural residence, others (customers without an industry specified, agricultural 
businesses, and agricultural services). Correlations between industry default rates are estimated 
based on AgStar's historical data on default rates per industry over 1998-2002 (see Table 6).
Table 6: Correlations of Default Between Industries in AgStar Data
Crops Dairy Swine OtherLvst Landlord GenFarms RuralRes Others
Crops 1.00 0.67 0.70 0.96 0.39 0.04 -0.80 -0.38
Dairy 0.67 1.00 0.27 0.82 -0.29 -0.03 -0.61 -0.31
Swine 0.70 0.27 1.00 0.66 0.25 -0.41 -0.52 -0.73
OtherLvst 0.96 0.82 0.66 1.00 0.13 -0.12 -0.86 -0.51
Landlord 0.39 -0.29 0.25 0.13 1.00 0.60 -0.01 0.39
GenFarms 0.04 -0.03 -0.41 -0.12 0.60 1.00 0.39 0.90
RuralRes -0.80 -0.61 -0.52 -0.86 -0.01 0.39 1.00 0.63
Others -0.38 -0.31 -0.73 -0.51 0.39 0.90 0.63 1.00
Based on the correlation structure, there appears to be two independent groups of 
industries. The first group represents the traditional farm economy and includes crops, dairy, 
swine, and other livestock. Defaults in these industries are positively correlated. The second 
group represents the general economy and includes rural residence, general farms (industry 
assigned by default to small loans usually given to part-time farmers), and others. Default 
probabilities across these industries are also positively correlated. Default probabilities are 
negatively correlated between the “traditional farm” industries and the “general economy” 
industries. Defaults in the landlord industry are somewhat correlated with some of the both 
traditional farm industries and the general economy industries. The landlord industry is correlated 
with crops, general farms, and "others" industry. This is an expected result, since landlords
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usually receive most of their income from renting land to crop farmers and part-time farmers, so 
they are affected by both farm economy and general economy.
The presence of two independent groups of industries representing the traditional farm 
economy and the general economy is the evidence that the economic cycle in agriculture is 
independent of the economic cycle in the general economy. Longer data series would be 
necessary to confirm this result with a higher accuracy.
Since the model is not designed to handle negative correlations, industries where 
probabilities of default are negatively correlated are assumed to be independent (have zero 
correlation), resulting in a slight conservative bias of the resulting economic capital requirements. 
Replacing negative correlations with zeros and rounding AgStar's internal correlation data, the 
correlations in Table 7 are obtained. This correlation structure is used in the study.
Table 7: Correlations of Default Between Industries Used in the Model
Crops Dairy Swine OtherLvstLandlordGenFarmsRuralRes Others
Crops 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dairy 0.7 1.0 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Swine 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OtherLvst 0.9 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Landlord 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.4
GenFarms 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.0 0.4 0.9
RuralRes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.6
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.6 1.0
Market and Operational Risks
Since the Farm Credit System does not have any rules on estimating capital for operational 
risk, the recommendations of the New Basel Capital Accord are used. The simplified standardized 
approach for operational risk is the Basic Indicator Approach (applicable to any bank regardless of 
its complexity or sophistication), under which banks must hold capital equal to a fixed percentage 
(15%) of average annual gross income over the previous three years (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, p.94). Annual gross income based on AgStar's 2002 Annual Report is about 
$158,401,300, which makes operational risk capital 0.87% of the gross exposure.
Since associations do not have trading book, foreign exchange risk and commodity price 
risk exposures, they are not required to hold market risk capital according to the Basel regulations. 
AgStar is protected from interest rate risk, since it borrows from AgriBank to fund its lending 
operations. Thus, there is minimal market risk capital required. Since the operational risk capital 
is estimated to be 0.87% of the gross exposure, the market risk capital is taken to be 0.13% of the 
gross exposure for simplicity, to make the sum of operational risk capital and market risk capital 
equal to 1% of the gross exposure, or $26,083,431.
Model Results
The main result of the credit risk model is the loan loss distribution. All model outputs are 
based on the loan loss distribution. Table 8 shows the summary of the analyzed portfolio and the 
summary of the resulting loan loss distribution. Throughout the study, all exposures, losses, and 
percentiles are given in dollar amounts.
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Table 8: Loan Loss Distribution Summary
Summary Data
Total No. of exposures 28,662
No. of nondefaulted exposures 28,330
Total volume 2,608,343,079
Maximum loss 786,365,777
Loan Loss Distribution Characteristics
Mean 12,781,624
Standard deviation 6,909,614
Skewness 1.11
Kurtosis 4.80
90th percentile 32,522,867
99th percentile 44,594,626
99.99th percentile 65,615,834
Total exposure is the sum of individual exposures including unfunded commitments 
weighted at 75%. Maximum loss is the sum of exposures multiplied by LGD rates. The 
distribution mean is the expected loss on non-defaulted loans. Tail percentiles show the Value-at- 
Risk, the total required risk funds to cover expected losses and unexpected losses.
Capital Adequacy
The mean of the distribution, or expected loss, represents allowance requirements. In the 
Basel 1988 Accord, it was agreed that allowance could be recorded as capital against 
requirements. Thus, the difference between Value-at-Risk at the selected percentile (such as 
99.97%) and the mean is credit risk capital. Since the establishment of the allowance impacts the 
level of capital, the adequacy of allowance should be established first (FCA). Expected losses on 
defaulted loans are added to the expected losses on non-defaulted loans to arrive at the required 
allowance for loan loss in Table 9.
Table 9: Allowance for Loan Loss
Expected Losses on_________________________% Exposure
nondefaulted loans 12,781,624 0.49%
+ defaulted loans 10,398,970 0.40%
= Allowance 23,180,594 0.89%
Charge-offs on defaulted loans should be counted against the required allowance since they 
are actual losses, not expected losses. Actual losses are already paid out of allowance. 
Alternatively, charge-offs on defaulted loans can be added to the actual allowance to arrive at the 
same difference between actual and required allowance. AgStar’s book allowance is $42,402,000. 
Adding charge-offs on defaulted loans brings allowance to about $46,000,000. This exceeds (by 
twice) the required allowance under chosen parameterization.
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Table 10: Economic Capital Under Various Confidence Levels
Loss CreditRisk 
Percentile ValueAtRisk
Allowance Credit Risk % RWA Mrkt&Oper. Economic 
Capital Risk Capital Capital
% RWA
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6 Col. 7 Col. 8
90.00% 32,522,867 23,180,594 9,342,273 0.42% 26,083,431 35,425,704 1.59%
95.00% 36,362,992 23,180,594 13,182,398 0.59% 26,083,431 39,265,829 1.77%
97.00% 39,065,658 23,180,594 15,885,064 0.71% 26,083,431 41,968,495 1.89%
98.00% 41,142,301 23,180,594 17,961,708 0.81% 26,083,431 44,045,138 1.98%
99.00% 44,594,626 23,180,594 21,414,032 0.96% 26,083,431 47,497,463 2.14%
99.50% 47,944,787 23,180,594 24,764,193 1.11% 26,083,431 50,847,624 2.29%
99.90% 55,420,110 23,180,594 32,239,516 1.45% 26,083,431 58,322,947 2.62%
99.95% 58,528,006 23,180,594 35,347,412 1.59% 26,083,431 61,430,843 2.76%
99.97% 60,834,934 23,180,594 37,654,340 1.69% 26,083,431 63,737,771 2.87%
99.99% 65,615,834 23,180,594 42,435,240 1.91% 26,083,431 68,518,671 3.08%
The loan loss distribution allows for the comparison of economic capital at various 
confidence levels to the existing risk funds (Table 10). Typical confidence levels range from 
99.00% to 99.99%. The choice of the confidence level depends on the lender’s level of risk 
aversion. The choice of the confidence level selected by a financial institution with rated debt 
depends on the target debt rating. For example, a 99.90% capital level corresponds to a single-A 
rating. The New Basel Capital Accord uses 99.50th percentile in deriving the regulatory function. 
The 99.97th percentile is used by many commercial banks, and it is used as a primary confidence 
level in this study. This confidence level means that AgStar would incur losses greater than 
economic capital in one out of 3,000 years under the given parameterization.
Table 10 (Column 2) shows Value-at-Risk (required total risk funds to cover losses at a 
given loss percentile). Credit risk capital is Value-at-Risk less allowance. Economic capital needs 
to cover market and operational risks in addition to credit risk. The sum of credit risk capital and 
market and operational risk capital is total economic capital. Total economic capital (Column 7) 
can be compared with the lender's book capital. Economic capital as a percent of Risk-Weighted 
Assets (RWA) (Column 8) can be compared against the 7% permanent capital ratio requirement. 
Risk-weighted assets are $2,222,644,152. Table 10 shows that the choice of confidence level is an 
important parameter. The amount of economic capital nearly doubles as the confidence level 
increases from 90.00% to 99.99%.
Table 11 shows the comparison of economic capital to the book capital under the 99.97th 
loss percentile. Economic capital is $63,737,771, much less than the book capital of 
$269,829,000. Unallocated surplus is $240,938,000, also significantly exceeding economic 
capital.
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Table 11: Comparison of Economic Capital at 99.97th Percentile to Book Capital
% RWA Risk
Capital
% Total 
Capital
Credit Risk Capital 
Operational & Market
1.69% 37,654,340 59.08%
Risk Capital 1.17% 26,083,431 40.92%
Total Economic Capital 2.87% 63,737,771 100.00%
Current Book Capital 12.14% 269,829,000
Current Capital Margin 9.27% 206,091,229
Allowance for Losses 1.04% 23,180,594
Current Book Allowance 1.91% 42,402,000
Allowance Margin 0.86% 19,221,406
Total Risk Funds 3.91% 86,918,365
Current Book Risk Funds 14.05% 312,231,000
Risk Funds Margin 10.14% 225,312,635
In an efficient market, book capital should be the minimum of regulatory and economic 
capital. Regulators would not allow the level of capital below the regulatory capital requirement, 
while the market would not allow the book capital below economic capital requirements 
(Falkenstein, p. 2). Holding excess economic capital is not optimal since the lender could increase 
its returns by taking on risky projects where economic requirements are greater than the regulatory 
requirements because the marginal capital cost is zero in such cases (Falkenstein, p. 10).
Under selected parameters, AgStar holds more than three times as much capital as the 
model requires. One may think that AgStar holds excessive economic capital, and it should 
reduce its book capital to the 7% permanent capital ratio. It is important to remember that 
probabilities of default and their standard deviations were calculated based on the last five years, 
which were comparatively favorable for the agricultural economy. Ideally, these parameters 
should be averages over at least one economic cycle. Stress-testing (covered later) is necessary to 
analyze the effects of economy deterioration on the economic capital requirements. The Basel 
Capital Accord recommends that capital be sufficient in the event of at least a mild recession. The 
Farm Credit System would like to see associations being able to withstand the stress compatible to 
the stress of 1980s4.
Stress-Testing
Stress-testing gauges potential vulnerability of financial institutions to probable and 
exceptional but plausible events. Stress-testing is widely used as a supplement for Value-at-Risk 
models (Committee on the Global Financial System, p. 2). Stress-testing is a way of measuring 
and monitoring the consequences of extreme movements in parameters. Value-at-Risk is of 
limited use in measuring exposures to extreme market events because, by definition, such events 
happen too rarely to be captured by empirically driven statistical models (Committee on the 
Global Financial System, p. 2).
4 Based on the opinions of AgriBank management staff.
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Stress-testing scenarios show the effects of changes in several parameters reflecting events 
that can be historical or hypothetical, probable or extreme. Stress-testing scenarios are required by 
the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision).
Table 14 shows model results under various historical and hypothetical scenarios. Model 
parameters are returned to their basic values after analyzing each scenario. Loans that are in 
default are assumed to remain in default. Allowance, economic capital, and total risk funds 
margin are shown as dollar amounts and percentages of Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) under 
various scenarios. Risk Funds Margin (column 6) shows excess of book risk funds (if positive) or 
shortage of book risk funds (if negative). All of the scenarios are analyzed under 99.97th 
confidence level.
Table 14: Stress-Testing at 99.97th Percentile
Scenario__________ Allowance % RWA Econ. Capital % RWA RiskFundsMargin %RWA
Basic 23,180,594 1.04% 63,737,771 2.87% 225,312,635 10.14%
Mild Recession 1 29,499,473 1.33% 74,120,475 3.33% 208,611,052 9.39%
Mild Recession 2 35,962,218 1.62% 88,799,807 4.00% 187,468,974 8.43%
Simple Implement. 23,180,594 1.04% 124,005,906 5.58% 165,044,500 7.43%
Moder. Recession 60,456,152 2.72% 118,069,215 5.31% 133,705,632 6.02%
Zero Recovery 86,417,254 3.89% 136,798,883 6.15% 89,014,863 4.00%
Severe Recession 92,102,402 4.14% 189,342,480 8.52% 30,786,118 1.39%
Crisis of 1980s 129,274,260 5.82% 472,610,785 21.26% -289,654,045 -13.03%
The “Basic” scenario repeats the results described earlier in the chapter under the chosen 
parameters. To simulate the effect of a recession, one can shock probabilities of default, their 
standard deviations, and LGD rates in the following two ways. The first way is to change 
probabilities of default and their standard deviations for each risk rating, and to change LGD rates 
for each LGD rating. The second way is to migrate clients to lower risk ratings and LGD ratings, 
keeping default probabilities and recovery rates the same for each rating. The two approaches can 
be combined. The choice can reflect the definition of default probability and recovery rate: point- 
in-time or through-the-cycle, or simply be the choice that is easier to understand.
"Mild Recession 1" scenario assumes that 50% of risk ratings and LGD ratings migrate to 
the next lower rating, representing the fact that risk ratings may migrate downward, and collateral 
values may decline or collateral may become less liquid during a recession. Thus, half of the 
loans risk rated 1 become risk rated 2, half of the loans risk rated 2 become risk rated 3, etc. "Mild 
Recession 2" scenario shows the situation when all probabilities of default and their standard 
deviations double, which can also be representative of a mild recession. Both Mild Recession 
scenarios do not have much effect on the risk funds margin, decreasing it only from 10% to 8-9% 
of risk-weighted assets.
The "Simple Implementation” scenario shows model results under conservative 
assumptions made in calibrating the model. The author of CreditRisk+, Wilde (2000), states that 
"A simple but robust implementation of CreditRisk+ is to use one sector, and assume that the 
default rate volatility for each borrower is about 100% of its mean" (p. 613). This is a 
conservative implementation of the model that may be preferred under the absence of reliable 
industry correlation structure and default rate volatilities. Assuming 100% correlation between 
defaults in all industries and standard deviations of 100% of the mean default probabilities doubles
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the amount of economic capital, having more effect on capital adequacy than a mild recession. It 
reduces the risk funds margin from 10% to 7% of risk-weighted assets.
The "Moderate recession" scenario assumes that all risk ratings and LGD ratings migrate 
downward by 2 ratings. Thus, all loans that are risk rated 1 become risk rated 3; all loans that are 
risk rated 2 become risk rated 4; etc. Under this scenario, risk funds margin decreases to 6% of 
risk-weighted assets.
“Zero Recovery” scenario reflects the situation when Loss Given Default is 100% for all 
the loans. This can be the case when collateral assets devalue and/or market becomes so illiquid 
that collateral cannot be recovered in a reasonable time period. This scenario increases total risk 
funds in 2.5 times. Risk funds margin shrinks to 4% of risk-weighted assets.
“Severe recession” scenario assumes that default probabilities and their standard deviations 
triple, and loss given default rates double. The scenario increases the need for risk funds over the 
three times compared to the basic scenario. Book risk funds are still sufficient to withstand the 
increased risk in the portfolio at the 99.97% confidence level, having risk funds margin of over 1% 
of risk-weighted assets.
“Crisis of 1980s” scenario assumes that default probability and its standard deviation is 
10% for loans in all risk ratings, reflecting the fact that in Minnesota, 24% of commercial farms 
faced default in 1984-86, and 10% were technically insolvent (Hanson et. al.) in the absence of 
more detailed information. The scenario assumes that LGD rates increase by 50% for all LGD 
ratings (LGD for rating 4 is capped at 100%) reflecting the fact that land values declined by about 
50% during 1981-87 (Hanson et. al.). The book risk funds show significant shortage under this 
scenario at the 99.97th percentile. However, the funds are still sufficient under the 95th percentile 
(shortage of funds in one out of 20 years). Considering that a crisis similar to the one of 1980s 
lasts less than 20 years, AgStar may have sufficient funds to withstand a similar event.
Overall, stress-testing under the chosen parameters shows that AgStar is adequately 
capitalized to withstand a recession, even a severe one or a farm financial crisis.
Conclusions
This research makes a significant contribution to the existing literature on credit risk 
assessment and the tools that are available for evaluating credit risk exposure in the Farm Credit 
System. It also provides a new practical perspective on the issue of capital adequacy. The credit 
risk model improves the overall ability to identify, measure and manage credit risk. A lending 
institution may use the model to: forecast losses, identify allowance and capital requirements, 
evaluate risk-adjusted profitability for the overall portfolio, various subportfolios and individual 
loans, price loans, manage portfolio risk and monitor it over time, set risk-based concentration 
limits, forecast effects of portfolio growth, analyze the effects of changes in portfolio composition, 
diversification, and various hypothetical or historical scenarios that affect credit quality.
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The Impact of Conservation Reserve Program
Enrollment on Local Job Growth
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The Impact of Conservation Reserve Program
Enrollment on Local Job Growth
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was established by the Food Security Act of 
1985 and began enrolling farmland in 1986. Under this voluntary program, the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture contracts with agricultural producers and landowners to retire roughly 34 million 
acres of highly erodible and environmentally sensitive cropland from production for a period of 
10-15 years. Enrolled land is planted to grasses, trees, and other cover, thereby reducing erosion 
and water pollution, providing other environmental benefits, and reducing the supply of 
agricultural commodities. CRP rental payments give participants a stable source of revenue and 
CRP’s impact on production increases the market price of commodities for all crop farmers. The 
program’s benefits to the environment, CRP participants, and other crop farmers have made it a 
recurring focus of subsequent farm program legislation; but the program’s potential impact on 
hired farm labor and off-farm jobs in nearby communities has been a concern.
As with other farmland retirement programs, enrollment in CRP could reduce demand for 
farm inputs and agricultural marketing services unless cultivation is expanded by an equivalent 
amount elsewhere. While CRP rental payments compensate participants for the losses they incur 
from idling their land, CRP does not reimburse others for associated reductions in demand. As a 
result, if cultivation on nonenrolled land does not increase as CRP land is taken out of 
production, demand for local labor could decline as participation in CRP increases. For this 
reason, enrollment in CRP is capped at 25 percent of each county’s total cropland unless 
permission to waive the cap is requested by county officials and granted by USDA. On the other 
hand, CRP provides environmental benefits which can enhance natural resource based tourism 
and recreational spending. Our aim in this paper is to determine if high levels of CRP enrollment 
had a measurable impact on job growth in affected counties during the program’s first 15 years 
of operation.
Analytical Approach
Most research on CRP’s economic impacts has relied on input/output models, such as 
IMPLAN, to estimate what is likely to happen as farmland is taken out of production. Studies by 
Martin, et al. (1988), Standaert and Smith (1989), Mortensen, et al. (1990), Hines et al. (1991), 
Hyberg, et al. (1991), Siegel and Johnson (1991), Dodson, et al. (1994), and Otto and Smith 
(1996) generally find that CRP could have a small negative impact on areas with high CRP 
participation. While providing a rough estimate of the potential adjustments local communities 
might face as farmland is retired, such simulations do not necessarily reflect how local 
economies actually adjust.2 Our approach examines job growth trends before and after CRP was
2 Input/output models capture economywide linkages at one point in time, but they hold these relationships constant 
when estimating the effects of subsequent policy changes. As the size of the CRP changes, industrial sectors, 
workers, and factor owners are expected to change in predictable ways. But as farm commodity prices change, 
previously uncultivated land may be planted, reducing CRP’s impact on demand for farm-related goods and 
services. And as the program’s environmental benefits begin to accumulate, other business opportunities not 
anticipated by existing input/output relationships, such as recreation, can emerge, altering the impact of a policy 
shock on job growth.
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enacted and compares trends in counties with high levels of CRP enrollment with similar 
counties having little or no CRP enrollment. To our knowledge, this is the first nationwide 
econometric analysis of how job growth in rural counties reacted as land was enrolled in the CRP 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In measuring the local importance of CRP, the enabling legislation implicitly adopted the 
proportion of each county’s total cropland enrolled in CRP, capping it at 25 percent. After 1990, 
the mean proportion of cropland enrolled in CRP among counties with acreage in the program 
was roughly 6.6 percent. This is a reasonable metric when the primary concern is CRP’s effect 
on farms and farm-related industries. But if the primary concern is with broader measures of 
community well-being, such as the change in total employment, high CRP enrollment relative to 
cropland may have little effect on the local economy if farming is a minor source of economic 
activity. A more direct measure of the local economic importance of resources retired by the 
CRP is the proportion of total household income received by county residents from CRP rental 
payments.3 The mean rental-payment-to-income ratio among participating counties was 
remarkably stable during the early 1990s at about 0.75 percent. The two measures of CRP’s 
local importance are positively correlated, but they measure different aspects of the program’s 
importance.
To focus on locales most likely to be affected by cropland retirement, only counties in 
which farm employment comprised more than 5 percent of jobs in 1980 are considered. 
Furthermore, only counties in the contiguous 48 States that had an urban population of less than 
20,000 in 1980 are analyzed. The resulting universe is composed of 1,481 counties located 
throughout the country, but concentrated in the Plains. These counties accounted for 79 percent 
of land enrolled in the CRP in both 1990 and 2002.
We further identify counties in which CRP is relatively important, based on the ratio of 
average CRP rental payments during 1991-1993 to total household income in 1985 (adjusted for 
inflation).4 Focusing on counties with a payments-to-income ratio exceeding 2.75 percent and 
having more than 5,000 acres enrolled in the program yields 195 high-CRP counties, most of 
which were in the Plains. These high-CRP counties were matched with similar counties having 
little or no CRP enrollment to highlight CRP’s impact on job growth trends. Figure 1 shows the 
location of the 195 high-CRP counties and their low-CRP matches.
To assess CRP’s impact on the job growth process, we develop a single-equation, 
reduced-form rural job growth model based on previous literature. Four groups of explanatory 
variables are used in the analysis in addition to measures of CRP’s local importance: (1) pre- 
CRP measures of employment and population change, (2) pre-CRP industrial and farm structure
3 Because we do not want the denominator of our measure to be influenced by CRP, we use pre-CRP estimates of 
county cropland and total household income to standardize CRP enrollment and rental payments, respectively.
4
The program was nearly fully implemented by 1993. Using a 1991-93 average allows us to assess both the short­
term impacts of CRP enrollment as well as impacts over a longer period, after local economies had time to adjust to 
the retirement of county farmland.
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measures, (3) quality of life/amenity measures, and (4) pre-CRP demographic measures. To 
avoid biasing the estimated parameters, our non-CRP explanatory variables are from before CRP 
was enacted whenever possible. The dependent variable measures county employment change 
after 1985, as land began enrolling in the CRP. To capture both the short- and long-term 
response to CRP enrollment, employment change is measured over two periods—1985-1992 and 
1985-2000. The specific measures included in our analysis are discussed in the appendix.
Our database includes over 45 measures that previous studies have associated with job 
change or that reflect local agricultural conditions. While these explanatory variables should 
capture the independent effects of many county characteristics potentially related to employment 
change, several socioeconomic measures are highly correlated, with no a priori reason for 
selecting one over the other. To avoid statistical problems from estimating relationships with an 
over-identified model, in addition to a standard analysis including all explanatory variables, a 
backward stepwise regression procedure narrows the set of variables.
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Although the selection criteria provide a reasonably homogeneous group of observations, 
the resulting counties still exhibit enormous variation in socioeconomic factors. This variability, 
coupled with the complexity of the economic growth process, invites erroneous estimates due to 
misspecified models. One approach to testing for program impacts where the underlying process 
is complex is the use of quasi-experimental, or matched-pair, control group analysis (Bohm and 
Lind, 1993; Reed and Rogers, 2003). Intuitively, if high-CRP (treatment) counties were 
compared to otherwise identical low-CRP (control) counties, differences in economic 
performance between the two groups would demonstrate the effects of high CRP enrollment. In 
reality, the matches are imperfect so econometric analysis is still required, but the use of 
matched-pairs should help clarify relationships.5
In theory, the standard econometric approach should provide efficient, unbiased estimates 
of CRP’s influence on job growth trends. However, in practice there are several reasons for 
preferring a more controlled analytical design. First, enrollment in the CRP likely depends on 
the economic health of the community. While all environmentally sensitive land is eligible for 
enrollment, the program initially appealed most to owners of farmland with below-average 
productivity that didn’t have particularly high value for nonfarm uses. That is, CRP use was 
most heavily concentrated in isolated areas with relatively poorly performing economies—not in 
fast growing areas. This can be seen in figure 2.
5 Ideally, counties should be similar in every respect except for the amount of CRP-eligible land, with low-CRP 
counties classified as such because their land was ineligible based on environmental sensitivity criteria. 
Unfortunately, it seems likely that some low-CRP counties are such because their eligible lands were too productive 
or too valuable for nonfarm uses to make enrollment in the CRP attractive. To the extent that considerations other 
than program eligibility led low-CRP counties to enroll fewer acres, our matched-pair comparisons will overstate the 
impact that CRP enrollment has on socioeconomic trends.
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Counties with a high ratio of CRP rental-payments-to-income (greater than 2.75 percent) 
tended to have anemic local economies both before and after CRP was enacted in 1986. So the 
appropriate question is not whether high-CRP counties have performed worse than other 
counties, but whether CRP has affected their relative economic performance. This is much 
easier to evaluate within a quasi-experimental control group (QECG) analysis where high-CRP 
counties can be compared with counties having similar pre-CRP job growth trends, economic 
structures, etc.
Another reason why the traditional econometric approach might not be very fruitful is 
that CRP is not a sizeable program in the aggregate and for most counties with CRP enrollment. 
After an initial ramp-up period in the late 1980s, CRP rental payments have held steady at $1.4 
to $1.7 billion per year. This isn’t much when compared to other Federal farm program 
payments, let alone to all the other government programs and market fluctuations that influence 
job growth trends. By isolating counties with sizeable CRP enrollments, QECG analysis focuses 
on those counties most likely to be measurably affected by the program. Furthermore, the 
stability of CRP payment streams (guaranteed for the life of the 10-15 year contract) reinforces 
the analysis of high-CRP counties as “treatment” subjects from a program analysis perspective. 
Local CRP enrollment and rental receipts were fairly stable once the program was up and 
running.
Finally, QECG analysis makes it easier to assess program impacts when the precise 
functional form of the relationship between CRP enrollment and job growth is uncertain. It 
seems likely that the relationship between CRP and job growth is nonlinear, changes over time, 
and varies with economic conditions. By comparing “treatment” counties with “control” 
counties, QECG analysis can standardize many of the incidental characteristics which might 
influence the CRP-job growth relationship while putting variations in CRP’s local importance in 
stark relief.
Therefore, in addition to estimating a traditional job growth model based on 1,481 study 
counties, we also estimate a series of models based on matched pairs of high- and low-CRP 
counties. Potential matches were restricted to study group counties which were not themselves 
high-CRP (based on either enrollment or rental payments) at any time during the program’s 
history and which had CRP use measures that were less than 50 percent of the high-CRP county 
being matched.6 Unique matches were selected which minimized the “Mahalanobis distances” 
between the high-CRP counties and all possible combinations of eligible low-CRP counties.7 
The Mahalanobis distance measures the similarity between observations based on a set of key 
characteristics—the smaller the distance, the more similar the matching is, based on the
6 Paired t-tests indicate that the mean values of CRP’s local importance (based on enrollments and rental payments) 
in high-CRP counties and their matches differ by more than two standard deviations, with a 99 percent level of 
confidence.
7 The Mahalanobis distance metric takes the form d2(XT,XC)=(XT-XC)' X-1(XT-XC), where X is the vector of 
selection variables, T is the treatment (i.e. high-CRP) county, C is a possible control county, d is the distance 
between the two vectors, and X is the variance-covariance matrix of possible control counties (Isserman and 
Rephann, 1995).
52
characteristics being examined. Matches were based on pre-1984 measures of population 
growth, population density, commuting patterns, racial mix, mining employment, and the 
importance of Federal farm commodity program payments. In addition, contemporaneous 
measures of land in forest and the presence of natural amenities were included because historical 
data were not available. The aim is to find matched pairs of counties which were very similar 
before CRP enrollment began, and to then compare their development as land is enrolled.
The traditional growth model takes the form:
log (Ji,t / Ji,1985) = f(CRPi, Xi)
where Ji;t is the number of jobs in county i at time t greater than 1985, CRPi is the local 
importance of CRP (i.e., the proportion of county cropland enrolled or the ratio of CRP rental- 
payments-to-income) in county i during 1991-1993, and Xi is a vector of county i’s pre-1985 
socioeconomic and amenity characteristics hypothesized to influence local job growth.
For the matched-pair analysis, the difference in job growth trends between high-CRP 
counties and their matches were estimated as a function of differences in explanatory variables 
between matched pairs of counties. That is:
(log (J-rt) -  log (Jct))i = f((CRPx -  CRPc)i, (Xt -  Xc)i)
where JTt is the ratio of jobs in high-CRP county i at time t relative to jobs in 1985, Jct is the 
identical ratio for jobs in the low-CRP county uniquely matched with i, (CRPr -  CRPC)i is the 
difference between CRP’s local importance in high-CRP county i (the treatment county) and its 
matching low-CRP county (the control county), and (XT -  XC)i is a vector of the differences 
between each explanatory variable in high-CRP county i and its match. This approach examined 
whether differences in development trends between high-CRP counties and their matches could 
be accounted for by differences in pre-CRP socioeconomic factors and CRP’s local importance 
(Blundell and Dias).8
Finally, shifts in mining activity had a pronounced impact on several high-CRP counties 
and their matches. In addition to including mining employment in 1980 as an explanatory 
variable, we also created a separate set of matched pairs that excluded counties where mining 
comprised over 5 percent of 1980 employment. Doing so clarified the relationship between 
community development and CRP, since variations in mining added substantial statistical 
“noise” to the data.
Empirical Results
Between the matched-pair and study data sets, the two measures of CRP’s local 
importance, whether mining counties are excluded or included, and whether all variables are
8 When parameters are estimated without a measure of CRP’s local importance, the constant term measures the 
marginal effect on job growth trends of being classified as a high-CRP county. When CRP’s local importance is 
included as an explanatory variable, the constant term is constrained to equal zero.
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included in the model or a backward stepwise procedure is used, we have 20 different estimates 
of the relationship between CRP use and employment trends for each time period examined. By 
first looking at all of these estimated relationships, we can better assess the consistency of the 
matched-pair estimations
The results, reported in Table 1, are fairly consistent. CRP was associated with slower 
job growth in the short run. All coefficients were negative, and in 7 cases the coefficient was 
statistically significant at the .10 level or better. However, this negative relationship did not 
persist over the longer period. Apparently, if negative effects existed, they were short-lived. 
Over the long run, the sign on the estimated CRP coefficient shifted from negative to positive in 
all but one equation; in three equations this estimate was statistically different from zero at the 
0.10 level. This suggests that local economies were generally able to adapt to any loss in jobs 
associated with the CRP.
Table 1: Summary of initial analyses of CRP’s relationship with employment trends
Sign of CRP coefficients:
Positive Negative
All Significant All Significant
Change in the number of jobs: 
1985-1992 (short-term) 
1985-2000 (long-term)
0 0 
19 3
20 7
1 0
Note: The data refer to the sign and statistical significance of the CRP regression coefficient in 20 different versions 
of the growth model, allowing the functional form and the list of independent variables to vary. In each case, the 
dependent variable is the log of the ratio of jobs at the end of the period relative to 1985 (when matched pairs are 
analyzed, the dependent variable is the difference in the log of the jobs ratio in high- and low-CRP counties). 
Statistical significance is based on a 2-tailed t-test at the .10 level.
We have argued that CRP’s effect on job growth trends should be easier to detect using 
the QECG approach, and among the 7 analyses that report a significant negative relationship 
between CRP’s local importance and job trends, 5 rely on the matched pairs of counties. 
Focusing on the results of the backward stepwise regression analysis of the matched pairs, we 
find that job growth trends are particularly sensitive to CRP enrollment relative to county 
cropland.9 Table 2 presents the key results of a series of regressions on differences between 
high-CRP counties and their matched pairs. The first group of results shows whether differences 
in the size of the CRP payments-to-income ratio had a significant impact on county trends. Here
9 This result is not unique to the backward stepwise regression analysis. The ratio of CRP payments-to-income was 
significantly related to job trends over 1985-1992 in only 1 of the 8 regressions it appeared in (these include 
standard and backward stepwise regressions of all study counties and study counties other than those with more than 
5 percent employed in mining as well as similar analyses of matched-pairs of high- and low-CRP counties). On the 
other hand, the ratio of CRP enrollment-to-cropland was significant in 6 of the 8 regressions it appeared in. The 
remaining 4 regression analyses summarized in table 1 were for matched-pairs where neither measure of CRP’s 
local importance was present (allowing the constant term to capture the marginal impact of being classified as a hgh- 
CRP county).
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the results differ depending upon whether mining counties are included in the analysis or not. 
With mining counties excluded, job growth between 1985 and 2000 was positively related to 
CRP use.10 The second group of results shows whether differences in the proportion of cropland 
enrolled in the CRP are related to differences in county trends. It appears that the relative size of 
CRP enrollment has a consistent, statistically significant, negative effect on job growth between 
1985 and 1992, but little effect over the longer period.
One explanation for the discrepancy between the statistical significance of the 
coefficients for our two measures of CRP’s local importance is that CRP-related job losses are 
most likely to occur in agricultural service centers. Counties with the highest CRP payments-to- 
income ratios have very low populations, are heavily dependent on farming, and lack significant 
numbers of nonfarm businesses. However, counties with the highest proportions of land in CRP 
may still have small towns with nonfarm businesses that could be adversely affected by declining 
sales of farm inputs and services.
Table 2: CRP’s association with employment trends, 1985-2000
Matched pairs1 Matched pairs/no mining1
____________________________________Beta Adj. R2______ Beta Adj. R2
CRP payments/income ratio2
1985-1992 employment change -0.0020 0.33 -0.0007 0.43
1985-2000 employment change 0.0014 0.38 0.0045* 0.37
CRP enrollment/county acreage ratio2
1985-1992 employment change -0.0027* 0.34 -0.0028** 0.45
1985-2000 employment change 0.0009 0.38 0.0001 0.36
Source: Economic Research Service calculations using data from the 1980 Census of Population, the 1982 Census of 
Agriculture, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the CRP Contracts file.
* and ** indicate the regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at the .05 and .01 level of significance, 
respectively. Beta represents the standardized regression coefficient for the CRP variable. Adjusted R2 indicates the 
portion of variation explained by the regression.
1 There are a total of 195 high-CRP-low-CRP matched pairs; when counties with more than 5 percent employed in 
mining in 1980 are excluded, this number drops to 190.
2 When the difference-in-difference equations include a continuous variable measuring CRP’s local importance, the 
constant is constrained to equal 0.
To investigate this issue further, we focus on the matched pair data set as these counties 
all have relatively low population densities.11 By including a population density-CRP interaction 
term in the regression, we can measure CRP’s differential impact on local communities as
10 Mining employment was very volatile during the study period with employment increasing rapidly in some areas 
and decreasing rapidly in others. As a result, neither a continuous variable measuring the proportion of local jobs in 
mining nor a dummy variable for mining counties was effective at capturing mining’s impact.
11 This analysis was replicated for all counties remote from major cities and lacking towns of 2,500 or more. 
Results were generally consistent with those reported in table 3.
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county population density varies. Because agricultural service centers may have been losing out 
to larger centers during this period, we also include an interaction term (percentage employed in 
agriculture multiplied by population density) to reflect any tendency for employment loss to be 
greater in more densely settled agricultural areas over the study period. The results of these 
analyses indicate that the negative effects of CRP on the number of jobs in the county were 
stronger in more densely settled rural counties than in thinly settled counties (Table 3). This was 
true over both the short and the long run, but the CRP coefficient was slightly higher in the long 
run equation while the absolute size of the CRP-density interaction term was noticeably smaller. 
The net result was that the association between CRP and depressed job growth in more densely 
populated rural counties was not nearly as strong in the long run.
Table 3: Interaction between population density and CRP’s impact on nonfarm job growth
Short term job growth 
(1985-1992)
Beta t-statistic
Long term job growth 
(1985-2000) 
Beta t-statistic
CRP payments/income ratio 0.232 2.26* 0.247 2.28*
Population density, 1980 (log) -0.286 2.05* -0.012 0.08
Population density x CRP ratio -0.354 3.90** -0.201 2.20*
Agricultural jobs, 1980 (%) -0.507 4.69** -0.027 0.23
Population density x agricultural jobs 0.141 1.41 0.009 0.92
Population under 18, 1980 (%) 0.226 3.66** 0.243 3.70**
Black population, 1980 (%) -1.142 2.25* -0.238 3.68**
Mining jobs (%) -0.302 4.71** -0.133 2.02*
Working outside the county, 1980 (%) -- -- 0.122 1.66
Median household income, 1979 (log) -0.177 2.79** -- --
Great Plains dummy -0.209 2.90** -0.158 1.92
Land in forest (%) -- -- 0.256 3.38**
Govt. payments/total income, 1981-83 -- -- -0.268 2.40*
Wheat/total farm sales, 1982 (%) -0.126 1.74 -- --
Adi. R2 0.341 0.321
Source: Economic Research Service calculations using data from the 1980 Census of Population, the 1982 Census of 
Agriculture, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the CRP Contracts file. All variables represent the difference 
between the level in each high-CRP and its matching low-CRP county, excluding pairs that include a county with 
more than 5 percent employed in mining. The first 5 variables are included by default while the remaining variables 
were selected by the backward stepwise procedure from among all explanatory variables based on the statistical 
significance of their contribution. The constant term was constrained to equal 0.
* and ** indicate the regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at the .05 and .01 level of significance, 
respectively. Beta represents the standardized regression coefficient for the CRP variable. Adjusted R2 indicates the 
portion of variation explained by the regression.
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The marginal effect of CRP in thinly and more densely populated rural counties is easier 
to see in Figure 3. This figure shows the estimated impact of CRP on employment change as the 
difference in the ratio of CRP payments-to-income between low- and high-CRP counties 
increases from 0 to 4 percent. For low-density counties (those with fewer than 2 persons per 
square mile), CRP appears to have made little difference for employment change in either the 
short- or long-term. For higher density rural counties (those with more than 9 persons per square 
mile), the effect of a 4 percentage point increase in the ratio of CRP payments-to-income on 
county employment growth was substantial in the short-run, but effects dissipated over time as 
local economies adjusted. We interpret these results to mean that CRP had its most negative 
effects on jobs in counties with agricultural service centers, but that these effects were largely 
confined to the short term.
Figure 3: Nonfarm job growth in counties with low and moderate
population density
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Note: The bars indicate the estimated change in job growth if a county’s ratio of CRP rental payments-to- 
household-income increased from 0 to 4 percent, holding other county characteristics constant. Low density 
counties have fewer than 2 persons per square mile. Moderate density counties have more than 9 persons per square 
mile. (The average for all 1,481 counties in the broader study group is 24 persons per square mile.)
These results are consistent with earlier estimates of CRP’s likely effect on local 
economies in Oregon. In their forecasts, Martin, et al. (1988) projected that CRP would 
negatively affect farm dependent communities with small subregional agricultural supply 
centers. They expected farm dependent communities that were too small to support such centers 
(low density in our terminology) to be either unaffected or positively affected by CRP
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enrollments. Our results and the earlier forecasts by Martin, et al., focus on small isolated 
farming economies. Larger, more diversified economies are less likely to be significantly 
affected by CRP’s impact on demand for farm-related goods and services.
Summary, Limitations, and Future Work
Previous attempts to estimate CRP’s socioeconomic impacts have relied on: (1) 
deterministic models of the local economy, most often based on IMPLAN; (2) surveys of 
program participants and local government officials; and (3) econometric analyses of similar 
types of programs. While each of these approaches is useful and adds valuable insight into the 
adjustment process farming communities go through as they accommodate policy shocks, none 
can accurately evaluate what happens in response to changes in CRP enrollment. To our 
knowledge, this is the first systematic attempt to econometrically model the impact that CRP has 
had on farming communities nationwide based on observed data. These results suggest that local 
job growth may be sensitive to CRP enrollment, particularly in areas with small agricultural 
service centers. However, detrimental effects tend to be modest and fairly short lived. Rural 
economies, even those in undiversified farm-dependent areas, appear resilient enough to adapt to 
shifting demands and opportunities.
We designed our analysis to err on the side of finding a relationship between CRP and 
job growth. Nonetheless, limitations of the model and available data need to be acknowledged. 
Our analysis was conducted at the county level, so is not sensitive to changes in the distribution 
of jobs within counties. CRP could have much larger impacts on small geographic areas, such as 
individual towns, that are obscured by job growth elsewhere within the county.12 Furthermore, 
while we have found evidence of a short-term relationship between CRP enrollment and job 
growth trends in some counties, we haven’t demonstrated causality. CRP enrollment may be a 
more attractive option in areas experiencing economic problems whether or not that enrollment 
contributes to the area’s problems. Finally, our matched pairs of high- and low-CRP counties 
were drawn from the same geographic area since high-CRP counties have unique characteristics 
that make them hard to match. To the extent that CRP’s impacts are areawide, rather than 
confined to the county where CRP land is located, our analysis of differences between high- and 
low-CRP counties may be biased. The likely direction of the bias, if it exists, is unclear since 
CRP could have both positive and negative areawide impacts.
Our results hint at the complex economic changes that may have accompanied land 
retirement in counties with high levels of CRP participation. But to better understand how the 
adjustment process unfolded, we plan to perform cross-section time series analysis of changes in 
aggregate employment to see what the time lags were and what happened when CRP contracts 
began to expire after 1996. As time permits, we also plan to disaggregate the analysis to look at 
job growth in farm inputs and services industries as well as recreation and tourism industries to 
see how responsive they were to land retirement. Was the growth in recreation industries 
responsible for the longer term job growth patterns experienced by high-CRP counties or was the 
trend more widespread?
12 Research has shown that the relative size of program impacts is greatest within small geographic units (Hamilton 
and Levens, 1998) and that program impacts vary from community to community within a local area (Henderson, et 
al., 1992).
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Appendix: Modeling Rural Job Growth
W e  m e a s u re  jo b  g ro w th  as th e  n a tu ra l lo g  o f  th e  ra t io  o f  th e  n u m b e r  o f  jo b s  in  e a ch  
c o u n ty  in  1992  o r  2 0 0 0  re la tiv e  to  i ts  1985 jo b  co u n t. In  m o d e lin g  ru ra l jo b  g ro w th , a  c o u n ty ’s 
h is to r ic  p a tte rn  o f  p o p u la t io n  a n d  e m p lo y m e n t c h a n g e  a re  o f te n  k e y  p re d ic to rs . C o u n ty  c h a n g e s  
in  p o p u la t io n  a n d  e m p lo y m e n t a re  in c lu d e d  fo r  b o th  th e  1 9 7 0 s a n d  th e  y e a rs  im m e d ia te ly  
p re c e d in g  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f  th e  C R P  (1 9 8 2 -8 5 ) . In  th e  19 7 0 s, a g ric u ltu re , m in in g , an d  
m a n u fa c tu r in g  w e re  all r e la tiv e ly  p ro sp e ro u s  a n d  c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  ru ra l r e b o u n d  o f  th e  p e rio d . 
In  c o n tra s t, th e s e  in d u s tr ie s  su ffe re d  in  th e  1980s. T h e  in c lu s io n  o f  1 9 8 2 -8 5  c h a n g e s  c a p tu re s  
so m e  o f  th is  d ec lin e . A s  w ith  th e  d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le , th e s e  e x p la n a to ry  v a r ia b le s  ta k e  th e  lo g  
fo rm . T a b le  A -1  p ro v id e s  th e  m e a n  v a lu e s  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  a n d  e m p lo y m e n t c h a n g e  v a r ia b le s , 
e x p re s s e d  as s im p le  p e rc e n ta g e  c h a n g e s , fo r  th e  s tu d y  g ro u p , h ig h -C R P  c o u n tie s , a n d  th e ir  
m a tc h e d  p a irs .
T a b le  A -1 : M e a n  v a lu e s  o f  p o p u la t io n  a n d  e m p lo y m e n t t re n d  v a r ia b le s
V a r ia b le  d e sc r ip tio n U n its
S tu d y
c o u n tie s
H ig h -
C R P 1
M a tc h e d
c o u n tie s
D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le s - -  
P o s t-C R P  e m p lo y m e n t c h an g e : 
1 9 8 5 -1 9 9 2  (sh o r t  ru n ) P c t. 5 .6 -3 .7 1 4 **
1 9 8 5 -2 0 0 0  ( lo n g  ru n ) P c t. 2 3 .9 7 .6 13 .4**
E x p la n a to ry  v a r ia b le s - -  
P re -C R P  p o p u la t io n  c h an g e : 
1 9 7 0 -1 9 8 2 P c t. 1 1 . 3 -3 .2 3 .3 * *
1 9 8 2 -1 9 8 5 2 P c t -0 .3 -2 .3 -1 .3 * *
P re -C R P  e m p lo y m e n t c h an g e : 
1 9 7 0 -1 9 8 2 P c t. 17 .6 1 . 6 13 .5**
1 9 8 2 -1 9 8 5 2 P c t. 2 . 6 -1 .7 0 .3 * *
Source: BEA Income files.
** indicates that the difference between high-CRP counties and their matched pairs is significantly greater than 0 at 
the 0.01 level.
1 High-CRP counties have an average CRP rental-payment-to-income ratio for 1991-93 exceeding 2.75 percent. Of 
the 1,481 study counties, 195 were high-CRP by this definition.
2 We include 1982-85 trends separately because rural county growth was slower in this period than during the 
preceding 12 years.
M e a s u re s  o f  in it ia l  in d u s try  s tru c tu re  a re  u b iq u ito u s  in  s tu d ie s  o f  jo b  g ro w th . T h e  b a s ic  
a s su m p tio n  is  th a t  lo c a l t re n d s  re f le c t  n a tio n a l tre n d s . In d u s try  s tru c tu re  is  m e a s u re d  b y  th e  
p ro p o r t io n  o f  e m p lo y e d  re s id e n ts  w o rk in g  in  a g r ic u ltu re , m a n u fa c tu r in g , m in in g , b u s in e s s  
se rv ic e s  ( f in a n c e , in su ra n c e , rea l e s ta te , a n d  o th e r  p ro fe s s io n a l se rv ic e s ) , a n d  re c re a tio n  (e a tin g  
p la c e s , a m u se m e n t, a n d  re c re a tio n , o th e r  th a n  h o te ls )  in  1980 , b a s e d  o n  C e n su s  o f  P o p u la tio n  
d a ta . T h re e  ty p e s  o f  so m e w h a t u n iq u e  ru ra l in d u s tr ia l  e x p a n s io n  th a t  b e g a n  in  th e  la te  1 9 8 0 s  a re
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c a s in o  re so r ts , p r iso n s , a n d  la rg e  m e a tp a c k in g  p lan ts . T h e se  e x p a n s io n s  w e re  n o t  a f fe c te d  b y  
C R P , y e t  c o u ld  h a v e  m a jo r  im p a c ts  in  c o u n tie s  w h e re  th e y  a re  lo c a te d . T o  ta k e  a c c o u n t o f  th e  
so m e tim e s  d ra m a tic  c h a n g e s  a c c o m p a n y in g  th e s e  ty p e s  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t, d u m m y  v a r ia b le s  w e re  
in c lu d e d  to  re f le c t  w h e th e r  a  c o u n ty  h a d  an y  o f  th e s e  in d u s tr ie s  in  2 0 0 0 .
B e c a u s e  C R P  p r im a rily  a ffe c ts  f a rm in g -d e p e n d e n t a re a s , se v e ra l a g r ic u ltu ra l  v a r ia b le s  in  
a d d itio n  to  e m p lo y m e n t w e re  in c lu d e d  in  th e  a n a ly s is . F a rm  sa le s  in  1982  re la tiv e  to  1980  
h o u s e h o ld  in c o m e  a n d  fa rm  in c o m e  f ro m  g o v e rn m e n t p a y m e n ts  in  1 981-83  re la tiv e  to  to ta l 
p e rso n a l in c o m e  o v e r  th is  3 -y e a r  p e r io d  w e re  in c lu d e d  to  b e tte r  m e a s u re  th e  fa rm  s e c to r ’s 
im p o r ta n c e  to  th e  lo c a l e c o n o m y . 13 A ls o  in c lu d e d  w e re  th e  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  c o u n ty  la n d  in  c ro p s , 
th e  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  c o u n ty  fa rm la n d  th a t  w a s  ir r ig a te d , th e  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  fa rm  sa le s  b y  ty p e  
( liv e s to c k , a ll g ra in s , a n d  w h e a t) , a n d  to  re f le c t  fa rm  size , th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  sa le s  g o in g  to  v e ry  
sm a ll fa rm s  (u n d e r  $ 2 0 ,0 0 0  sa le s )  a n d  la rg e  fa rm s  (o v e r  $ 2 5 0 ,0 0 0  sa le s). T h e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  fa rm  
o p e ra to rs  w o rk in g  o ff- fa rm  o v e r  2 0 0  d a y s  a  y e a r  w a s  in c lu d e d , s in c e  th e  a v a ila b ility  o f  o ff-fa rm  
w o rk  m ig h t e n h a n c e  C R P  p a rtic ip a tio n . F in a lly , th e  ra t io  o f  C R P  e n ro l lm e n t- to - to ta l-c ro p la n d  o r 
th e  ra tio  o f  C R P  re n ta l p a y m e n ts  to  c o u n ty  h o u s e h o ld  in c o m e  is  in c lu d e d  to  m e a s u re  C R P ’s lo ca l 
im p o r ta n c e . A ll o f  th e s e  d a ta , w ith  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f  C R P  a n d  c o m m o d ity  p ro g ra m  p a y m e n ts  an d  
c o u n ty  in c o m e  w e re  f ro m  th e  1982  C e n su s  o f  A g r ic u ltu re . G o v e rn m e n t p a y m e n ts  a n d  in c o m e  
fo r  19 8 1 -8 3  w e re  f ro m  th e  B E A , a n d  h o u s e h o ld  in c o m e  w a s  f ro m  th e  1980  C e n s u s  o f  
P o p u la tio n . C R P  e n ro llm e n t a n d  re n ta l p a y m e n ts  w e re  c a lc u la te d  f ro m  d a ta  re p o r te d  in  th e  C R P  
c o n tra c ts  file . M e a n  v a lu e s  o f  th e  in d u s try  a n d  fa rm  s tru c tu re  v a r ia b le s  a re  p re s e n te d  in  
T a b le  A -2 .
T h e  f in a l se t o f  e c o n o m ic  m e a s u re s  re f le c ts  lo ca l la b o r  m a rk e t  c o n d itio n s . H ig h e r  
e m p lo y m e n t ra te s  a n d  h ig h e r  in c o m e s  m ig h t e n c o u ra g e  lo c a l jo b  g ro w th  th ro u g h  m ig ra tio n , b u t  
m ig h t d is c o u ra g e  n e w  e m p lo y e rs . T h e se  a re  m e a s u re d  b y  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  
e m p lo y e d  in  1980  a n d  th e  lo g  o f  m e d ia n  h o u s e h o ld  in c o m e  in  1979 . T h e  p e rc e n ta g e s  o f  y o u n g  
a d u lts  (a g e s  2 5 -4 4 )  w h o  c o m p le te d  le s s  th a n  12 o r  a t le a s t  16 y e a rs  o f  sc h o o l a re  a lso  in c lu d e d .
In  g e n e ra l, b o th  e a rn in g s  a n d  th e  l ik e lih o o d  o f  e m p lo y m e n t r is e  w ith  e d u c a tio n .
T h e  a ttra c t iv e n e s s  o f  an  a re a  is  a  fu n c tio n  o f  i ts  a c c e s s  to  se rv ic e s  a n d  o th e r  a m e n itie s . 
A c c e s s  to  se rv ic e s  is  m e a s u re d  b y  w h e th e r  th e  c o u n ty  w a s  a d ja c e n c y  to  a  m e tro p o li ta n  a re a  in  
1983 ( re p re s e n te d  as a  0/1 d u m m y  v a r ia b le )  a n d  th e  lo g  o f  its  p o p u la t io n  d e n s ity  in  1980 . T h e  
g ro w th  p o te n tia l  o f  a  c o u n ty  m a y  a lso  d e p e n d  o n  th e  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  i ts  re s id e n ts  c o m m u tin g  
o u ts id e  th e  c o u n ty  to  w o rk . F in a lly , b e c a u s e  th e  G re a t P la in s  h a s  i ts  o w n  u n iq u e  c h a ra c te r is tic s , 
a  d u m m y  v a r ia b le  in d ic a te s  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  th e  c o u n ty  w a s  in  th e  P la in s .
A  se rie s  o f  d e m o g ra p h ic  v a r ia b le s  c a p tu re s  th e  e ffe c ts  o f  rac e , e th n ic ity , a n d  a g e  o n  th e  
c o m m u n ity  g ro w th  p ro c e ss . T h e  p e rc e n ta g e s  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  c la s s if ie d  a s  B la c k , H is p a n ic , o r  
A m e ric a n  In d ia n  w e re  in c lu d e d  in  th e  e q u a tio n , a s  w a s  th e  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  u n d e r  18 
y e a rs  o f  ag e  a n d  o v e r  62  y e a rs  o f  age . A ll o f  th e  la b o r  m a rk e t  a n d  d e m o g ra p h ic  v a r ia b le s  w e re  
f ro m  th e  1980  C e n su s  o f  P o p u la tio n .
13 Goetz and Debertin (1996) found that farm program payments were negatively associated with population 
change, controlling for a number of farm and industry measures. Van der Sluis and Peterson found a similar 
relationship, although they attributed it to cropland diversion requirements (1998).
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T a b le  A -2 : M e a n  v a lu e s  o f  in d u s tr ia l  a n d  fa rm  s tru c tu re  v a r ia b le s
V a r ia b le  d e sc r ip tio n U n its
S tu d y
c o u n tie s
H ig h -
C R P 1
M a tc h e d
c o u n tie s
L o c a l e c o n o m ic  c h a ra c te r is tic s :
A g r ic u ltu ra l  e m p lo y m e n t, 1980 P c t . 16.7 3 1 .7 2 4 .7 * *
M a n u fa c tu r in g  e m p lo y m e n t, 1980 P c t . 17 .6 5.7 8 4 **
M in in g  e m p lo y m e n t, 1980 P c t . 2 .5 2 . 2 2.3
B u s in e s s  se rv ic e s  e m p lo y m e n t, 1980 P c t . 4 .2 3 .9 4 .2 *
R e c re a t io n  e m p lo y m e n t, 1980 P c t . 4.1 4.1 4 .5 *
S p ec ia l d e v e lo p m e n t d u m m y  v a r ia b le s 2:
P r is o n  c o u n ty  d u m m y 0 / 1 2 . 6 1 . 0 0 . 0
C a s in o  c o u n ty  d u m m y 3 0 / 1 0 .9 0 . 0 1.5
M e a tp a c k in g  p la n t  c o u n ty  d u m m y 0 / 1 1.4 0.5 1 . 0
A g ric u ltu ra l  c h a ra c te r is tic s :
C ro p la n d /a ll  lan d , 1982 P c t . 4 0 .5 4 6 .7 45 .1
I r r ig a te d  fa rm la n d , 1982 P c t . 4 .5 4.3 8 .5 * *
G ra in /to ta l  sa le s  v a lu e , 1982 P c t . 2 9 .5 3 8 .4 3 1 .5 * *
W h e a t/to ta l  sa le s , 1982 P c t . 8 . 8 2 5 .2 1 2 .2 **
L iv e s to c k /to ta l  sa le s , 1982 P c t . 56 .2 51 .5 6 1 .6 * *
G o v t. p a y m e n ts /to ta l  in c o m e , 1 9 81-83 P c t . 1 . 6 6 . 0 2 .6 **
C R P  e n ro llm e n t- to -c ro p la n d , 1991-93 P c t . 8 . 0 21 .3 5 .1**
C R P  p a y m e n ts - to - in c o m e  ra tio , 1 9 91-93 P c t . 1.3 6 .7 0 .8 **
F a rm  sa le s /h o u se h o ld  in c o m e , 1980 P c t . 0 . 8 1.9 1 .4**
F a rm s  w /  sa le s  o v e r  $ 2 5 0 ,0 0 0  in  1982 P c t . 4 .7 5.3 5.8
F a rm s  w /  sa le s  u n d e r  $ 2 0 ,0 0 0  in  1982 P c t . 51 .5 3 5 .7 3 8 .9 *
F a rm e rs  w o rk in g  o ff- fa rm  2 0 0 +  d ay s P ct. 2 8 .0 17.9 2 1 .0 **
Source: 1980 Census of Population, 1982 Census of Agriculture, BEA Income file, and CRP Contracts file.
* and ** indicate that the difference between high-CRP counties and their matched pairs is significantly greater than
0 at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
1 High-CRP counties have an average CRP rental-payment-to-income ratio for 1991-93 exceeding 2.75 percent. Of 
the 1,481 study counties, 195 were high-CRP by this definition.
2 The data reported for all 0/1 dummy variables represent the percentage of observations coded “ 1” rather than the 
mean for expositional ease.
3 In Tunica, MS, a hitherto declining agricultural county, the development of a casino-hotel complex led to a sixfold 
increase in the number of jobs between 1990 and 2000. Because Tunica County was an extreme outlier, a dummy 
variable was included for that county in the study group equations. In addition, a dummy variable reflecting 
Somervel, TX, enters the equation for the entire sample to adjust for its inordinate growth due to the construction of 
a nuclear power plant in an adjacent county.
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T o  m e a s u re  s c e n ic  a ttra c tiv e n e s s , th e  p re s e n c e  o f  h ig h  m o u n ta in s  (0 /1  d u m m y  v a ria b le ) , 
th e  p ro m in e n c e  o f  su rfa c e  w a te r  ( in  lo g a r i th m ic  fo rm )  a n d  fo re s ts  (p e rc e n ta g e  o f  la n d  a re a )  a re  
in c lu d e d  in  a n a ly se s  o f  th e  e n tire  s tu d y  g ro u p . A ls o  in c lu d e d  a re  z -s c o re s  o f  se v e ra l c lim a te  
m e a su re s , in c lu d in g  a v e ra g e  J a n u a ry  a n d  J u ly  te m p e ra tu re , re la tiv e  h u m id ity  in  Ju ly , a n d  su n n y  
d a y s  in  J a n u a ry , a ll o f  w h ic h  w e re  fo u n d  to  b e  a s so c ia te d  w ith  an  a r e a ’s a ttra c tiv e n e s s  
(M c G ra n a h a n , 1999). F o r  th e  m a tc h e d -p a ir  a n a ly s is , th e s e  a m e n ity  m e a s u re s  w e re  re p la c e d  b y  
th e  “ n a tu ra l a m e n ity  sc a le ” d e v e lo p e d  b y  M c G ra n a h a n  (1 9 9 9 )  to  c o m b in e  all o f  th e s e  fa c to rs  in to  
o n e  m e a su re . T a b le  A -3  p re s e n ts  d e s c r ip tiv e  s ta tis t ic s  fo r  th e s e  v a r ia b le s .
T a b le  A -3 : M e a n  v a lu e s  o f  la b o r  m a rk e t, d e m o g ra p h ic , a n d  a m e n ity  v a r ia b le s
V a r ia b le  d e sc r ip tio n U n its
S tu d y
c o u n tie s
H ig h -
C R P 1
M a tc h e d
c o u n tie s
L a b o r  m a rk e t  a n d  lo c a tio n  c h a ra c te r is tic s :
C iv ilia n  e m p lo y m e n t, a g e d  1 5 -64 , 1980 P ct. 6 2 .7 6 4 .9 6 5 .6
W o rk in g  o u ts id e  th e  c o u n ty , 1980 P c t. 19.0 10 .9 12 .9*
U n d e r  12 y e a rs  o f  sc h o o l, a g e d  2 5 -4 4 P c t. 2 3 .4 17 .2 16.5
C o lle g e  g rad s , a g e d  2 5 -4 4 , 1980 P c t. 14.1 16 .9 17.4
M e d ia n  h o u s e h o ld  in c o m e , 1979 $ 12 ,8 4 0 1 2 ,6 2 0 12 ,9 3 6
P o p u la tio n  d e n s ity , 1980 P /s q  m i 24 5 1 0 **
A d ja c e n t  to  a  m e tro p o li ta n  a re a , 1983 0 / 12 41 .3 15.9 2 2 . 6
G re a t P la in s  d u m m y  v a r ia b le 0 / 1 2 27 .1 80 .0 5 9 .5 * *
D e m o g ra p h ic  c h a ra c te r is tic s :
B la c k  p o p u la tio n , 1980 P c t. 7.1 0 . 6 0 .4
H is p a n ic  p o p u la tio n , 1980 P c t. 4 .2 4 .4 6 .9
N a tiv e  A m e ric a n  p o p u la tio n , 1980 P c t. 1.5 3.3 1.9
P o p u la tio n  u n d e r  18, 1980 P c t. 2 9 .7 2 9 .8 29 .3
P o p u la tio n  o v e r  62 , 1980 P c t. 18.2 19.3 19.7
N a tu ra l  a m e n ity  c h a ra c te r is tic s :
H ig h  m o u n ta in s  d u m m y  v a r ia b le 0 / 12 7 .4 5.6 1 0 . 8
W a te r/ to ta l  a re a  (x  10) L o g -2 . 1 . -6 .5 - 6 . 2
L a n d  in  fo re s t P c t. 2 6 .7 3 .7 8 .5**
Ja n u a ry  d a y s  w ith  su n  (x  10) Z -s c o re 1 . 8 5.2 5 .4
Ja n u a ry  te m p e ra tu re  (x  10) Z -s c o re -1 .9 -8 .3 -6 . 1 *
Ju ly  h u m id ity  (x  10) Z -s c o re 2.3 9 .7 7 .1 * *
Ju ly  te m p e ra tu re  (x  10) Z -s c o re -2 . 6 -4 .8 -5 .0
N a tu ra l  a m e n itie s  sc a le  (x  10) Z -s c o re -3 .6 -7 .2 - 6 . 6
Source: 1980 Census of Population and McGranahan (1999).
* and ** indicate that the difference between high-CRP counties and their matched pairs is significantly greater than
0 at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
1 High-CRP counties have an average CRP rental-payment-to-income ratio for 1991-93 exceeding 2.75 percent. Of 
the 1,481 study counties, 195 were high-CRP by this definition.
2 The data reported for all 0/1 dummy variables represent the percentage of observations coded “ 1” rather than the 
mean for expositional ease.
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Evidence from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances
Abstract
The 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances provides robust information on the 
financing of small businesses including an overview of their firm’s organization, financial 
characteristics, and credit use. Information from the survey is used in this study to compare the 
financial characteristics of metro and rural small businesses. While many financial 
characteristics are similar, rural small businesses do own more land and depreciable assets, and 
have lower inventory and other current assets when compared with urban firms. Rural firms 
have relatively similar access to technology and financial services, although utilization varies. 
Both metro and rural small businesses rely on a wide variety of sources for financing, although 
rural small businesses have significantly more mortgages, loans from shareholders, and other 
types of loans, but fewer credit cards. Nonparametric rank order statistical methods were 
required because normality assumptions were violated due to asymmetric distribution of small 
firms.
Keywords: business, finances, rural, small, survey
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Rural Small Business Finance -
Evidence from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances
During revision of North Central Regional Research Project NC221, committee members 
identified rural business finance as one of four high priority areas of future research. In the past, 
agricultural economists have emphasized agricultural finance from farm, agribusiness, and 
financial institution perspectives (Barry and Robison). Economists have explored many aspects 
of small business finance, in general (Petersen and Rajan). Western Regional Research Project 
W167 was organized to explore rural finance issues from the development perspective.
However, those studies did not provide in-depth analyses of rural small business financial 
management as their specific focus was on development finance and the appropriate role of 
public support programs. Moreover, the project was not renewed. Drabenstott and Meeker state, 
“Rural capital markets have not been widely studied, but many analysts believe that rural 
borrowers face less competitive markets, with fewer capital suppliers, and fewer financial 
products and services.” Thus, a gap in rural small business finance research appears to exist at 
the present.
The purpose of this article is two-fold. A primary goal is to introduce newly available 
data from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances. This periodic Federal Reserve Bank 
survey provides robust information on the financing of small businesses including an overview 
of the firms’ organization, financial characteristics, and credit use. The survey is the most 
comprehensive source of such information; no other source provides the breadth and detail of 
information for a nationally representative sample of small businesses (Bitler, Robb, and 
Wolken). An appealing feature of this survey is the delineation of rural and metro respondents. 
1Research on rural small business finance has been difficult in the past due to data limitations. 
Hopefully, ready access to rural small business financial data will stimulate additional 
investigation on the performance of rural capital markets and small business finance.
A second goal of this study is to present an overview of rural small business finance and 
delineate comparisons with metro small business firms. Counter to conventional wisdom, 
anecdotal evidence and the results of several case studies, rural small businesses are found to 
face equally competitive financial markets, have ready access to modern financial products and 
services, and possess similar capital structures relative to their metro counterparts.
Following sections of this article describe the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances 
including the survey’s history, content, sampling procedure utilized, and procedures for access. 
An overview of rural small business finance is then presented with comparisons made to metro
documentation of the Survey refers to the distinction as urban and rural. However, the actual screening is on 
Census Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) which are defined as an area with more than 50,000 inhabitants. The 
term urban is generally reserved for places exceeding 2,500. Thus, the term metro is more exact and used in this 
article. Less inhabited areas will be referred to as rural as a synonym of non-metro since it is widely recognized 
within the profession. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer who provided this clarification.
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The Survey of Small Business Finances
The Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) is conducted by the Federal Reserve 
Bank and collects demographic and financial information from 3,561 for-profit, nonfinancial, 
nonfarm small businesses (less than 500 employees) who were in business in the United States at 
the end of 1998. Similar surveys have been conducted in 1987 and 1993. Working papers, 
methodological documentation, codebooks, and full public datasets (SAS or PDF) are available 
online:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/nssbftoc.htm 
Information collected in the survey includes:
- Demographic information on the owners and characteristics of the firm including SIC, 
MSA, and Dun & Bradstreet industry classifications;
- Inventory of firm’s deposit and savings accounts, leases, credit lines, mortgages, loans 
and other financial services. For each financial service, the supplier is identified;
- Characteristics of financial service suppliers including type (e.g., bank, individual), 
method of conducting business, patronage, and reasons for choosing source;
- Experience in applying for credit in the past 3 years;
- Experience with trade credit and equity injections;
- Firm’s income and balance sheet; and
- Credit history, credit scores for both firm and owners, and Herfindahl index of 
concentration.
The sample for the survey was drawn from the Dun & Bradstreet Market Identifier file 
which represents approximately 93 percent of full-time business activity. Sampling was done 
according to a two-stage stratified random sample. In the second stage, small businesses with 
more than 20 employees and minority-owned firms were oversampled to ensure their numbers 
would be sufficient for statistical testing. An overall response rate of 33 percent was obtained. 
Appropriate sample weights are included in the public dataset.
Bitler, Robb, and Wolken summarize key survey findings. Over 83 percent of the small 
businesses had less than 10 employees and over one-half were organized as sole-proprietorships. 
The primary activity for 43 percent of the firms was business or professional services. 
Commercial banks were the primary supplier of financial services and 55 percent reported 
having loans, capital leases, or lines of credit at year end. Trade credit was used by 60 percent 
of small businesses in 1998, but interest rates were quite high; 2 percent a month was not
small business peers. Finally, an overview of rural small business finance and selected
comparisons with metro small business peers are derived from the 1998 Survey of Small
Business Finances.
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uncommon. Three-fourths of the firms used computers, primarily to access the internet, 
inventory management, and bookkeeping.
Data from this survey have been used to explore lending practices of rural banks involved 
in mergers (Walraven) and portfolio decisions of small agribusinesses (Holmes and Park). 
Walraven presents a table of summary statistics that compares demographic and financial 
characteristics of rural and metro small businesses. He concludes that rural small businesses are 
older, have greater sales and assets, experienced fewer business and personal bankruptcies, and 
have been denied trade credit less frequently.
Rural Small Business Finance
Historically, the financial performance of credit markets and small businesses in rural 
areas has been a topic of active professional discourse. At the center of the debate is whether or 
not gaps exist in rural financial markets. Edelman notes that: 1) rapid concentration of bank 
assets due to merger activity may limit lending to rural businesses, 2) financial market 
regulations impose greater costs to smaller lenders that are characteristic of rural communities, 3) 
rural borrowers with unique credit needs (large amount, start-up, unfamiliar venture) face greater 
difficulty obtaining credit, 4) rural equity markets are unorganized and virtually nonexistent, 5) 
rural infrastructure is difficult to finance, and 6) financing of housing construction and ownership 
is more difficult in rural areas. Barkema and Drabenstott expand on the difficulties rural areas 
have maintaining fundamental physical and social infrastructure including roads, utilities, and 
educational and health services. They proceed to highlight the impending need to invest in 
digital communication infrastructure. Markley and McGee conducted several detailed case 
studies in Arkansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, and North Carolina and found that credit gaps 
exist in all regions of the country, but are especially acute in rural areas. They proceed to offer 
several recommendations for improving the effectiveness of development finance programs that 
utilize public funds.
Other studies have not found significant shortfalls in rural small business financial 
markets. Surveys of small businesses in Arkansas and Illinois found adequate availability of 
debt and equity capital (Gruidl, Lamberson and Johnson). Shaffer and Pulver (1985) compared 
capital market performance in thinly and densely populated areas of Wisconsin and concluded 
they functioned relatively well for small businesses in both locations. In a later study, Shaffer 
and Pulver (1990) found that availability of capital is not a widespread problem and no one type 
or stage of business had difficulty acquiring capital.
Two comprehensive assessments of rural small business finance was undertaken in 1997. 
First, USDA published its assessment, Credit in Rural America. The report concluded that rural 
financial markets work reasonably well but those with low incomes, low skills, and lack of 
collateral have particular problems with access to credit and financial services. The report goes 
on to state that any public financial market failures are neither endemic to nor epidemic in rural 
America. Therefore, policies which provide untargeted subsidies to a broad range of rural lenders 
or borrowers are unlikely to be cost effective. A conference organized by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City came to a similar conclusion (Drabenstott and Meeker). Conference
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participants reviewed the importance of capital to the rural economy, discussed shortcomings in 
those markets, and identified opportunities to improve access to capital for rural borrowers. A 
consensus was that rural businesses have a smaller menu of products and often pay more for 
access to capital. This is due in part to the limited and declining supply of loanable funds, bank 
consolidation, and undeveloped equity markets in rural areas. Expanded secondary markets were 
identified as a source of increased liquidity, but development has been slow. Technology and 
globalization will likely diminish the geographical impediments in rural financial markets.
Also in 1997, the Rural Policy Research Institute (RUPRI) convened a rural finance 
taskforce. The taskforce found most rural borrowers with relatively routine credit needs are well 
served by existing lenders. However, borrowers with large debt capital needs, borrowers 
needing debt capital for start-up businesses, and borrowers needing debt capital for businesses 
unfamiliar to their lenders can expect difficulties in obtaining the credit they request.
Past studies evaluating the performance of rural financial markets have not provided 
definitive assessments primarily because they relied on selected localized information, case 
studies, and anecdotal observations. Comprehensive financial survey information may alleviate 
these past shortcomings and provide the necessary quantitative data for statistical testing and 
extrapolation.
Financial Characteristics of Rural Small Businesses
In general, both metro and rural small businesses in the sample were strong financially 
(Table 1). On average, they were profitable, liquid, and solvent. Accounts receivable and 
inventory comprise nearly a third of total assets. Roughly 10 percent of assets are held in the 
form of cash. Land is a minor asset for most small businesses, whereas the average small 
business has a large investment in equipment. Trade financing in the form of accounts payable 
represents nearly a fourth of small business total financing.
An appealing feature of the SSBF for purposes of this study is the ability to distinguish 
between metro and rural small businesses who participated in the survey. Screening firms using 
the MSA/non-MSA variable yielded 2,782 metro and 779 rural firms, respectively. This sort 
formed the basis for the following comparative analyses in this article.
Traditional parametric statistical analyses that compare the financial characteristics of 
metro and rural small businesses proved futile because the data violated assumptions of 
normality. A common feature of small business financial data is the presence of many small 
firms. The majority of firms contained in the dataset are of relatively small size (as measured by 
either sales, total assets, or number of employees). However, larger firms are also present, but 
fewer in number, thus creating a long right tail when modeling the distribution function. 
Classifying the largest firms as outliers failed to restore normality. Further, no clear demarcation 
for selecting outliers was evident.
Initial t-tests of mean financial characteristics found few significant differences between 
metro and rural firms, despite high statistical power as evidenced by a large number of
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observations and a sizable difference in mean values. Using Shapiro-Wilk and Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov tests, normality of the probability distribution function was readily rejected (SAS 
Institute Inc.). Efforts to transform the data into a normal distribution were unsuccessful. 
Therefore, the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank order method was used for statistical testing. 
Essentially, the Wilcoxon method determines whether two samples of financial data (metro vs. 
rural) have arisen from the same probability distribution function. Among linear rank statistics, 
Wilcoxon scores are locally most powerful for identifying location shifts of the distribution (SAS 
Institute Inc.). Standard deviations are reported in the following tables, but readers are advised 
against using traditional t-test’s for significance tests due to non-normality of data.
Even with the more general Wilcoxon statistical test, rural and metro small business firms 
were found to have few differences in financial characteristics. As shown in Table 1, rural small 
businesses were found to have statistically lower levels of inventory and other current assets and 
higher levels of land and depreciable assets. All other financial characteristics, including sales, 
costs of doing business, corporate taxes paid, and liabilities were not statistically different 
between metro and rural small businesses.
With respect to financial organization, the majority of firms are organized as sole 
proprietorships. Surprisingly, less than 6 percent of small businesses were organized as 
partnerships. Rural firms are significantly more likely to be organized as sole proprietorships as 
opposed to corporations. Rural firms may have access to fewer sources of equity capital.
Financial Accounts
Metro and rural small businesses both rely on a wide variety of sources for financing 
(Table 2). Surprisingly, rural firms utilize each source just as frequently and to the same degree 
as their metro counterparts.
Just about all metro and rural firms have a checking account with an average balance of 
$30,000. Savings accounts are far less frequent with only 22 percent of firms using one. Nearly 
half of metro and rural firms use an owner’s or business credit card for transaction financing, 
although statistically, rural firms use both credit cards less frequently.
Firms in poor financial condition and those with limited access to capital often have 
multiple (split) credit lines to bridge their financial needs. The vast majority of metro and rural 
firms (over 80 percent) in this survey patronize one creditor. The average credit limit ranges 
from $144,470 for rural firms to $377,316 for metro firms, but the difference is not statistically 
significant. The actual amount borrowed on both lines is approximately one-half. The majority 
of these lines do require a guaranty, but not collateral.
Rural small businesses do rely more on mortgage financing as a source of capital than 
metro small businesses. The average balance of mortgages supporting rural small businesses is 
$160,686. Rural and metro small businesses utilize vehicle loans as a source of capital to the 
same extent (20 percent of firms). The average vehicle loan balance exceeds $25,000.
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Neither metro nor rural small businesses utilize equipment financing extensively. Small 
business equipment is often so specialized with minimal salvage value that financing is difficult 
to obtain. Moreover, many small business equipment manufacturers may not have the financial 
capacity to offer financing programs.
Over one-fourth of rural and metro small businesses received loans from stockholders. 
Average loan size ranged from $108,523 for metro firms to $150,313 for rural firms. Rural firms 
do statistically utilize other types of loans to a greater extent than metro firms do. This may be 
related to rural firm’s relatively greater investment in land and depreciable assets. Moreover, 
the majority of rural firms are organized as sole proprietorships, and transactions costs associated 
with personal forms of credit (e.g. home equity loans, loans from relatives, etc.) maybe lower for 
sole proprietors.
In addition though, credit options in rural areas may be more limited. Thus, rural firms 
would be expected to rely more heavily on mortgages, other loans, and larger stockholder loans 
than shorter-term financing such as credit cards, that metro small businesses do. When financial 
services are limited, small business owners often draw on personal forms of credit to finance 
either investment or operations. Thus, reliance on mortgage, shareholder and other loan types by 
rural small businesses could be construed as an indicator of inefficient financial markets in rural 
areas. If rural financial markets were as efficient as metro markets, rural small businesses would 
be provided with and optimally use a full range of financial products.
Financial markets are presumed to be most efficient when a large number of financial 
institutions compete against each other. A common measure of financial market competition is 
the Herfindal index which is created by taking the percentage market shares of each firm in the 
market, squaring them, and summing.. In this survey, rural small businesses operated in regions 
of statistically lower bank concentration as compared with metro small businesses. With less 
competition, banks have less incentive to supply a breadth of financial products to risky small 
businesses. However, this lower concentration does not apparently lead to lower frequency or 
amounts of credit as rural firms appear to utilize loan products equal to or even to a greater 
degree than metro firms. As described in the next section, access to financial services is also on 
par with metro small businesses.
Use of Technology and Financial Services
The majority of small businesses do use computers frequently for business purposes 
(Table 3). Most popular uses of a computer are for accounting/bookkeeping, email, and general 
administration. However, use of computers for financial services such as PC banking and online 
credit applications is limited.
Computer usage among rural small businesses significantly lags behind metro firms.
Rural firms are less likely to use computers for banking, email, internet sales, and administrative 
functions. Interestingly, rural firms utilize computers for inventory management more frequently 
than metro firms. Greater distance may preclude vendors from performing that function for 
them.
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Rural and metro firms are frequent users of trade credit and periodic users of transactions 
services. However, few small businesses use other financial services for cash management, 
credit, trusts, or brokerage. Rural firms use a statistically higher rate of credit services and lower 
rate of trust services, although both are infrequent.
With respect to trade credit, metro and rural small businesses purchase over two-thirds of 
their supplies on trade credit. Consequently, it is not surprising that they report an average 
number of twenty trade credit suppliers. Rural firms are offered more frequent cash discounts 
(28 percent). Almost a third of both metro and rural small businesses report repayment of trade 
credit after the due date. The average length of discount is 14 days and the average discount is 
2.41 percent for rural firms and 1.46 percent for metro firms, although the difference is not 
statistically significant.
Creditworthiness
As measured by the Dun & Bradstreet credit score, rural small businesses possess 
statistically higher creditworthiness (Table 4). Metro and rural firms appear to have similar 
frequency of being denied trade credit and bankruptcy. Moreover, rural small businesses are 
statistically less likely to be delinquent on business obligations, but more reluctant to apply for 
mortgage loans for fear of being denied. Over 25 percent of rural small businesses reported 
being delinquent on business obligations.
Conclusions
The 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances provides robust information on the 
financing of small businesses including an overview of their firm’s organization, financial 
characteristics, and credit use. Information from the survey is used in this study to compare the 
financial characteristics of metro and rural small businesses. Nonparametric rank order 
statistical methods were required when comparing dollar values of metro and rural small 
businesses because normality assumptions were violated due to the high concentration of small 
firms.
On average, rural and metro small businesses were strong financially and profitable. 
Accounts receivable and inventory comprise nearly a third of total assets. Rural small businesses 
tended to have lower inventory and other current assets but higher levels of depreciable assets 
and land. Most small businesses utilized computers, primarily for accounting/bookkeeping, 
administration, and email. Primary financial services are used for transactions and trade credit. 
Two-thirds of purchases involve trade credit from more than twenty trade credit suppliers, on 
average.
Both metro and rural small businesses rely on a wide variety of sources for financing, 
although rural small businesses have significantly more mortgages and other types of loans, but 
fewer credit cards. Whereas most metro small businesses were organized as either sole 
proprietorships or corporations, significantly more rural firms were organized as sole
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proprietorships. This, and their larger investment in fixed assets, may partially explain rural 
small business’s greater reliance on mortgage, stockholder, and other types of loans for financial 
capital. Lack of bank concentration in rural areas does not appear to stymie rural small business 
access to either loans or financial services. Rural small businesses possess higher 
creditworthiness, but nearly one-fourth still report being delinquent on business obligations.
Preliminary results of the survey leave a number of unanswered researchable questions. 
First, it is unknown whether the lack of statistical difference between metro and rural firms is in 
fact due to few differences between the two groups or whether high variation and non-normal 
distributions of firm size within each group limits statistical power. Second, the results reflect 
only one observation in time, a period of relatively strong economic prosperity. Additional study 
utilizing either past or future survey results could provide more robust conclusions. Finally, a 
number of interesting financial differences characterizing rural small businesses (emphasis on 
longer term assets, more personal forms of finance, greater numbers organized as sole 
proprietorships, and higher use of computers for inventory management and administration) 
could be delineated with multivariate analysis and resolve unexplained relationships raised in 
this preliminary review of the dataset.
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Table 1. Financial Characteristics
Item Metro Rural
(Weighted
Mean)
(Std.Dev.) (Weighted
Mean)
(Std.Dev.)
Income:
Total sales $1,064,665 2.74 E8 $664,088 8.71E7
Other income 14,764 5.88 E6 10,967 7.72E6Cost of doing business 944,250 2.56E8 561,093
Corp. tax 18,494 5.54E6 23,730 8.00E7
5.46E6
Assets:
Cash on hand 44,212 1.16E7 30,497 1.12E7
A/R 104,155 2.54E7 49,470 8.93E6
Inventory 79,803 3.06E7 69,438** 2.06E7
Other current assets 32,734 1.40E7 21,076* 9.66E6
Investments 14,441 6.03E6 19,529 2.13E7
Land, book value 30,799 1.31E7 39,947* 1.15E7
Depreciable assets 115,259 3.05E7 122,520* 3.17E7
Total assets 426,710 8.05E7 356,711 6.44E7
Liabilities:
Accounts payable 66,306 1.40E7 43,465 1.60E7
Current liabilities 38,431 1.29E7 20,710 7.50E7
Total liabilities 261,456 5.90E7 194,199 
-------- percent--------------
4.50E7
Organization:
Sole proprietor 47 N/A 58** N/A
Partnership 5 N/A 5 N/A
Corporation 45 N/A 33** N/A
*Statistically significant based on Wilcoxon nonparametric linear rank test @ p < .05 
**Statistically significant based on Wilcoxon nonparametric linear rank rest @ p< .01
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Table 2. Source of Financing
Item Metro Rural
(Weighted (Std. (Weighted (Std.
Mean) Dev.) Mean) Dev.)
Have checking account (1 = yes, 2 = no) 1.05 9.01 1.07 9.51
If yes, average balance $31,400 6.98E6 $29,096 7.77E6
Have savings account (1 = yes, 2 = no) 1.77 16.23 1.78 15.27
If  yes, average balance $63,230 1.03E7 $35,819 3.32E6
Use owner’s credit card for business (1 = yes, 2 1.53 19.46 1.57* 18.28
= no)
If yes, average balance
$1,649 4.43E5 $1,011 3.11E5
Use business credit card (1 = yes, 2 = no) 1.65 18.59 1.69* 17.03
If yes, average balance $2,558 3.43E5 $1,255* 1.09E5
Number of credit lines 1.19 17.94 1.10 17.33
If yes, credit limit $377,316 8.03E7 $140,470 1.73E7
amount owed $144,224 2.94E7 68,834 1.16E7
collateral required (1 = yes, 2 = no) 1.57 17.03 1.54 15.78
guaranty required (1 = yes, 2 = no) 1.39 16.81 1.44 15.74
Any mortgages? (1 = yes, 2 = no) 1.89 12.21 1.78** 15.25
If yes, principal owed $279,887 2.56E7 160,686 2.34E7
Motor vehicle loan? (1 = yes, 2 = no) 1.80 15.70 1.79 15.07
If yes, principal owed $25,254 6.10E6 29,310 2.40E6
Equipment loan? (1 = yes, 2 = no) 1.91 11.31 1.88 12.19
If yes, principal owed $81,480 1.20E7 $90,253 2.37E7
Any loans from stockholders? (1 = yes, 2 = no) 1.72 15.94 1.74 16.31
If yes, principal owed $108,573 1.32E7 $150,313 2.57E7
Any other loans? (1 = yes, 2 = no) 1.91 11.46 1.86* 11.09
If yes, principal owed $118,499 1.94E7 $82,275 1.12E7
Herfindahl index
1 = 0 < herfindahl < 1000
2 = 1000 < = herfindahl < 1800
3 = 1800 < herfindahl
23.38 2.38** 13.47
*Statistically significant based on Wilcoxon nonparametric linear rank test @ p< .05 
**Statistically significant based on Wilcoxon nonparametric linear rank test @ p< .01
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Table 3. Use of Technology and Financial Services
Item Metro Rural
Weighted (Std. (Weighted (Std.
Mean) Dev.) Mean) Dev.)
Computer use (1 = yes, 2 = no)
Used computer for business 1.21 15.86 1.35** 17.67
If yes, computer used for:
PC banking 1.84 13.39 1.89* 14.00
Email 1.24 16.34 1.28 15.57
Internet sales 1.63 18.46 1.68 16.10
Credit applications on line 1.94 8.55 1.95 7.66
Inventory management 1.60 18.71 1.54** 17.20
Administration 1.17 14.29 1.23** 14.42
Accounting/bookkeeping 1.17 14.30 1.18 14.31
Financial service use (1 = yes, 2 = no)
Transaction services 1.58 19.23 1.62 17.98
Cash management services 1.94 8.82 1.96 7.58
Credit services 1.97 6.38 1.96* 7.58
Trade services 1.86 13.33 1.91 10.64
Brokerage services 1.95 8.21 1.97 6.42
Used trade credit 1.38 18.97 1.37 17.83
If yes: % of purchases 69.11 1,226 71.14 1,160
Number of trade credit suppliers 25.37 4,442 19.06 2,832
% offering cash discount 20.51 1,199 28.00* 1,338
% balance paid after due date 31.67 1,622 29.02 1,504
Length of discount period 13.97 537 14.20 606
Amount of discount 1.46 125 2.41 70.5
*Statistically significant based on Wilcoxon nonparametric linear rank test @ p< .05 
**Statistically significant based on Wilcoxon nonparametric linear rank test @ p< .01
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Table 4. Creditworthiness
Item Metro Rural
(Weighted
Mean)
(Std.
Dev.)
(Weighted
Mean)
(Std.
Dev.)
Dun & Bradstreet score 
(1 = low risk, 5 = high risk)
3.01 38.72 2.93* 36.04
Denied trade credit (1 = yes, 2 = no) 1.94 9.12 1.96 6.93
Bankrupt in past seven years 
(1 = yes, 2 = no)
1.95 6.07 1.97 5.69
Delinquent on business obligations 
(1 = yes, 2 = no)
1.32 34.15 1.26* 27.62
Didn’t apply for mortgage loan fearing 
denial
1.76 16.65 1.79* 14.96
(1 = yes, 2 = no)
*Statistically significant based on Wilcoxon nonparametric linear rank test @ p< .05
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Credit Counseling and Mortgage Termination by Low-Income Households
Valentina Hartarska and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega *
Abstract
Published research on credit counseling and mortgage termination is surprisingly scarce, 
despite substantial growth in this industry. While the purpose of counseling is to help low-income 
borrowers to handle better debt, and thus prevent default, counseling could also improve these 
borrowers understanding of their financial positions and thus affect prepayment. This paper shows 
that evaluations of counseling programs with a narrow focus on default may miss an important 
effect that counseling may have on prepayment. We use a competing risks framework to study the 
effects on both default and prepayment of a counseling program implemented in several Mid-West 
states. Our results indicate that the default hazard was not lower for the graduates of the 
counseling program but that the prepayment hazard was higher. Overall, counseling seems to 
affect lenders’ profits but the net effect should be evaluated both in terms of prepayment and 
default.
* Valentina Hartarska is Assistant Professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, 
Auburn University, 210 Comer Hall Auburn, AL 36849, Phone: 334-844-5666, Fax: 334-844-5639, Email: 
hartarska@auburn.edu: Claudio Gonzalez-Vega is Professor and Director of the Rural Finance Program, Department 
of Agricultural, Environmental and Development Economics, The Ohio State University, 2120 Fyffe Road, Ag. 
Administration Building, Columbus, OH 43210, Phone: 614-292-6376, Fax: 614-292-7362, Email:
gonzalez.4@osu.edu. Financial support for this research was provided by Paul Taylor & Associates and Fannie Mae.
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Credit Counseling and Mortgage Loan Termination by Low-Income Households
1. Introduction
Many lending initiatives, usually termed “affordable lending” promote lending to low- 
income households by using flexible underwriting guidelines and new mechanisms for risk 
mitigation such as counseling. The ostensible purpose of credit counseling is to help low-income 
borrowers estimate better the amount of debt they would be able to service and, thus, prevent 
default. Counseling, however, improves low-income borrowers’ understanding of their financial 
position as well as their understanding of mortgage loan markets and, therefore, it may have an 
affect on borrower prepayment.
Counseling is a growing industry but little is known about its effectiveness. Previous 
studies have focused primarily on homeownership, default and delinquency, but none have 
explored how credit counseling may simultaneously affect both default and prepayment. 
Understanding how counseling may affect prepayment is important, because the cost of a 
mortgage loan includes a significant premium to compensate for prepayment risk. Some evidence 
suggests that low-income households have higher default hazards but lower prepayment hazards, 
perhaps because their propensity refinance is dampened by income and collateral constraints and 
because, financially, these households are less endowed and less sophisticated (Archer, Ling and 
McGill, 1996; Peristiani, Bennett, Monsen et al., 1997; Goldberg and Harding, 2003).
This paper studies the effect of counseling on both prepayment and default by adopting a 
competing risks approach to mortgage termination. Using data on a counseling program 
implemented in several, mainly Mid-West, states during the 1991-2000 period, we explore the 
idea that counseling affects borrower behavior and that counseled borrowers may default less 
often but may also prepay more often than non-counseled borrowers. The results suggest that the 
counseling program examined indeed graduates borrowers who differ in both prepayment and 
default patterns. The findings also show that a narrow focus on the effects of counseling on default 
may provide misleading results on the overall effectiveness of various programs.
2. Discussion of the literature
At present, there is no systematic body of research that clearly demonstrates that 
counseling influences default on mortgage loans (McCarthy and Quercia, 2000). Studies of 
counseling programs in California in the mid- and late-1970s show both positive and no effect on 
homeownership rates, and a study of counseling programs in Detroit shows long-term negative 
effects of counseling on default (Mallach, 2001). There is evidence that credit counseling 
improves the subsequent use of credit, but this result cannot be readily extended to home purchase 
counseling, which often deals with both the housing and the financing decisions (Mallach, 2001; 
Ellienhausen, Lundquist, and Staten, 2003).
Counseling programs vary by method of delivery, desired outcomes, characteristics of the 
counselors (stake in the transaction and qualifications), and program content. In terms of content, 
credit counseling programs usually include topics on credit issues and financing including 
financing of a home. Homeownership counseling programs include these topics but may add 
topics such as finding a home and maintaining the property. This complexity requires that the 
research methodology be adjusted to address the specific characteristics of each program.
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The lack of published research is also due to data scarcity. In 2000, Price Waterhouse 
Coopers abandoned a project to study the effectiveness of counseling after a feasibility study 
concluded that lenders either do not collect or collect very limited data about borrowers who have 
undergone counseling (Mallach, 2001). Data availability is an important issue because even when 
such data are available, they are often proprietary and, thus, less accessible to external researchers. 
In addition, since many affordable loan programs require counseling as part of the loan 
qualification requirement, is it hard to find an adequate control group.
This is one of the challenges that Hirad and Zorn (2002) encounter in their, to date, most 
comprehensive study on the effectiveness of homeownership counseling. They use a sample of 
40,000 mortgages originated under the Freddie Mac’s Affordable Gold program to assess how 
pre-purchase homeownership counseling affects delinquency rates. As a quasi-control group they 
use loans in the Affordable Goal loans that qualified for exemption from counseling. The qualities 
of these borrowers that made them qualify as an exception may, the authors state, make them 
somewhat different from the counseled borrowers. Hirad and Zone attempt to control for this 
endogeniety by using a nested logit model and find that after this correction counseling still 
decreases the 90 day delinquency rate and that different type of counseling vary in their 
effectiveness.1 However, after these adjustments the study fails to confirm the effectiveness of 
some types of counseling like individual in person counseling and home-study counseling.
Hirad and Zorns’ study focuses on delinquency and uses a logit model, where the 
explanatory variables are controls for counseling, borrower characteristics, and loan and property 
characteristics. Quercia and Watcher (1996) suggest that innovative methodology to study the 
effectiveness of counseling would come from recent developments in the literature on default. The 
modern literature on default views default as the exercise of an option.
According to option-based theory, the decision to terminate the mortgage (through default 
or prepayment) is a purely financial decision, independent of the housing decision. The value of a 
mortgage loan consists of the present value of scheduled payments by a borrower and the value of 
the options granted to the borrower to terminate the mortgage either by prepayment or default. 
When deciding on how to act on the loan obligation, a borrower faces several choices. The 
borrower has the choice to (1) make the payment on the loan and continue in good standing as a 
debtor, (2) pay in full the remaining balance on the loan, by refinancing (prepayment, or call 
option), or (3) surrender the house to the lender in exchange for cancellation of the debt (put, or 
default option). Thus, prepayment and default are two actions that borrowers undertake to increase 
their wealth.
Furthermore, a series of papers developed the theoretical arguments that emphasize the 
importance of the jointness of the prepayment and default options (Kau, Keenan, Muller et al., 
1992 and 1995). At least partially, this development was motivated by the observation that default 
rates predicted by the option theory differed from observed default rates. Failure to exercise the 
default option, researchers reasoned, could indicate that borrowers may expect that this option 
could have even higher value in the future. Moreover, borrowers may not exercise the default 
option when it is in-the-money because they may expect that in the future the prepayment option 
would be more valuable.
1 Without adjustment for endogeniety, Hirad and Zorn (2002) find that delinquency rates were the lowest in individual 
homeownership counseling programs, followed by classroom counseling, with telephone counseling being least 
effective.
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As a result of these theoretical developments, mortgage termination is now being specified 
in a competing risks framework, where the values of the prepayment and default options are 
included and where borrower heterogeneity, trigger events and transaction costs are controlled for 
(Deng, 1997; Deng and Gabriel, 2002; Deng, Quigley and Van Order, 2000; Clapp, Goldberg, 
Harding et al., 2001; Pavlov, 2001; and Archer, Ling and McGill, 2003).
A competing risk approach is appropriate to study the effect of credit counseling because 
counseling may improve the borrowers’ level of financial sophistication, as it introduces concepts 
such as the present value of money and annualized interest rates. As interest rates and property 
values change, borrowers who have undergone counseling may have a better understanding of 
how these changes affect the value of their loan obligations. This better knowledge may improve 
the borrowers’ ability to “price” their options. At the same time, counseling may improve 
creditworthiness of borrowers who already are financially sophisticated and thus more likely to 
prepay. If this is the case, lenders need to be aware that the potential benefit of lower default rates 
must be weighted against the potential cost of higher prepayment rates. Thus, exploring its effects 
on both prepayment and default will most fully account for the consequences of counseling.
3. Description of the credit counseling program
The Community Mortgage Loan Program studied here was part of a larger Community 
Centered Banking program, organized by a major bank in Columbus, Oh to fulfill this bank’s 
CRA requirements and provide financial services to underserved communities. This larger 
program targeted low-to-moderate income households who did not routinely use the banking 
system and who typically were declined loans. The objectives of the Community Centered 
Banking program were to improve the integration of the financial products offered in a community 
and to enhance opportunities available to low-to-moderate income households. The program was 
organized in collaboration with Community Churches and a local consulting firm with experience 
in implementing community outreach programs.2 Potential clients were approached through a 
series of seminars organized by the Community Churches. Through this program, low-income 
households gained access to a full range of banking services—checking and savings accounts, 
student and consumer loans, and educational services.
As the bank learned more about the financial needs of the target population, it identified a 
substantial need for mortgage loans and the Community Mortgage Loan Program (CML) was 
initiated in 1992. The purpose of this program was to provide cost-efficient mortgage loans to 
low-income households, in a fashion profitable to the bank. The program was designed for this 
specific market. Borrowers could get mortgage loans for up to $75,000 with a down payment of 
the lesser than 5 percent of the loan or $1,000 down payment with gifts and grants accepted as 
alternative source of down payment.3 The bank offered eased credit restrictions, one percent 
origination fee, no discount points, the bank could also negotiate to pay mortgage insurance, and 
when applicable, it would pay for counseling services. To cover its costs the bank charged interest 
rate of 150 points above the Fannie Mae 60 days average rate on 80% LTV conforming loans.
2 The community churches and the outreach consulting firm collaborated not only on the CCB project where the bank 
was their third partner but also in other areas such as education, employment, alcohol and substance abuse, healthcare, 
community relations and crime. This collaboration relied on and improved the social capital in the community and 
helped the bank recruit more creditworthy borrowers (Hartarska and Gonzalez-Vega, 2003).
3 In 12 cases, the bank granted loans bigger than $75,000 to customers recruited through the Community Churches.
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A t th e  b e g in n in g  o f  th e  p ro g ra m , c o u n s e lin g  w a s  n o t  a v a ila b le  in  a ll re g io n s , o r  a t a ll t im e s  
in  a re a s  w h e re  th e  b a n k  w a s  o rg a n iz in g  se m in a rs  a n d  o ffe r in g  its  se rv ic e s  a n d  th e re fo re  so m e  
b o r ro w e rs  re c e iv e d  c o u n s e lin g  a n d  so m e  d id  n o t . In  fac t, a c c o rd in g  to  th e  b a n k  re p re s e n ta tiv e s  
c o u n s e lin g  se rv ic e s  w e re  o f fe re d  q u ite  ra n d o m ly  p r io r  to  1996  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  la c k  o f  sy s te m a tic  
a g re e m e n ts  w ith  c o u n se l p ro v id e rs  a n d  b e c a u s e  o f  v a r io u s  p re s s u re s  to  fu lf il l  le n d in g  ta rg e ts .
S in c e  1996  F a n n ie  M a e  b e c a m e  a  p a r tn e r  in  th e  p ro g ra m  b y  o f fe r in g  to  b u y  n o n -d e lin q u e n t lo a n s  
s e a so n e d  fo r  a t le a s t  th re e  y e a rs . S in ce  1996 , c o u n s e lin g  b e c a m e  a n  o b lig a to ry  p a r t  o f  th e  
q u a lif ic a tio n  fo r  m o rtg a g e  lo a n s  w ith  th is  p ro g ra m . A ll b o r ro w e rs  re c ru ite d  th ro u g h  th e  se m in a rs  
o rg a n iz e d  in  c o lla b o ra tio n  w ith  C o m m u n ity  C h u rc h e s  w e re  re q u ire d  to  m e e t  w ith  a  c o u n se l 
p ro v id e r  a t le s t  o n ce .
C o u n s e lin g  w a s  p ro v id e d  b y  th e  C o n s u m e r  C re d it  C o u n s e lin g  S e rv ic e s  (C C S ), an  
o rg a n iz a tio n  w ith  se v era l d e c a d e s  o f  e x p e rie n c e . T h e y  o ffe re d  a  p ro d u c t  b a s e d  o n  p ro x im ity  to , 
a n d  k n o w le d g e  o f, th e  p o te n tia l  c lie n te le . T o  a d d re s s  th e  sp e c if ic  n e e d s  o f  e a c h  b o rro w e r , th e  
a m o u n t o f  c o u n s e lin g  w a s  in d iv id u a lly  d e te rm in e d . E a c h  p o te n tia l  b o r ro w e r  p ro v id e d  p re lim in a ry  
in fo rm a tio n , o n  th e  b a s is  o f  w h ic h  a  c o u n s e lo r  d e te rm in e d  h o w  m a n y  se ss io n s  e a c h  p e rs o n  h a d  to  
a tten d . C o u n s e lin g  in c lu d e d  so m e  tra d itio n a l  to p ic s  su ch  a s  im p ro v in g  s p e n d in g  h a b its , c o rre c tin g  
p ro b le m s  o n  n o n -s u f f ic ie n t  fu n d s  c h e c k s , im p ro v in g  th e  u s e  o f  c re d it, d e b t  c o n so lid a tio n . P o te n tia l  
c lie n ts  d is c u s s e d  w ith  a  c o u n s e lo r  w h e re  th e y  liv e d , w h e th e r  th e y  h a v e  c h a n g e d  jo b  o r  in co m e . 
D e p e n d in g  o n  th e  c lie n t, c o u n s e lin g  c o u ld  la s t  so m e tim e s  u p  to  2  y e a rs .4
S o m e  p a rts  o f  th e  c o u n s e lin g  p ro g ra m  w e re  d if fe re n t  f ro m  th e  tra d itio n a l  c o u n se lin g  
o ffe re d  b y  th e  C C S . O n  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  o f  th e  c o n s u ltin g  f irm  th a t  h e lp e d  b r in g  to g e th e r  
C o m m u n ity  C h u rc h e s  a n d  th e  b a n k , c o u n s e lo rs  fo c u s e d  o n  th e  c a sh  f lo w s  o f  p o te n tia l  b o rro w e rs . 
P o te n tia l  b o r ro w e rs  le a rn e d  h o w  to  k e e p  tra c k  o f  th e ir  l iv in g  e x p e n se s , m e a s u re  th e ir  lev e l o f  deb t, 
a n d  c a lc u la te  w h e th e r  th e  e x p e c te d  m o rtg a g e  lo a n  c o u ld  b e  su s ta in a b le . G ra d u a tio n  f ro m  th e  
c o u n s e lin g  p ro g ra m  w a s  g ra n te d  o n ly  to  th o s e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  w h o , g iv e n  an  in te re s t  ra te  a n d  a  lo a n  
a m o u n t, c o u ld  g e n e ra te  z e ro  o r  p o s it iv e  c a sh  f lo w , b a s e d  o n  a  th o ro u g h  v e r if ic a tio n  an d  
c a lc u la t io n  o f  th e ir  a c tu a l l iv in g  e x p e n se s  a n d  d eb t. L o a n  a m o u n ts  a d ju s te d  b y  th e s e  c r ite r ia  d o  
n o t  a lw a y s  c o rre s p o n d  to  th o s e  re s u ltin g  f ro m  th e  s ta n d a rd  f in a n c ia l  ra tio s  u s e d  as a  s c re e n in g  
d e v ic e .5 H o u s e h o ld s  w h o  c a n n o t b e c o m e  h o m e o w n e rs  d id  n o t  g ra d u a te  f ro m  th e  c o u n se lin g  
p ro g ra m  a n d  w e re  n o t  a b le  to  g e t  m o rtg a g e  lo an . G ra d u a tio n  m a d e  b o r ro w e rs  e lig ib le  to  a p p ly  fo r  
a  lo a n  a t  th e  b a n k  a n d  th e  b a n k  h a d  a  f in a l say  in  w h o  is  g ra n te d  a  c re d it  a n d  w h o  is  d en ied .
T h e  C o m m u n ity  M o rtg a g e  P ro g ra m  a lso  c o m b in e d  c o u n s e lin g  w ith  so m e  f in a n c ia l  
a s s is ta n c e . I f  th e  b o r ro w e r  c o u ld  n o t  a ffo rd  th e  le s s e r  th a n  f iv e -p e rc e n t  o r  $ 1 ,0 0 0  d o w n  p a y m e n t, 
sh e  w a s  g ra n te d  a  c o n s u m e r  lo a n  to  m a k e  th is  p o ss ib le . T h e  e x tra  d e b t w a s  a c c o u n te d  fo r  in  th e  
c a lc u la t io n  o f  th e  h o u s e h o ld  c a sh - f lo w  c o n s tra in ts .
T h e  e x p e r t is e  o f  th e  c o u n se lo rs , c o m b in e d  w ith  a  c o n s e rv a tiv e  a p p ro a c h  to  m a x im u m  
s u s ta in a b le  d e b t e s tim a tio n  c o u ld  b e  im p o r ta n t  a d v a n ta g e s  o f  c o u n s e lin g  in  r e d u c in g  d e fa u lts .
S in c e  th e  p ro g ra m  im p ro v e d  lo w - in c o m e  h o u s e h o ld s  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  w a y  m o rtg a g e  lo a n s  
a ffe c t  th e i r  w e lfa re , c o u n se lin g  m a y  h a v e  a f fe c te d  p re p a y m e n t b e h a v io r  as w e ll.
4 All counseling was pre-purchase counseling, the focus was on the credit side of the mortgage loan and counseling 
did not include topics on responsibilities of homeowners.
5 In the absence of credit scoring methods, the estimation of standard debt ratios and borrower net worth was among 
the most important determinants of creditworthiness, as perceived by the bank. The banks started using credit scores 
only in 1998 and that is why credit scores cannot be used in this analysis.
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4. Methodology
We study the prepayment and default behavior of counseled and non-counseled borrowers 
in a competing risks framework. Prepayment and default are two actions driven by the value of the 
underlying prepayment (call) and default (put) options that borrowers undertake in order to 
increase their wealth. Since by exercising one option the borrower gives up the other, the extent to 
which one option is in the money affects the exercise of the other. For instance, the probability of 
prepayment is a function of the extent to which the default option is in the money. This jointness 
of the two options is captured well in the competing risks framework.
The option-based theory stipulates that when a payment on the mortgage loan becomes 
due, depending on the value of the put and call options, and given transaction costs and trigger 
events, the borrower decides whether to default on the loan, prepay or remain current. Let default 
and prepayment be termination events, and let loans that remain current be observations that were 
censored at the time of data collection. To develop the competing risks model, we first consider a 
hazard function for default and a hazard function for prepayment defined as
X[t; X(t)] = lim h~1P(t < T < t + h | J  = j)  for j=1,2 (1)
j h 0^
where j=1 for default and j=2 for prepayment, T is continuous termination time, x(t), t > 0 is a 
vector of possibly time-dependent covariates, X(t) ={x(u) : 0 < u < t}, that is X(t) is the history of 
the covariates prior to time t. Here Xj [t; X  (t)] represents the instantaneous rate of termination (by
default or by prepayment), given X(t). If only one termination type can occur, that is, if the 
borrower could either prepay or default, then
X[t; X  (t)] = f j X] [t; X  (t)] (2)
j= i
Applying the specification of the Cox model, the termination specific hazard function is
X [t; X (t)] = Xo j (t )exp[Z (t)'P] ] for j=1,2 (3)
Here, Z(t) is a p  derived vector of possibly time-varying covariates defined as a function of X(t), 
where X(t) is left continuous with right hand side limits; the baseline hazard X0 j (t) and the
regression coefficients Pj can vary arbitrary over the termination types, that is, the baseline hazard
of default and prepayment and the estimated coefficients on are allowed to be different as 
required. The overall survivor function S (which is nothing else than one minus the cdf) is defined 
as
S[t;X (t)] = exp - 2  J0 X0 j (u) exp[Z (u)'Pj]du (4)
j=i
The individual pdf  for each termination type is
f j  [t; X (t)] = Xj [t; X (t )]S[t; X (t)] for j=1,2 (5)
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and the overall density function is
f  [t; X  (t)] = / [ t ;  X (t)] + f 2[t; X (t)] (6)
If tyi<... <tjki denote the kj time of type j  termination and Zp denote the regression be function for 
the individual that terminated the loan at j  then the Loglikelihood to be maximized is
LogL (Pi, P2 )  [ e x P [ Z i j ( t  )P} ]  -  Z feR tt, ) e x P [ Z  ^(tji)'P] ]
j=1 l i=1
(7)
k
where p  for j=1,2 are the estimated coefficients and R(ti]) is the set of all individuals who have
not terminated and are still under observation just prior to t. The baseline hazard is eliminated and 
not estimated in this model but it is allowed to vary by termination type, that is, is can be different 
for prepayment and for default. 6
This paper uses the specifications introduced in Deng, Quigley and Van Order (1997 and 
2000) and used in studies on mortgage terminations (Ambrose and Capone, 2000; Pavlov, 2001) 
to measure of the influence of the put and call options on mortgage termination. The first variable 
measures the probability that the put option is in-the-money, that is, the probability that defaulting 
has value, PROBNEQ is defined as:
PROBNEQi k = p r o b ( E < 0) = 0 ( logV,,mi r +t -  log M" j  T i +kivw
k
(8)
where Ei k is the equity in the house for the ith individual, evaluated k periods after origination, 
0(.) is a cumulative standard normal distribution function; Vim is the value of the present
,rnj Ti+ki 2
value of the outstanding loan balance at mT +k market interest rate, w is the estimated variance
from repeat (paired) sales, by state, provided by the Office of Federal Housing Oversight 
(OFHEO). Here, k is the market value of property, purchased at cost Ci at time ti and evaluated
ki months thereafter is
M i,ki C i
I  \
j  ,Ti +ki
V I jT i J
(9)
where the term in parenthesis follows a log-normal distribution and I j T is an index of house 
prices by state j, at time . The higher the value of PROBNEQ, the higher the probability that the 
equity in the house is negative and the more profitable it is to default.
6 For more detail see Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) and Crowder (2001).
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To study whether the call option influenced prepayment, this paper uses PREPAY, which 
is equal to one minus the ratio of the present value of the unpaid mortgage balance at the current 
market interest rate mT +k , relative to the value discounted at the contract interest rate. That is
PREPAY,k = 1 --
Vi
1,mj Ti +ki
~V*
where
V,, = Z
p.
v,; = z
1 (1 +  m Tt + ki )
P
1 (1 + rt)t
(10)
(11)
(12)
and where P, is the monthly payment in principal and interest and ri is the contract interest rate. 
Positive values would indicate that the option is out-of-the-money, that is, it is not to the 
borrower’s advantage to prepay; the option will move in-the-money as it becomes negative 
because negative values indicate that contract rate is greater than the market rate and it will be 
more profitable to refinance.
Other time-variant events that affect termination are divorce and shocks to income 
(Quigley and Van Order, 1995; Elmer and Seelig, 1999). These have been characterized as trigger 
events because they may trigger termination through either default or prepayment. We control for 
this event through a time-variant dummy SHOCK.
The time-invariant covariates included are value of the loan, monthly payment and value of 
the house which serve as a proxy of borrower income level and wealth; mortgage insurance paid 
by the bank, property type (single unit, two-unit), origination year and loan-to-value ratio at time 
of origination, which serves as a proxy for the down payment.7
This specification controls for the characteristics of the loan contract, property type and 
shock events. A significant coefficient on the dummy for counseling on both prepayment and 
default, after controlling for these variables, would indicate that lenders should not ignore the 
effect of counseling on prepayment.
We define loans in default as loans for which foreclosure took place, loans tied up in 
bankruptcy procedures and/or loans for which a loss was realized, as well as loans coded as DIL, 
(dead-in-lieu or foreclosure), and PRS (presale/short sale). Default is recorded at a time when 
these loans became 90 days overdue. Regarding prepayment, the information available is less 
detailed. The bank has not collected information on the reason for prepayment—refinancing or 
moving. This may affect the results. Clapp, Goldberg, Harding et al. (2001) report that 
prepayment due to refinancing and prepayment motivated by a move are affected by different 
factors.
7 Monthly pay and loan amount are not necessarily equivalent and are both included because although most of the 
loans were 30 year fixed rate loans, on occasion the bank granted fixed-rate loans for 10, 15, 20 or 25 years. No 
information on these outliers was available, however.
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5. The Data
The complete dataset consists of 1,338 loans originated from 1992 to 2000 to borrowers 
mainly in Ohio but also to few borrowers from Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, and West 
Virginia (Table 1). Thirty two observations were deleted because origination data were 
incomplete, thus the final number of loans is 1306. The sample of loans originated prior to 1996, 
when counseling was offered in some and regions and period, contains 919 loans. Of them, 410 
are to counseled borrowers and 509 are to non-counseled clients (Table 1). During the period from 
1996 to 2000, when counseling was obligatory for everybody recruited through the Community 
Mortgage Loan Program, the bank originated 387 loans.
Repayment records in the sample expand up to nine years with most loans still outstanding. 
The characteristics of the portfolio presented in Table 2. It is organized in two panels, with Panel 
A presenting data for the complete portfolio and Panel B presenting data for all loans that were 
originated prior to 1996. Clearly, using only loans originated prior to 1996 is better because the 
relatively random availability of counseling makes the group of non-counseled borrowers an 
appropriate control group for two reasons. First, counseling was not mandatory during the period 
so counseling was done somewhat random, and second, these loans were given in relatively 
similar economic conditions (Graph 1 and Graph 2).
This data are interesting to analyze because counseling is often made obligatory for some 
low-income categories of borrowers as a precondition of getting a mortgage loan and there are 
rarely adequate control groups. Analysis of sample of loans originated prior to 1996 and the 
portfolio with loans originated after 1996 allows to study not only whether counseling affects 
termination but also what are the consequences of making counseling mandatory to everybody in a 
population of low-income borrowers, who do not use the banking system and who may be 
categorized as less creditworthy.
Comparison of the characteristics of the loan performance of the two groups (Table 2) 
reveals that their prepayment patterns prior to 1996 do not differ while default is slightly higher 
for the counseled borrowers. If non-counseled borrowers are compared to all counseled borrowers 
including those who received a loan after 1996, when it became mandatory to have counseling, 
then counseled borrowers have lower both default and prepayment rates.
Table 3 presents definition of the variables used in the analysis. The database does not 
contain information of borrower characteristics, which have been found to be related to 
termination. Loan amount, house value and monthly payment and LTV at time of origination are 
used to proxy the level of housing that each household could afford and may, to a limited extent, 
proxy for household income and wealth. Loan-to-value at origination can be used to control for the 
amount of down payment and as argued by Pavlov (2001) for borrower heterogeneity as he 
includes LTV in the group of variables that proxy borrower heterogeneity.
Table 4, presents the means and standard errors of the variables in the portfolio by various 
groups—all loans, loans originated prior to 1996, counseled borrowers and non-counseled 
borrowers. The data reveal that the two groups are very similar. As expected, the probability of 
negative equity has increased at the time of default for all groups. Counseled borrowers had higher 
values of the probability of negative equity at both time of origination and at time of termination. 
As expected, loans were repaid when the value of the prepayment option was in-the-money, as
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indicated by the negative sign of this variable at termination. Compared to non-counseled 
borrowers, counseled borrowers started with higher value of the prepay option.
A trigger event was the reason for default for half of the counseled borrowers, while only 
thirty percent of the non-counseled borrowers reported a shock event as a reason for default. This 
difference may be due incorrect reporting of the reason for delinquency, as it may be that 
counseled borrowers were more involved in the program and more willing to reveal why they are 
defaulting on the loans as opposed to non-counseled borrowers who did not interact with 
counselors and were less comfortable sharing the reasons of their default. A larger percentage of 
the non-counseled borrowers qualified for a loan without mortgage insurance (9.7 percent, versus 
5.9 percent). Mortgage loans were used to buy mainly single family houses, with counseled 
borrowers buying slightly higher proportion. Perhaps because of this both loan amount and house 
values are slightly higher for the counseled borrowers. On average they also paid slightly lower 
down payment.
The data on origination indicates how the program progressed as the share of the non- 
counseled borrowers decreases while that of counseled increases. Overall, the differences in the 
loan and property characteristics of the two groups are every similar and indicate that the non- 
counseled borrower could serve as a reasonable control group.
6. Discussion of Results
The results show that counseling must be evaluated in terms of its effects on both 
prepayment and default. Borrowers who graduated from the counseling program did not 
necessarily have lower default hazard but they do seem to have a higher prepayment hazard.
Model 1 in Table 5 presents the results of a model which uses data for all loans prior to 
1996. Although counseled borrowers did not default less than non-counseled borrowers (the 
coefficient on the default hazard is insignificant), they did prepay more-often than non-counseled 
borrowers.
The same result is obtained with data from the complete portfolio in a Model 2 in Table 5, 
which also includes dummies for years of origination prior to 1996. Counseled borrowers still 
prepay more often but this result is attenuated, as the coefficient is now significant only at 10 
percent (p value is 0.09). The effect of counseling on prepayment seems to be affected by the fact 
that all borrowers recruited though church seminars since 1996 were asked to go through 
counseling. In this model, counseled borrowers default less often but the coefficient is not 
statistically significant.
Results also indicate that the competing risks framework is appropriate to study mortgage 
termination by low-income households. As expected, and in both models, default is affected 
positively and significantly by the probability of negative equity and by the value of the 
prepayment option. Also as expected, and in both models PREPAY affects significantly 
prepayment, that is, the more negative PREPAY is, the more profitable it is to prepay. As, 
expected, the sign on PROBNEQ is negative in Model 2 but it is not significant. Surprisingly, this 
sign is positive and significant in Model 1, indicating that borrowers prepaid when the probability 
that their equity was negative was high. This result could indicate that low-income borrower’s 
reputation was so important that they might have taken a financial loss (by selling the house or 
refinancing) and prepaying even if defaulting for pure financial considerations would have been 
wealth increasing.
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A s e x p e c te d , th e  v a r ia b le  th a t  a p p ro x im a te s  th e  e f fe c t  o f  t r ig g e r  e v e n ts  is  s ig n if ic a n t in  th e  
d e fa u lt  h a z a rd  in  b o th  sp e c if ic a tio n s , a n d  i t  is  e v e n  n e g a tiv e  a n d  s ig n if ic a n t in  th e  p re p a y m e n t 
h a z a rd  o f  M o d e l 2. B o rro w e rs  w h o  b o u g h t  s in g le  fa m ily  o r  tw o -fa m ily  h o u s e s  w e re  le s s  l ik e ly  to  
d e fa u lt  b u t  p ro p e r ty  ty p e  d id  n o t  a f fe c t  p re p a y m e n t h a z a rd .
F o r  th e  lo w - in c o m e  b o r ro w e rs  w h o  p a r t ic ip a te d  in  th is  p ro g ra m , la rg e r  lo a n  s iz e  in c re a s e d  
th e  c h a n c e  th a t  th e  m o rtg a g e  w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  te rm in a te d . T h e  v a lu e  o f  th e  p ro p e r ty  
d id  n o t  a f fe c t  p re p a y m e n t  b u t  b o r ro w e rs  w h o  b o u g h t  h ig h e r  v a lu e d  h o u se s  h a d  lo w e r  d e fa u lt  
h a z a rd s . L o a n s  w ith  h ig h e r  m o n th ly  p a y m e n t w e re  le s s  l ik e ly  to  b e  p re p a id  b u t  m o re  l ik e ly  to  
b e c o m e  in  d e fa u lt. I t  is  w id e ly  a c c e p te d  th a t  lo a n s  w ith  h ig h e r  L T V  ( sm a lle r  d o w n  p a y m e n t)  a re  
m o re  r isk y . T h e  re su lts  s h o w  th a t  th is  w a s  n o t  th e  c a se  fo r  th e  lo w - in c o m e  p e o p le  in  th e  p o rtfo lio . 
O n  th e  c o n tra ry , b o r ro w e rs  w ith  h ig h e r  L T V  h a v e  lo w e r  d e fa u lt  h a z a rd s . S u c h  re s u lt  is  n o t 
u n u s u a l in  le n d in g  to  lo w - in c o m e  h o u se h o ld s . M F Is  h a v e  d isc o v e re d  th a t  in  lo w - in c o m e  
c o m m u n itie s , th e  p o o re r  th e  b o rro w e r , th a t  is  th e  le s s  c o lla te ra l  h e /s h e  h as , th e  m o re  im p o r ta n t  th e  
r e p u ta tio n  b e c o m e s  a n d  th is  t ra n s la te s  in to  fe w e r  d e fa u lts  in  th e  p o o re s t  o f  th e  p o o r  ( r e f  w ith  th e  
m o s t  p re s t ig io u s  jo u rn a l ) .8
6. Conclusions
P u b lis h e d  re s e a rc h  o n  c re d it  c o u n s e lin g  a n d  m o rtg a g e  te rm in a tio n  is  su rp r is in g ly  sca rce , 
d e sp ite  su b s ta n tia l  g ro w th  in  th is  in d u s try . C o u n s e lin g  is  u s u a lly  a n  o b lig a to ry  re q u ire m e n t fo r  th e  
lo w - in c o m e  to  q u a lify  fo r  a  m o rtg a g e  lo an , i t  is  e x p e n s iv e , a n d  i t  is  im p o r ta n t  to  u n d e rs ta n d  h o w  it 
a ffe c ts  m o r tg a g e  te rm in a tio n . T h is  p a p e r  sh o w s  th a t  e v a lu a tio n s  o f  c o u n s e lin g  p ro g ra m s  w ith  a 
n a rro w  fo c u s  o n  d e fa u lt  m is s  im p o r ta n t  an  e f fe c t  th a t  c o u n se lin g  m a y  h a v e  o n  p re p a y m e n t. W e  
u s e  a  c o m p e tin g  r isk s  f ra m e w o rk  to  s tu d y  th e  e ffe c ts  o n  b o th  d e fa u lt  a n d  p re p a y m e n t o f  a 
c o u n s e lin g  p ro g ra m  im p le m e n te d  in  se v e ra l M id -W e s t  s ta te s. T h e  p a p e r  sh o w s  th a t  th e  d e fa u lt  
h a z a rd  w a s  n o t  lo w e r  fo r  th e  g ra d u a te s  o f  th e  c o u n s e lin g  p ro g ra m  b u t  th a t  th e  p re p a y m e n t h a z a rd  
w a s  h ig h e r . O v e ra ll, c o u n s e lin g  se e m s  to  a ffe c t  le n d e r s ’ p ro f its  a n d  th is  e ffe c t  sh o u ld  b e  e v a lu a te d  
b o th  in  te rm s  o f  p re p a y m e n t a n d  d e fa u lt  h a z a rd s  a n d  th e  h ig h e r  p re p a y m e n t h a z a rd  sh o u ld  b e  
a c c o u n te d  fo r  th ro u g h  an  a d e q u a te  p re p a y m e n t  p rem iu m .
8 Borrowers in our sample are less wealthy, with the average loan amount of $46,000, than borrowers in the 
comparable study of the effect counseling on delinquency by low income borrowers conducted by Hirad and Zorn, 
(2002), where the average loan for comparable period (1993-1998) was $94,000.
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Table l.Geographic distribution of the loans by year
Y e a r O H F L IN K Y M I W V
1992 1 0 0 b
1993 1 0 0
1994 1 0 0
1995 89.1 3 .9 2.3 0 . 0 1 . 6 3.1
1996 86 .5 1.9 1.9 5.8 0 . 0 3 .8
1997 9 2 .0 0 .9 1 . 8 1 . 8 0 . 0 3 .6
1998 8 9 .4 2 . 1 0 . 0 4.3 1 .1 3 .2
1999 93.1 1.4 1.4 2 . 8 0 . 0 1.4
a all loans to non-counseled borrowers are to borrowers from Ohio. 
b percentage of loans originated in the current year.
T a b le  2. D e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  P o r tfo lio .
Panel A: All loans in the portfolio
L o a n  S ta tu s N o n -C o u n s e le d  
N u m b e r  %
C o u n s e le d  
N u m b e r  %
T o ta l
N u m b e r  %
In  D e fa u lt 42 8.3 55 5 .6 97 7 .4
P re p a id 81 15.9 124 12.7 205 15.7
C u rre n t 3 8 6 75 .8 800 8 1 .7 1004 7 6 .9
T o ta l 509 1 0 0 9 7 9 1 0 0 1306 1 0 0
Panel B: Loans originated prior to 1996
L o a n  S ta tu s N o n -C o u n s e le d  
N u m b e r  %
C o u n s e le d  
N u m b e r  %
T o ta l
N u m b e r  %
In  D e fa u lt 42 8.3 38 9.3 80 8 . 8
P re p a id 81 15.9 63 15.4 124 13.6
C u rre n t 3 8 6 75 .8 3 0 9 7 5 .4 705 7 7 .6
T o ta l 509 1 0 0 4 1 0 1 0 0 9 0 9 1 0 0
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Table 3. Variable definition
Variable Name Description of the Explanatory Variables
COUNSELED
PROBNEQ
PREPAY
1 if the borrower was counseled, zero otherwise
Probability that the borrowers’ equity is negative (as in Deng et al., 2000) 
1 minus the ratio of discounted value of the remaining mortgage payment 
at current market rate to the discounted value of the remaining mortgage 
payment at the contract interest rate
LTV
SFHOUSE
DFHOUSE
SHOCK
Loan-to-value ratio at time of origination 
Property is a single unit house 
Property is a double unit house
1 if the borrower has indicated that a shock event has caused the
LAMOUNT
HVALUE
MPAY
delinquency, 0 if no reason was indicated 
Loan amount
House value at time of loan origination
Monthly payment on the loan (principal and interest, does not include 
insurance and taxes)
NMI
ORIGIN92
ORIGIN93
ORIGIN94
ORIGIN95
1 if the loan did not need/have mortgage insurance 
The mortgage was originated in 1992 
The mortgage was originated in 1993 
The mortgage was originated in 1994 
The mortgage was originated in 1995
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Table 4. Means and standard errors of the regression variables by groups
A ll lo a n s  (p r io r  
to  1996)
N o n -
c o u n s e le d
C o u n se le d  
(p r io r  to  1996)
C o u n se le d  
(a ll lo a n s )
A ll lo a n s
C O U N S E L E D 21
P R O B N E Q
0 .4 4 6
(0 .4 9 7 )
0 .3 8 6 0 .261 0 .5 8 8 0 .6 2 9
0 .6 1 0
(0 .4 8 8 )
0 .4 2 7
P R O B N E Q b
(0 .3 4 7 ) (0 .2 4 3 ) (0 .3 9 8 ) (0 .4 0 1 ) (0 .3 7 0 )
0 .5 2 0 0 .361 0 .6 9 6 0 .7 3 8 0 .5 7 5
(0 .3 3 0 ) (0 .2 7 9 ) (0 .2 9 4 ) (0 .2 6 1 ) (0 .3 2 7 )
P R E P A Y -0 .0 3 6 0 . 0 2 1 -0 . 1 0 1 1 -0 .131 -0 .0 7 3
P R E P A Y b
(0 . 1 0 1 ) (0 .0 5 3 ) (0 . 1 0 2 ) (0 .0 8 3 ) (0 .1 0 5 )
-0 .161 -0 .1 1 5 -0 .2 1 9 -0 .2 0 9 -0 .1 7 2
(0 . 1 0 1 ) (0 .0 6 8 ) (0 .1 0 5 ) (0 .0 9 3 ) (0 .0 9 6 )
R E A S O N c 0 .4 0 0 0 .3 0 9 0 .5 0 0 0 .491 0 .4 1 2
(0 .4 9 3 ) (0 .4 6 8 ) (0 .5 0 7 ) (0 .5 0 5 ) (0 .4 9 5 )
N M I 0 .0 7 7 0 .0 9 7 0 .0 5 9 0 .1 6 5 0 .1 3 4
(0 .2 6 7 ) (0 .2 9 6 ) (0 .2 3 5 ) (0 .3 7 2 ) (0 .3 4 1 )
S F H O U S E 0 .9 2 9 0 .9 1 7 0 .9 7 8 0 .961 0 .9 4 3
(0 .2 5 7 ) (0 .2 7 6 ) (0 .2 2 0 ) (0 .1 9 4 ) (0 .2 3 3 )
T F H O U S E 0 .0 4 2 0 .0 4 7 0 .0 3 6 0 .031 0 .0 3 8
(0 .2 0 2 ) (0 .2 1 3 ) (0 .1 8 6 ) (0 .1 7 4 ) (0 .1 9 0 )
L A M O U N T 4 4 ,2 3 7 4 3 ,2 9 5 4 5 ,6 9 2 4 8 ,8 0 6 4 6 ,3 2 6
(1 1 ,2 4 2 ) (1 0 ,6 1 9 ) (1 2 ,1 9 2 ) (1 4 ,8 0 6 ) (1 3 ,4 7 7 )
H V A L U E 4 8 ,2 0 4 4 7 ,2 2 6 4 9 ,0 8 3 52 ,6 9 3 5 0 ,5 6 4
(1 2 ,2 2 3 ) (1 2 ,0 9 4 ) (1 2 ,2 4 4 ) (1 5 ,5 6 1 ) (1 4 ,4 4 9 )
M P A Y 3 4 9 .9 6 9 3 2 6 3 7 9 3 9 4 3 7 0
(9 .8 5 2 ) (8 1 ) (1 0 6 ) (1 1 9 ) ( 1 1 2 )
L o g  (R IN C IP A L ) 1 0 .6 5 7 1 0 .6 4 0 1 0 .6 8 0 10.731 10 .6 9 6
(0 .3 0 5 ) (0 .2 8 0 ) (0 .3 7 2 ) (0 .3 4 7 ) (0 .3 2 8 )
L o g (H V A L U E ) 1 0 .7 4 6 1 0 .7 2 7 1 0 .7 6 2 10.823 10 .7 8 7
(0 .2 8 7 ) (0 .2 7 5 ) (0 .3 0 1 ) (0 .3 2 9 ) (0 .3 1 1 )
L o g (M P A Y ) 5 .8 1 4 5 .7 5 2 5 .9 8 2 5 .9 3 2 5 .863
(0 .3 1 6 ) (0 .2 8 0 ) (0 .3 2 8 ) (0 .3 4 3 ) (0 .3 3 6 )
L T V 9 1 .8 4 3 9 1 .8 8 3 9 2 .4 8 8 9 1 .6 3 6 9 1 .7 2 8
6 .4 3 4 (5 .8 9 6 ) (7 .8 9 8 ) (8 .1 3 6 ) (7 .6 9 6 )
O R IG IN  92 0 .2 1 4 0 .3 2 6 0 .0 7 7 0 .0 3 9 0 .151
(0 .4 1 1 ) (0 .4 6 9 ) (0 .2 6 6 ) (0 .1 9 4 ) (0 .3 5 8 )
O R IG IN  93 0 .3 6 6 0 .5 2 9 0 .1 7 9 0 .0 8 9 0 .2 5 8
(0 .4 8 2 ) (0 .4 9 9 ) (0 .3 7 9 (0 .2 8 5 ) (0 .4 3 8 )
O R IG I  N  94 0 .2 4 9 0 .1 4 0 0 .4 2 6 0 .2 1 8 0 .1 8 3
(0 .4 3 3 ) (0 .3 4 7 ) (0 .4 9 5 ) (0 .4 1 3 ) (0 .3 8 7 )
O R IG IN  95 0 .1 6 8 0 . 0 2 0 0 .3 2 4 0 .1 6 0 0 .1 2 3
(0 .3 7 4 ) (0 .0 4 4 ) (0 .4 6 8 ) (0 .4 1 3 ) (0 .3 2 9 )
a all values are at origination unless indicated otherwise 
b values at termination 
c values at default
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Table 5. Maximum likelihood estimates of a competing risks model of mortgage 
prepayment and default
Model 1 Model 2
Default________ Prepay________Default
COUNSELED 0.817 0.255 0.346 -0.291
(4.31) (0.91) (167) (0.92)
PROBNEQ 2 .1 1 7.062 -1.195 8.824
(1.91) (4.54) ( 1 1 1 ) (6.55)
PREPAY -13.953 18.411 -23.255 18.488
(-7.28) (5.04) (-11.37) (6.05)
NMI -1.073 -0.432 0.153 -0.227
(2.76) (0.74) (0.41) (0.38)
SHOCK -0.549 1.678 -0.654 1.793
(145) (6.99) (2 .10) (8.23)
LTV -0.078 -0.667 -0.006 -0.706
(145) (3.08) (0 .1 1 ) (3.23)
SFHOUSE -0.129 -1.822 0.060 -1.826
(-0.17) (2.91) (0.06) (3.05)
TFHOUSE 0.189 -1.552 -0.329 -1.966
(0 .2 1 ) (185) (0.31) (2.30)
LAMOUNT 11.214 33.032 18.359 40.446
(3.92) (186) (2.499) (2.33)
HVALUE -2.007 -42.107 0.265 -44.076
(0.78) (2.45) (0.14) (2.51)
MPAY -8.693 10.338 -18.217 3.649
(4.90) (3.30) (9.53) (1.75)
ORIGIN92 -8.499 -2.776
(16.46) (5.56)
ORIGIN 93 -6.877 -2.034
(15.43) (4.39)
ORIGIN 94 -5.089 -0.790
(14.07) (2.08)
ORIGIN 95 -4.040 -0.385
(9.96) (-1 .00)
Log likelihood 
No. observations
-1967
919
-2552.987
1306
t-values are in the parentheses.
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Figure 1. Fannie Mae 60 days averages for 30 year fixed rate mortgages.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Y ear
Figure 2. Housing price index by state.
H o u s i n g  Pr i c ing i ndex
Y ear
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Risk Sharing and Incentives
with Crop Insurance and External Equity Financing
Sangtaek Seo, David J. Leatham, and Paul D. Mitchell*
Abstract
Farmers have increasingly been procuring external equity financing through either written 
or verbal business arrangements. Passage of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act in 2000 has 
resulted in widespread adoption of crop insurance among farmers. Crop insurance changes 
farmers’ production decisions, so that investors providing external equity may want to adjust the 
equity financing contract to account for these changes. This paper uses a principal-agent model to 
determine optimal risk sharing and incentives under crop insurance and external equity financing. 
Results show that with the introduction of crop insurance, the investor’s optimal equity financing 
contract requires that the farmer bears more risk in order to have the incentive to work hard.
Key words: risk sharing, incentives, crop insurance, equity financing, principal agent model.
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Risk Sharing and Incentives with Crop Insurance and External Equity Financing
Arrangements such as land leases, partnerships and other corporations, and vertical 
integration have been the traditional channels through which farmers have obtained external 
equity, i.e. equity capital procured from the non-farmers or other sources than retained earnings. 
Sharecropping is probably the most common use of external equity (Allen and Lueck). Based on 
the 1988 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey, Canjels reported that almost one- 
third of all leased acres were sharecropped in 1988. In many of these arrangements, the landlord 
provides the land and/or input costs for farming and shares the output with the farmer.
Partnerships and other forms of corporations comprised 10% of farms in 1997 and these farms 
accounted for 48% of total farm product sales (USDA-NASS). The members of the partnership 
and corporation might share the output or dividends according to the investment share or the share 
of the operating costs. To use external equity, a farmer needs a contract in verbal or written form 
with the investor providing the external equity. For example, 90% of surveyed California wine 
grape farmers used contracts in 1999, with 70% using written contracts only, 11% using oral 
contracts only, and 9% using both contract types (Goodhue, Heien, and Lee). These contracts 
typically specify the investment share, input use, and/or output shares. The investor may provide 
additional economic incentives to derive the best effort of the farmer.
Farmers have several risk management alternatives available, such as crop insurance, 
futures and options, and government programs. Among these subsidized crop insurance is widely 
adopted by the farmer. As a result of purchasing crop insurance, a farmer may change production 
decisions depending on his risk attitudes and the fairness of insurance (Ahsan, Ali, and Kurian). 
The most studied production decisions include land allocation and variable input use, especially 
nutrients and pesticides (Babcock and Hennessey; Horowitz and Lichtenberg; Smith and 
Goodwin). To maintain focus, this paper only considers land allocation as a production decision. 
Also including variable input use makes the model rather complicated without little gain in terms 
of conceptual understanding.
Because crop insurance also benefits the external equity investor, he may require crop 
insurance or specify a certain level of coverage in the contract (Leatham, McCarl, and 
Richardson). The investor may also want to adjust the contract to induce the farmer’s best effort, 
since crop insurance may change the farmer’s production decisions and hence the risks both the 
farmer and the investor face. To better understand these relationships, we develop a principal- 
agent model of the contract between the external equity investor and the farmer when the farmer 
can purchase crop insurance.
Many principal-agent models of sharecropping and crop insurance have been developed, 
primarily focused on the design of optimal contracts to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard 
(e.g. Canjels and Volz; Chambers; Nelson and Loehman; Skees and Reed; Ahsan, Ali, and Kurian; 
Raviv; Allen and Lueck). Principal-agent models have also been used to analyze agricultural 
financing contracts (e.g., Wang, Leatham, and Chaisantikulawat; Santos). Wang, Leatham, and 
Chaisantikulawat studied risk sharing and incentives with external equity financing, but did not 
incorporate risk management tools such as crop insurance or risk averse investors.
This paper first determines an investor’s preferences for crop insurance based on the 
farmer’s production decisions and then determines the optimal contract between the investor and 
the farmer with crop insurance and external financing. Those aims can be done with several 
assumptions about risk attitudes and fairness of insurance. For production decisions with crop 
insurance, we assume a risk neutral insurer and a risk averse farmer. For the contract between the
100
i n v e s t o r  a n d  t h e  f a r m e r ,  w e  a s s u m e  a  r i s k  a v e r s e  i n v e s t o r  a n d  a  r i s k  a v e r s e  f a r m e r  w i t h  f a i r  a n d  
u n f a i r  i n s u r a n c e ,  a n d  u s e  t h e  c a s e  o f  n o  i n s u r a n c e  f o r  c o m p a r i s o n .
Farmer Production Decisions with Crop Insurance
F o l l o w i n g  A h s a n ,  A l i ,  a n d  K u r i a n ,  w e  d e v e l o p  a  m o d e l  o f  a  r i s k  a v e r s e  f a r m e r  a l l o c a t i n g  
t o t a l  a c r e a g e  M  t o  e i t h e r  a  r i s k y  c r o p  o r  a  s a f e  ( r i s k - f r e e )  c r o p .  D e n o t i n g  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  t h e  r i s k y  
c r o p  a s  t h e  a c r e a g e  A, t h e n  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  t h e  s a f e  c r o p  i s M -  A. T w o  s t a t e s  o f  n a t u r e  e x i s t — a  
g o o d  s t a t e  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  1 -  p  a n d  a  b a d  s t a t e  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  p . T h e  f a r m e r  p u r c h a s e s  
a c t u a r i a l l y  f a i r  c r o p  i n s u r a n c e  t h a t  p a y s  t h e  i n d e m n i t y  aF(A) w h e n  t h e  b a d  s t a t e  o c c u r s ,  w h e r e  a i s  
t h e  i n s u r a n c e  c o v e r a g e  l e v e l  a n d  F ( - )  i s  t h e  r e v e n u e  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  f o r  r i s k y  c r o p  a c r e a g e  (F  
> 0 ) .  T h e  f a r m e r  p a y s  a n  i n s u r a n c e  p r e m i u m  ayA r e g a r d l e s s  o f  t h e  s t a t e ,  w h e r e  yis t h e  p e r  a c r e  
p r e m i u m  f o r  t h e  r i s k y  c r o p .  F o r  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  t o  b e  f a i r ,  t h e  p r e m i u m  ayA m u s t  e q u a l  t h e  e x p e c t e d  
i n d e m n i t y  paF(A).
G i v e n  t h e s e  a s s u m p t i o n s ,  f a r m e r  i n c o m e  i n  t h e  g o o d  s t a t e  i s  Y1 =  F (A)  +  r(M -  A)  -  ayA, 
w h e r e  r i s  t h e  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  f o r  t h e  s a f e  a s s e t  (M  -  A) ,  a n d  Y2 =  aF (A)  +  r(M -  A)  -  ayA i n  t h e  b a d  
s t a t e .  T h u s  r a n d o m  f a r m e r  i n c o m e  Y i s :
y  = j Yi = F(Af  )  + r(M  -  Af  )  -  af yAf  P r  = 1 - p
[Y2 = af F(Af  )  + r(M -  A f  )  -  af  yAf  P r  = p  ’
w h e r e  t h e  s u b s c r i p t  f d e n o t e s  t h e  o p t i m a l  a c r e a g e  a l l o c a t i o n  a n d  c o v e r a g e  l e v e l  t h e  f a r m e r  c h o o s e s  
w i t h  f a i r  i n s u r a n c e .
F o r  a c t u a r i a l l y  u n f a i r  i n s u r a n c e ,  t h e  i n s u r e r  c o l l e c t s  m o r e  t h a n  t h e  f a i r  p r e m i u m  t o  p a y  
i n s u r a n c e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t s  a n d  e a r n  a  n o r m a l  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n .  T h i s  a d d i t i o n a l  p a y m e n t  i s  
t y p i c a l l y  a  p r o p o r t i o n a l  a d j u s t m e n t  c o f  t h e  f a i r  p r e m i u m ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  u n f a i r  p r e m i u m  i s  ( 1  + 
c)paF(A). A s s u m i n g  a  c o m p e t i t i v e  m a r k e t ,  t h e  i n s u r e r ’ s  e x p e c t e d  p r o f i t  w i l l  e q u a l  z e r o .  G i v e n  
u n f a i r  i n s u r a n c e ,  t h e  r i s k  a v e r s e  f a r m e r  c h o o s e s  t h e  c o v e r a g e  l e v e l  a a n d  r i s k y  c r o p  a c r e a g e  A t o  
m a x i m i z e  e x p e c t e d  u t i l i t y  U( - )  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  i n s u r e r ’ s  z e r o  p r o f i t  c o n d i t i o n .  T h u s  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
a n d  c o n s t r a i n t  a r e
( 2 )  m a x  (1  -  p ) U ( Y,)  + pU ( Y2 )
au , Au
( 3 )  auYAu -  au (1  +  C)pF  ( Au )  =  ^
w h e r e  t h e  s u b s c r i p t  u d e n o t e s  t h e  o p t i m a l  c o v e r a g e  l e v e l  a n d  a c r e a g e  a l l o c a t i o n  w i t h  u n f a i r  
i n s u r a n c e .
Rearranging the first order condition for the insurance coverage level au gives
U '(Y1) =  1 - p (1 + c )  =  1 - p - p c <  1
U '(Y2) (1 - p ( 1  +  c )  1 - p - p c + c
Since income in the good state exceeds income in the bad state (Y > Y2), then the optimal
coverage level must be less than one (au < 1 ), implying that the farmer does not buy full insurance, 
but self-insures some of the risk.
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Rearranging the first order condition for risky crop acreage Au gives the relationship
(5) F '(Au) >
r
1 - P -a uPc
Using equation (5) and results from Ahsan, Ali, and Kurian gives F '(Au) > ---------------
1 - P - a u Pc
r
> F ' (An) > ------= F '(A f ) = F ' (A0), where An, Af, and A0 respectively denote optimal risky crop
1- P
acreage for a risk averse farmer without insurance, a risk averse farmer with fair insurance, and the 
risk neutral farmer. As a result, optimal risky crop acreage for a risk averse farmer with fair 
insurance is the same as for a risk neutral farmer, but exceeds optimal risky crop acreage for a risk 
averse farmer without crop insurance, which must exceed optimal risky crop acreage for a risk 
averse farmer with unfair insurance: A0 = Af > An > Au. Let ^and O  respectively denote the mean 
and variance of revenue from the risky crop. Assuming both are proportional to risky crop 
acreage, the optimal acreage ordering gives the following ordering for the revenue means and 
variances: ju0 = /uf  > /un > /uu and o 02 > o 2n > o f > o f , as summarized in Table 1.
dF ’(A )Applying standard comparative static methods to equation (5) gives---- > o and
dau
dF'(A ) dA dA
— ^  > 0 , which imply —-  < 0 and —-  < 0. Thus land allocated to the risky crop decreases
dc dau dc
with the insurance coverage level and the unfairness of crop insurance. With a convex loading 
factor instead of linear loading factor, this effect likely is stronger (Chambers and Quiggin).
Equity-Investor’s Preferences for the Farmer’s Purchase of Crop Insurance
When crop insurance is fair, a risk neutral investor prefers that the farmer purchase crop 
insurance because the farmer then behaves as a risk neutral farmer and maximizes expected 
revenue. This is consistent with the farmer’s preferences, since with fair crop insurance, the 
farmer’s expected revenue increases as a result of the acreage reallocation and downside risk is 
eliminated. With unfair crop insurance, a risk neutral investor prefers that the farmer not buy crop 
insurance, since the associated acreage reallocation causes a decrease in the farmer’s expected 
revenue. However, for a range of premium loads, the farmer prefers to buy crop insurance since 
he is willing to tradeoff the decrease in downside risk with the decrease in mean revenue. When 
crop insurance is fair and the investor is risk averse, the investor prefers that the farmer purchase 
crop insurance because, after the associated acreage allocation, the insurance increases mean 
revenue and decreases downside risk. When crop insurance is unfair and the investor is risk 
averse, the investor’s preferences for the farmer’s purchase of crop insurance are unclear, 
depending on the investor’s trade off between expected revenue and variance relative to the 
farmer’s tradeoff. Table 2 summarizes the investor’s preferences for crop insurance.
Principal-Agent Model of an External Equity Investor and a Farmer
We develop a principal-agent model of the contractual relationship between an external 
equity investor and a farmer. This model extends the work of Wang, Leatham, and
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Chaisantikulawat by assuming a risk averse investor and allowing the farmer to purchase crop 
insurance. We also incorporate the farmer’s production decision under crop insurance as 
presented in the previous section.
An investor and a farmer share the cost M  of an investment using external equity and 
retained earnings. The farmer’s share is 8 and the investor must invest the remainder (1 -  8), 
where 0 < 8<1. The business outcome is stochastic as a result of uncertain production or market 
price or both. For convenience1, the output price is normalized to one and only agricultural output 
q is stochastic. The farmer’s effort level (e) is a continuous choice variable for the farmer that 
affects the distribution of output. For notation, denote the conditional probability density function 
for output as f  (q | e) . The output distribution when the farmer exerts effort level e1 first order 
stochastically dominates the output distribution when the farmer exerts effort level e0 < e1. The 
crop output is observable, but not the farmer’s effort, which creates a moral hazard problem.
Because effort causes disutility for the farmer, the farmer is willing to tradeoff effort and 
the associated shift in the output distribution. However, because of the effect of effort on the 
output distribution, the investor prefers the farmer to exert higher effort, since effort has no direct 
cost to the investor. To induce the farmer to exert the desired effort, the investor must create a 
contract that gives the farmer the appropriate incentive. However, the contract can only 
compensate the farmer based on the observable output, not on the unobservable effort. Denote 
this compensation as t(q), where q depends on the farmer’s effort level e, the crop insurance 
coverage level a(q) , and stochastic yield 0 .
From the investment, the investor and the farmer’s payoff are proportional to output q 
minus the compensation t(q) to the farmer. The investor and the farmer’s profit function are
(6) n p = (1 -  8)(q(e, 0 ,0 ) -1  (q))
(7) n a = 8 (q(e, 0 ,~ ) -1  (q))+t (q ) ,
where the subscripts p and a denote the investor (principal) and the farmer (agent).
Following standard assumptions, we assume farmer’s effort cost function c(e) is separable 
from the utility function, where c' > 0 and c" > 0 (Laffont and Martimort). So that the farmer is 
willing to take the contract, the investor must ensure the farmer’s expected utility with the contract 
equal or exceeds his reservation utility U , the expected utility from his next best option. This 
participation or individual rationality constraint (IRC) is
(8) { U (na) f  (q 1 e)dq -  c(e) > U .
1 We also suppress the subscript in risky crop acreage, A, from now on.
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Since farmer effort is unobservable, the investor must also ensure that the contract gives 
the farmer the incentive to exert the desired effort. This incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) 
requires that if the farmer accepts the contract, his expected utility when exerting high effort 
equals or exceeds his expected utility with low effort. Mathematically, this ICC can be expressed 
as follows:
( 9 ) arg maxe
f  U(na ) f  (q \ e)dq -  c(e) .
As specified, condition (9) cannot be implemented when solving the investor’s optimization 
problem. The First Order Approach (Laffont and Martimort) is a commonly used to replace this 
global condition with a local condition consisting of the first order condition for problem (9):
(10) f  U'(n„) - ^ - f e  (q | e)dq -  c'(e) = 0.
J de
Thus the investor’s problem is to find the contractual compensation t(q) and effort level e that 
maximize his expected utility V(-) of income np:
(11) m ax fV (nP) f  (q \ e)dq ,t (q),e ■> F
subject to the individual rationality constraint (8) and the incentive compatibility constraint ( 10).
To derive an explicit solution, we introduce the Linear-Exponential-Normal (LEN) model 
of Spremann. We also introduce crop insurance by linking to the previous model and assuming a 
random yield of 6  = F (A) + r(M -  A) , where 6  has as normal distribution with mean j  and 
variance a 2, 6 ~ N ( j ,a 2) (Weninger and Just). Thus, the outcome with crop insurance is:
(1 2 ) q(e,9,6) = e + 6 +1 (6,6) -  p(6 ),
where I (6 ,9 ) is the indemnity (max[(6 -6 ),0 ]) and p(6 ) is the insurance premium. Equation 
(12) shows the conditional distribution of output given effort. When crop insurance is actuarially 
fair, the insurance premium equals the expected indemnity, and when it is unfair, the insurance 
premium exceeds the expected indemnity: p (6 ) > E[ I  (6 ,6 )].
A farmer compensation scheme is linear in the outcome. The investor pays a fixed 
payment and a varying payment that is proportional to output: t(q) = w + bq. Note that w can be 
negative, implying that the farmer must make some initial investment or expenditure, but b will be 
positive, otherwise the farmer will have no incentive to exert any effort. A convex quadratic 
function is used for the farmer’s effort cost function: c(e) = e2, implying increasing marginal 
disutility for effort.
A constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function is used for both the investor and 
the farmer. Since yield has a normal distribution, the investor’s income also has a normal 
distribution. In addition, since the compensation function is a linear transformation of yield, the
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farmer’s income also has a normal distribution. As a result, both the investor’s and the farmer’s 
expected utility can be expressed in terms of the mean and variance of their respective incomes:
(13) E [ U )] = E[np]-  0.5ap var(np)
(14) E[U(na)] = E[na] -  0.5a, var(n )
where ap and aa are the coefficients of absolute risk aversion for the investor and farmer. 
Optimal Contract for External Equity Financing with Crop Insurance
For the model as specified, farmer profit is:
(15) n a = s\e + 0 + I(9 ,0 ) - p(0) + w + b(e + 0 +1(9,0) - p(0 ))]-e2.
Based on the specified model, the mean and variance of farmer profit is then:
(16) E[na ] = [(1 -5 )b  + 5]p + 5e + (1 -5)(w  + be) -  e2
(17) Var (na) = [5 + (1 -S')b]2a 2,
where a 2 = Var (0 +1 (0 , d )) represents the truncated variance, since crop insurance removes 
downside risk, so that profit variance with crop insurance is less than without crop insurance. 
Given the compensation parameters w and b, the farmer chooses his effort to maximize his 
expected utility:
(18) max [5 + (1 -5)b]p  + 5e + (1 -5)(w  + be)- e2 - 0.5aa[5 + (1 -5 )b ]2a 2.e
Solving the first order condition for this problem gives the farmer’s optimal effort e*:
(19) e * = 0.5[5 + (1 -5)b].
Substituting this effort level into individual rationality constraint (8) and solving for w gives:
(20 ) w* = - ^ { U  -  [5 + (1 -  5)b]p -  0.25[5 + (1 -  5)b]2 *(1 -  2 a „ a )}.
The investor’s optimal fixed compensation w increases in the farmer’s reservation utility U and 
decreases in the farmer’s expected profit. If the risk aversion parameter, a a, and variance term,
a 2, are positive and small enough, the fixed compensation decreases with the introduction of crop 
insurance because it has an effect of decreasing risk, thus making (1 -  2aaa 2) increase.
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The investor’s profit with crop insurance is:
(2 1 ) n  = (1 -S )  (1 - b)(e + G + I(G,G)- p(G))- w .
Based on the specified model, the mean and variance of the investor’s profit is:
(2 2 ) E (ftp ) = (1 -S)[(1 -  b)( e + p) -  w]
(23) Var (np) = (1 -S )2(1 -  b)2a 2
Expected profit with and without insurance are equal because the insurance is fair. The variance 
depends on farmer’s risk attitude, the existence of crop insurance, the fairness of crop insurance, 
and insurance coverage level. Substituting equations (22) and (23) into the investor’s objective in 
equation (1 1 ) and simplifying gives:
(24) Max
f (1 -S )  [(1 -  b) (0.5[S + (1 -S )  b] + p)]
-  {U -  [S + (1 -  S)b]p -  0.25[S + (1 -  S)b]2 * (1 -  2aaa 2)  
-0 .5ap (1 - S ) 2(1 -  b f a 2
Solving the first order condition for b gives:
0  + 2 a pCT2)
(25) b  =
1 - S 0 + 2(a + a p  )a2)
- S
Using this result, several comparative static results can be obtained. The variable
* db*compensation rate b depends inversely on the farmer’s share of investment: ---- < 0 . This occurs
dS
because the greater the farmer’s share of the investment, the greater farmer’s incentive to exert 
effort. The variable compensation rate b decreases with the farmer’s risk aversion because the
db*
farmer needs to bear less risk to motivate high effort: -----< 0. On the other hand, as the
da„
investor’s risk aversion increases, the variable compensation rate b also increases, db
da„
> 0 ,
because the investor wants to share more risk with farmer. As the variance of the outcome
increases, the variable compensation rate b* decreases,
da"
<0 , because a smaller b* gives the
farmer relatively less risk. Thus overall, crop insurance leads to the increase in variable 
compensation because it reduces the risk. Because of this effect of crop insurance, the investor 
must increase the farmer’s risk share from the contract to motivate high effort. In effect, crop 
insurance insulates the farmer from sufficiently powerful incentives to motivate high effort, so the 
investor compensates by increasing the variable compensation rate to increase the farmer’s risk
106
share. Furthermore, we know that the variable compensation rate increases with an increase in the
insurance coverage level because —  < 0 and > 0 .
da dA
(26) e = 0.5
Substituting the optimal b* into equations (19) and (20) gives the optimal w* and e*: 
(  + 2a pa 2)
(  + 2(aa +a p ) ° 2)
(27) w* =
(1 - S )
U -
(1 + 2 a pa 2)
(  + 2(aa + a p ) ° 2 )
\  f
U -  0.25
J
(1 + 2 a pa 2)
(  + 2(aa + a p ) ° 2)
l1 -  2a 2)
Again, several comparative static results can be obtained. The optimal level of effort 
increases with the investor’s risk aversion and decreases with the farmer’s risk aversion and the
d * d * d *variance of outcome: ----- > 0 , ------< 0, and — -  < 0 . Because the farmer’s compensation is
dav daa da,
highly dependent on output, the farmer must exert more effort relative to the case without
dA
insurance. Also the insurance coverage level increases the optimal level of effort because —  < 0
da
d da2 0and----- > 0 .
dA
dw
da„
The optimal level of the fixed compensation w decreases with the investor’s risk aversion 
< 0. This means that the risk averse investor wants to share more risk with the farmer, and
thus decreases the fixed compensation. The optimal level of the fixed compensation increases
dw 
da
with the variance of outcome > 0 , resulting in the increase with the insurance coverage level.
dwIt also increases with the farmer’s risk aversion-----> 0 . Thus the investor needs to increase the
daa
fixed compensation to induce the participation of the risk averse farmer in the contract. The
optimal level of fixed compensation also increases with the farmer’s investment share
dw
~dS
> 0 .
The farmer with high investment share would be willing to exert effort, thus the investor increases 
fixed compensation instead of variable compensation. Similarly, the optimal level of fixed
dw*
compensation increases with the farmer’s reservation utility, —— > 0 , and decreases with
dU
dw*
expected revenue,-----< 0. Expected revenue is positively correlated with its variance so that the
dju
fixed compensation decreases with expected revenue to share more risk.
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Crop insurance leads to increase the optimal level of effort through the increase in variable 
compensation, and decreases the optimal level of fixed compensation. Thus it induces more risk 
sharing between the investor and the farmer.
Implications
Comparing these results to those of Wang, Leatham, and Chaisantikulawat, we find that 
the risk neutral or risk averse investor induces more effort, pays more variable compensation, and 
pays less fixed compensation with crop insurance regardless of fairness of crop insurance. In 
other wards, crop insurance increases a farmer’s optimal effort e, and for the optimal contract, 
crop insurance increases the slope b and decreases the intercept w. Figures 1 through 5 summarize 
these results graphically.
In Figure 1, the compensation schedule under crop insurance shows lower fixed payment w 
and higher variable payment rate b compared to the case without insurance. This new 
compensation scheme leads to more risk sharing between the investor and the farmer in order to 
induce more effort from the farmer. Also these effects become stronger with an increase in the 
insurance coverage level, as illustrated in figure 2. As expected, a higher coverage level reduces 
the downside risk further so that the farmer can afford to bear more risk. Thus a higher coverage 
level leads to a higher variable compensation b and effort level e, and a lower fixed compensation 
w than with a lower coverage level. Figure 3 shows how the fairness of crop insurance also affects 
the optimal compensation scheme. Fair insurance decrease more variance than unfair insurance, 
which gives afford for the farmer to bear more risk. So the contract with more variable 
compensation and effort, and less fixed compensation is needed.
As the investor’s risk aversion increases, the variable compensation b and effort level also 
increase e and the fixed compensation w decreases because the investor would prefer to share 
more risk with the farmer, as shown in figure 4. On the other hand, as the risk aversion of farmer 
increases, opposite results are obtained as shown in figure 5, because the farmer would not accept 
the contract if the variable compensation is too high.
Conclusion
This paper determines the investor’s preferences for crop insurance according to risk 
attitude and the fairness of the crop insurance. Also, for any given crop insurance, we determine 
the optimal contract design that induces the best effort from the farmer using a variable 
compensation rate and a fixed compensation rate.
A risk averse farmer with fair crop insurance behaves like a risk neutral farmer. He 
allocates more to the risky crop, thus resulting in higher expected revenue and a lower variance, as 
long as the crop insurance is actuarially fair. So both a risk neutral investor and a risk averse 
investor prefer a farmer with fair crop insurance. If the insurance is not fair, the risk averse farmer 
reduces the risky crop acreage compared to the case without insurance. Thus, even though crop 
insurance decreases the variance of revenue, expected revenue also decreases. Therefore, a risk 
neutral investor does not like unfair crop insurance, but a risk averse investor must tradeoff 
between decreased expected revenue and decreased variance. The risk averse investor may prefer 
unfair crop insurance as long as the benefit from reducing risk is greater than the cost of reducing 
expected revenue. Given crop insurance, the investor will adjust the compensation scheme to 
induce the best effort from the farmer. The results show that the investor’s optimal contract will 
use a larger variable compensation rate than without insurance. The variable compensation rate
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a lso  in c re a s e s  w ith  th e  c o v e ra g e  lev e l. T h e  o p tim a l c o n tra c t  w ith  f a i r  in su ra n c e  u se s  a  la rg e r  
v a r ia b le  c o m p e n s a tio n  ra te  th a n  u n fa ir  in su ra n c e . T h e  r is k  a v e rse  in v e s to r  p re fe rs  th a t  th e  o p tim a l 
c o n tra c t  d e p e n d  m o re  o n  v a r ia b le  c o m p e n s a tio n  th a n  th e  r is k  n e u tra l  in v e s to r . T h e  r isk  a v e rse  
f a rm e r  is  g iv e n  a  la rg e r  v a r ia b le  c o m p e n s a tio n  ra te  th a n  th e  r is k  n e u tra l  fa rm er.
O p tim a l c o n tra c t  re q u ire s  th e  fa rm e r  to  b e a r  m o re  r is k  so  th a t  th e  f a rm e r  h a s  th e  
a p p ro p r ia te  in c e n tiv e s  to  w o rk  h a rd . T h u s  b y  m a k in g  th e  c o m p e n s a tio n  sc h e m e  d e p e n d  m o re  on  
v a r ia b le  c o m p e n s a tio n  w ith  c ro p  in su ra n c e , th e  in v e s to r  m a y  in d u c e  m o re  e ffo r t  f ro m  th e  fa rm e r  
a n d  sh a re  m o re  r is k  w ith  th e  fa rm er. T h u s  c ro p  in su ra n c e  m a y  re d u c e  th e  m o ra l h a z a rd  p ro b le m  
c a u se d  b y  a s y m m e tr ic  in fo rm a tio n .
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Table 1. The results of production decision.*
Risk Neutral Farmer Risk Averse Farmer
No Insurance No
Insurance
Fair
Insurance
Unfair
Insurance
Risky Crop Acreage ( A ) 1 2 1 3
Expected Revenue ( /uA) 1 2 1 3
Revenue Variance ( a 2A) 1 2 4 3
*
Numbers represent farmer rankings from highest (1) to lowest (4).
Smallest number denotes the highest risky crop acreage, expected revenue, and revenue variance
in each row. The larger the number, the smaller the magnitude of them.
Table 2. The investor’s preference for farmer’s purchasing crop insurance.
Fair Insurance Unfair Insurance
Risk Neutral Investor Prefer Not Prefer
Risk Averse Investor Prefer Uncertain
Figure 1. The effect of crop insurance on optimal compensation scheme
+ bq: With crop insurance 
+ bq: Without crop insurance
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Figure 2. The effect of insurance coverage level on optimal compensation scheme
F ig u re  3. T h e  e ffe c t  o f  fa irn e s s  o f  in su ra n c e  o n  o p tim a l c o m p e n s a tio n  sc h e m e
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Figure 4. The effect of investor’s risk aversion on optimal compensation scheme
t(q) w + bq: High risk aversion
w + bq: Low risk aversion
q
Figure 5. The effect of farmer’s risk aversion on optimal compensation scheme
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Input Inefficiency in Commercial Banks:
A Normalized Quadratic Input Distance Approach
T h o m a s  L . M a rsh , A lle n  M . F e a th e rs to n e , a n d  T h o m a s  A . G a rre tt*
Abstract:
A  n o rm a liz e d  q u a d ra tic  in p u t d is ta n c e  fu n c tio n  is  p ro p o se d  w ith  w h ic h  to  e s tim a te  
te c h n ic a l  e f f ic ie n c y  o n  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s  re g u la te d  b y  th e  F e d e ra l  R e s e rv e  S y stem . T h e  s tu d y  
p e r io d  c o v e rs  1990  to  2 0 0 0  u s in g  in d iv id u a l b a n k  in fo rm a tio n  f ro m  th e  C a ll a n d  B a n k in g  
H o ld in g  C o m p a n y  D a ta b a se . A  s to c h a s tic  f ro n t ie r  m o d e l is  s p e c if ie d  to  e s tim a te  th e  in p u t 
n o rm a liz e d  d is ta n c e  fu n c tio n  a n d  o b ta in  m e a s u re s  o f  te c h n ic a l  e ff ic ie n c y .
Associate Professor and Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State University; and Research 
Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, MO.
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Input Inefficiency in Commercial Banks:
A Normalized Quadratic Input Distance Approach
Introduction
In  th is  p a p e r  w e  e x p lo re  te c h n ic a l  e f f ic ie n c y  o f  c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s  o v e r  th e  p e r io d  1990  to  
2 0 0 0  u s in g  a n  in p u t d is ta n c e  fu n c tio n  a p p ro a c h . T h e  in p u t d is ta n c e  fu n c tio n  a p p ro a c h  is  o f  
in te re s t  b e c a u s e  i t  is  a  v a lid  re p re s e n ta tio n  o f  m u lt ip le  o u tp u t  te c h n o lo g ie s  a n d  d ire c tly  m e a su re s  
te c h n ic a l  e f f ic ie n c y  in  p ro d u c in g  a  g iv e n  se t o f  o u tp u ts . T h e  a n a ly s is  c o v e rs  th e  sa m p le  p e r io d  
f ro m  1990  to  2 0 0 0  u s in g  C a ll a n d  B a n k in g  H o ld in g  C o m p a n y  D a ta b a s e  in fo rm a tio n  fo r  
in d iv id u a l c o m m e rc ia l  b a n k s . In  th e  a n a ly s is , w e  im p le m e n t a  n o rm a liz e d  q u a d ra tic  d is ta n c e  
fu n c tio n  th a t  c h a ra c te r iz e s  m u ltip le  in p u t  a n d  o u tp u t  p ro d u c tio n  p ro c e s s e s  e s tim a te d  w ith  
B a y e s ia n  e c o n o m e tr ic s . T h e  B a y e s ia n  m e th o d  p ro v id e s  a  s y s te m a tic  a p p ro a c h  fo r  m o re  e ff ic ie n t 
e s tim a tio n  b y  im p o s in g  p a ra m e te r  a n d  e c o n o m ic  re s tr ic tio n s , w h ic h  a re  in h e re n t  in  d u a lity  
m o d e ls  o f  f irm  b e h a v io r .
K a p a ra k is , M ille r , a n d  N o u la s  (1 9 9 4 )  p ro v id e d  a  re v ie w  o f  m e th o d o lo g ie s  an d  
c o n c lu s io n s  fo r  e ig h t  s tu d ie s  o n  b a n k  f ro n t ie r  a n a ly s is . P a s t  s tu d ie s  h a v e  ta k e n  n o n -p a ra m e tr ic  
a n d  p a ra m e tr ic  e s tim a tio n  a p p ro a c h e s , in c lu d in g  m a th e m a tic a l p ro g ra m m in g , s to c h a s tic  f ro n tie r  
a n a ly s is , a n d  s im u lta n e o u s  e q u a tio n  e s tim a tio n . In  a d d itio n , s tu d ie s  h a v e  u s e d  v a r io u s  fu n c tio n a l 
fo rm s  su c h  a s  th e  tra n s lo g  c o s t fu n c tio n  (F e rr ie r  a n d  L o v e ll, 1 9 90), p ro f i t  fu n c tio n  (B e rg e r , e t  al. 
1 9 93), a n d  o u tp u t  d is ta n c e  fu n c tio n  (E n g lish , e t a l., 1993). T h e  c o n se n su s  o f  th e s e  s tu d ie s  is  th a t  
s ig n if ic a n t  in e f f ic ie n c ie s  e x is t  a n d  w e re  g e n e ra lly  d e c lin in g  o v e r  t im e  (p o ss ib ly  d u e  to  
d e re g u la tio n ) , b a n k s  e x h ib it  b e t te r  a llo c a tiv e  re la tiv e  to  te c h n ic a l  in e ff ic ie n c y , a n d  th a t  e x te rn a l 
fa c to rs  e x p la in s  so m e  o f  th e  o b s e rv e d  in e ff ic ie n c ie s . M o re  rec e n tly , B e rg e r  a n d  M e s te r  (1 9 9 9 )  
fo u n d  th a t  c o s t p ro d u c tiv ity  d e c re a s e d  w h ile  p ro f i t  p ro d u c tiv ity  in c re a s e d  f ro m  1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 7 , 
p a r t ic u la r ly  fo r  b a n k s  in v o lv e d  in  m e rg e rs . W h e e lo c k  a n d  W ils o n  (2 0 0 1 )  e x a m in e d  m e a s u re s  o f  
sc a le  a n d  p ro d u c t  m ix  e c o n o m ie s  w ith  n o n p a ra m e tr ic  e s tim a tio n  fo u n d  th a t  b a n k s  e x p e rie n c e  
in c re a s in g  re tu rn s  to  sc a le  u p  to  a p p ro x im a te ly  $ 5 0 0  m illio n  d o lla rs  in  a sse ts . R e p o r te d  
e ff ic ie n c ie s  in  p a s t  s tu d ie s  v a ry  o v e r  a  w id e  ra n g e  a n d  c o m p a r is o n s  a re  d if f ic u lt  d u e  to  
d iffe re n c e s  in  m a in ta in e d  h y p o th e se s , sam p le , a n d  fu n c tio n a l fo rm .
O u r  m e th o d o lo g ic a l fo c u s  is  o n  th e  p ro d u c tio n  s id e  w h e re  w e  sp e c ify  a  fo rm  o f  th e  
n o rm a liz e d  q u a d ra tic  fu n c tio n  e x h ib itin g  p ro p e r t ie s  c o n s is te n t  w ith  an  in p u t d is ta n c e  fu n c tio n .
N o  s tu d y  to  d a te  h a s  e x p lo re d  te c h n ic a l  e f f ic ie n c y  in  b a n k in g  u s in g  in p u t d is ta n c e  fu n c tio n  
a p p ro a c h . F u r th e rm o re , re s e a rc h  o n  n o rm a liz e d  q u a d ra tic  d is ta n c e  fu n c tio n s  is  l im ite d . O n  th e  
c o n s u m e r  d e m a n d  s id e , H o lt  a n d  B is h o p  (2 0 0 2 )  re c e n tly  sp e c if ie d  a  n o rm a liz e d  q u a d ra tic  
d is ta n c e  fu n c tio n  a n d  u s e d  i t  to  e s tim a te  in v e rs e  d e m a n d  re la tio n s h ip s  fo r  fish . A lso , th e  
n o rm a liz e d  q u a d ra tic  in p u t  d is ta n c e  fu n c tio n  is  s p e c if ie d  to  a c c o m m o d a te  b o th  s in g le  a n d  
m u lt ip le  o u tp u t  p ro d u c tio n  p ro c e s s e s  a n d  a llo w s  d ire c t  te s t in g  o r  im p o s itio n  o f  in p u t  a n d  o u tp u t 
c u rv a tu re  c o n d itio n s . E v e n  fo r  th e  c a se  o f  a  s in g le  in p u t w h e re  th e  p ro p e r t ie s  o f  th e  c o n s u m e r  
a n d  in p u t d is ta n c e  fu n c tio n  a re  e q u iv a le n t  (C o rn e s  1 9 92), th e  fu n c tio n a l  s p e c if ic a tio n  is  d iffe re n t.
T o  e s tim a te  m e a s u re s  o f  te c h n ic a l  e ff ic ie n c y , w e  e x p lo it  th e  s to c h a s tic  f ro n tie r  a p p ro a c h  
(S te v e n s o n  1980 ; G re e n e  1980 , 1990 ; B a tte s e  a n d  C o e lli  1988). T h is  f ra m e w o rk  c o u p le d  w ith  
th e  n o rm a liz e d  q u a d ra tic  fu n c tio n  is  s u ff ic ie n tly  f le x ib le  to  im p o s e  e c o n o m ic  re s tr ic tio n s  o n  b o th  
in p u ts  a n d  o u tp u ts  w ith  B a y e s ia n  e s tim a tio n . W e  im p le m e n t a  p a ra m e tr ic  e s tim a to r  th a t  u s e s  a 
m a x im u m  l ik e lih o o d  fu n c tio n  to  c o n s tru c t  a  B a y e s ia n  M a rk o v  c h a in  M o n te  C a r lo  m o d e l w ith  
e c o n o m ic  re s tr ic tio n s  im p o s e d  fo llo w in g  G e w e k e  (1 9 8 6 ). T h is  re s e a rc h  c o m p lim e n ts  re c e n t
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studies by Atkinson and Primont (2002) and Atkinson, Fare, and Primont (2003), who estimated 
complete systems of inverse demand relationships jointly with the distance function using a 
GMM estimator. The input distance function is applied to several years during the period 1990 
to 2000 to explore changes in technical efficiency that may have occurred over time.
Input Distance Function and Technical Efficiency
Input Distance Function
The direct input distance function is defined by
(1) D (x , y ) = sup (5> 0 | (x  / 5) e S (y ), Vy e R +"}
s
where 5> 1. In (1), y  is a (mx 1) vector of outputs, x  =(xi,.. ,,xk)' is a (n x 1) vector of inputs and 
S (y ) is the set of all input vectors x  e R  + that can produce the output vector y  e R  ^. The 
underlying behavioral assumption is that the distance function represents a rescaling of all the 
input levels consistent with a target output level. Intuitively, 5 is the maximum value by which 
one could divide x  and still produce y . The value 5 places x  / 5 on the boundary of S (y ) and on 
the ray through x . For example, in Figure 1, the distance function value is D(xy)=OB/OA; the 
value required to scale the vector x1 back to x on the boundary of S (y ) . In other words, the 
input distance function measures the extent to which the firm is input efficient in producing a 
fixed set of output. Investigating the distance function is interesting because it is a dual 
representation of the cost function and both are valid representations of multiple output 
technologies.
The standard properties of a distance function are that it is homogenous of degree one, 
nondecreasing, and concave in input quantities x , as well as nonincreasing and quasi-concave in 
outputs y  (Shephard 1970; Fare and Primont 1995). From (1) inverse factor demand equations 
may be obtained by applying Gorman’s Lemma
d D (x , y  )
(2 )
d x
= p*(x, y)
where p*=(p1,.. ,,pn)' is a (n x 1) vector of cost normalized input prices or p* = p i / ^ n p jxj .
The Hessian matrix is given by the second order derivatives of the distance function (Antonelli 
matrix)
(3 )
d 2 D (x , y ) d2 D (x , y ) 
dxdx' dxdy'
d 2 D (x , y ) d2 D (x , y  )
dydx' dydy'
Imposing monotonicity constraints require that dD(x, y) /dx > 0 and dD(x, y) /dy < 0, while 
curvature constraints are based on the eigenvalues of the Antonelli matrix in (3).
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The input distance function has been exploited as a measure of technical efficiency 
(Farrell 1957; Debreu 1951). Inefficiencies arise if firms do not use cost minimizing amounts of 
input for several reasons, including regulated production, production quotas, or shortages 
(Atkinson and Primont 2002; Atkinson, Fare, and Primont 2003). The input-oriented measures 
of technical efficiency are given by
(4) TE = 1/ D = mf (5 : 5x e S (y)}
where TE lies between zero and one. This efficiency measure can be equivalently specified as
(5) ln D + ln TE = ln D -  u = 0
where the term u = - ln  TE can be expressed as TE = exp(-u). Hence, u is nonnegative being 
bounded below by zero and unbounded from above.
Normalized Quadratic Distance Function
To complete the empirical model specification, we specify a normalized quadratic distance 
function. The normalized quadratic allows explicit investigation of the interactions between 
inputs and outputs and allows imposition of curvature conditions. The importance of curvature 
properties was emphasized by Berger, Hancock, and Humphery (1993). Featherstone and Moss 
(1994) used a normalized quadratic cost function with curvature properties to measure 
economies of scale and scope in agricultural banking, finding contrasting results in measures of 
scope and scale with or without curvature restrictions. The proposed normalized quadratic 
distance function is given by
(6)
Technical Efficiency
1
f , n + m  n+ m
D(x y ) = b0 + Z bi xi + Z  by  + 2  I Z a k xk \ Z Z bv xrx j  + Z  Z  h y ^ j  +1111 b + j
2  \  k=1 J i=1 j= 1 i=n+1 j = n+1 J i=1 j = n+1i=1 i=n+1
n
with n inputs and m outputs. The bt ' s and bij' s are parameters to be estimated, while the a t are
predetermined positive constants that dictate the form of normalization. Symmetry is imposed 
by restricting bij = bjt. The normalized quadratic distance function in (6) is semiflexible at a
reference vector x* (Diewert and Wales 1988).
Homogeneity of degree zero in inputs in the input demand equations implies that
n n
Z  by  = 0 , while the normalization restriction requires that Z  a k xk  = 1 at a reference vector.
j=1 k=1
Normalizing quantities by their mean values yields unit means, or x* = (1,..., 1)' = ln, which can 
be used as a reference bundle. At a reference vector x*, the demand restrictions become
(7) Z *a  kxk
k =1
=  Z a  k = ^  ak > ^  v k ,  a n d  Z  x?v = Z  bv = 0
j=1 j=1k =1
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G iv e n  th e  d is ta n c e  fu n c tio n  is  h o m o g e n e o u s  o f  d e g re e  o n e  q u a n titie s , th e n  i t  is  p o s s ib le  
to  n o rm a liz e  b y  so m e  X (e .g ., a n  in p u t o r  o u tp u t  o r  c o n v e x  c o m b in a tio n s ) ,
( 8 ) -1 d (x, y ) = D* A , y j o  ln  D (x, y ) - ln  X = ln  D* y j
F ro m  (5 ) th e  re la tio n s h ip  c a n  b e  re w rit te n  as
Stochastic Input-Normalized Distance System
(9 ) ln X ln D ' X , y + u
In empirical applications, the term u = -  ln TE has been exploited to form an estimable equation 
of the distance function itself that provides a direct measure of input inefficiency (Stevenson 
1980; Greene 1980; Battese and Coelli 1988; Morrison Paul, Johnston, and Frengley 2000; 
Brummer, Glauben, and Thussen 2002).
To define a distance function normalized by the kth input letx* = x j x k Vs = 1,...,n .
n
Define the predetermined constants as a  = (0,...,0, a k ,0...,0) 3 a k = 1, then S a sx* = 1 . Using
s=1
the homogeneity property of the distance function, it can be written as 
(10)
/ -v -.A n-1 n+m i ( n-1 n-1
D ' (x ,y ) = D (X ' x‘’y > = b *  + 2 b * x *  + S  by, +1 S S bf  n-1 n-1 n+m n+m j  n-1 n+m2 , xi xj  +  S S bv y y  + S S b^ y .
^  (  i=1 j =1 i=n+1 j=n+1  J  i=1 j = n+1
Hence, the distance function in (10) is a special case of that in (6). From (9) the kth input- 
normalized distance function can be represented by
( 1 1 )
k
ln xk = -  ln
r i—i  r i ^ t n-m * 7 * * 7
b 0 + 2 br xr +  S bN
f  n-1 n-1 n+m n+m
S S h x xj + S S bjy y j( i=1 j=1 i=n+1 j=n+1 ■SS j  yj -i=1 j =n+1 j
where s0 is assumed to be an identically distributed stochastic error term and independent of u.
Estimation issues concerning (11) are complicated by that fact that u is unobserved, but have 
been addressed in several ways in the stochastic frontier production literature, which we discuss 
in more detail below.
Econometric Estimation
Following Greene (1980, 1990) the likelihood for the composite error term v is specified as a 
GAMMA distribution with parameters 9 > 2 and X = 1, which yields the exponential 
distribution. For 9> 2 the maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters is a regular case.
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The log-likelihood function for (11) becomes
(13) l n  L( P, 0, a | Y, X)  = ^ =1 {l n  0 + (0a)2 /  2  + 0si + l n  O ( s ! - 0 a 2 ) /
where a  is the variance of the normal distribution. Under a general set of regularity conditions 
the maximum likelihood estimates are asymptotically normally distributed and asymptotically 
efficient.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo
To specify a posterior pdf for either (12) or (13), we assume prior information on the 
(P',9 ) with prior pdf n(0,9 ) = tc(P)tc(9 ). Here, 9  represents parameters a and 0 > 2  in (13). 
The P parameters are assumed to have a noninformative prior (i.e., P <x constant) for either 
model. For the truncated normal distribution g is assumed to have uniform distribution bounded 
below by zero. The inverted gamma is used for a prior on a , while 0 is assumed to have a 
uniform distribution bounded below by two. These priors have been used in numerous Bayesian 
studies (e.g., Zellner, Bauwnes, and Van Dijk 1988). The posterior pdf is then as
P(P, 9) = L(P, a, g, a u | Y, X)n(P)n(9 )
Techniques of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation estimation using the Metropolis- 
Hastings algorithm are applied to Bayesian estimation (Mittelhammer, Judge, and Miller 2000; 
Chib and Greenberg).
Empirical Methodology and Data
To estimate a measure of technical inefficiency a theoretically consistent model must be 
specified. There are two common approaches to modeling banks, the production and 
intermediation approach. The production approach measures bank production in terms of the 
numbers of loans and deposit accounts serviced and includes operating costs. The intermediation 
approach measures outputs in terms of the dollar amounts of loans and deposits and includes 
operation costs and interest expense. We choose to follow the intermediation approach as have 
Berger et al (1987), Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Kaparakis, Miller, and Noulas (1994), and 
Wheelock and Wilson (2001) among others.
The data are from the 1990, 1994 and 2000 Call Report information for commercial 
banks. Following Kaparakis, Miller, and Noulas (1994) and Wheelock and Wilson (2001) the 
model includes four outputs, four variable inputs, and one quasi-fixed input. Outputs include 
loans to individuals (y1), real estate loans (y2), commercial and industrial loans (y3), and federal 
funds, securities purchased under agreements to resell (y4). Inputs include interest-bearing 
deposits except certificates of deposits greater than $100,000 (x1), purchased funds (certificates 
of deposits greater than $100 ,000, federal funds purchased, and securities sold plus demand 
notes) and other borrowed money (x2), number of employees (x3), and book value of premises 
and fixed assets (x4). The quasi-fixed asset is noninterest-bearing bonds. Kaparakis, Miller, and 
Noulas (1994) suggest that banks cannot attract more noninterest-bearing deposits by offering 
interest and they should be regarded as exogenous. The data used in the empirical model are 
based on average quarterly values across a given year.
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Rather than compute input prices, we choose to estimate only the distance function itself 
in (11) without the system of inverse demand relationships defined by (2). Typically, inverse 
demand relationships are included to increase econometric efficiency, obtain measures of price 
flexibilities, or obtain dual cost measures. Our justification is that for large sample sizes the 
efficiency gains from including the inverse demand system will likely not compensate for the 
added numerical complexities and computations, and because our interest is technical efficiency 
that is completely characterized by (11). Moreover, including calculated input prices may 
introduce measurement error or results in prices with little price variation that can compromise 
empirical duality properties (Lusk, Featherstone, Marsh, and Abdulkadri).
To arrive at the final data sets for estimation, several data management steps were taken. 
First, we excluded banks that reported negative inputs or outputs (which only influenced x1).
This yielded 12,395 observations in 1990, 10,765 observations in 1994, and 8,517 observations 
in 2000. Then to account for extreme outliers, we excluded banks that 6 or more standard 
deviations away from the mean of the input and output values. In 1990 there were 12,218 
remaining observations, in 1994 there were 10,620 remaining observations, and in 2000 there 
were 8,409 remaining observations. The number of employees (x3) was used to normalize the 
other inputs because it had a few reported zero values (e.g., in 2000 there were only eleven zero 
values). The zero values were assigned the minimum value of the remaining observations in x3.
Econometric models of (11) were estimated for each year using the Bayesian estimator 
based on alternative cross-sections of the data. Models were estimated on the entire data set, for 
banks with total assets less than $50 million, and banks with assets greater than $50 million. 
Partitioning data in this manner are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Kaparakis, Miller, and 
Noulas 1994) and allows comparison and testing of results between smaller and larger banks (as 
well as across the entire sample). A histogram of the number of banks across total assets is 
presented in Figure 2, showing a steady decrease (increase) in the number of banks with total 
assets under (over) $50 million.
To complete the MCMC simulation of the Bayesian estimator, a burn-in period of 30,000 
iterations was used. These iterations were then discarded and 70,000 additional iterations were 
simulated to yield the final empirical distribution. Additional details of the data and the MCMC 
analysis are available from the authors upon request. Curvature conditions are imposed using 
Cholesky decomposition (Lau 1970).
Results and Discussion
Empirical results are presented in Table 1 for 1990, 1994, and 2000. For convenience we 
summarize these results with the median, mean, and standard deviation of technical efficiency in 
Table 1 for the Bayesian exponential model.
In general, the preliminary technical efficiency estimates are consistent with those 
obtained in Berger et al. (1993) and English, et al. (1993). English et al. (1993) report a mean 
output technical efficiency of 0.754 with standard deviation of 0.145 for small commercial banks 
in 1982. Focusing on the results from the exponential model over the entire sample, input 
efficiency has increased over the sample period and were higher for larger banks. In 1990 and 
1994, the median efficiency values were nearly identical yielding 0.732 and 0.730, respectively. 
In 2000, the median efficiency level over the entire sample increased to 0.754. For smaller 
banks (total assets less than $50 million) the median technical efficiency measure incremented
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f r o m  0 . 6 9 6  i n  1 9 9 0 ,  t o  0 . 7 0 4  i n  1 9 9 4 ,  a n d  t o  0 . 7 1 5  i n  2 0 0 0 .  F o r  l a r g e r  b a n k s  ( t o t a l  a s s e t s  
g r e a t e r  t h a n  $ 5 0  m i l l i o n )  t h e  m e d i a n  t e c h n i c a l  e f f i c i e n c y  m e a s u r e  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  0 . 7 5  i n  1 9 9 0  
a n d  l e v e l e d  o f f  t o  0 . 8 0  i n  1 9 9 4  a n d  2 0 0 0 .  C o m p a r i n g  a c r o s s  b a n k  s i z e s ,  l a r g e r  b a n k s  w e r e  m o r e  
7 % ,  1 4 % ,  a n d  1 1 %  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t  t h a n  s m a l l e r  b a n k s  i n  1 9 9 0 ,  1 9 9 4 ,  a n d  2 0 0 0  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  N o t e  
t h a t ,  w h e n  c o m p a r i n g  t h e  m e a n  t e c h n i c a l  e f f i c i e n c y  m e a s u r e s ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  w o u l d  r e d u c e  t o  
0 % ,  6 % ,  a n d  4 %  i n  1 9 9 0 ,  1 9 9 4 ,  a n d  2 0 0 0  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I n  a l l ,  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t  b a n k  e f f i c i e n c y  h a s  b e e n  i n c r e a s i n g  o v e r  t i m e  ( K a p a r a k i s ,  M i l l e r ,  a n d  
N o u l a s  1 9 9 4 )  a n d  t h a t  t h e  l a r g e r  b a n k s  e x h i b i t  h i g h e r  t e c h n i c a l  e f f i c i e n c y  l e v e l s  ( B e r g e r ,  e t  a l .  
1 9 9 3 ) .
R e s u l t s  w e r e  a l s o  o b t a i n e d  b y  e s t i m a t i n g  ( 1 1 )  w i t h o u t  c u r v a t u r e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  2 0 0 0 ,  
p r o v i d i n g  m i x e d  r e s u l t s .  F o r  s m a l l e r  b a n k s ,  r e l a x i n g  c u r v a t u r e  c o n d i t i o n s  i n c r e a s e d  t e c h n i c a l  
e f f i c i e n c y .  F o r  l a r g e r  b a n k s ,  r e l a x i n g  c u r v a t u r e  c o n d i t i o n s  d e c r e a s e d  t e c h n i c a l  e f f i c i e n c y .
A c r o s s  t h e  e n t i r e  s a m p l e ,  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  e f f i c i e n c y  m e a s u r e s  w e r e  n e a r l y  i d e n t i c a l .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  
r e s u l t s  a r e  m i x e d ,  i t  i s  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  t e c h n i c a l  e f f i c i e n c y  r e s u l t s  a r e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  c u r v a t u r e  
r e s t r i c t i o n s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h i s  e f f e c t  w a s  n o t  c o n s i s t e n t  b e t w e e n  s m a l l e r  a n d  l a r g e r  
b a n k s .
Conclusions
I n  t h i s  p a p e r  a  n o r m a l i z e d  q u a d r a t i c  i n p u t  d i s t a n c e  f u n c t i o n  i s  p r o p o s e d  w i t h  w h i c h  t o  
e s t i m a t e  t e c h n i c a l  e f f i c i e n c y  o n  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  S y s t e m .
T h e  s t u d y  p e r i o d  c o v e r s  1 9 9 0  t o  2 0 0 0  u s i n g  i n d i v i d u a l  b a n k  i n f o r m a t i o n  f r o m  t h e  C a l l  a n d  
B a n k i n g  H o l d i n g  C o m p a n y  D a t a b a s e .  A  B a y e s i a n  v a r i a t i o n  o f  a  s t o c h a s t i c  f r o n t i e r  m o d e l  i s  
u s e d  t o  e s t i m a t e  t h e  i n p u t  n o r m a l i z e d  d i s t a n c e  f u n c t i o n  a n d  o b t a i n  m e a s u r e s  o f  t e c h n i c a l  
e f f i c i e n c y .  P r e l i m i n a r y  f i n d i n g s  b a s e d  o n  1 9 9 0 ,  1 9 9 4 ,  a n d  2 0 0 0  d a t a  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
p r e v i o u s  f i n d i n g s  i n  t h a t  t e c h n i c a l  i n e f f i c i e n c y  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  d e c r e a s i n g  o v e r  t i m e  a n d  t h a t  l a r g e r  
b a n k s  a r e  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t .  W e  r e c o g n i z e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  p a p e r .  
P e r h a p s  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  t e c h n i c a l  e f f i c i e n c y  e s t i m a t e s  w e r e  b a s e d  o n l y  o n  s e l e c t e d  y e a r s .  O u r  
i n t e n t i o n  i s  t o  r e v i s i t  a n d  e x t e n d  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  a n a l y s i s  b y  u s i n g  a  p a n e l  d a t a  s e t  f r o m  1 9 9 0  t o  
2 0 0 0 .
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Section 5313 of The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 made permanent the 
interest assistance (IA) program for the Farm Service Agency’s (FSA) guaranteed loans. The Act 
authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to fund this program up to $750 million in lending per 
year, a considerable increase from amounts authorized in previous years. Moreover, the Act states 
that not less than 15 percent of annual funding shall be reserved for beginning farmers and 
ranchers. Even though the program has been in existence for more than 15 years, little is known 
about its impact and utilization.
This research provides a basic descriptive analysis of past IA use. In particular, borrower 
data for Federal fiscal years 1985 through 2002 are examined in several dimensions. First, the 
geographical distribution of IA payments is documented. It is known that the distribution 
throughout the 1990s of IA use was not uniform across the United States. The analysis updates 
this distribution. Moreover, it is not known what types of borrowers use the IA program. The 
analysis investigates how the use of IA is distributed over beginning farmers, socially 
disadvantaged farmers (SDA) and borrowers who are not in either of the two prior groups. These 
outcome data are examined across the categories of beginning, SDA, and other farmers. Use of 
interest assistance by lender type are also explored with lender categorization being commercial 
bank, Farm Credit System, savings and loan, Credit Union, mortgage company, and other lenders.
Another aspect of the analysis examines interest rate differentials between loans to 
borrowers not receiving interest assistance and those that do. According to the FSA Handbook, 
Guaranteed Loan Making and Servicing, interest rates charged on guaranteed loans cannot 
.exceed the rate the lender charges its average agricultural loan customer.” This applies to 
loans receiving interest assistance as well as loans not receiving interest assistance. The research 
investigates if the average rate charged to IA borrowers before the subtraction of IA differs from 
the rate charged to those guaranteed borrowers not receiving IA.
Finally, analysis compares the success rates of IA users versus non-users where success is 
defined as completing the loan without having a loss claim paid. This finding has significant 
policy implications because a primary objective of the program is to assist borrowers in avoiding 
default.
History of Interest Assistance Program
Interest rate assistance was originally enacted with the Food Security Act of 1985 (P.L. 99­
198). Section 1716 authorized an interest rate reduction program for 3 years, ending on 
September 30, 1988 to be administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Farmers Home 
Administration (FmHA).2 This program was originally established to make payments to “legally 
regulated” lending institutions that reduce interest rates of borrowers of loans guaranteed by the 
Secretary of Agriculture. Stipulations were that (1) borrowers that participate in this program 
must meet the established eligibility requirements which include that they operate a “not larger 
than family size farm” after the loan is closed and they demonstrate an inability to obtain credit 
from other lenders at reasonable rates and terms; (2) a borrower must not have been able to make 
payments on the loan in a timely manner without the benefit of the interest rate reduction; (3) the 
borrower must have a projected cash flow after the interest rate reduction of at least 100%; and (4) 
the lender must agree to reduce the interest rate by a minimum amount established by the
Analysis of Borrower and Lender Use of Interest Assistance
on FSA Guaranteed Farm Loans
' FmHA’s farm loan programs were moved to the newly formed FSA in 1994 and FmHA ceased to exist.
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S e c r e t a r y .  I n  r e t u r n ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  w o u l d  m a k e  p a y m e n t s  t o  t h e  l e n d e r  e q u a l  t o  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  t h e  
i n t e r e s t  r e d u c t i o n  u p  t o  2  p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s .  T h u s ,  t h e  p r o g r a m  w a s  c o m m o n l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  t h e  
b u y d o w n  p r o g r a m .  T h e  t e r m s  w e r e  t o  b e  n o t  m o r e  t h a n  3  y e a r s  o r  f o r  t h e  t e r m  o f  t h e  l o a n s ,  
w h i c h e v e r  i s  l e s s  [ R e f :  H o u s e  C o n f e r e n c e  R e p o r t  9 9 - 4 4 7 ;  S e n a t e  R e p o r t  9 9 - 1 4 5 ] .
I n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  H o u s e  a n d  S e n a t e  r e p o r t s ,  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  e x p l a n a t i o n  a s  t o  t h e  t h o u g h t s  o f  
p o l i c y m a k e r s  i n  i n i t i a t i n g  t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n .  B u t ,  d u r i n g  t h i s  t i m e  p e r i o d  t h e r e  w e r e  t w o  i s s u e s  
a f f e c t i n g  c r e d i t  p o l i c y  t h a t  m a y  h a v e  i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  p a s s a g e  o f  t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n .  O n e  w a s  t h e  d e s i r e  
t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  u s e  o f  g u a r a n t e e d  c r e d i t  a m o n g  l e n d e r s  a n d  r e d u c e  d i r e c t  l e n d i n g  b y  t h e  U . S .  
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e .  S e c o n d l y ,  t h e r e  w e r e  c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  t h e  i m p a c t s  r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w e r e  h a v i n g  o n  f a r m e r s ’ f i n a n c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  T h e  d r a f t e r s  o f  t h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n  m a y  
h a v e  e n v i s i o n e d  t h e  b u y d o w n  p r o g r a m  a s  a n  i n d u c e m e n t  t o  l e n d e r s  t o  u t i l i z e  t h e  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n  
p r o g r a m  t o  r e f i n a n c e  f a r m e r  l o a n s  a t  l o w e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a n d  l o n g e r  t e r m s ,  t h e r e b y  p r o v i d i n g  
b o r r o w e r s  s o m e  r e l i e f  f r o m  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  d e b t  s e r v i c e  o b l i g a t i o n s .
T h e  b u y d o w n  p r o g r a m  w a s  a d d r e s s e d  a g a i n  i n  t h e  A g r i c u l t u r a l  C r e d i t  A c t  o f  1 9 8 7  [ P . L .  
1 0 0 - 2 3 3 ] .  I n  t h e  H o u s e  C o n f e r e n c e  R e p o r t ,  i t  i s  a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h a t  l e n d e r s  w e r e  n o t  u s i n g  t h e  
b u y d o w n  p r o g r a m .  H e n c e ,  t h e  A g r i c u l t u r a l  C r e d i t  A c t  o f  1 9 8 7  a t t e m p t e d  t o  e n c o u r a g e  g r e a t e r  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h i s  p r o g r a m .  T h i s  i n c l u d e d  ( 1 )  a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  p r o g r a m  f r o m  S e p t e m b e r  3 0 ,  
1 9 8 8  u n t i l  S e p t e m b e r  3 0 ,  1 9 9 3 ;  ( 2 )  t h e  G e n e r a l  A c c o u n t i n g  O f f i c e  ( G A O )  w a s  d i r e c t e d  t o  c o n d u c t  
a n  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  b u y d o w n  p r o g r a m  w h e r e b y  t h e y  w o u l d  s u r v e y  b a n k s  a s  t o  w h y  t h e y  
w e r e  n o t  u t i l i z i n g  t h e  p r o g r a m ;  ( 3 )  G A O  w a s  d i r e c t e d  t o  e v a l u a t e  p r o g r a m  e l i g i b i l i t y  a n d  m a k e  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a s  t o  e n c o u r a g e  g r e a t e r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  d e b t  r e s t r u c t u r i n g ;  a n d  ( 4 )  G A O  w a s  t o  
e v a l u a t e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e d u r e s  o f  t h e  F m H A  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n  p r o g r a m s  a n d  m a k e  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  i m p r o v e m e n t s  i n  t i m e  a n d  e f f i c i e n c y .
T o  e n c o u r a g e  g r e a t e r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  p r o g r a m ,  c a s h  f l o w  r e q u i r e m e n t s  w e r e  r e d u c e d .  
B o r r o w e r s  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  s h o w  a  p r o j e c t e d  c a s h  f l o w  a f t e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  a t  l e a s t  
1 0 0 %  o v e r  a  2 4 - m o n t h  p e r i o d ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  1 2  m o n t h s .  A l s o ,  F m H A  c o u n t y  s u p e r v i s o r s  w e r e  
r e q u i r e d  t o  m a k e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  f a r m e r s ,  u p o n  r e q u e s t ,  a  l i s t  o f  a p p r o v e d  l e n d e r s  t h a t  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  
F m H A ’ s  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n  p r o g r a m  [ R e f e r e n c e  H o u s e  R e p o r t  n o  1 0 0 - 2 9 5 ] .
T h e  O m n i b u s  B u d g e t  R e c o n c i l i a t i o n  A c t  o f  1 9 9 0  [ P . L .  1 0 1 - 5 0 8 ]  m a d e  s u b s t a n t i a l  c h a n g e s  
t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  p r o g r a m .  T h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  a  m a t c h i n g  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  b y  
l e n d e r s  w a s  d e l e t e d  a n d  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  t h e  s u b s i d y  p r o v i d e d  w a s  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  2  t o  4  p e r c e n t a g e  
p o i n t s .  A l s o  e l i m i n a t e d  w a s  t h e  3 - y e a r  t e r m  o f  a s s i s t a n c e  m a k i n g  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  o n l y  
a v a i l a b l e  i n  1 - y e a r  i n c r e m e n t s .  A n d  t h e  p r o g r a m  w a s  e x t e n d e d  t o  S e p t e m b e r  3 0 ,  1 9 9 5 .  T h e  
p r o g r a m  w a s  l a t e r  e x t e n d e d  t o  S e p t e m b e r  3 0 ,  2 0 0 3  b y  t h e  F r e e d o m  t o  F a r m  A c t  [ P . L .  1 0 1 - 1 2 7 ]  o f  
1 9 9 6  b e f o r e  b e i n g  m a d e  p e r m a n e n t  b y  t h e  F a r m  S e c u r i t y  a n d  R u r a l  I n v e s t m e n t  A c t  o f  2 0 0 2 .
Interest Assistance Usage
I n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  w i t h  F S A  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s  h a s  b e e n  u s e d  b y  l e n d e r s  t o  l o w e r  t h e  c o s t  o f  
b o r r o w i n g  f o r  t h e i r  c l i e n t s  s i n c e  1 9 8 5 .  I n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  w a s  o r i g i n a l l y  m a d e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  f a r m  
o w n e r s h i p  ( F O )  a n d  o p e r a t i n g  ( O L )  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s .  H o w e v e r ,  s i n c e  1 9 9 1  t h e  p o l i c y  h a s  b e e n  t o  
t a r g e t  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  O L  l o a n s .  T h e  p r i m a r y  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  c h a n g e  i n  p o l i c y  i s  t h e  l a r g e  
s u b s i d y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  F O  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  l o a n s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  n a t u r e  o f  t h e s e  
l o a n s .
T h e  n u m b e r s  o f  F O  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s  a n d  t h o s e  t h a t  r e c e i v e d  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  a r e  s h o w n  
i n  F i g u r e  1 .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  F O  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  4 1 5  i n  1 9 8 5  t o  2 9 3 0  i n  1 9 9 3 .  T h e  
p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e s e  l o a n s  t h a t  r e c e i v e d  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  4 . 8  p e r c e n t  i n  1 9 8 5
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t o  1 7 . 9  p e r c e n t  i n  1 9 9 1 .  T h e  c h a n g e  i n  p o l i c y  a w a y  f r o m  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  f o r  F O  l o a n s  c a n  b e  
s e e n  b y  t h e  s h a r p  d r o p  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  t h e s e  l o a n s  w i t h  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  f r o m  1 9 9 1  t o  1 9 9 2 .  
S i n c e  t h e  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  p r o g r a m  i s  t a r g e t e d  t o  t h e  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n  p r o g r a m ,  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
p a p e r  w i l l  f o c u s  o n  O L  l o a n s .
T h e  n u m b e r s  o f  O L  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s  a n d  t h o s e  w i t h  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  a r e  s h o w n  i n  
F i g u r e  2 .  T h e r e  a r e  m a n y  m o r e  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n s  t h a n  g u a r a n t e e d  F O  l o a n s  m a d e  i n  a  y e a r .
T h e  n u m b e r  o f  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n s  h a s  v a r i e d  o v e r  t h e  y e a r s .  T h e  l a r g e s t  n u m b e r  o f  l o a n s ,
1 4 , 1 6 6 ,  w a s  m a d e  i n  1 9 8 6 ,  o n e  y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  p r o g r a m  w a s  e m p h a s i z e d .  T h e  f e w e s t  n u m b e r  o f  
l o a n s  w a s  8 , 1 4 4  i n  1 9 9 8 .  O n l y  0 . 8  t o  3 . 6  p e r c e n t  o f  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n s  r e c e i v e d  i n t e r e s t  
a s s i s t a n c e  f r o m  1 9 8 5  t o  1 9 9 0 .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  1 9 9 0  A c t ’ s  r e m o v a l  o f  t h e  l e n d e r  r e q u i r e m e n t  t o  
m a t c h  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  a n d  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  f e d e r a l  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  f r o m  t w o  t o  f o u r  p e r c e n t a g e  
p o i n t s  s p u r r e d  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  p r o g r a m  u s a g e  i n  1 9 9 1 .  S i n c e  1 9 9 1  a t  l e a s t  1 2 . 4  p e r c e n t  o f  
g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n s  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  w i t h  3 8 . 8  p e r c e n t  r e c e i v i n g  i n t e r e s t  
a s s i s t a n c e  i n  2 0 0 0 .
T h e  r e g i o n a l  n u m b e r s  o f  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  T a b l e  1 .  
T h e  L a k e  S t a t e s ,  C o r n  B e l t ,  a n d  N o r t h e r n  P l a i n s  r e g i o n s  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  t h e  m o s t  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  
l o a n s  w i t h  a n d  w i t h o u t  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e s  ( 1 9 . 0 2 ,  2 0 . 3 4 ,  a n d  2 2 . 2 2 )  o f  
g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n s  t h a t  r e c e i v e d  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  t h o s e  t h r e e  r e g i o n s  a r e  n e a r l y  t w i c e  t h a t  o f  
t h e  n e x t  h i g h e s t  r e g i o n  ( 1 0 . 1 5 ) .  T h e  P a c i f i c ,  D e l t a  S t a t e s ,  a n d  S o u t h e a s t  r e g i o n s  o n l y  h a d  0 6 3 ,
0 . 7 6 ,  a n d  1 . 1 6  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e i r  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n s  r e c e i v e  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e .  A d d i t i o n a l  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  s o u r c e s  o f  r e g i o n a l  v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  p r o g r a m  i s  
n e e d e d .
O n e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  a b o u t  t h e  b o r r o w e r  i n  t h e  d a t a  i s  i f  t h e  b o r r o w e r  i s  a n  S D A  f a r m e r ,  
b e g i n n i n g  f a r m e r ,  o r  n e i t h e r  S D A  o r  b e g i n n i n g  f a r m e r .  F S A  b e g a n  r e c o r d i n g  S D A  a n d  b e g i n n i n g  
f a r m e r s  t h a t  r e c e i v e d  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s  i n  1 9 9 1  a n d 1 9 9 4 .  B u t  f e w  S D A  f a r m e r s  w e r e  r e c o r d e d  i n  
1 9 9 1  a n d  1 9 9 2 .  T h e r e f o r e ,  d a t a  o n  S D A  a n d  b e g i n n i n g  f a r m e r s  f o r  1 9 9 3  t h r o u g h  2 0 0 2  a r e  
p r e s e n t e d  i n  T a b l e  2 .  A s  w o u l d  b e  e x p e c t e d  s i n c e  F S A  t a r g e t s  a  p o r t i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  
f u n d s  t o w a r d  b e g i n n i n g  f a r m e r s ,  a  g r e a t e r  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  n o n - S D A ,  b e g i n n i n g  f a r m e r s  t h a t  
r e c e i v e d  a  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n  a l s o  r e c e i v e d  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  ( 2 3 . 0 2  p e r c e n t )  t h a n  d i d  n o n ­
b e g i n n i n g  a n d  n o n - S D A  f a r m e r s  ( 2 0 . 9 0  p e r c e n t ) .  H o w e v e r ,  i t  w a s  s u r p r i s i n g  t o  s e e  t h a t  l e s s e r  
p e r c e n t a g e s  o f  n o n - b e g i n n i n g ,  S D A  f a r m e r s  ( 1 5 . 9 2  p e r c e n t )  a n d  b e g i n n i n g ,  S D A  f a r m e r s  ( 1 5 . 6 1  
p e r c e n t )  r e c e i v e d  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  t h a n  d i d  n o n - b e g i n n i n g ,  n o n - S D A  f a r m e r s  ( 2 0 . 9 0  p e r c e n t ) .  
F u r t h e r  a n a l y s i s  i s  n e e d e d  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s .
T a b l e  3  c o n t a i n s  d a t a  o n  t y p e  o f  l e n d e r  m a k i n g  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n s  a n d  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  
l o a n s  w i t h  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e .  B y  f a r  t h e  l e n d e r  c a t e g o r y  w i t h  t h e  m o s t  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n s  i s  
C o m m e r c i a l  B a n k s  w i t h  8 6 , 5 0 0  l o a n s  f o r  1 9 9 3  t h r o u g h  2 0 0 2 .  T h e  n e x t  l a r g e s t  c a t e g o r y  i s  t h e  
F a r m  C r e d i t  S y s t e m  w i t h  1 5 , 1 4 8  l o a n s ,  f o l l o w e d  b y  t h e  O t h e r  c a t e g o r y  w i t h  1 , 3 1 4  l o a n s ,  S a v i n g s  
a n d  L o a n s  w i t h  1 , 2 5 2  l o a n s ,  C r e d i t  U n i o n  w i t h  6 4 1  l o a n s ,  M o r t g a g e  C o m p a n y  w i t h  o n l y  6 5  l o a n s .  
A l t h o u g h  C r e d i t  U n i o n s  d i d  n o t  m a k e  t h a t  m a n y  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s ,  i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  t h a t  4 5  
p e r c e n t  o f  t h o s e  l o a n s  r e c e i v e d  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e ,  a l m o s t  t w i c e  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  a l l  o t h e r  l e n d e r  
c a t e g o r i e s .
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  s e e  i f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  o n  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n s  n o t  r e c e i v i n g  i n t e r e s t  
a s s i s t a n c e  a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  o n  t h o s e  l o a n s  r e c e i v i n g  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  ( b o r r o w e r  
c h a r g e d  r a t e  p l u s  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  r a t e ) .  F i g u r e  3  s h o w s  t h e  a v e r a g e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t h a t  l e n d e r s  
w e r e  t o  r e c e i v e  f o r  n o n - i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  l o a n s  a n d  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  l o a n s  a n d  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  
t h e s e  t w o  r a t e s  f o r  1 9 8 5  t h r o u g h  2 0 0 2 .  N o t i c e  t h a t  t h e  n o n - i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  r a t e  i s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y
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t w o  p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s  m o r e  t h a n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  r a t e  f o r  1 9 8 5  t h r o u g h  1 9 9 0 .  A f t e r  1 9 9 0  
t h e r e  i s  h a r d l y  a n y  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  r a t e s .  T h i s  c a n  b e  e x p l a i n e d  b y  t h e  1 9 9 0  A c t  t h a t  
r e m o v e d  t h e  u p  t o  t w o  p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  m a t c h  r e q u i r e m e n t .  I t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  s i n c e  1 9 9 0  
l e n d e r s  a r e  c h a r g i n g  a b o u t  t h e  s a m e  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  o n  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s ,  w h e t h e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t  i s  
c h a r g e d  j u s t  t o  t h e  b o r r o w e r  a s  o n  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s  w i t h o u t  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  o r  t h e  i n t e r e s t  i s  
c h a r g e d  b o t h  t o  t h e  b o r r o w e r  a n d  F S A  a s  o n  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s  w i t h  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e .
T h e  d a t a  p r e s e n t e d  i n  T a b l e  4  s h o w s  t h e  F S A  g u a r a n t e e  p e r c e n t a g e  f o r  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s .  
T h e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n s  ( 9 0 . 8 5  p e r c e n t )  a r e  w r i t t e n  a t  a  9 0  p e r c e n t  g u a r a n t e e .  A n  
e v e n  h i g h e r  p e r c e n t  o f  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s  w i t h  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  ( 9 4 . 5 0 )  a r e  w r i t t e n  a t  t h e  9 0  
p e r c e n t  g u a r a n t e e .  A l s o  n o t e  t h a t  4 1 . 7 5  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s  w i t h  m o r e  t h a n  a  9 0  
p e r c e n t  g u a r a n t e e  r e c e i v e d  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e .
F i g u r e  4  s h o w s  t h e  p e r c e n t  o f  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n s  m a d e  i n  a  g i v e n  y e a r  t h a t  h a d  a t  
s o m e t i m e  c l a i m e d  a  l o s s  b y  M a r c h  2 0 0 3 .  T h e  l o s s  c l a i m  p e r c e n t a g e s  a r e  f o r  n o n - i n t e r e s t  
a s s i s t a n c e  l o a n s  a n d  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  l o a n s .  T h e  p e r c e n t  o f  l o a n s  c l a i m i n g  a  l o s s  h a v e  t r e n d e d  
d o w n w a r d  o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d .  B u t  m u c h  o f  t h i s  d o w n w a r d  t r e n d  i n  l o s s  c l a i m  r a t e s  i s  l i k e l y  t h e  r e s u l t  
o f  t h e  l o a n s  m a d e  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  h a v e  n o t  h a d  e n o u g h  t i m e  t o  i n c u r  a n d  c l a i m  a  l o s s .  T h e  l o s s  
c l a i m  p e r c e n t a g e  i s  g r e a t e r  f o r  n o n - i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  l o a n s  t h a n  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  l o a n s  i n  e v e r y  
y e a r .  T h i s  m a y  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  p r o g r a m  i s  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  a s s i s t i n g  f a r m e r s  r e p a y  
t h e i r  l o a n s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  i n t e n t  o f  t h e  p r o g r a m  m a y  b e  t o  a l l o w  f a r m e r s  t h a t  q u a l i f y  f o r  i n t e r e s t  
a s s i s t a n c e  t o  h a v e  t h e  s a m e  s u c c e s s  w i t h  r e p a y i n g  l o a n s  a s  t h o s e  f a r m e r s  w i t h  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s  
t h a t  d o  n o t  q u a l i f y  f o r  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e .
F i g u r e  5  s h o w s  t h e  p e r c e n t  o f  g u a r a n t e e d  O L  l o a n s  m a d e  i n  a  g i v e n  y e a r  t h a t  a r e  s t i l l  
a c t i v e  a s  o f  M a r c h  2 0 0 3 .  T h e r e  i s  a n  u p w a r d  t r e n d  i n  t h e  p e r c e n t  o f  a c t i v e  l o a n s  s i n c e  m o r e  r e c e n t  
l o a n s  h a v e  n o t  h a d  a s  m u c h  o f  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  b e  r e p a i d  o r  i n c u r  a  l o s s  a s  t h e  l o a n s  m a d e  i n  
e a r l i e r  y e a r s .  A  h i g h e r  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s  w i t h  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  a r e  s t i l l  a c t i v e  i n  
e v e r y  y e a r  t h a n  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s  w i t h o u t  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e .  B e s i d e s  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  l o s s  c l a i m  
r a t e s ,  a n o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  a c t i v e  s t a t u s  i s  t h a t  f a r m e r s  a r e  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  
p a y  e a r l y  o n  b e l o w - m a r k e t  r a t e ,  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  l o a n s  t h a n  o n  a t - m a r k e t  r a t e ,  n o n - i n t e r e s t  
a s s i s t a n c e  l o a n s .
Summary
T h e  F a r m  S e c u r i t y  a n d  R u r a l  I n v e s t m e n t  A c t  o f  2 0 0 2  m a d e  p e r m a n e n t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  
a s s i s t a n c e  p r o g r a m  f o r  t h e  F a r m  S e r v i c e  A g e n c y ’ s  g u a r a n t e e d  l o a n s ,  a u t h o r i z e d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  
i n c r e a s e  i n  f u n d i n g  f o r  t h e  p r o g r a m ,  a n d  t a r g e t e d  f u n d i n g  f o r  b e g i n n i n g  f a r m e r s  a n d  r a n c h e r s .  T h e  
r e s e a r c h  p r e s e n t e d  h e r e  p r o v i d e d  a  b a s i c  d e s c r i p t i v e  a n a l y s i s  o f  p a s t  u s e .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  b o r r o w e r  
d a t a  f o r  F e d e r a l  f i s c a l  y e a r s  1 9 8 5  t h r o u g h  2 0 0 2  w e r e  e x a m i n e d  i n  s e v e r a l  d i m e n s i o n s .  T h e s e  
d i m e n s i o n s  i n c l u d e d  g e o g r a p h i c ,  b o r r o w e r  t y p e ,  l e n d e r  t y p e ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  p e r c e n t  
g u a r a n t e e ,  a n d  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  l o a n  a s  t o  w h e t h e r  a  l o s s  c l a i m  w a s  p a i d  o r  t h e  l o a n  r e m a i n e d  
a c t i v e .
E v e n  t h o u g h  t h e  p r o g r a m  h a s  b e e n  i n  e x i s t e n c e  f o r  m o r e  t h a n  1 5  y e a r s ,  l i t t l e  i s  k n o w n  
a b o u t  i t s  i m p a c t  a n d  u t i l i z a t i o n .  T h i s  r e s e a r c h  i s  a n  i n i t i a l  s t e p  i n  d o c u m e n t i n g  u s a g e  o f  t h e  
p r o g r a m .  M o r e  d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  i s  n e e d e d  t o  e x p l a i n  r e g i o n a l  v a r i a t i o n ,  b o r r o w e r  t y p e ,  a n d  l e n d e r  
t y p e  u s a g e .  A l s o ,  a d d i t i o n a l  r e s e a r c h  i s  n e e d e d  t o  e x p l a i n  i n t e r e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  p r o g r a m  s u c c e s s e s  
a n d  l o s s e s  a t  t h e  l o a n  l e v e l .
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Table 1. Guaranteed OL Loans by Region, 1985-2002
Regions
IA Total Percent IA
Northeast 722 7,347 9.83
Lake States 5,437 28,587 19.02
Corn Belt 8,896 43,733 20.34
Northern Plains 7,864 35,391 22.22
Appalachian 1,059 11,568 9.15
Southeast 91 7,874 1.16
Delta States 149 19,509 0.76
Southern Plains 2,143 21,122 10.15
Mountain 1,024 11,087 9.24
Pacific 43 6,857 0.63
IA = Interest Assistance Loans
Table 2. Guaranteed OL Loans by Borrower Type, 1993-2002
Borrower Type IA Total OL Loans Percent IA
BF Only 2,564 11,139 23.02
SDA Only 503 3,159 15.92
BF & SDA 130 833 15.61
Non-BF, Non-SDA 18,778 89,868 20.90
Total 21,975 104,999 20.93
BF = Beginning Farmer
SDA = Socially Disadvantaged Farmer
IA = Interest Assistance Loans
Table 3. Guaranteed OL Loans by Lender, 1993-2002
Lender Type IA Total OL Loans Percent IA
Commercial Bank 19,841 86,500 22.94
Farm Credit System 2,111 15,148 13.94
Savings and Loans 217 1,252 17.33
Credit Union 290 641 45.24
Mortgage Company 5 65 7.69
Other 91 1 ,31 4 6.93
Total 22,555 104,920 21.50
IA = Interest Assistance Loans
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Table 4. OL Loans by Percent Guarantee, 1985-2002
Percent Guarantee IA Total Percent IA of Total IA as Percent of IA 
Column Total
Total as Percent of 
Total Column Total
<60 6 227 2.64 0.02 0.12
60-69 8 1,644 0.49 0.03 0.86
70-79 300 5,983 5.01 1.09 3.12
80-89 958 9,135 10.49 3.49 4.76
90 25,923 174,434 14.86 94.50 90.85
>90 238 570 41.75 0.87 0.30
Column Total 27,433 191,993 14.29
IA = Interest Assistance Loans
Figure 1. Guaranteed FO Loans
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Figure 2. Guaranteed OL Loans
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Figure 3. OL Interest Rate Average
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Figure 4. Percent of Guaranteed OL Loans Claiming Loss
Year
Figure 5. Percent of Guaranteed OL Loans Active
Year
135
136
Analysis of Market Segmentation in Farm Credit Markets
B y  C h a r l e s  B .  D o d s o n  a n d  S t e v e n  R .  K o e n i g 1
Abstract:
A g r i c u l t u r a l  c r e d i t  m a r k e t s  a r e  d o m i n a t e d  b y  t w o  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e t a i l  l e n d e r  g r o u p s ,  t h e  
c o o p e r a t i v e  F a r m  C r e d i t  S y s t e m  ( F C S )  a n d  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s .  T o g e t h e r  t h e s e  t w o  l e n d e r  g r o u p s  
s u p p l y  7 0  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  f a r m  s e c t o r ’ s  t o t a l  c r e d i t  n e e d s .  T h i s  a n a l y s i s  u s e s  U S D A ’ s  2 0 0 1  a n d  
2 0 0 2  A g r i c u l t u r a l  R e s o u r c e  M a n a g e m e n t  S u r v e y  t o  e x a m i n e  w h e t h e r  t h e s e  t w o  l e n d e r  g r o u p s  
w e r e  s e r v i n g  d i f f e r e n t  s e g m e n t s  o f  t h e  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t .  R e g u l a t o r y ,  l e g i s l a t i v e ,  s t r u c t u r a l ,  a n d  
c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  f a c t o r s  a r e  e x p e c t e d  t o  i n f l u e n c e  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t a t i o n .  N a t i o n a l  e s t i m a t e s  m a d e  
u s i n g  a  b i n o m i a l  l o g i t  m o d e l  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  N a t i o n a l  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t  i s  s e g m e n t e d .  W h e n  
c o m p a r e d  t o  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k  l e n d i n g  i n  2 0 0 1  a n d  2 0 0 2 ,  t h e  F C S ’ s  l e n d i n g  w a s  m o r e  f o c u s e d  o n  
f u l l - t i m e  c o m m e r c i a l  f a r m s  t h a t  w e r e  l e s s  h e a v i l y  i n d e b t e d ,  m o r e  p r o f i t a b l e ,  a n d  h a d  g r e a t e r  d e b t  
r e p a y m e n t  c a p a c i t i e s .  T h e  F C S  w a s  a l s o  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  s u p p l y  c r e d i t  t o  y o u n g  a n d  b e g i n n i n g  
f a r m e r s  a n d  t o  f a r m s  l o c a t e d  i n  a r e a s  h a v i n g  a c c e s s  t o  a  F C S  o f f i c e ,  b u t  w h e r e  f e w  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
b a n k s  w e r e  l o c a t e d .
Keywords: A g r i c u l t u r a l  C r e d i t  M a r k e t s ,  M a r k e t  S e g m e n t a t i o n ,  F a r m  C r e d i t  S y s t e m ,  A g r i c u l t u r a l  
B a n k s ,  a n d  F a r m  L e n d e r s .
1 Charles B. Dodson and Steven R. Koenig are agricultural economists with USDA’s Farm Service Agency. The 
views expressed here are those of the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the USDA or the Farm Service 
Agency.
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C o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  a n d  t h e  c o o p e r a t i v e  F a r m  C r e d i t  S y s t e m  ( F C S )  a r e  t h e  p r i m a r y  
s u p p l i e r s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c r e d i t .  T h e s e  t w o  l e n d e r  g r o u p s  s u p p l i e d  o v e r  7 0  p e r c e n t  o f  t o t a l  f a r m  
b u s i n e s s  d e b t  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  2 0 0 2  ( U S D A  2 0 0 3 ) .  B e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  l a r g e  m a r k e t  s h a r e s ,  t h e  l e n d i n g  
p o l i c i e s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  o f  t h e s e  t w o  l e n d e r  g r o u p s  s h o u l d  h a v e  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n f l u e n c e  o n  o v e r a l l  
c r e d i t  a v a i l a b i l i t y  t o  f a r m e r s  a n d  r a n c h e r s .
M a r k e t  s e g m e n t a t i o n  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  a  m a r k e t  i n t o  h o m o g e n e o u s  g r o u p s  i n  o r d e r  
t o  f o c u s  o n  c u s t o m e r s  m o s t  l i k e l y  t o  p u r c h a s e  p r o d u c t s  o r  s e r v i c e s  o f f e r e d .  I f  d o n e  p r o p e r l y ,  
m a r k e t  s e g m e n t a t i o n  c a n  e n h a n c e  a  f i r m ’ s  c o m p e t i t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  a n d  i m p r o v e  m a r k e t  e f f i c i e n c i e s .  
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t a t i o n  m a y  r e s u l t  i n  l e s s  c o m p e t i t i v e  d e l i v e r y  o f  p r o d u c t s  o r  
s e r v i c e s  t o  g r o u p s  i d e n t i f i e d  b y  l e n d e r s  a s  m o r e  c o s t l y  t o  s e r v e .  S t r u c t u r a l  c h a n g e  i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o d u c t i o n  w h e n  c o u p l e d  w i t h  t h e  d e r e g u l a t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  t e c h n o l o g i e s  
a d v a n c e m e n t s  h a v e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i m p r o v e d  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  l e n d e r s  t o  s e g m e n t  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t s .
I n  t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  w e  u s e  a  l o g i t  m o d e l  t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  t h e  t w o  p r i m a r y  f a r m  l e n d e r  
g r o u p s ,  t h e  F C S  a n d  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s ,  a r e  s e r v i n g  d i f f e r e n t  s e g m e n t s  o f  t h e  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t  i n  
2 0 0 1  a n d  2 0 0 2 .
Market Segmentation and Farm Credit Markets
M a r k e t  s e g m e n t a t i o n  w a s  f i r s t  d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  1 9 5 0 ’ s ,  w h e n  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  w a s  
t h e  p r i m a r y  m a r k e t i n g  s t r a t e g y .  I n  t h e  1 9 7 0 ’ s  a n d  1 9 8 0 ’ s ,  f i r m s  u s e d  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t a t i o n  t o  
e x p a n d  s a l e s  a n d  o b t a i n  c o m p e t i t i v e  a d v a n t a g e s  i n  t h e  m a r k e t  p l a c e  ( W e d e l  a n d  K a m u k a r a ) .  
I m p r o v e m e n t s  i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  t e c h n o l o g y  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 9 0 ’ s  p r o v i d e d  b u s i n e s s e s  w i t h  m o r e  
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  a n d  l o w e r  c o s t  t e c h n i q u e s  t o  i d e n t i f y  a n d  r e a c h  p o t e n t i a l  c u s t o m e r s  w i t h  m o r e  
c u s t o m i z e d  o f f e r i n g s  o f  g o o d s  o r  s e r v i c e s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  m a n y  l e n d e r s  n o w  u s e  c r e d i t - s c o r i n g  
t e c h n i q u e s  t o  b e t t e r  s e g m e n t  b o r r o w e r s .
T o  s e g m e n t  m a r k e t s  e f f e c t i v e l y  t h e r e  m u s t  b e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a n d  m e a s u r a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e s  
a m o n g  c u s t o m e r s .  D e m o g r a p h i c  v a r i a b l e s  s u c h  a s  a g e ,  s e x ,  r a c e ,  i n c o m e ,  o c c u p a t i o n ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  
h o u s e h o l d  s t a t u s ,  a n d  g e o g r a p h i c  l o c a t i o n  c a n  b e  u s e d  t o  s e g m e n t  m a r k e t s .  H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  l e n d e r s  h a v e  u s e d  l o c a t i o n ,  e n t e r p r i s e  t y p e ,  l o a n  s i z e ,  o r  c r e d i t  r i s k  a s  a  b a s i s  f o r  
s e g m e n t i n g  c r e d i t  m a r k e t s  ( B o e h l j e ) .  F o r  s o m e  l e n d e r s ,  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t a t i o n  m a y  a l s o  u s e  
p s y c h o g r a p h i c  v a r i a b l e s  s u c h  a s  l i f e - s t y l e ,  a c t i v i t i e s ,  i n t e r e s t s ,  a n d  o p i n i o n s .  E a c h  g r o u p  
r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  a  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t  m u s t  s e e k  u n i q u e  b e n e f i t s  a n d  t h e  m a r k e t e r  m u s t  b e  a b l e  t o  
p r o v i d e  p r o d u c t s  o r  s e r v i c e s  t h a t  a d d r e s s  s u c h  n e e d s .
S o m e  p a s t  r e s e a r c h  h a s  i d e n t i f i e d  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t s  b a s e d  o n  f a r m ,  n o n f a r m ,  
a n d  o p e r a t o r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  D o d s o n  a n d  K o e n i g  ( 1 9 9 5 )  u s e d  o p e r a t o r  a g e ,  o c c u p a t i o n ,  f a r m  
s a l e s ,  n e t  w o r t h ,  a n d  o f f - f a r m  i n c o m e s  t o  i d e n t i f y  v a r i o u s  n i c h e s  i n  t h e  f a r m  l e n d i n g  m a r k e t .
M o s s  e t  a l .  u s e d  a  s i m i l a r  c r i t e r i o n  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h r e e  p o t e n t i a l  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t s  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  l a r g e -  
s c a l e  p r o d u c e r s ,  s m a l l - s c a l e  p r o d u c e r s ,  a n d  i n d u s t r i a l  u n i t s .  B o t h  s t u d i e s  i n d i c a t e d  t h e  c r e d i t  
n e e d s  o f  p a r t - t i m e  f a r m e r s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h e  c r e d i t  n e e d s  o f  f u l l - t i m e  c o m m e r c i a l  f a r m e r s .
I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s  h a v e  u n d e r g o n e  f u n d a m e n t a l  c h a n g e s  t h a t  h a v e  e n h a n c e d  
t h e  a b i l i t i e s  o f  l e n d e r s  t o  u n d e r t a k e  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t a t i o n .  B e s i d e s  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a d v a n c e s  t h a t  
h a v e  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  l o w e r e d  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s ,  f i n a n c i a l  d e r e g u l a t i o n
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has increased competition and prompted consolidation by removing geographic and industry 
barriers (Executive Office of the President). Financial institutions are now better able to focus on 
market segments or niches in which they have the greatest competitive advantage. Nonbank 
financial institutions have increased their presence by providing financial products not previously 
available. Internet based financial services have lowered financial transaction costs and reduced 
the importance of physical location.
While these advances should greatly enhance the overall efficiency of credit markets, some 
groups may be less likely to benefit. For example, credit scoring may be difficult to apply to some 
market segments with unique characteristics that are difficult to standardize. And some lenders 
may limit lending to market segments that are not easily scored. On the other hand, credit scoring 
may be better suited for quantifying risk for smaller farm loans where repayment is based mostly 
on non-farm earnings. These loans are more similar to consumer loans and, therefore, may be 
more easily standardized.
Farmers in more sparsely populated areas may have fewer lender choices, and therefore, 
are more likely to face imperfect competition for their loans than their counterparts in more urban 
areas (USDA 1997). The financial deregulation over the past couple decades spurned 
consolidation in commercial banking with the number of banks dropping from over 14,000 to just 
7,800 in 2002. The FCS has experienced similar changes with the number of associations 
dropping from over 800 to under 100. The fear is that larger financial institutions may focus more 
on large customers and business lines that utilize economies of scale and scope, leaving smaller 
borrowers, especially those in more rural areas with more limited credit sources.
In this analysis, we examine the segmentation of the agricultural credit market by FCS 
lenders and commercial banks in 2001 and 2002. There are several reasons to expect that the FCS 
and banks might serve different market segments. Statutes and regulations restrict eligibility to 
FCS loans and limit the types of financial products it may offer. While banks may geographically 
segment markets, the FCS is expected to provide access to their services in all counties of the US. 
Banks and FCS have very different organizational structures that may impact the market segments 
chosen to target.
Past research using USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) has 
shown that different groups of lenders tend to serve different segments of the farm credit markets. 
Dodson and Koenig (1994) using 1991-2 data found the FCS concentrated its lending most 
heavily among larger, older, wealthier, and higher income operators. Using 1997 data, Ryan and 
Koenig (1999) found similar results, showing that FCS debt was concentrated in larger farming 
operations that were more financially secure. Ryan and Koenig (2001) using 1999 data reaffirmed 
the earlier studies.
Regulations and Market Segmentation
The Farm Credit Act of 1971 requires the FCS to serve bona fide farmers and ranchers. 
Regulations define a bona fide farmer or rancher as a person owning agricultural land or engaged 
in the production of agricultural products, including aquatic products under controlled conditions 
[US Code 12CFR613.3000]. This can include both full and part-time farmers, as well as 
nonfarming landlords. Also, regulations stipulate that FCS institutions provide full credit, to the 
extent of creditworthiness, to full-time bona fide farmers for agricultural enterprises [US Code 
12CFR613.3005].
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F C A  r e g u l a t i o n s  l i m i t  t h e  t y p e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s  w h i c h  F C S  i n s t i t u t i o n s  m a y  p r o v i d e .  
S u c h  r e l a t e d  f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s  o f f e r e d  i n c l u d e  t a x  p r e p a r a t i o n ,  l e a s e s ,  a n d  c o n s u l t i n g  a n d  a p p r a i s a l  
s e r v i c e s .  U n l i k e  a  f u l l  s e r v i c e  b a n k ,  F C S  l e n d e r s  m a y  n o t  d i r e c t l y  p r o v i d e  s e r v i c e s  s u c h  a s  
c h e c k i n g ,  i n v e s t m e n t s ,  o r  b u s i n e s s  l o a n s  n o t  r e l a t e d  t o  f a r m i n g .  C o m p a r e d  t o  p a r t - t i m e  f a r m s ,  
o p e r a t o r s  o f  c o m m e r c i a l - s i z e  f a r m s  a r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e n e f i t  f r o m  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p r o d u c t s  a n d  
s e r v i c e s  p r o v i d e d  b y  F C S ,  s u c h  a s  c o n s u l t i n g  a n d  a p p r a i s a l  s e r v i c e s ,  o r  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  k n o w l e d g e  
a n d  e x p e r t i s e  a n  F C S  l o a n  o f f i c e r  m a y  p r o v i d e .  W h i l e  t h e r e  a r e  n o  e x p l i c i t  l i m i t a t i o n s  o n  
p r o v i d i n g  c r e d i t  t o  p a r t - t i m e  f a r m e r s ,  c u r r e n t  F C A  r e g u l a t i o n s  c l e a r l y  l i m i t  t h i s  a c t i v i t y .  S c o p e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  s t i p u l a t e  t h a t  F C S  l e n d e r s  a r e  t o  p r o v i d e  o n l y  “ c o n s e r v a t i v e ”  c r e d i t  t o  p a r t - t i m e  
f a r m e r s .
C o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  h a v e  n o  s p e c i f i c  r e g u l a t i o n s  g o v e r n i n g  w h i c h  s e g m e n t s  o f  t h e  c r e d i t  
m a r k e t  t h e y  s e r v e .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  C o m m u n i t y  R e i n v e s t m e n t  A c t  ( C R A )  e n c o u r a g e s  b a n k s  t o  s e r v e  
a  b r o a d  c l i e n t e l e  b a s e  i n  t h e i r  m a r k e t  a r e a .  L a r g e r  b a n k s  s e r v i n g  r u r a l  m a r k e t s  m a y  h a v e  m o r e  o f  
a n  i n c e n t i v e  t o  s e r v e  s m a l l  f a r m i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  b e c a u s e  o f  g r e a t e r  C R A  r e p o r t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
i m p o s e d  o n  t h e m .  A l s o ,  b a n k s  a r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  a  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  o v e r  t h e  F C S  i n  
m e e t i n g  t h e  n e e d s  o f  p a r t - t i m e  f a r m e r s  b e c a u s e  t h e y  c a n  p r o v i d e  a  w i d e r  a r r a y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
s e r v i c e s .  F o r  p a r t - t i m e  a n d  s m a l l  f a r m s ,  c o n s u m e r  c r e d i t  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  s e r v i c e s  a v a i l a b l e  f r o m  
b a n k s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  t o  c h o o s i n g  a  l e n d e r  t h a n  t h e  f a r m  c r e d i t  s e r v i c e s  p r o v i d e d .  
T h u s ,  F e d e r a l  l a w s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h  a n  e n v i r o n m e n t  w h e r e  t h e  F C S  i s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  s e r v e  
f u l l - t i m e  f a r m s  w h i l e  b a n k s  a r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  s e r v e  s m a l l  o r  p a r t - t i m e  f a r m s .
Impact of Lender Competition on Market Segmentation
T h e  F C S  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  C o n g r e s s  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  f a r m e r s  i n  a l l  a r e a s  o f  t h e  U S  h a d  
a c c e s s  t o  f a r m  c r e d i t . 2 F C S  b r a n c h  o f f i c e s  a r e  g e o g r a p h i c a l l y  d i s p e r s e d ,  w i t h  o f f i c e s  l o c a t e d  i n  4 8  
o f  t h e  5 0  S t a t e s .  O n l y  A l a s k a  a n d  R h o d e  I s l a n d  d o  n o t  h a v e  a  F C S  b r a n c h  o f f i c e  w i t h i n  t h e i r  
b o r d e r s .  W i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  m o r e  r e m o t e  a r e a s ,  a l l  c o u n t i e s  i n  t h e  U S  a r e  w i t h i n  5 0  m i l e s  o f  a  
F C S  b r a n c h  o f f i c e  ( F i g u r e  1 ) .  E v e n  s o m e  o f  t h o s e  a r e a s  o r  c o u n t i e s  w i t h o u t  a  b r a n c h  o f f i c e  m a y  
b e  s e r v e d  t h r o u g h  c o n t a c t  p o i n t s ,  w h i c h  a r e  s t a f f e d  b y  F C S  o n l y  o n  d e s i g n a t e d  d a y s .
2 The Farm Credit Act of 1971 specifies that all counties and municipalities in the US and Puerto Rico should have 
access to FCS credit.
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Location of FCS Branch Offices in 2003
Source: Association Annual Reports to Stockholders for 2003
Figure 1. FCS Branch Offices Dispersed Throughout U.S.
I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  F C S ,  b a n k s  a r e  n o t  r e q u i r e d  t o  s e r v e  a l l  U . S .  c o u n t i e s  a n d  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  b a n k s  m a y  b e  r e l u c t a n t  t o  p r o v i d e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c r e d i t  i n  a r e a s  w i t h  l i m i t e d  f a r m  
b o r r o w e r s  o r  d e p r e s s e d  e c o n o m i c  c o n d i t i o n s .  H e n c e ,  f a r m  b o r r o w e r s  i n  s u c h  r e g i o n s  m a y  f a c e  
l e s s  c o m p e t i t i v e  f a r m  l o a n  m a r k e t s  b e c a u s e  o f  a  l i m i t e d  p r e s e n c e  o f  b a n k s  t h a t  m a k e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
l o a n s .  B a n k s  t h a t  s p e c i a l i z e  i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l e n d i n g  ( a t  l e a s t  1 0  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  l e n d i n g  t o  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  b u s i n e s s e s )  a r e  h e a v i l y  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  t h e  C o r n  B e l t  a n d  c e n t r a l  p l a i n s  S t a t e s ,  w h e r e  
a g r i c u l t u r e  r e p r e s e n t s  a  l a r g e r  p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  e c o n o m i c  a c t i v i t y  ( F i g u r e  2 ) .  F a r m e r s  l o c a t e d  i n  
t h e s e  r e g i o n s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  a c c e s s  t o  m u l t i p l e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  b a n k  b r a n c h e s  w i t h i n  a  r e l a t i v e l y  
s h o r t  g e o g r a p h i c  d i s t a n c e ,  w h i l e  f a r m e r s  i n  t h e  N o r t h e a s t ,  M i d - A t l a n t i c ,  S o u t h e a s t  a n d  M o u n t a i n  
S t a t e s  m a y  h a v e  n o  a g r i c u l t u r a l  b a n k  b r a n c h e s  w i t h i n  t h e i r  c o u n t y  o r  i n  a  n e a r b y  l o c a t i o n .  I n  
t h o s e  a r e a s  w i t h  f e w  a l t e r n a t i v e  f a r m  l e n d e r s ,  t h e  F C S  i s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  a  l a r g e r  m a r k e t  s h a r e .
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Farmers in two-thirds of U.S. Counties Served 
by Fewer than Three Ag Banks
£
Agricultural Bank Branches Per County
a1 - 23 - 67 or more
Ag. Bank Defined as 10% or more o f loans are agricultural.
Figure 2. Branches of Agricultural Banks Concentrated in Midwest.
T h e  f i n a n c i a l  h e a l t h  o f  s m a l l  o r  c o m m u n i t y  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  i s  c l o s e l y  l i n k e d  t o  t h e  
e c o n o m i c  c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  r e g i o n  t h e y  s e r v e .  E v e n  w i t h  C R A  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  b a n k s  m i g h t  b e  
r e l u c t a n t  t o  p r o v i d e  f a r m  o r  n o n f a r m  c r e d i t  i n  e c o n o m i c a l l y  d e p r e s s e d  r e g i o n s .  T h e  F C S ,  o n  t h e  
o t h e r  h a n d ,  i s  l e s s  a b l e  t o  e x e r c i s e  s u c h  g e o g r a p h i c  s e g m e n t a t i o n .  O n e  m e a s u r e  o f  r e g i o n a l  
e c o n o m i c  w e l l  b e i n g  i s  m e d i a n  h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e .  N o t  s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  t h e  m e d i a n  h o u s e h o l d  
i n c o m e  t e n d s  t o  b e  h i g h e s t  i n  m e t r o  r e g i o n s  a n d  l o w e r  i n  r u r a l  a r e a s .  S o m e  o f  t h e  l o w e s t  
h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e s  o c c u r  i n  A p p a l a c h i a ,  t h e  D e l t a ,  a n d  t h e  O z a r k s .  T h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  i s  t h a t  b a n k s  
w o u l d  b e  l e s s  a c t i v e  i n  p r o v i d i n g  b u s i n e s s  l o a n s  i n  c o u n t i e s  w i t h  l o w e r  h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e s .  
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  b o r r o w e r s  l o c a t e d  i n  t h e s e  c o u n t i e s  m i g h t  b e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  F C S  
i n s t i t u t i o n s .
Impact of Lending Structure on Market Segmentation
T h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  l e n d i n g  i n s t i t u t i o n s  m a y  a f f e c t  t h e  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t s  t h e y  
s e r v e .  T h e  F C S  i s  a  b o r r o w e r  o w n e d  c o o p e r a t i v e  w i t h  g o v e r n m e n t  s p o n s o r e d  e n t e r p r i s e  ( G S E )  
s t a t u s  w h e r e a s  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  a r e  i n v e s t o r  o w n e d  f i r m s .  T h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  a f f e c t  h o w  t h e y  a r e  
m a n a g e d .  B a n k s  s e e k  t o  m a x i m i z e  r e t u r n s  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s  w h i l e  c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  t h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  s e e k  
t o  m i n i m i z e  m e m b e r ’ s  b o r r o w i n g  c o s t s .
R e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  F C S ,  b a n k s  t y p i c a l l y  h a v e  a  m u c h  m o r e  d i v e r s i f i e d  i n v e s t m e n t  o r  l o a n  
p o r t f o l i o .  A s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  b a n k  m a n a g e r s  m a y  b e  l e s s  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  r i s k  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  l e n d i n g  t o  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  m a y  m o r e  e a s i l y  a d o p t  
u n d e r w r i t i n g  s t a n d a r d s  t h a t  a r e  l e s s  s t r i n g e n t  t h a n  t h a t  o f  a  F C S  l e n d e r .  A l s o ,  b a n k s  m a y  p r o f i t
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from other business relationships with the borrower, which could foster less concern about the risk 
associated with an agricultural loan. FCS associations are primarily invested in agricultural loans 
and are much more sensitive to unsystematic risk, which could lend to a more conservative 
lending approach than banks. On the other hand, by specializing in agricultural loans, FCS 
managers may be more capable of identifying and managing farm lending risks, which could 
result in a less conservative lending approach than banks.
Differences in regulatory structure may also influence market segmentation. FCA 
examiners are focused only on FCS institutions, and therefore are well acquainted with the risks 
and issues affecting agricultural lending. Bank examiners, on the other hand, may have less 
expertise concerning agricultural loans. The greater expertise of FCA examiners may result in the 
FCS being more thorough in their loan making decisions and able to satisfy regulator concerns on 
higher risk loans. A more limited understanding of agricultural businesses by bank examiners 
may discourage banks from making higher risk farm business loans. In addition, banks face 
different regulatory systems depending on the nature of their bank charter and hence face 
potentially different review systems.
The different governance and regulatory structure for banks and the FCS could result in 
differences and underwriting criteria and lending policy. Though, it is difficult to predict, a priori, 
the direction of these impacts. Nonetheless, the expectation would be that these differences could 
impact the market segments served by banks and FCS.
Impact of Targeting on Market Segmentation
To assure that presumed undeserved groups within society have access to credit, Congress 
has instituted policies requiring certain lender groups to target their lending resources to 
disadvantaged groups or economically distressed areas. Section 4.19 of the Farm Credit Act of 
1971 specifically directs the FCS to adopt policies that increase service to young, beginning, and 
small farms (YBS). In recent years, FCA has placed increased emphasis on enforcing this part of 
the FCS’s legislative mission. A FCA Policy Statement issued in 1998 said, “Each Board of 
Directors within the System should renew its commitment to be a reliable, consistent, and 
constructive lender for YBS borrowers.” While the FCS does not have quantifiable targeting 
goals like the housing GSE’s; the directive has lead to increased public reporting requirements and 
greater YBS program development and use (68 Federal Register 53915, September 15, 2003).
While banks have no specific targeting requirements they can be subject to the Community 
Reinvestment Act, which encourages lending to underserved credit markets, such as those in urban 
centers. While the FCS and banks are prohibited from practicing discrimination in lending, there is 
no specific regulatory requirement for either the FCS or banks to serve racial or ethnic minority 
farmers. Yet, many regions with a greater presence of racial and ethnic minorities are 
characterized by lower incomes. Such characteristics might discourage bank lending to farms in 
these counties. However, the FCS is directed to serve all farm borrowers with a basis for credit, 
regardless of location, which could increase the likelihood that racial and ethnic minorities are 
served by FCS institutions relative to the banking industry.
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The Model
T h e  e s t i m a t e d  m o d e l ’ s  n u l l  h y p o t h e s i s  i s  t h e  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  b o r r o w e r s  r e c e i v i n g  F C S  l o a n s  i s  
n o t  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h o s e  r e c e i v i n g  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k  l o a n s .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  a n y  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  
b o r r o w e r  a t t r i b u t e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  l e n d e r  g r o u p s  i s  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t a t i o n .  
M u l t i v a r i a t e  t e c h n i q u e s  s u c h  a s  c l u s t e r i n g ,  c o n j o i n t  a n a l y s i s ,  o r  f a c t o r  a n a l y s i s  a r e  c o m m o n l y  u s e d  
t o  i d e n t i f y  a n d  c r e a t e  p o s t  h o c  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t s .  F o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  a  p r i o r i  e x i s t e n c e  o f  m a r k e t  
s e g m e n t s ,  l o g i t ,  p r o b i t ,  o r  d i s c r i m i n a t e  a n a l y s i s  i s  c o m m o n l y  u s e d  ( W e d e l  a n d  K a m u k a r a ) .  B l a c k  
a n d  S c h w e i t z e r  u s e d  m u l t i n o m i a l  p r o b i t  a n a l y s i s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  h o m e  m o r t g a g e  m a r k e t s  
w e r e  s e g m e n t e d  a m o n g  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  a n d  m u t u a l  s a v i n g s .  B a s e d  o n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
f o r  t h e  m o d e l ’ s  s u m m a r y  s t a t i s t i c s ,  B l a c k  a n d  S c h w e i t z e r  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  h o m e  m o r t g a g e  m a r k e t s  
w e r e  s e g m e n t e d .  I n  t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  a  m u l t i v a r i a t e  l o g i t  m o d e l  i s  u s e d  t o  e x a m i n e  m a r k e t  
s e g m e n t a t i o n  o f  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t s  b e t w e e n  t h e  F C S  a n d  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s .  A s  w i t h  B l a c k  a n d  
S c h w e i t z e r ,  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  m o d e l  s u m m a r y  s t a t i s t i c s  w o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t a t i o n .
T h i s  s t u d y  u t i l i z e s  d a t a  f r o m  t h e  2 0 0 1  a n d  2 0 0 2  A g r i c u l t u r a l  R e s o u r c e  M a n a g e m e n t  
S u r v e y .  T h e  A R M S  i s  U S D A ’ s  p r i m a r y  v e h i c l e  f o r  d a t a  o n  a  b r o a d  r a n g e  o f  i s s u e s  a b o u t  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  r e s o u r c e  u s e s  a n d  c o s t s ,  a n d  f a r m  f i n a n c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s . 3 F i n a n c i a l  a n d  d e m o g r a p h i c  
d a t a  f o r  f a r m s  o b t a i n i n g  l o a n s  f r o m  a  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k  o r  a  F C S  i n s t i t u t i o n  d u r i n g  2 0 0 1  a n d  2 0 0 2  
w a s  s e l e c t e d  f o r  t h i s  s t u d y .  T h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e ,  Y ,  i s  e q u a l  t o  1 i f  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  f a r m  
o p e r a t o r ’ s  d e b t  o r i g i n a t e d  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  w a s  p r o v i d e d  b y  F C S ,  0  i f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  w a s  f r o m  
b a n k s . 4 A s  s u c h ,  a  Y  e q u a l  t o  1 w o u l d  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  g r o u p  o f  f a r m e r s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  F C S  
m a r k e t  s e g m e n t ,  w h i l e  a  Y  e q u a l  t o  0  w o u l d  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  o n e  i n  t h e  b a n k  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t .
T h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  a s  t o  w h i c h  p a r t i c u l a r  s e g m e n t  a  b o r r o w e r  b e l o n g s  i s  h y p o t h e s i z e d  t o  b e  a  
f u n c t i o n  o f  a  s e t  o f  f a c t o r s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  o f  l o c a l  
c r e d i t  m a r k e t s ,  l e n d e r  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  g o v e r n a n c e ,  a n d  b o r r o w e r  t a r g e t i n g  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  ( t a b l e  1 ) .
Y =  f  ( r e g u l a t o r y  f a c t o r s ,  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  a n d  g o v e r n a n c e ,  t a r g e t i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s ) .  
Regulatory Factors
R e g u l a t i o n s  g o v e r n i n g  e l i g i b i l i t y  f o r  F C S  f a r m  l o a n s  s h o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  
F C S  b o r r o w e r s  a r e  f u l l - t i m e  o r  c o m m e r c i a l - s i z e d  f a r m e r s  a n d  r e d u c e  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  i t s  
b o r r o w e r s  a r e  p a r t - t i m e  o r  h o b b y  f a r m s .  F C A  r e g u l a t i o n s  s t a t e  t h a t  “ l o a n s  t o  f a r m e r s  s h a l l  b e  o n  
a n  i n c r e a s i n g l y  c o n s e r v a t i v e  b a s i s  a s  t h e  e m p h a s i s  m o v e s  a w a y  f r o m  t h e  f u l l - t i m e  b o n a  f i d e  
f a r m e r  t o  t h e  p o i n t  w h e r e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  n e e d s  o n l y  w i l l  b e  f i n a n c e d  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a n t  w h o s e  b u s i n e s s  
i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  o t h e r  t h a n  f a r m i n g .  C r e d i t  s h a l l  n o t  b e  e x t e n d e d  w h e r e  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
a s s e t s  f o r  s p e c u l a t i v e  a p p r e c i a t i o n  i s  a  p r i m a r y  f a c t o r ”  ( 1 2 C F R  6 1 3 . 3 0 0 5 ) .
3 For more information on ARMS see Mishra et al, Appendix A.
4 Majority of debt is defined as a borrower having at least 50 percent of their total debt from a particular lender group. 
Ryan and Koenig (2001) have shown that most borrowers rely on one lender for their credit needs.
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F C A  p r o v i d e s  n o  a b s o l u t e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  f u l l - t i m e  o r  p a r t - t i m e  f a r m s .  H o w e v e r ,  p a s t  
r e s e a r c h  b y  U S D A ’ s  E c o n o m i c  R e s e a r c h  S e r v i c e  h a s  c o n s i d e r e d  f u l l - t i m e  s t a t u s  t o  b e  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  f a c t o r s  s u c h  a s  t h e  o p e r a t o r ’ s  p r i m a r y  o c c u p a t i o n ,  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  l a b o r  h o u r s  d e v o t e d  t o  
f a r m i n g ,  t h e  r e l i a n c e  o n  t h e  f a r m  e n t e r p r i s e s  f o r  t o t a l  h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e ,  a n d  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  f a r m  
( H o p p e  e t  a l . )  I n  o r d e r  t o  i d e n t i f y  f u l l  a n d  p a r t - t i m e  f a r m e r s  f i v e  m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e  c a t e g o r i e s  
w e r e  d e v e l o p e d  f o r  t h e  m o d e l  ( t a b l e  1 ) .
A  l a r g e  f u l l - t i m e  c o m m e r c i a l  f a r m e r  ( F U L L T I M E )  w a s  d e f i n e d  a s  o n e  w h o  c o n s i d e r s  
f a r m i n g  t o  b e  t h e i r  p r i m a r y  o c c u p a t i o n ,  i s  f u l l y  e m p l o y e d  b y  t h e  f a r m  b u s i n e s s ,  i s  r e l i a n t  o n  t h e  
f a r m  b u s i n e s s  f o r  m o s t  o f  t h e i r  f a m i l y  i n c o m e ,  a n d  h a s  a n n u a l  f a r m  s a l e s  o f  g r e a t e r  t h e n  $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 .  
T h i s  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t  w o u l d  m o s t  l i k e l y  b e  a  f u l l - t i m e  b o n a  f i d e  f a r m e r  a n d  n o t  a  p a r t - t i m e  f a r m e r .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e s e  f u l l - t i m e  f a r m s  a r e  m o s t  l i k e l y  t o  b e n e f i t  f r o m  t h e  F C S ’ s  c r e d i t  p r o g r a m s ,  i t s  
e x p e r t i s e ,  a n d  i t s  f a r m  r e l a t e d  s e r v i c e s .
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Table 1. Variable names, description, and expected influence on outcome.
Variable name Description Lend
-er
FULLTIME Large full-time commercial farm. 1, if primary occupation is 
farming, annual operator labor hours over 1,500, over 50 % of 
household’s income is from farm business, and annual sales over 
$250,000; 0 otherwise.
FCS
FAMFARM Family-size commercial farm. 1, if not considered a large full-time 
commercial farm, primary occupation is farming, annual operator 
labor hours over 1,500, and sales over $100,000; 0 otherwise.
Both
OTH_COM_FM Other commercial-size farm. 1, if annual sales over $100,000 and 
not considered either large or family-size commercial farm as 
previously defined; 0 otherwise.
Bank
\1
PARTTIME Part-time farm. 1, if primary occupation is farming, annual sales 
under $100,000, annual operator labor hours > 1,000 hours, and 
median household income < 200% of county median; 0 otherwise.
Bank
HOBBY Hobby or lifestyle farm. 1, if annual sales under $100,000 and not 
considered as part-time; 0 otherwise.
Bank
COMPETITION Lending competition. 1, if farms is located in a county where there 
is less than 3 bank branches making agricultural loans and an FCS 
branch located within 20 miles of the county line; 0 otherwise.
FCS
FARM_SHR Measure of farming’s importance to economy. Share of total 
population residing on farms.
FCS
MED_HHI Median county-level household income. 1, if county average 
household income less than $32,000; 0 otherwise.
FCS
DA RATIO Solvency. Total year-end debt plus production loans repaid divided 
by year-end assets plus the amount of production loans repaid 
during the year.
A/
TDBTCOV Debt capacity. Term debt coverage ratio. B/
PMARGIN Profitability. Profit margin. B/
CAPITAL Capitalization. Net worth per dollar of annual sales. B/
VULNERABLE Financial vulnerability. 1, if total household income is below 
poverty level and debt-to-asset ratio greater than 0.40; 0 otherwise.
A/
RACE_ETHNIC Racial and ethnic minority. Share of total farm resident population 
in county that is a member of racial or ethnic minority group.
FCS
BEG_YOUNG Young or beginning farmers. 1, if primary operator under 36 years 
of age or has less than 10 years of farming experience; 0 otherwise.
FCS
OVER_55 Older farmers. 1, if primary operator > 55 years of age; 0 
otherwise.
Bank
\1 Variable omitted from model for estimation. A/, B / There is no a priori expectation concerning underwriting 
standards. It expected that directional impacts to be consistent among those designated /A and /B. That is, if those 
borrowing from banks <the FCS> had higher debt-asset ratios, banks would also be expected to serve more financially 
vulnerable borrowers. Those borrowing from the FCS < banks> that had greater capitalization would also be expected 
to have greater profitability and debt capacity.
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A  f a m i l y - s i z e  c o m m e r c i a l  f a r m  ( F A M F A R M )  h a d  a n n u a l  s a l e s  o f  a t  l e a s t  $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  a n d  
t h e  p r i m a r y  o p e r a t o r  e i t h e r  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e i r  p r i m a r y  o c c u p a t i o n  t o  b e  f a r m i n g  o r  s u p p l i e d  a t  l e a s t  
2 0  h o u r s  o f  l a b o r  p e r  w e e k  t o  t h e  f a r m  b u s i n e s s .  M o s t  w i t h i n  t h i s  g r o u p  w o u l d  l i k e l y  b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  f u l l - t i m e  b o n a  f i d e  f a r m e r s ,  t h o u g h  s o m e  m a y  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  p a r t - t i m e  f a r m e r s .  T h e  
e x p e c t a t i o n  i s  t h a t  f a m i l y - s i z e  c o m m e r c i a l  f a r m s  m i g h t  b e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  t h e  F C S  
r a t h e r  t h a n  f r o m  b a n k s .  T h e  o t h e r  c o m m e r c i a l  f a r m  g r o u p  ( O T H _ C O M _ F M )  i s  a  r e s i d u a l  
s e g m e n t  a n d  i n c l u d e s  t h o s e  c o m m e r c i a l  f a r m s  f o r  w h o  t h e  p r i m a r y  o c c u p a t i o n  i s  n o t  f a r m i n g  a n d  
r e p o r t  l e s s  t h a n  1 , 0 0 0  h o u r s  o f  a n n u a l  o p e r a t o r  l a b o r  h o u r s .  T h i s  g r o u p  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  b e  m o r e  
l i k e l y  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  b a n k s ,  b u t  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  e m p i r i c a l  e s t i m a t i o n  t h i s  v a r i a b l e  w a s  o m i t t e d .
P a r t - t i m e  f a r m s  ( P A R T T I M E )  w e r e  d e f i n e d  a s  t h o s e  w i t h  a n n u a l  f a r m  s a l e s  o f  l e s s  t h a n  
$ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  w h e r e  t h e  p r i m a r y  o p e r a t o r  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e i r  p r i m a r y  o c c u p a t i o n  t o  b e  f a r m i n g ,  a n d  t h e  
o p e r a t o r  i n d i c a t e d  h e  o r  s h e  s u p p l i e d  l e s s  t h a n  2 0  h o u r s  o f  l a b o r  p e r  w e e k  t o  t h e  f a r m  b u s i n e s s .  
A l s o ,  t h e  h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e  o f  t h e  o p e r a t o r  w a s  l e s s  t h a n  t w i c e  t h e  c o u n t y  a v e r a g e .  T h e  p a r t - t i m e  
f a r m e r  g r o u p  i s  s t r u c t u r e d  t o  c a p t u r e  s m a l l  f a r m s  t h a t  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  o p e r a t e d  a s  a  f a r m  b u s i n e s s  
r a t h e r  t h a n  a s  a  h o b b y  o r  l i f e s t y l e  f a r m .  W h i l e  s o m e  w i t h i n  t h i s  g r o u p  m a y  s t i l l  m e e t  t h e  
r e g u l a t o r y  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  b e i n g  a  f u l l - t i m e  b o n a  f i d e  f a r m e r ,  i t  i s  a l s o  l i k e l y  t h a t  m a n y  m a y  f i n d  
t h e  a r r a y  o f  n o n f a r m  r e l a t e d  f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s  p r o v i d e d  b y  b a n k s  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  t o  t h e i r  n e e d s  
t h a n  t h e  f a r m  r e l a t e d  f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s  o f  t h e  F C S .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  i s  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  m e m b e r s  o f  t h i s  
g r o u p  a r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  f a l l  w i t h i n  t h e  b a n k  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t .
F a r m s  d e f i n e d  a s  h o b b y  o r  l i f e s t y l e  ( H O B B Y ) ,  i n c l u d e  a l l  t h o s e  w i t h  l e s s  t h a n  $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  i n  
a n n u a l  s a l e s  t h a t  w e r e  n o t  a l r e a d y  d e f i n e d  a s  p a r t - t i m e .  O p e r a t o r s  o f  h o b b y  f a r m s  w o u l d  b e  
c o n s i d e r e d  l e a s t  l i k e l y  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  f u l l - t i m e  b o n a  f i d e  f a r m e r s  a n d  F C S  i s  s u p p o s e  t o  b e  
p r o v i d i n g  o n l y  “ c o n s e r v a t i v e ”  c r e d i t  t o  t h i s  g r o u p .  T h i s  b o r r o w e r  g r o u p  i s  m o s t  l i k e l y  t o  f a l l  i n t o  
t h e  b a n k  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t .
Farm Credit Market Competitiveness
W h i l e  t h e  F C S ’ s  m a n d a t e  i s  t o  s e r v e  f a r m e r s  n a t i o n w i d e  w i t h  a  b a s i s  f o r  c r e d i t ,  
c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  w i t h  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l e n d i n g  e x p e r t i s e  c a n  a v o i d  r e g i o n s  o r  c o u n t i e s  w h e r e  f a r m  
l e n d i n g  v o l u m e s  a r e  l o w  o r  u n p r o f i t a b l e .  I n  g e o g r a p h i c  r e g i o n s  w h e r e  a g r i c u l t u r e  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  
s p a r s e  o r  w h e r e  t h e r e  a r e  c o m p e t i n g  i n v e s t m e n t  o p t i o n s  f o r  b a n k s ,  t h e  l o c a l  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t  i s  
m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  l e s s  c o m p e t i t i v e .  F a r m e r s  r e s i d i n g  i n  s u c h  c o u n t i e s  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  t u r n  
t o  t h e  F C S  f o r  t h e i r  c r e d i t  n e e d s .
T o  m e a s u r e  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s ,  a  v a r i a b l e  ( C O M P E T I T I O N )  w a s  
c o n s t r u c t e d  w h i c h  i d e n t i f i e d  c o u n t i e s  w h e r e  f e w  a g r i c u l t u r a l  b a n k s  h a v e  a  p r e s e n c e .  U s i n g  
c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k  c a l l  r e p o r t  d a t a ,  b r a n c h e s  o f  b a n k s  h a v i n g  a t  l e a s t  1 0  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e i r  t o t a l  l o a n s  
t o  a g r i c u l t u r e  w e r e  i d e n t i f i e d .  U s i n g  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s  t o  S t o c k h o l d e r s ,  F C S  a s s o c i a t i o n  b r a n c h e s  
w e r e  a l s o  l o c a t e d .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  b a n k  b r a n c h e s  p e r  c o u n t y  a n d  F C S  a s s o c i a t i o n  
b r a n c h e s  p e r  c o u n t y  w e r e  t h e n  e s t i m a t e d . 5 T h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  w a s  u s e d  t o  c o n s t r u c t  t h e  l e a d i n g  
c o m p e t i t i o n  v a r i a b l e .  T h e  v a r i a b l e  h a d  a  v a l u e  o f  1 i f  t h e  f a r m  w a s  l o c a t e d  i n  a  c o u n t y  w h e r e
5 The Call Report data and FCS Association Annual Reports provided information on the mailing address of each 
branch. Using zip codes, the software application ArcView could approximate the geographic location of each 
agricultural bank and FCS association branch. By using the ArcView query procedure, bank or FCS branches per 
county were subsequently determined. A county was considered to have access to a FCS branch if it was located 
either within the county or within 20 miles of the county line.
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t h e r e  a r e  l e s s  t h a n  3  b a n k  b r a n c h e s  m a k i n g  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l o a n s  a n d  a n  F C S  b r a n c h  l o c a t e d  w i t h i n  2 0  
m i l e s  o f  t h e  c o u n t y  l i n e .  I t  w a s  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  f o r  o b s e r v a t i o n s  w h e r e  t h e  v a l u e  w a s  1 ,  t h e  
b o r r o w e r  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  f a l l  i n t o  t h e  F C S  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t . 6
R e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  F C S ,  b a n k s  m a y  b e  m o r e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  i n  t h e i r  p r o v i s i o n  o f  c r e d i t  t o  
e c o n o m i c a l l y  d i s t r e s s e d  r e g i o n s .  A s  a  p r o f i t - m a x i m i z i n g  f i r m ,  b a n k s  u s u a l l y  f o c u s  t h e i r  l e n d i n g  
e f f o r t s  i n  a r e a s  t h a t  o f f e r  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p r o f i t s ,  w h i c h  i s  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  i n c l u d e  e c o n o m i c a l l y  
d i s t r e s s e d  r e g i o n s .  T h e  c o u n t y ’ s  m e d i a n  h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e  w a s  u s e d  a s  a n  i n d i c a t o r  o f  e c o n o m i c  
w e l l - b e i n g  ( M E D _ H H I ) .  F a r m s  l o c a t e d  w i t h i n  c o u n t i e s  w h e r e  t h e  m e d i a n  h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e  w a s  
i n  t h e  t w o  l o w e s t  n a t i o n a l  q u a r t i l e s  ( l e s s  t h a n  $ 3 2 , 0 0 0 )  w o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  f a l l  
w i t h i n  t h e  F C S  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t .
I n  m a n y  c o u n t i e s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  U . S . ,  t h e r e  i s  n o t  e n o u g h  d e m a n d  f o r  f a r m  l o a n s  f o r  
l e n d e r s  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  d e v o t i o n  o f  a n y  r e s o u r c e s  t o  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l e n d i n g .  T h e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  
c o u n t y  p o p u l a t i o n  c o m p r i s e d  b y  f a r m  r e s i d e n t s  ( F A R M _ S H R )  f r o m  t h e  2 0 0 0  C e n s u s  o f  
P o p u l a t i o n  w a s  u s e d  a  m e a s u r e  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e ’ s  r e l a t i v e  e c o n o m i c  i m p o r t a n c e .  I t  w a s  e x p e c t e d  
t h a t  a m o n g  c o u n t i e s  w h e r e  f a r m  r e s i d e n t s  c o m p r i s e d  a  l a r g e r  s h a r e  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n ,  f a r m e r s  w e r e  
m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  f a l l  i n t o  t h e  b a n k  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t .  F o r  c o u n t i e s  w h e r e  f a r m  r e s i d e n t s  w e r e  l e s s  
c o m m o n ,  b o r r o w e r s  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  f a l l  i n t o  t h e  F C S  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t .
Structural Differences in Lending
T h e  t y p e s  o f  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t s  s e r v e d  b y  t h e  t w o  l e n d e r  g r o u p s  s h o u l d  b e  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  o w n e r s h i p  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  s y s t e m s .  M a n a g e r s  a n d  d i r e c t o r s  o f  t h e  F C S  a n d  b a n k s  
m a y  h a v e  d i f f e r e n t  g o a l s  a n d  o b j e c t i v e s  c o n c e r n i n g  p r o f i t  m o t i v a t i o n  a n d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l e n d i n g  
p o l i c i e s .  T h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  i n  t u r n ,  m a y  r e s u l t  i n  d i s s i m i l a r  u n d e r w r i t i n g  c r i t e r i a  b e t w e e n  b a n k s  
a n d  t h e  F C S .
F i n a n c i a l  m e a s u r e s  f o r  s o l v e n c y ,  d e b t  r e p a y m e n t  c a p a c i t y ,  a n d  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  w e r e  i n c l u d e d  
i n  t h e  m o d e l  t o  r e f l e c t  p o s s i b l e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  l e n d i n g  s t a n d a r d s  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  l e n d e r  g r o u p s .  
S o l v e n c y  ( D A  R A T I O )  w a s  m e a s u r e d  u s i n g  t h e  b o r r o w e r ’ s  d e b t - t o - a s s e t  r a t i o .  T h e  t o t a l  
o u t s t a n d i n g  d e b t  a n d  a s s e t s  u s e d  t o  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  d e b t - t o - a s s e t  r a t i o  w e r e  r e s t a t e d  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  
l o a n s  r e p a i d  d u r i n g  t h e  y e a r .  R e p a y m e n t  c a p a c i t y  ( T D B T C O V )  w a s  m e a s u r e d  u s i n g  t h e  t e r m  d e b t  
c o v e r a g e  r a t i o  a n d  i n c l u d e d  n o n f a r m  s o u r c e s  o f  i n c o m e .  P r o f i t a b i l i t y  ( P M A R G I N )  w a s  m e a s u r e d  
u s i n g  t h e  p r o f i t  m a r g i n  o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s .  C a p i t a l i z a t i o n  ( C A P I T A L )  o r  f a r m  n e t  w o r t h  w a s  u s e d  t o  
m e a s u r e  o f  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  f a r m  t o  w i t h s t a n d  e c o n o m i c  d o w n t u r n s  w i t h o u t  a n y  a d v e r s e  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  t o  t h e  l e n d e r .  B e c a u s e  l a r g e r  f a r m s  r e q u i r e  g r e a t e r  a m o u n t s  o f  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n ,  n e t  
w o r t h  w a s  e x p r e s s e d  a s  a  s h a r e  o f  a n n u a l  s a l e s .  F i n a l l y ,  l e n d e r s  w h o  a r e  m o r e  r i s k  a v e r s e  w o u l d  
b e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  a v o i d  m a k i n g  l o a n s  t o  f i n a n c i a l l y  v u l n e r a b l e  f a r m s .  A  f a r m  w a s  d e f i n e d  a s  
f i n a n c i a l l y  v u l n e r a b l e  ( V U L N E R A B L E )  i f  t o t a l  h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e  w a s  b e l o w  t h e  p o v e r t y  l e v e l  
a n d  t h e  d e b t - t o - a s s e t  r a t i o  w a s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  0 . 4 0 .
T h e r e  i s  n o  c l e a r  e x p e c t a t i o n  a s  t o  w h i c h  l e n d e r  g r o u p  m i g h t  b e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  s e g m e n t  t h e  
m a r k e t  b a s e d  o n  f i n a n c i a l  c r i t e r i a .  W h i l e  t h e  F C S  m a y  b e  m o r e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  i n  i t s  l e n d i n g  
p o l i c i e s  d u e  t o  t h e  f a c t  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a  s i n g l e  s e c t o r  l e n d e r  a n d  m a y  b e  u n a b l e  t o  p r o f i t  f r o m
6 The absence of agricultural banks does not necessarily mean there are no banks making agricultural loans. A large 
commercial bank may have a large amount of agricultural loans, but is not considered agricultural because it does not 
meet the 10 percent requirement.
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o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  t h e  b o r r o w e r ,  i t  m a y  b e  b e t t e r  a b l e  t o  i d e n t i f y  a n d  m a n a g e  
l e n d i n g  r i s k s  t h a n  m a n y  b a n k  l e n d e r s .  P a s t  r e s e a r c h  h a s  g e n e r a l l y  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  n o t i o n  i t  i s  m o r e  
c o n s e r v a t i v e  i n  i t s  l e n d i n g  p o l i c i e s .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  c o n s i s t e n c y  a m o n g  l o a n  u n d e r w r i t i n g  m e a s u r e s  
i s  e x p e c t e d .  M o r e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  l e n d i n g  w o u l d  r e s u l t  i n  l o w e r  d e b t - t o - a s s e t  r a t i o s ,  h i g h e r  c o v e r a g e  
r a t i o s ,  g r e a t e r  p r o f i t  m a r g i n s ,  h i g h e r  n e t  w o r t h ,  a n d  f e w e r  l o a n s  t o  f i n a n c i a l l y  s t r e s s e d  f a r m s .
Underserved Groups
A g e  i s  a  c o m m o n  f a c t o r  u s e d  t o  s e g m e n t  m a r k e t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s .  O l d e r  
f a r m e r s  m a y  h a v e  a  g r e a t e r  n e e d  f o r  a  b r o a d e r  s p a n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  
i n v e s t m e n t s  a n d  e s t a t e  p l a n n i n g .  C o n v e r s e l y ,  y o u n g e r  o r  n e w  e n t r a n t s  a r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  n e e d  t o  
b o r r o w  c a p i t a l ,  a n d  t h u s  a r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  d e m a n d  c r e d i t  p r o d u c t s  o r  r e l a t e d  s e r v i c e s .  Y e t ,  l o a n s  
t o  t h e s e  f a r m e r s  t e n d  t o  c a r r y  g r e a t e r  r i s k  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  l i m i t e d  c a p i t a l ,  i n c o m e s ,  a n d  c r e d i t  
h i s t o r i e s .  T h i s  d i s c o u r a g e s  l e n d e r s  f r o m  p r o v i d i n g  c r e d i t  t o  t h i s  g r o u p .
S t a t u t e  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  e a c h  F C S  a s s o c i a t i o n  h a v e  p o l i c i e s  a n d  p r o g r a m s  i n  p l a c e  t h a t  m e e t  
t h e  s p e c i a l  n e e d s  o f  y o u n g  a n d  b e g i n n i n g  f a r m e r s .  F o l l o w i n g  F C A  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  y o u n g  a n d  
b e g i n n i n g  f a r m e r s ,  t h e s e  f a r m e r  g r o u p s  ( B E G _ Y O U N G )  w e r e  i d e n t i f i e d  b a s e d  o n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  
y e a r s  o f  f a r m i n g  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  o n  t h e  a g e  o f  t h e  o p e r a t o r .  B e c a u s e  o f  t h e s e  s t a t u t o r y  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  i t  i s  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  y o u n g  a n d  b e g i n n i n g  f a r m e r s  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  f a l l  w i t h i n  
t h e  F C S  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  f a r m e r s  o v e r  5 5  y e a r s  o l d  ( O V E R _ 5 5 )  a r e  e x p e c t e d  
t o  f a l l  w i t h i n  t h e  b a n k  s e g m e n t  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  m o r e  v a r i e d  n e e d  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s .
T h e r e  a r e  n o  s p e c i f i c  r e q u i r e m e n t s  t h a t  t h e  F C S  o r  b a n k s  t a r g e t  t h e i r  l e n d i n g  t o  r a c i a l  o r  
e t h n i c  m i n o r i t y  f a r m e r s .  Y e t ,  t h e  F C S  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  h a v e  a  g r e a t e r  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  s e r v i n g  t h i s  
m a r k e t  s e g m e n t  b e c a u s e  t h e s e  g r o u p s  t e n d  b e  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  e c o n o m i c a l l y  d i s t r e s s e d  r e g i o n s .  A s  
a  N a t i o n a l  l e n d e r ,  t h e  F C S  i s  s u p p o s e  t o  s e r v e  a l l  f a r m  b o r r o w e r s  a n d  r e g i o n s  w i t h  a  b a s i s  f o r  
c r e d i t ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  i n  e c o n o m i c a l l y  d i s t r e s s e d  r e g i o n s .  T h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  r a c i a l  a n d  e t h n i c  
m i n o r i t y  f a r m e r s  ( R A C E _ E T H N I C )  w a s  m e a s u r e d  a s  t h e  r a t i o  o f  t h e s e  f a r m  r e s i d e n t s  t o  t o t a l  f a r m  
r e s i d e n t s  i n  a  c o u n t y . 7
Results
M e a n  s t a t i s t i c s  i n d i c a t e  t h e r e  w e r e  s o m e  d i s t i n c t  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  m a r k e t  s e g m e n t s  
b e i n g  s e r v e d  b y  t h e  F C S  a n d  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  i n  2 0 0 1  a n d  2 0 0 2 .  T h e  F C S  h a d  a  g r e a t e r  
p r e s e n c e  i n  t h e  f u l l - t i m e  c o m m e r c i a l - s i z e d  f a r m  s e g m e n t  r e l a t i v e  t o  b a n k s .  F C S  b o r r o w e r s  
o p e r a t e d  l a r g e r  f a r m s  a s  i n d i c a t e d  b y  t h e  v a l u e  o f  f a r m  p r o d u c t i o n ,  a c r e s  o p e r a t e d ,  a n d  t o t a l  f a r m  
a s s e t s  ( t a b l e  2 ) .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  F C S  b o r r o w e r s  w e r e  m o r e  r e l i a n t  o n  t h e  f a r m  b u s i n e s s  t h a n  n e w  b a n k  
b o r r o w e r s ,  r e c e i v i n g  3 8  p e r c e n t  o f  t o t a l  h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e  f r o m  t h e  f a r m  c o m p a r e d  t o  o n l y  6  
p e r c e n t  f o r  b a n k  b o r r o w e r s .
T h e  s t a t i s t i c s  a l s o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  F C S  w a s  s e r v i n g  l o w e r  r i s k  s e g m e n t s  o f  t h e  c r e d i t  m a r k e t  
r e l a t i v e  t o  b a n k s .  F C S  b o r r o w e r s  e x h i b i t e d  g r e a t e r  s o l v e n c y  w i t h  l o w e r  d e b t - t o - a s s e t  r a t i o s  a n d  
l e s s  f i n a n c i a l  s t r e s s .  Y e t ,  p e r h a p s  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  N a t i o n a l  l e n d i n g  m a n d a t e ,  t h e  F C S  t e n d e d  t o  
s e r v e  p o o r e r  r e g i o n s  t h a t  h a d  l o w e r  i n c o m e s  a n d  w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  a  g r e a t e r  p r e s e n c e  o f
7 While ARMS provided information on the race, ethnicity, and gender of each surveyed farm, there too few 
observations of racial and ethnic minorities to provide reliable estimates. Therefore, Census of Population data was 
used to measure the presence of racial and ethnic minorities in farming.
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r a c i a l  a n d  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t i e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  F C S  m a r k e t  s h a r e  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  g r e a t e r  i n  t h o s e  r e g i o n s  
t h a t  a r e  l e s s  c o m p e t i t i v e ,  h a v i n g  f e w e r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  b a n k s  a n d  f a r m  b o r r o w e r s .  F i n a l l y ,  t h o s e  
r e c e i v i n g  F C S  l o a n s  i n  2 0 0 1  a n d  2 0 0 2  t e n d e d  t o  b e  y o u n g e r  a n d  w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  a  
b e g i n n i n g  f a r m e r  t h a n  b a n k s ,  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  r e l a t i v e l y  n e w  Y B S  r u l e s  m i g h t  b e  i n f l u e n c i n g  F C S  
l e n d i n g  d e c i s i o n s .
T h e  m u l t i v a r i a t e  l o g i t  a n a l y s i s  l a r g e l y  c o n f i r m e d  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  F C S  a n d  b a n k  
b o r r o w e r s ,  b o t h  i n d i v i d u a l l y  a n d  c o l l e c t i v e l y .  E a c h  o f  t h e  s t a n d a r d  s u m m a r y  s t a t i s t i c s  w e r e  
s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  0 . 0 0 0 1  l e v e l  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  F C S  a n d  b a n k  b o r r o w e r s  w e r e  s e g m e n t e d  o n  a t  l e a s t  
o n e  o f  t h e  a t t r i b u t e s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  m o d e l  ( t a b l e  3 ) .  T h e  r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  m o s t  i n d i v i d u a l  
p a r a m e t e r  s i g n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a n d  a r e  a s  e x p e c t e d .  T h e  c  s t a t i s t i c  e s t i m a t e s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a  
f a r m  b o r r o w i n g  f r o m  F C S  h a v i n g  a  h i g h e r  p r e d i c t e d  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a n  a  f a r m  b o r r o w i n g  f r o m  
b a n k s .  B a s e d  o n  t h i s  s t a t i s t i c ,  t h e  m o d e l  c o r r e c t l y  i d e n t i f i e d  f a r m s  l i k e l y  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  F C S  6 1 . 8  
p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  t i m e .
T h e  e s t i m a t i o n s  c o n f i r m  e a r l i e r  r e s e a r c h  t h a t  s h o w e d  t h e  F C S  s e r v e s  l a r g e r  f a r m i n g  
o p e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t .  F u l l - t i m e  c o m m e r c i a l  s i z e  f a r m e r s  w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  
b o r r o w e r  f r o m  t h e  F C S  w h i l e  t h e  p a r t - t i m e  a n d  h o b b y  f a r m  s e g m e n t s  o f  t h e  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t  
w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  s e r v e d  b y  b a n k s  ( t a b l e  4 ) .  T h e  o d d s  r a t i o  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  f u l l - t i m e  
c o m m e r c i a l - s i z e  f a r m s  a r e  1 . 6 7 8  t i m e s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t h a n  s m a l l e r  s i z e  f a r m s  t o  b e  F C S  b o r r o w e r s  
( t a b l e  5 ) .  M e a n w h i l e  p a r t - t i m e  a n d  h o b b y  f a r m s  w e r e  t w i c e  a s  l i k e l y  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  b a n k s  t h a n  
f u l l - t i m e  f a r m s .  W h i l e  t h e  p a r a m e t e r  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  f a m i l y  f a r m s  w a s  n o t  a s  e x p e c t e d ,  t h e  o d d s  
r a t i o s  s u g g e s t  l i t t l e  e f f e c t ,  w i t h  f a m i l y - s i z e  f a r m s  b e i n g  o n l y  1 . 0 4  t i m e s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t h a n  o t h e r  s i z e  
g r o u p s  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  b a n k s .
L o c a l  c r e d i t  m a r k e t  c o n d i t i o n s  w e r e  f o u n d  t o  i m p a c t  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  b o r r o w i n g  f r o m  
F C S .  A  g r e a t e r  p r e s e n c e  o f  f a r m e r s  a n d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  b a n k s  c o m b i n e d  w i t h  a  s t r o n g e r  e c o n o m y  
s h o u l d  r e s u l t  i n  m o r e  c o m p e t i t i v e  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t s  a n d  l e s s  d e m a n d  f o r  l o a n s  p r o v i d e d  b y  F C S .  
R e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  f a r m  b o r r o w e r s  i n  r e g i o n s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  f e w e r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  b a n k s ,  l o w e r  
i n c o m e s ,  a n d  f e w e r  f a r m e r s  w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  F C S .  F a r m e r s  l o c a t e d  i n  c o u n t i e s  
w i t h  a c c e s s  t o  a  F C S  b r a n c h ,  b u t  n o  a g r i c u l t u r a l  b a n k s  w e r e  1 . 1 4  t i m e s  a s  l i k e l y  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  
t h e  G S E .  F a r m e r s  i n  l o w - i n c o m e  c o u n t i e s  w e r e  1 . 4 1  t i m e s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t h a n  f a r m e r s  i n  h i g h e r  
i n c o m e  c o u n t i e s  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  F C S .  T h e  n e g a t i v e  s i g n  f o r  v a r i a b l e  m e a s u r i n g  t h e  r a t i o  o f  f a r m  
r e s i d e n t s  t o  t o t a l  r e s i d e n t s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  f a r m e r s  i n  c o u n t i e s  w i t h  a  g r e a t e r  p r e s e n c e  o f  f a r m e r s  a r e  
m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  b a n k s .
T h e  m o d e l  r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  b o r r o w e r s  w h i c h  w e r e  m o r e  s o l v e n t ,  l e s s  f i n a n c i a l l y  
s t r e s s e d ,  m o r e  p r o f i t a b l e ,  a n d  h a d  g r e a t e r  d e b t  s e r v i c e  c a p a c i t y  w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  F C S  
c u s t o m e r s .  T h i s  m o r e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  l e n d i n g  p o l i c y  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h a t  o f  a  s i n g l e  s e c t o r  l e n d e r  
a n d  w i t h  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  e n v i r o n m e n t  i n  w h i c h  i t  o p e r a t e s .  S o m e  o f  t h e s e  r e s u l t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  m a y  b e  
a  r e s u l t  o f  F C S ’ s  g r e a t e r  r o l e  i n  s e r v i n g  f u l l - t i m e  c o m m e r c i a l  f a r m e r s  a n d  b a n k s ’ s t r o n g e r  r o l e  i n  
t h e  p a r t - t i m e  a n d  h o b b y  f a r m  m a r k e t .  P a r t - t i m e  a n d  h o b b y  f a r m s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  b e  l e s s  
e f f i c i e n t  a n d  p r o f i t a b l e ,  n o t  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  n o n f a r m  i n c o m e .  T h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t r e s s  a n d  
t e r m - d e b t - c o v e r a g e  r a t i o s ,  h o w e v e r ,  i n c l u d e d  n o n f a r m  i n c o m e .  T h u s ,  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e s e  
t w o  v a r i a b l e s  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  F C S ’ s  g r e a t e r  l e n d i n g  t o  l o w e r  r i s k  s e g m e n t s  o f  t h e  f a r m  c r e d i t  
m a r k e t .
A  f i n a n c i a l l y  v u l n e r a b l e  f a r m  w a s  o n l y  0 . 7 9 5  t i m e s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t h a n  f a r m s  m o r e  
f i n a n c i a l l y  s e c u r e  t o  b e  a  F C S  b o r r o w e r  c o m p a r e d  t o  o t h e r  f a r m s .  G r e a t e r  l e v e l s  o f  i n d e b t e d n e s s ,  
a s  m e a s u r e d  u s i n g  t h e  d e b t - t o - a s s e t  r a t i o ,  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a  f a r m  b o r r o w i n g  f r o m
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b a n k s .  A  o n e - p e r c e n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  a d j u s t e d  d e b t - t o - a s s e t  r a t i o  d e c r e a s e d  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
b o r r o w i n g  f r o m  F C S  b y  0 . 1 0  p e r c e n t  . F a r m s  w i t h  g r e a t e r  t e r m - d e b t - c o v e r a g e  r a t i o s  w e r e  m o r e  
l i k e l y  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  F C S .  H o w e v e r ,  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  t e r m - d e b t - c o v e r a g e  r a t i o  h a d  a  s l i g h t  i m p a c t  
o n  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  b e i n g  a  F C S  b o r r o w e r .  A  o n e - p e r c e n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  t e r m - d e b t - c o v e r a g e  
r a t i o  i m p r o v e d  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  b e i n g  a  F C S  b o r r o w e r  b y  o n l y  0 . 0 6  p e r c e n t .
T h e  o d d s  r a t i o  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  a  y o u n g  o r  b e g i n n i n g  f a r m e r  i s 1 . 3 9 2  t i m e s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  a  
F C S  b o r r o w e r .  L i k e w i s e ,  f a r m e r s  o v e r  t h e  a g e  o f  5 5  w e r e  o n l y  0 . 9 1 2  t i m e s  a s  l i k e l y  a s  f a r m e r s  
u n d e r  t h e  a g e  o f  5 5  t o  b e  a  F C S  b o r r o w e r ,  w h i c h  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  o l d e r  
f a r m e r s  i n  t h e  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t  d e m a n d  f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s  a v a i l a b l e  f r o m  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s .
T h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  p r e s e n c e s  o f  r a c i a l  a n d  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t i e s  i n  a  c o u n t y  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  b e i n g  a  F C S  b o r r o w e r  r o s e  a s  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  m i n o r i t i e s  f e l l .  F o r  e v e r y  1 - p e r c e n t  
r i s e  i n  t h e  s h a r e  o f  f a r m  r e s i d e n t s  w h o  a r e  m e m b e r s  o f  a  r a c i a l  o r  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t y  g r o u p ,  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  b e i n g  a  F C S  b o r r o w e r  f a l l s  b y  0 . 0 8 3  p e r c e n t  s u g g e s t i n g  a n  i n e l a s t i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e t w e e n  m i n o r i t i e s  a n d  F C S  l e n d i n g .  R a c i a l  a n d  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t i e s  a r e  g e o g r a p h i c a l l y  
c o n c e n t r a t e d ,  w i t h  m a n y  l a r g e  r e g i o n s  h a v i n g  f e w  r a c i a l  o r  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t i e s  p r e s e n t .  F u r t h e r  
a n a l y s i s  c o m p a r e d  c o u n t i e s  w h e r e  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  r a c i a l  a n d  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t i e s  i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  a v e r a g e  w i t h  a l l  o t h e r  c o u n t i e s .  I t  w a s  f o u n d  t h a t  a m o n g  c o u n t i e s  w i t h  a  g r e a t e r  p r e s e n c e  
o f  r a c i a l  a n d  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t i e s ,  f a r m s  w e r e  o n l y  0 . 6  t i m e s  a s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  a  F C S  b o r r o w e r  c o m p a r e d  
t o  b a n k s
Summary
I n  g e n e r a l ,  m o d e l  e s t i m a t i o n  r e s u l t s  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  F a r m  
C r e d i t  S y s t e m  a n d  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  s e r v e  s o m e w h a t  d i f f e r e n t  s e g m e n t s  o f  t h e  f a r m  c r e d i t  
m a r k e t .  A s  a n t i c i p a t e d  f u l l - t i m e  c o m m e r c i a l - s i z e d  f a r m s  i n c u r r i n g  d e b t  i n  2 0 0 1  a n d  2 0 0 2  w e r e  
m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  t h e  F C S ,  w h i l e  p a r t - t i m e  a n d  h o b b y  f a r m s  w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b o r r o w  
f r o m  b a n k s .  S u c h  r e s u l t s  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  F e d e r a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  t h a t  f o c u s  F C S  l e n d i n g  o n  “ f u l l  
c r e d i t  t o  f u l l - t i m e  b o n a  f i d e  f a r m e r s ”  a n d  “ c o n s e r v a t i v e  c r e d i t  t o  p a r t - t i m e  f a r m e r s . ”
T h i s  f i n d i n g  i s  a l s o  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  l a r g e r  f u l l - t i m e  f a r m e r s  b e n e f i t  
e c o n o m i c a l l y  m o r e  f r o m  t h e  s p e c i a l i z e d  f a r m  f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s  p r o v i d e d  b y  t h e  F C S  a n d  
t h e r e f o r e ,  a r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  c h o o s e  t h e  G S E  r e l a t i v e  t o  b a n k s .  O v e r a l l ,  t h e  F C S  m a y  b e  m o r e  
c o m p e t i t i v e  o n  l o a n s  t o  l a r g e r  f a r m s ,  w h i l e  b a n k s ,  w i t h  t h e i r  b r o a d e r  a r r a y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s ,  
a r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  m o r e  c o m p e t i t i v e  w i t h  s m a l l e r  f a r m s .  E v e n  w i t h  i t s  f u n d i n g  a d v a n t a g e s  i t  
m a y  b e  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  F C S  t o  r e c o u p  f i x e d  l e n d i n g  c o s t s  a n d  r e m a i n  c o m p e t i t i v e  w i t h  f u l l -  
s e r v i c e  b a n k s  w h e n  c r e d i t  r e q u e s t s  a r e  s m a l l .
E s t i m a t i o n  r e s u l t s  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  p a s t  r e s e a r c h  t h a t  h a s  s h o w n  F C S  s e r v e s  m o r e  
c r e d i t w o r t h y  s e g m e n t s  o f  t h e  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t .  F C S  c u s t o m e r s  w e r e  l e s s  h e a v i l y  i n d e b t e d ,  m o r e  
p r o f i t a b l e ,  a n d  h a d  g r e a t e r  d e b t  r e p a y m e n t  c a p a c i t i e s .  B e c a u s e  t h e  F C S ’ s  l e n d i n g  i s  c o n c e n t r a t e d  
i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  i t s  m a n a g e r s  a n d  i t s  r e g u l a t o r s  w o u l d  b e  e x p e c t e d  t o  m o r e  r i s k  a d v e r s e  r e l a t i v e  t o  
c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s .  R e s u l t s  f r o m  e a r l i e r  s t u d i e s  a l s o  h a d  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  F C S  b o r r o w e r s  w e r e  m o r e  
h i g h l y  c a p i t a l i z e d  w h e n  c o m p a r e d  b a n k  c u s t o m e r s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  s u g g e s t s  t h i s  f i n d i n g  i s
8 Log-odds ratios are for continuous variables are estimated based on a one-unit change in the independent variable. 
This results in the magnitude of the log-odds ratio being affected by the units chosen to measure the dependent 
variable. Therefore, sensitivity of results for continuous variables are shown using elasticity as the percent change in 
the dependent variable as a result of a 1 percent change in the independent variable.
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l a r g e l y  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  f a r m  s i z e .  W h e n  b o r r o w e r  n e t  w o r t h  w a s  n o r m a l i z e d  b y  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  
f a r m ’ s  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e r e  w a s  n o  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  l e v e l s  b e t w e e n  F C S  a n d  b a n k  
b o r r o w e r s .
R e s u l t s  a l s o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  f a r m s  i n  c o u n t i e s  w i t h  f e w e r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  b a n k s ,  o r  f e w e r  f a r m e r s ,  
a n d  o r  e x p e r i e n c i n g  g r e a t e r  e c o n o m i c  d i s t r e s s  w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  t u r n  t o  F C S  l e n d e r s  f o r  t h e i r  
c r e d i t  n e e d s .  T h i s  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  F C S ’ s  s t a t u t o r y  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  i t  s e r v e  a l l  b o n a  f i d e  f a r m e r s  
w i t h  a  b a s i s  f o r  c r e d i t ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  l o c a t i o n .  I t  m a y  a l s o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  F C S  l e n d e r s  a r e  s e r v i n g  a s  a  
s o u r c e  o f  c r e d i t  i n  t h o s e  a r e a s  w h e r e  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t s  m a y  b e  l e s s  c o m p e t i t i v e .
I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  f r o m  e a r l i e r  s t u d i e s ,  t h e  F C S  w a s  f o u n d  t o  b e  a  m o r e  l i k e l y  
s u p p l i e r  o f  c r e d i t  t o  y o u n g  a n d  b e g i n n i n g  f a r m e r s  t h a n  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s .  A n  i n c r e a s e  i n  l e n d i n g  
t o  t h i s  s e g m e n t  o f  t h e  f a r m  c r e d i t  m a r k e t  m i g h t  b e  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  F a r m  C r e d i t  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  p o l i c y  
i n i t i a t i v e s  u n d e r t a k e n  s i n c e  1 9 9 8  t h a t  w e r e  d e s i g n e d  t o  b o l s t e r  F C S  l e n d i n g  t o  t h e s e  f a r m e r s .  
F i n a l l y ,  f a r m e r s  i n  c o u n t i e s  w i t h  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  r a c i a l  a n d  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t y  p o p u l a t i o n  w e r e  l e s s  
l i k e l y  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  F C S .  T h i s  r e s u l t  w a s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  F C S  f i l l s  
v o i d s  i n  c r e d i t  m a r k e t s .  O n e  p o s s i b l e  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  t h e  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  m i g h t  b e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
r a c i a l  a n d  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t y  f a r m e r s  t e n d  t o  o p e r a t e  s m a l l  a n d  p a r t - t i m e  f a r m s  t h a t  t h e  G S E  i s  n o t  
a l w a y s  c o m p e t i t i v e  i n  s e r v i n g .
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T a b l e  2 .  F i n a n c i a l  a n d  s t r u c t u r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  f a r m s  a c q u i r i n g  d e b t  i n  2 0 0 1  a n d  
2 0 0 2 ,  b y  l e n d e r  g r o u p  p r o v i d i n g  m a j o r i t y  o f  n e w  c r e d i t .
B y  P r i m a r y  L e n d e r  o f  N e w  D e b t s
B a n k s F C S A l l  o t h e r  
l e n d e r s
A l l  f a r m s  
W /  n e w  l o a n s
N u m b e r  o f  f a r m s  a c q u i r i n g  d e b t 1 8 4 , 0 0 0  
D o l l a r s  p e r
3 0 , 7 0 0
f a r m
7 7 , 0 0 0 2 9 1 , 7 0 0
F a r m  a s s e t s 6 6 1 , 9 0 9 9 5 5 , 3 8 4 5 7 6 , 1 6 7 6 7 0 , 4 1 8
F a r m  d e b t 1 7 3 , 5 5 4 2 1 9 , 0 4 0 1 2 2 , 8 0 5 1 6 5 , 0 1 9
N e w  d e b t 1 0 6 , 7 8 1 1 3 2 , 6 4 4 4 2 , 0 5 7 9 2 , 4 9 3
C o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s 1 0 0 , 5 7 0 D D 6 3 , 8 8 6
F a r m  C r e d i t  S y s t e m D 1 2 3 , 6 9 1 D 1 3 , 3 3 4
F a r m  n e t  w o r t h 4 8 8 , 3 5 5 7 3 6 , 3 4 4 4 5 3 , 3 6 1 5 0 5 , 3 9 8
N e t  w o r t h  p e r  $  o f  p r o d u c t i o n 2 , 7 5 5 2 , 6 9 9 3 , 4 3 3 2 , 8 8 0
V a l u e  o f  f a r m  p r o d u c t i o n 1 7 7 , 2 5 8 2 7 2 , 7 9 9 1 3 2 , 0 5 3 1 7 5 , 4 8 0
T o t a l  h o u s e h o l d  i n c o m e 6 2 , 6 8 0 7 1 , 2 6 4 6 9 , 1 2 1 6 5 , 2 7 6
F a r m  i n c .  t o  h o u s e h o l d  i n c . 3 , 6 8 3 2 6 , 8 1 4 7 , 0 8 5 7 , 0 4 1
A c r e s  o p e r a t e d  
F i n a n c i a l  r a t i o s :
7 6 9
P e r c e n t
9 6 6 4 9 6 7 1 8
S o l v e n c y
Y e a r - e n d  D e b t - t o - A s s e t  r a t i o 2 6 . 2 2 2 . 9 2 1 . 3 2 4 . 6
D / A  w / r e p a i d  o p e r a t i n g  l o a n s 2 6 . 5 2 3 . 4 2 1 . 7 2 4 . 9
S h a r e  f i n a n c i a l l y  s t r e s s e d 5 . 8 5 . 4 4 . 5 5 . 4
D e b t  C a p a c i t y
T e r m - d e b t - c o v e r a g e  r a t i o 7 5 . 9 9 7 . 2 1 4 1 . 8 8 9 . 3
D e b t  r e p a y m e n t  c a p a c i t y  u t i l i z a t i o n  5 1 . 1 5 1 . 8 3 8 . 5 4 8 . 1
P r o f i t a b i l i t y  &  e f f i c i e n c y
O p e r a t i n g  e x p e n s e  r a t i o 8 5 . 4 7 8 . 4 8 4 . 5 8 4 . 1
R e t u r n  o n  f a r m  a s s e t s - 0 . 2 1 . 1 - 1 . 1 - 0 . 3
P r o f i t  m a r g i n - 0 . 8 3 . 2 - 4 . 6 - 1 . 0
P r i m a r y  o p e r a t o r  a g e  ( y e a r s ) 4 9 . 6  4 8 . 4  
P e r c e n t
4 8 . 0 4 9 . 1
O v e r  5 5  y e a r s  o f  a g e 2 8 . 5 2 4 . 2 2 4 . 0 2 6 . 9
B e g i n n i n g  o r  y o u n g  f a r m e r s 9 . 9 1 3 . 0 9 . 4 1 0 . 1
F u l l - t i m e 1 0 . 1 2 4 . 6 9 . 5 1 1 . 5
F a m i l y 8 . 9 1 2 . 5 8 . 3 9 . 2
O t h e r  c o m m e r c i a l - s i z e 1 0 . 2 1 4 . 3 8 . 0 1 0 . 0
P a r t - t i m e 3 8 . 5 2 5 . 1 3 6 . 2 3 6 . 5
H o b b y 3 2 . 4 2 3 . 5 3 8 . 0 3 2 . 9
C o m p e t i t i v e  f a c t o r s :
F a r m  r e s i d e n t s / t o t a l  i n  c o u n t y 6 . 8 6 . 0 4 . 2 6 . 1
S h a r e  i n  l o w - i n c o m e  c o u n t i e s 1 7 . 7 1 9 . 7 1 1 . 1 1 6 . 2
N o .  o f  A g .  b a n k s  i n  t h e  c o u n t y 3 . 7 3 . 2 2 . 4 3 . 3
R a c i a l / e t h n i c  s h a r e  o f  a l l  f a r m e r s  i n  c t y  5 . 3 5 . 9 6 . 2 5 . 6
Source: 2001 and 2002 Agricultural Resource Management Survey. D -  Insufficient data for disclosure.
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T a b l e  3 .  M u l t i v a r i a t e  l o g i t  m o d e l  a n a l y z i n g  l o a n s  
m a d e  b y  t h e  F C S  a n d  b a n k s  i n  2 0 0 0  a n d  2 0 0 1
S u m m a r y  s t a t i s t i c C h i - s q u a r e
L i k e l i h o o d  r a t i o  ( W / 1 5  
d . f . )
1 7 , 5 1 2  * * *
W a l d 1 6 , 7 2 8  * * *
S c o r e 1 7 , 7 4 6  * * *
A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  P r e d i c t e d  P r o b a b i l i t i e s  a n d  O b s e r v e d
R e s p o n s e s
P e r c e n t
C o n c o r d a n t 6 1 . 0
D i s c o r d a n t 3 8 . 4
T i e d 0 . 6
C . 6 1 . 8
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T a b l e  4 .  R e g r e s s i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a n d  a s y m p t o t i c  t -  
v a l u e s  f r o m  l o g i t  m o d e l  a n a l y z i n g  l o a n s  m a d e  b y  
F C S  a n d  b a n k s  i n  2 0 0 0  a n d  2 0 0 1
P a r a m e t e r E s t i m a t e  a n d  
S t a n d a r d  e r r o r  \  1
C o n s t a n t - 1 . 0 2 0 1
( 0 . 0 1 6 3 )
F U L L T I M E 0 . 5 1 7 7
( 0 . 0 1 5 9 )
F A M F A R M - 0 . 0 4 6 2
( 0 . 0 1 7 8 )
P A R T T I M E - 0 . 8 5 0 9
( 0 . 0 1 5 6 )
H O B B Y - 0 . 6 5 2 9
( 0 . 0 1 6 1 )
C O M P E T I T I O N 0 . 1 3 0 1
( 0 . 0 1 1 0 )
F A R M - S H R - 0 . 0 3 6 2
( 0 . 0 0 0 9 )
M E D _ H H I 0 . 3 4 3 3
( 0 . 0 1 2 4 )
D A  R A T I O - 0 . 4 4 8 6
( 0 . 0 2 1 8 )
V U L N E R A B L E - 0 . 2 2 9 5
( 0 . 0 2 2 0 )
T D B T C O V 0 . 0 0 7 4
( 0 . 0 0 0 4 )
P M A R G I N 0 . 3 4 3 1
( 0 . 0 2 9 8 )
C A P I T A L - 1 . 1 4 9 3
( 0 . 0 6 7 1 )
O V E R _ 5 5 - 0 . 0 9 2 5
( 0 . 0 1 1 1 )
B E G _ Y O U N G 0 . 3 3 0 6
( 0 . 0 1 5 0 )
R A C E _ E T H N I C - 0 . 0 1 5 6
( 0 . 0 0 0 6 )
1/ All estimates significant at 0.0001 level of significance or 
greater.
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T a b l e  5 .  S e n s i t i v i t y  o f  p r e d i c t e d  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  t o  
c h a n g e s  i n  p a r a m e t e r  v a l u e s .
V a r i a b l e O d d s  r a t i o  \ 1
F U L L T I M E 1 . 6 7 8
F A R M F A R M 0 . 9 5 5
P A R T T I M E 0 . 4 2 7
H O B B Y 0 . 5 2 1
C O M P E T I T I O N 1 . 1 3 9
M E D  H H I 1 . 4 1 0
V U L N E R A B L E 0 . 7 9 5
B E G  Y O U N G 0 . 9 1 2
O V E R  5 5 1 . 3 9 2
E l a s t i c i t y  \ 2
D A  R A T I O - 0 . 0 9 8
F A R M - S H R - 0 . 1 8 5
T D B T C O V 0 . 0 0 6
P M A R G I N  \  3 0 . 2 8 3
C A P I T A L 0 . 0 0 0
R A C E  E T H N I C - 0 . 0 8 3
\1 Change in probability of farmer being included in FCS 
market segment as a result of independent variable having 
a value of 1.
\ 2 Percentage change in probability of farmer being 
included in FCS market segment as a result of a 1 percent 
change in the independent variable.
\ 3 Since the mean ROA was approximately equal to 1, 
the elasticity was evaluated at 1 percent.
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The DuPont Profitability Analysis Model: An E-Learning Application and
Evaluation
J o n  M e l v i n ,  M i c h a e l  B o e h l j e ,  C r a i g  D o b b i n s  a n d  A l l a n  G r a y *
Abstract
S u c c e s s f u l  f a r m  b u s i n e s s  m a n a g e r s  m u s t  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n d  
h a v e  a n  o v e r a l l  l o n g - t e r m  o r  s t r a t e g i c  m a n a g e m e n t  f o c u s .  T h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  i s  t o  h e l p  
p r o d u c e r s  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  i m p a c t s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p r o d u c t i o n ,  p r i c i n g ,  c o s t  c o n t r o l  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  
d e c i s i o n s  o n  t h e i r  f a r m s  f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r m a n c e .  T h i s  o b j e c t i v e  w i l l  b e  a c c o m p l i s h e d  b y  
d e v e l o p i n g  a n d  t e s t i n g  a  c o m p u t e r - b a s e d  t r a i n i n g  a n d  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o o l  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  h e a l t h  o f  f a r m  b u s i n e s s e s  u s i n g  t h e  D u P o n t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  m o d e l .  T h e  r e s u l t s  o f  
t h e  t w o  e x p e r i m e n t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  c o m p u t e r  s o f t w a r e  w a s  e f f e c t i v e  f o r  t e a c h i n g  t e c h n i q u e s  o f  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  c o n t a i n e d  w i t h i n  t h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l .
Keywords: D u P o n t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s ,  e - l e a r n i n g ,  c o m p u t e r  a s s i s t e d  a n a l y s i s ,  r e t u r n  o n  e q u i t y  
( R O E ) ,  r e t u r n  o n  a s s e t s  ( R O A )
*Jon Melvin, graduate student, Agricultural Economics Department, Purdue University, Drs. Michael Boehlje, Craig 
Dobbins, and Allan Gray, Agricultural Economics Department, Purdue University.
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Introduction
I t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  p e r c e i v e d  t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  a s  a  m a n a g e m e n t  f u n c t i o n  
o f  a n y  b u s i n e s s ,  i n c l u d i n g  f a r m  b u s i n e s s e s .  P o o r  f i n a n c i a l  p r a c t i c e s  r a n k  s e c o n d  o n l y  t o  e c o n o m i c  
c o n d i t i o n s  a s  a  c a u s e  o f  b u s i n e s s  f a i l u r e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  D u n  &  B r a d s t r e e t  ( 1 9 9 4 ) .  A  s t u d y  b y  
G a s k i l l ,  V a n  A u k e n ,  a n d  M a n n i n g  ( 1 9 9 3 )  e x a m i n e d  c a u s e s  o f  b u s i n e s s  f a i l u r e  i n  t h e  a p p a r e l  
i n d u s t r y ;  t h e y  f o u n d  t h a t  p o o r  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r o l  i s  a  m a i n  c a u s e  o f  b u s i n e s s  f a i l u r e .  W i c h m a n  
( 1 9 8 3 )  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  a c c o u n t i n g  c a p a c i t y  w a s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  s m a l l  b u s i n e s s  
s u c c e s s  o r  f a i l u r e .  L a u z e n  ( 1 9 8 5 )  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  t h e  f i r s t  5  y e a r s  o f  a  b u s i n e s s  a s  b e i n g  t h e  c r i t i c a l  
t i m e  p e r i o d .  H e  a r g u e s  t h a t  b y  a n a l y z i n g  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  d e v e l o p i n g  g o o d  m a n a g e r i a l  
s k i l l s ,  a  b u s i n e s s  o w n e r  c a n  i n c r e a s e  h i s  c h a n c e s  o f  s u c c e s s .  W o o d  ( 1 9 8 9 )  s p e c i f i c a l l y  c i t e s  t h e  
i m p o r t a n c e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  t r a i n i n g  a s  a  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  w h e t h e r  a  b u s i n e s s  w i l l  
s u c c e e d .
B o e h l j e  e t  a l .  ( 1 9 9 9 )  r e c o g n i z e  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  f a r m  b u s i n e s s  m a n a g e r s  t o  e v a l u a t e  a n d  
m o n i t o r  f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r m a n c e .  T h e y  a l s o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  l i n k  b e t w e e n  m a n a g e r i a l  d e c i s i o n s  a n d  r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n .  T h e y  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  f a r m  
m a n a g e r  m u s t  c o l l e c t  a c c u r a t e  d a t a  f o r  a  f i n a n c i a l  e v a l u a t i o n  a n d  t h e n  m a k e  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
a d j u s t m e n t s  i f  n e c e s s a r y .  F i r e r  ( 1 9 9 9 )  a g r e e s  s t a t i n g  t h a t  m a n a g e r s  n e e d  t o  h a v e  a t  l e a s t  a  b a s i c  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  h o w  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  h e a l t h  o f  t h e i r  b u s i n e s s  a n d  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i e s .  P l u m l e y  a n d  H o r n b a k e r  ( 1 9 9 1 )  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
e n v i r o n m e n t  e n c o u n t e r e d  b y  t h e  f a r m  s e c t o r  p l a c e s  m u c h  i m p o r t a n c e  o n  f i n a n c e  i n  f a r m  
m a n a g e m e n t .  M u m e y  ( 1 9 8 7 )  a l s o  a r g u e s  t h a t  i f  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o n  f a r m  p r o d u c t i o n  h a s  p r o v e d  
s u c c e s s f u l  t o  f a r m  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  t h e n  i n c r e a s e d  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o n  f i n a n c i a l  m a n a g e m e n t  m i g h t  a l s o  
b e  j u s t i f i e d .
Profitability Analysis
P r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  a n d  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  d r i v e r s  o f  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  a  c r i t i c a l  
c o m p o n e n t  o f  e v a l u a t i n g  f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r m a n c e .  P e r f o r m a n c e  m e a s u r e s  l i k e  t h e  o p e r a t i n g  p r o f i t  
m a r g i n ,  a s s e t  t u r n o v e r  r a t i o ,  r e t u r n  o n  a s s e t s  a n d  r e t u r n  o n  e q u i t y  - -  a n d  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t l y  h o w  
t h e y  a r e  i m p a c t e d  b y  m a r k e t i n g ,  o p e r a t i o n s ,  i n v e s t m e n t  a n d  f i n a n c i n g  d e c i s i o n s  - -  a r e  e x t r e m e l y  
v a l u a b l e  t o  a  f a r m  m a n a g e r .  T h e  o p e r a t i n g  p r o f i t  m a r g i n  s h o w s  t h e  a m o u n t  t h a t  e a c h  d o l l a r  o f  
s a l e s  y i e l d s  t o  n e t  i n c o m e .  T h e  a s s e t  t u r n o v e r  r a t e  m e a s u r e s  t h e  r e v e n u e s  g e n e r a t e d  p e r  d o l l a r  o f  
a s s e t s  a n d  i n d i c a t e s  h o w  e f f i c i e n t l y  t h e  b u s i n e s s  u s e s  i t s  a s s e t s .  T h e  r e t u r n  o n  a s s e t s  i s  a  m e a s u r e  
t h a t  m a n a g e r s  c a n  u s e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  i f  c a p i t a l  i s  g e n e r a t i n g  a n  a c c e p t a b l e  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n .  R e t u r n  o n  
e q u i t y  h e l p s  m a n a g e r s  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  d e b t  o f  t h e  f a r m  b u s i n e s s  i s  w o r k i n g  f o r  o r  
a g a i n s t  t h e m .  T o g e t h e r  t h e s e  m e a s u r e s  h e l p  t o  s h o w  h o w  w e l l  t h e  f a r m  b u s i n e s s  i s  p e r f o r m i n g  
f i n a n c i a l l y .  T h e s e  f o u r  m e a s u r e s  a r e  c o r e  t o  t h e  m a n a g e r ’ s  a n a l y s i s  o f  b u s i n e s s  f i n a n c i a l  
p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  a r e  n e a t l y  s u m m a r i z e d  i n  t h e  D u P o n t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  m o d e l .
The DuPont Model
T h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l  i s  a  c o m m o n  a n d  u s e f u l  w a y  t o  a s s e s s  a n d  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  d r i v e r s  o f  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  ( B a r r y ,  2 0 0 0 :  p . 1 2 1 ) .  T h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l  i s  a  r a t i o - b a s e d  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  a l l o w s  
m a n a g e r s  t o  s e e  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  a m o n g  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  c o s t - v o l u m e - p r o f i t  c h a i n  
( V a n  V o o r h i s ,  1 9 8 1 ) .  B l u m e n t h a l  ( 1 9 9 8 )  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l  i s  a  u s e f u l  w a y  o f  
v i s u a l i z i n g  f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  i s  a  g o o d  t o o l  f o r  g e t t i n g  p e o p l e  s t a r t e d  i n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
h o w  m a n a g e r i a l  d e c i s i o n s  h a v e  a n  i m p a c t  o n  f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r m a n c e .
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F i r e r  ( 1 9 9 9 )  e x p l a i n s  t h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l  a s  a  f i n a n c i a l  a n a l y s i s  a n d  p l a n n i n g  t o o l  i n t e n d e d  
t o  d e v e l o p  a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  a f f e c t  t h e  r e t u r n  o n  e q u i t y  ( R O E )  o f  t h e  f i r m  u s i n g  
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  a c c o u n t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  H e  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l  a l l o w s  f o r  t h e  
a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  c o m p o n e n t s  o f  R O E  a n d  a s s i s t s  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  e x a m i n i n g  t h e  p o s s i b l e  
i n f l u e n c e  o f  s t r a t e g i c  i n i t i a t i v e s  o n  f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r m a n c e .  R o s s  e t  a l .  ( 1 9 9 9 )  f u r t h e r  i d e n t i f y  t h r e e  
f a c t o r s  t h a t  i m p a c t  t h e  R O E  a s  i t  i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l .  T h e  t h r e e  f a c t o r s  a r e :  ( 1 )  
o p e r a t i n g  e f f i c i e n c y  ( m e a s u r e d  b y  p r o f i t  m a r g i n ) ;  ( 2 )  a s s e t  u s e  e f f i c i e n c y  ( m e a s u r e d  b y  a s s e t  
t u r n o v e r ) ;  a n d  ( 3 )  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  ( m e a s u r e d  b y  t h e  e q u i t y  m u l t i p l i e r ) .  E i s e m a n n  ( 1 9 9 7 )  a g r e e s  
s a y i n g  t h a t  t h e  r a t i o s  t h a t  e s t a b l i s h  R O E  r e f l e c t  t h r e e  m a j o r  p e r f o r m a n c e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :  o n e  
i n c o m e  s t a t e m e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  f e a t u r e  ( p r o f i t  g e n e r a t e d  p e r  s a l e s  d o l l a r )  a n d  t w o  b a l a n c e  s h e e t  
m a n a g e m e n t  f e a t u r e s  ( s a l e s  g e n e r a t e d  p e r  a s s e t  a n d  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  s o l v e n c y  r i s k ) .
Application to Farm Businesses
A s  n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  a  p r o d u c e r  n e e d s  t o  g o  b e y o n d  p r o d u c t i o n  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  a d d r e s s  t w o  
f u n d a m e n t a l  c o n c e r n s :  ( 1 )  “ H o w  a m  I  d o i n g  f r o m  a  f i n a n c i a l  p e r s p e c t i v e ? ”  a n d  ( 2 )  “ H o w  c a n  I  d o  
i t  b e t t e r ” . A d a g e s  s u c h  a s  “ l o w e r  c o s t s ”  o r  “ p r o d u c e  m o r e ”  h a v e  o f t e n  b e e n  t a k e n  a s  a  p o i n t  o f  
f a c t .  I t  i s  s i m p l y  a s s u m e d  t h a t  p u r s u i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  s t r a t e g i e s  l i k e  t h e s e  w i l l  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  
i m p r o v e  f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r m a n c e .  A n  a n a l y s i s  u s u a l l y  i s  n o t  d o n e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h i c h  s t r a t e g i e s  
w a r r a n t  t h e  m o s t  a t t e n t i o n .  T h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l  a l l o w s  p r o d u c e r s  t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
i m p r o v e d  p e r f o r m a n c e  b y  c o n c e n t r a t i n g  o n  v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  h a v e  t h e  m o s t  b e a r i n g  o n  t h a t  
p e r f o r m a n c e .
A  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  m e a s u r e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s u c c e s s  t o  a n y  b u s i n e s s ,  f a r m  o r  o t h e r w i s e ,  i s  t h e  
r e t u r n  o n  e q u i t y  ( R O E ) .  A s s u m i n g  a  p r o d u c e r  h a s  a n  i n c o m e  s t a t e m e n t  t o  o b t a i n  n e t  i n c o m e  a n d  a  
b a l a n c e  s h e e t  t o  o b t a i n  o w n e r  e q u i t y ,  t h e  R O E  i s  a n  e a s y  m e t r i c  t o  c a l c u l a t e  u s i n g  t h e  s i m p l e  
f o r m u l a  o f  n e t  i n c o m e  d i v i d e d  b y  o w n e r  e q u i t y .  H o w e v e r ,  v i e w i n g  t h e  r a t i o  s e p a r a t e l y  r a t h e r  t h a n  
i n  c o m b i n a t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r  m e t r i c s  d o e s  l i t t l e  t o  i n f o r m  m a n a g e m e n t  o n  h o w  t o  i m p r o v e  
p e r f o r m a n c e  ( V a n  V o o r h i s ,  1 9 8 1 ) .  I f  R O E  i s  f o u n d  t o  b e  l e s s  t h a n  r e t u r n  o n  a s s e t s  ( R O A )  o r  h a s  
d e c l i n e d  r e c e n t l y ,  t h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l  s u g g e s t s  t w o  b a s i c  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  i m p r o v e  p e r f o r m a n c e .  
A n a l y s i s  c a n  b e  d o n e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  t h e  R O E  c a n  b e  i m p r o v e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  i n c o m e  s t r e a m  
o r  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  s t r e a m  ( F i g u r e  1 ) .
I n i t i a l l y  m o s t  p r o d u c e r s  m a y  b e  c o n c e r n e d  m o r e  w i t h  t h e  i n c o m e  s t r e a m  t h a n  t h e  
i n v e s t m e n t  s t r e a m ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  m a d e  i n  t h e  f a r m  b u s i n e s s  w i l l  u s u a l l y  h a v e  a  
m o r e  d i r e c t  e f f e c t  o n  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  i n c o m e  s t r e a m .  T h e  i n c o m e  s t r e a m  i n v o l v e s  v a r i a b l e s  
s u c h  a s  s e l l i n g  p r i c e ,  e x p e n s e s ,  n e t  s a l e s ,  p r o f i t  m a r g i n ,  a n d  t h e  u s e  o f  a s s e t s .  I f  t h e  p r o d u c e r  
d i s c o v e r s  a  m a j o r  w e a k n e s s  i n  t h e  R O E ,  b a c k t r a c k i n g  t h r o u g h  t h e  i n c o m e  s t r e a m  a n d  d e t e r m i n i n g  
w h e r e  c h a n g e s  c a n  b e  m a d e  w i l l  e a s i l y  i d e n t i f y  o n e  s e t  o f  p o t e n t i a l  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  w e a k n e s s .
F o r  e x a m p l e ,  i f  t h e  p r o d u c e r  d i s c o v e r s  t h a t  R O A  i s  n o t  s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  h e  c a n  t r a c k  t h i s  b a c k  
t o  a s s e t  t u r n o v e r  a n d  n e t  p r o f i t  m a r g i n .  T h e  a n a l y s i s  c a n  b e  f u r t h e r  t r a c k e d  t o  n e t  s a l e s  a n d  t o t a l  
c o s t  i f  t h e  n e t  p r o f i t  m a r g i n  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  t o  b e  t h e  m a i n  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  l o w  R O A .  N e t  s a l e s  c o u l d  
b e  i m p r o v e d  b y  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  p r i c e  r e c e i v e d  ( b e t t e r  m a r k e t i n g )  o r  b y  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  v o l u m e  o f  
p r o d u c t  s o l d  ( i n c r e a s i n g  y i e l d s  o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y ) .  A  f a r m e r  w i l l  m o s t  l i k e l y  c o n s i d e r  t h e s e  a c t i o n s ,  
b u t  t h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l  o f f e r s  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  d o  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  a n d  d e t e r m i n e  w h a t  o p t i o n s  
w i l l  m o s t  b e n e f i t  t h e  p r o d u c e r .
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T h e  s e c o n d  a p p r o a c h  t o  i m p r o v i n g  R O E ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  s t r e a m ,  c u l m i n a t e s  i n  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  m u l t i p l i e r .  M o s t  o f  t h e  b a c k t r a c k i n g  t h r o u g h  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  s t r e a m  w i l l  f o l l o w  
t o t a l  a s s e t s .  F r o m  b a s i c  a c c o u n t i n g  w e  k n o w  t h a t  t o t a l  a s s e t s  a r e  e q u a l  t o  t o t a l  l i a b i l i t i e s  p l u s  
o w n e r  e q u i t y .  T h i s  s i m p l y  m e a n s  t h a t  a l l  a s s e t s  a r e  e i t h e r  c l a i m e d  b y  c r e d i t o r s  o r  o w n e r s  a n d  t h i s  
a l l o w s  u s  t o  b r e a k  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  s t r e a m  i n t o  t w o  m o r e  s e c t i o n s ,  t o t a l  d e b t  a n d  o w n e r  e q u i t y .
I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  a  p r o d u c e r  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  w h a t  c h a n g e s  o c c u r  i n  R O E  a s  l i a b i l i t i e s ,  
e q u i t y  a n d  a s s e t s  a r e  r e s t r u c t u r e d .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  a  p r o d u c e r  m i g h t  h y p o t h e s i z e  t h a t  b y  d e c r e a s i n g  
h i s  d e b t  l o a d  h e  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  h i s  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  b e c a u s e  t h e  i n t e r e s t  e x p e n s e  o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s  w i l l  
d e c r e a s e .  H o w e v e r ,  b y  a n a l y z i n g  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  s t r e a m  o f  t h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l  t h e  p r o d u c e r  w i l l  
r e a l i z e  t h a t  i f  t h i s  r e d u c e d  d e b t  l o a d  r e q u i r e s  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  o w n e r  e q u i t y  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  a s s e t  b a s e  
o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s ,  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  m u l t i p l i e r  w i l l  d e c l i n e  a n d  t h e  R O E  m a y  a l s o  d e c l i n e .
A g a i n ,  b y  d o i n g  s i m p l e  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  t h e  p r o d u c e r  w i l l  s e e  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
f i n a n c i n g  d e c i s i o n s .
DuPont Model Software
T o  h e l p  f a r m  p r o d u c e r s  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  i m p a c t s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p r o d u c t i o n ,  p r i c i n g ,  c o s t  
c o n t r o l  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  o n  f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  a  c o m p u t e r - b a s e d  f i n a n c i a l  a n a l y s i s  
t r a i n i n g  a n d  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o o l  w a s  d e v e l o p e d  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  a n a l y z i n g  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  h e a l t h  o f  f a r m  
b u s i n e s s e s .  T h e  s o f t w a r e  a n a l y s i s  t o o l  w a s  i n t e n d e d  t o  i n t r o d u c e  t h e  D u P o n t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  
i n  a  u s e r - f r i e n d l y  s e t t i n g  w i t h  a u d i o  h e l p  a n d  i n s t r u c t i o n .  T h e  c o m p u t e r  s o f t w a r e  w a s  c r e a t e d  
u s i n g  M i c r o s o f t  V i s u a l  B a s i c  6 . 0 1 a n d  p a c k a g e d  a s  a  s t a n d - a l o n e  p r o g r a m .  T h u s  t h e  p r o g r a m  c a n  
b e  u s e d  w i t h o u t  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  o f  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  M i c r o s o f t  a p p l i c a t i o n  s u c h  a s  E x c e l .  T h e  c o m p u t e r  
s o f t w a r e  i s  s e g m e n t e d  i n t o  t w o  m a i n  s e c t i o n s :  a  t u t o r i a l  a n d  a n  a n a l y s i s  a p p l i c a t i o n .
T h e  t u t o r i a l  w a s  d e v e l o p e d  t o  f a m i l i a r i z e  t h e  u s e r  w i t h  t h e  D u P o n t  f i n a n c i a l  a n a l y s i s  
m o d e l  a s  w e l l  a s  h o w  t o  o p e r a t e  t h e  s o f t w a r e .  T h e  t u t o r i a l  b e g i n s  b y  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  g e n e r a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  a n d  c o n c e p t s  o f  t h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l .  O n c e  t h i s  i s  c o m p l e t e ,  t h e  t u t o r i a l  c o n t i n u e s  b y  
d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  f o r m u l a s  u s e d  t o  p e r f o r m  t h e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  a n d  p r o v i d e s  a  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
f l o w  c h a r t  t o  b e t t e r  v i s u a l i z e  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  T h e  t u t o r i a l  f i n i s h e s  b y  i l l u s t r a t i n g  h o w  t o  c o m p l e t e  
t h e  D u P o n t  a n a l y s i s  w i t h  a n  e x a m p l e  f a r m  b u s i n e s s .
T h e  a n a l y s i s  a p p l i c a t i o n  w a s  d e v e l o p e d  t o  e n a b l e  t h e  u s e r  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e i r  f a r m  b u s i n e s s .  T h e  a n a l y s i s  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  D u P o n t  s o f t w a r e  a l l o w s  t h e  f a r m  m a n a g e r  t o  l o o k  
a t  a r e a s  f o r  i m p r o v e m e n t  a n d  d o  p r e l i m i n a r y  l o n g - r u n  p l a n n i n g .  T h e  a n a l y s i s  s e c t i o n  i s  d i v i d e d  
i n t o  t h r e e  l e v e l s .  T h e  L e v e l  I  a n a l y s i s  o n l y  r e q u i r e s  d a t a  o n  g r o s s  r e v e n u e ,  f i x e d  e x p e n s e ,  v a r i a b l e  
e x p e n s e ,  i n t e r e s t  e x p e n s e ,  t o t a l  a s s e t s  a n d  t o t a l  e q u i t y  ( F i g u r e  2 ,  P a n e l  A )  t o  p e r f o r m  t h e  D u P o n t  
a n a l y s i s  a n d  i s  t h e  m o s t  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  o f  t h e  t h r e e  l e v e l s  o f  a n a l y s i s .  T h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  
a r e  s u m m a r i z e d  a s  r e t u r n  o n  e q u i t y  ( R O E ) ,  r e t u r n  o n  a s s e t s  ( R O A ) ,  o p e r a t i n g  p r o f i t  m a r g i n  
( O P M )  a n d  a s s e t  t u r n o v e r  r a t i o  ( A T R )  a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  P a n e l  B  o f  F i g u r e  2 .  T h e  L e v e l  I  a n a l y s i s  
f o l l o w s  t h e  t y p i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  D u P o n t  a n a l y s i s  d e s c r i b e d  b y  m o s t  f i n a n c e  t e x t  b o o k s  a n d  
p u b l i c a t i o n s .
T h e  L e v e l  I I  a n a l y s i s  r e q u i r e s  m o r e  d e t a i l e d  i n f o r m a t i o n ;  f o r  e a c h  e n t e r p r i s e  o r  b u s i n e s s  
u n i t ,  a v e r a g e  p r i c e ,  v o l u m e  p e r  u n i t ,  t o t a l  u n i t s  a n d  v a r i a b l e  c o s t  p e r  u n i t  m u s t  b e  e n t e r e d  ( F i g u r e  
3 ) .  U p  t o  f i v e  e n t e r p r i s e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  c a n  b e  e n t e r e d  i n  t h e  L e v e l  I I  a n a l y s i s .  T h e  L e v e l  I I
1 Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corp. 1987-2000
162
a n a l y s i s  w a s  d e s i g n e d  t o  h e l p  t h e  f a r m  p r o d u c e r s  u s i n g  t h e  s o f t w a r e  w i t h  t h e  d i a g n o s t i c s  o f  
s p e c i f i c  p r i c i n g ,  c o s t  c o n t r o l ,  e n t e r p r i s e  c h o i c e ,  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  e t c .  d e c i s i o n s  t o  i m p r o v e .  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y .
T h e  L e v e l  I I I  a n a l y s i s  a l l o w s  f o r  t w o  l o n g - r u n  c h a n g e s  t o  b e  m a d e  t o  t h e  f a r m  b u s i n e s s :  a n  
e x p a n s i o n  a n a l y s i s  a n d  a  c o n t r a c t i o n  a n a l y s i s  ( F i g u r e  4 ) .  L e v e l  I I I  u s e s  t h e  b a s e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
e n t e r e d  f o r  L e v e l  I I  t o  i n i t i a t e  t h e  a n a l y s i s .  T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  L e v e l  I I I  a n a l y s i s  c a n  b e  
c o n d u c t e d  o n l y  a f t e r  t h e  L e v e l  I I  a n a l y s i s  h a s  b e e n  c o m p l e t e d .  T h e  L e v e l  I I I  a n a l y s i s  w a s  
i n t e n d e d  t o  a s s i s t  t h e  f a r m  p r o d u c e r  w i t h  s t r a t e g i c  p o s i t i o n i n g  d e c i s i o n s  r e l a t e d  t o  g r o w t h  o r  
d o w n s i z i n g  t h e  b u s i n e s s  a s  w e l l  a s  d i f f e r e n t  b u s i n e s s  v e n t u r e s  s u c h  a s  c o n t r a c t  p r o d u c t i o n  o r  
c u s t o m  f a r m i n g .
A u d i o  i n s t r u c t i o n  a n d  h e l p  s e c t i o n s  a r e  a l s o  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  c o m p u t e r  s o f t w a r e .  A u d i o  
i n s t r u c t i o n  i s  i n c l u d e d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  t u t o r i a l  a n d  t h e  a n a l y s i s  t o  p r o v i d e  g u i d a n c e  a n d  i n s t r u c t i o n  
i n  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  c o m p u t e r  p r o g r a m  a n d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s .
Software Test
A n  e x p e r i m e n t  w a s  c o n d u c t e d  t o  t e s t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  p r i o r  t o  a n d  a f t e r  u s e  o f  t h e  c o m p u t e r  a s s i s t e d  e d u c a t i o n a l  p r o g r a m .  T w o  
s a m p l e  g r o u p s  w e r e  u s e d :  P u r d u e  g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t s  a n d  f a r m  p r o d u c e r s .  T h e  t w o  g r o u p s  w e r e  
t e s t e d  s e p a r a t e l y ;  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  s a m e  e x p e r i m e n t  w a s  a p p l i e d  t o  b o t h  g r o u p s .
F o r  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t ,  e a c h  p a r t i c i p a n t  w a s  g i v e n  i n i t i a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s  b y  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r  a n d  
a n  i n s t r u c t i o n a l  s h e e t .  T h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  f o r  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  w e r e  a s  f o l l o w s :  1 )  T a k e  T e s t  # 1 ;  2 )  G o  
t h r o u g h  t h e  t u t o r i a l ;  3 )  G o  t h r o u g h  t h e  a n a l y s i s  u s i n g  t h e  p r o v i d e d  c a s e  s t u d y ;  4 )  T a k e  T e s t  # 2 .  
T h e s e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  w e r e  m e a n t  t o  g u i d e  t h e  t e s t  p a r t i c i p a n t  t h r o u g h  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t .  T h e  
a p p r o x i m a t e  t i m e  t o  c o m p l e t e  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  w a s  a b o u t  1 h o u r .
T e s t  # 1  a n d  T e s t  # 2  w e r e  i d e n t i c a l  a n d  c o n s i s t e d  o f  1 0  m u l t i p l e  c h o i c e  q u e s t i o n s  b a s e d  o n  
i d e a s  a n d  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  a r e  c o m p o n e n t s  o f  t h e  D u P o n t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  
m o d e l .  T h e  q u e s t i o n s  w e r e  c a t e g o r i z e d  i n t o  t h r e e  a r e a s  o f  l e a r n i n g :  1 )  c a l c u l a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s  o f  
t h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l ,  2 )  f i n a n c i a l  c o n c e p t s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l ,  a n d  3 )  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  c o n c e p t s  t o  m a n a g e r i a l  d e c i s i o n s .  C a l c u l a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  w e r e  i n c l u d e d  t o  
d e t e r m i n e  h o w  w e l l  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  l e a r n e d  t h e  m e c h a n i c a l  a n d  o p e r a t i o n a l  d e t a i l s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  
D u P o n t  m o d e l .  A p p l i c a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  w e r e  i n c l u d e d  t o  h e l p  d e t e r m i n e  h o w  w e l l  t h e  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  w e r e  a b l e  t o  c o m b i n e  c a l c u l a t i o n  a n d  c o n c e p t u a l  q u e s t i o n s  t o  h e l p  s o l v e  r e a l  l i f e  
p r o b l e m s .  C o n c e p t u a l  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  w e r e  i n c l u d e d  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t ’ s  a b i l i t y  t o  
c o m p r e h e n d  f u n d a m e n t a l  f i n a n c i a l  c o n c e p t s  t h a t  a r e  e m b o d i e d  i n  a n y  b u s i n e s s .
Summary Results
Graduate Students
A  r a n d o m  s a m p l e  o f  2 0  P u r d u e  U n i v e r s i t y  A g r i c u l t u r a l  E c o n o m i c s  g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t s  w a s  
u s e d  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  e x p e r i m e n t a l  g r o u p .  T o  o b t a i n  t h e  s a m p l e ,  a n  e - m a i l  w a s  s e n t  t o  a l l  g r a d u a t e  
s t u d e n t s  w i t h i n  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  A g r i c u l t u r a l  E c o n o m i c s  a s k i n g  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  t o  r e s p o n d .  N o n e  o f  t h e  g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t  s u b j e c t s  w e r e  p r e ­
s e l e c t e d  a n d  t h e i r  k n o w l e d g e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  c o n c e p t s  w a s  u n k n o w n  t o  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  a d m i n i s t r a t o r .
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T a b l e  1 c o n t a i n s  t h e  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h e  g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t  g r o u p .  T e s t  # 1  a n d  T e s t  # 2  a r e  t h e  
r e s p e c t i v e  t e s t  s c o r e s  f o r  p a r t i c i p a n t s  b e f o r e  a n d  a f t e r  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  c o m p u t e r  p r o g r a m .  O t h e r  
i n f o r m a t i o n  g a t h e r e d  i n c l u d e s :  e d u c a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  a c a d e m i c  a r e a ,  r a t i n g  o f  k n o w l e d g e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
c o n c e p t s ,  r a t i n g  o f  c o m p u t e r  s k i l l s ,  a n d  p r e v i o u s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a n  e x p e r i m e n t  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e .  
S e l f - a s s e s s m e n t  o f  f i n a n c i a l  c o n c e p t s  a n d  c o m p u t e r  s k i l l s  w e r e  b a s e d  o n  a  s c a l e  o f  1 t o  5 ,  w i t h  1 
b e i n g  p o o r  a n d  5  b e i n g  e x c e l l e n t .
T h e r e  w e r e  f o u r t e e n  M S  a n d  s i x  P h D  s t u d e n t s  t h a t  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t .
D i f f e r e n t  a c a d e m i c  a r e a s  i n c l u d e d :  a g r i b u s i n e s s ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
m a r k e t i n g ,  a n d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  f i n a n c e .  N o n e  o f  t h e  g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e y  
h a d  e v e r  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  a  s t u d y  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e .  T h e  a v e r a g e  s e l f - a s s e s s m e n t  r a t i n g  o f  k n o w l e d g e  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  c o n c e p t s  b e f o r e  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  w a s  2 . 2 5  a n d  t h e  a v e r a g e  s e l f - a s s e s s m e n t  r a t i n g  o f  
c o m p u t e r  p r o f i c i e n c y  w a s  a  3 . 8 5  ( T a b l e  1 ) .
T h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t  t e s t s  a r e  s u m m a r i z e d  i n  T a b l e  1 .  T h e  a v e r a g e s  a r e  t h e  
a v e r a g e  s c o r e  o f  a l l  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  o u t  o f  1 0  p o i n t s .  O v e r a l l  t h e  s c o r e s  i n c r e a s e d  f o r  t h e  g r a d u a t e  
s t u d e n t s ,  a f t e r  u s i n g  t h e  s o f t w a r e ;  1 7  o f  t h e  2 0  g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t s  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  s c o r e  f r o m  t h e  
f i r s t  t e s t  t o  t h e  s e c o n d .  T h e  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  w a s  a  4 . 2 5  a n d  t h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  
w a s  1 . 7 4 .  T h e  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  f o r  t h e  s e c o n d  t e s t  w a s  6 . 6 5  a n d  t h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  w a s  1 . 7 9 .
T h e  m i n i m u m  s c o r e  o n  T e s t  # 1  w a s  a  0  a n d  t h e  m a x i m u m  s c o r e  w a s  a  7 .  T h e  m i n i m u m  s c o r e  o n  
T e s t  # 2  w a s  a  3  a n d  t h e  m a x i m u m  s c o r e  w a s  a  1 0 .
T h e  a v e r a g e  t e s t  s c o r e s  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  a r e a s  o f  l e a r n i n g  a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  t h e  p r e - t e s t  t o  
t h e  p o s t - t e s t  ( T a b l e  1 ) .  T h e  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  f o r  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  o n  t h e  p r e - t e s t  w a s  
1 . 3  a n d  t h e  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  f o r  t h e  p o s t - t e s t  w a s  2 . 3 5  o u t  o f  t h r e e  q u e s t i o n s .  T h e  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  f o r  
t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  q u e s t i o n s  w a s  0 . 8  o n  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  a n d  1 . 8 5  o n  t h e  s e c o n d  t e s t  o u t  o f  t h r e e  
q u e s t i o n s .  T h e  f i n a l  a r e a  o f  l e a r n i n g ,  c o n c e p t u a l ,  e x h i b i t e d  a n  a v e r a g e  f i r s t  t e s t  s c o r e  o f  2 . 1 5  a n d  
a n  a v e r a g e  s e c o n d  t e s t  s c o r e  o f  2 . 5 0  o u t  o f  t h r e e  q u e s t i o n s .
O v e r a l l  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  a n d  a p p l i c a t i o n  q u e s t i o n s  e x h i b i t e d  a  l a r g e r  n u m b e r  o f  t e s t  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e i r  s c o r e  f r o m  t h e  p r e - t e s t  t o  t h e  p o s t - t e s t  t h a n  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  q u e s t i o n s .  
T h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  q u e s t i o n s  h a d  1 5  p e o p l e  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  s c o r e  a n d  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  q u e s t i o n s  h a d  1 4  
p e o p l e  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  s c o r e s  f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  t o  t h e  s e c o n d .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  s c o r e s  f o r  t h e  
c o n c e p t u a l  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  w a s  o v e r  a  f u l l  p o i n t  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  a n d  w a s  a l m o s t  a  f u l l  p o i n t  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  f o r  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  
q u e s t i o n s .  T h e  c o n c e p t u a l  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  a l s o  h a d  t h e  h i g h e s t  p o s t - t e s t  a v e r a g e  ( 2 . 5 / 3 )  o f  t h e  
t h r e e  a r e a s  o f  l e a r n i n g .
Farm Producers
A  r a n d o m  s a m p l e  o f  2 0  f a r m  p r o d u c e r s  w a s  u s e d  f o r  t h e  s e c o n d  e x p e r i m e n t a l  g r o u p .  N o n e  
o f  t h e  f a r m  p r o d u c e r  t e s t  s u b j e c t s  w e r e  p r e - s e l e c t e d  a n d  t h e i r  k n o w l e d g e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  c o n c e p t s  w a s  
u n k n o w n  t o  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  a d m i n i s t r a t o r .  P a r t i c i p a n t s  f o r  t h e  f a r m  p r o d u c e r  g r o u p  w e r e  r e c r u i t e d  
t h r o u g h  a g  e x t e n s i o n  e d u c a t o r s  a n d  t h r o u g h  l e a d s  p r o v i d e d  b y  f a c u l t y  a n d  s t u d e n t s  i n  t h e  
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  A g r i c u l t u r a l  E c o n o m i c s  a t  P u r d u e  U n i v e r s i t y .  P a r t i c i p a n t s  f o r  t h e  f a r m  p r o d u c e r  
g r o u p  c a m e  f r o m  I n d i a n a ,  T e n n e s s e e ,  a n d  N o r t h  D a k o t a .  E a c h  p a r t i c i p a n t  w a s  g i v e n  i n i t i a l  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  b y  t h e  t e s t  a d m i n i s t r a t o r  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n a l  s h e e t  p r o v i d e d  o n  t h e  f r o n t  o f  t h e  
t e s t  p a c k e t .
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T a b l e  2  c o n t a i n s  t h e  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h e  f a r m  p r o d u c e r  g r o u p .  D i f f e r e n t  a c a d e m i c  a r e a s  o f  t h e  
f a r m  p r o d u c e r s  i n c l u d e d  a g r i b u s i n e s s ,  a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  a g  s c i e n c e  ( T a b l e  2 ) .  N o n e  o f  t h e  f a r m  
p r o d u c e r  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e y  h a d  e v e r  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  a  s t u d y  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e .  T h e  
a v e r a g e  s e l f - a s s e s s m e n t  r a t i n g  o f  f i n a n c i a l  c o n c e p t s  b e f o r e  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t  w a s  2 . 3 7  a n d  t h e  
a v e r a g e  s e l f - a s s e s s m e n t  r a t i n g  o f  c o m p u t e r  p r o f i c i e n c y  w a s  3 . 1 1  ( T a b l e  2 ) .
O v e r a l l  t h e  s c o r e s  i n c r e a s e d  f o r  t h e  f a r m  p r o d u c e r s ,  w i t h  1 3  o f  t h e  2 0  f a r m  p r o d u c e r s  
i n c r e a s i n g  t h e i r  s c o r e  f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  a n d  2  o f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  e x h i b i t i n g  a  l o w e r  
s c o r e  o n  t h e  s e c o n d  t e s t .  T h e  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  w a s  a  3 . 6 8  a n d  t h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  
w a s  1 . 9 5 .  T h e  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  f o r  t h e  s e c o n d  t e s t  w a s  5 . 2 1  a n d  t h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  w a s  1 . 0 5 .
T h e  m i n i m u m  s c o r e  o n  T e s t  # 1  w a s  a  0  a n d  t h e  m a x i m u m  s c o r e  w a s  a n  8 .  T h e  m i n i m u m  s c o r e  o n  
T e s t  # 2  w a s  a  2  a n d  t h e  m a x i m u m  s c o r e  w a s  a  9 .
T h e  a v e r a g e  t e s t  s c o r e s  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  a r e a s  o f  l e a r n i n g  a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  t h e  p r e - t e s t  t o  
t h e  p o s t - t e s t  ( T a b l e  4 ) .  T h e  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  f o r  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  o n  t h e  p r e - t e s t  w a s  
1 . 5 0  a n d  t h e  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  f o r  t h e  p o s t - t e s t  w a s  2 . 2 0 .  T h e  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
q u e s t i o n s  w a s  0 . 4 5  o n  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  a n d  1 . 0 0  o n  t h e  s e c o n d  t e s t .  T h e  f i n a l  a r e a  o f  l e a r n i n g ,  
c o n c e p t u a l ,  e x h i b i t e d  a n  a v e r a g e  f i r s t  t e s t  s c o r e  o f  1 . 8 0  a n d  a n  a v e r a g e  s e c o n d  t e s t  s c o r e  o f  1 . 9 5 .  
T h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  q u e s t i o n s  h a d  1 3  p e o p l e  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  s c o r e  f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  t o  t h e  s e c o n d .  T h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  a n d  c o n c e p t u a l  q u e s t i o n s  h a d  8  p e o p l e  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  s c o r e s  f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  t o  t h e  
s e c o n d .
Sign Test
T h e  g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t  a n d  f a r m  p r o d u c e r  t e s t  r e s u l t s  w e r e  e x a m i n e d  t o  d e t e r m i n e  i f  t h e  
i n c r e a s e  i n  t e s t  s c o r e s  f r o m  T e s t  # 1  t o  T e s t  # 2  a r e  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  T o  t e s t  f o r  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  p a i r e d  d a t a ,  a  s i g n  t e s t  w a s  u s e d .  T h e  s i g n  t e s t  f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i s  a  n o n ­
p a r a m e t r i c  m e t h o d  f o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  i f  t w o  c o l u m n s  o f  o b s e r v a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  
o n e  a n o t h e r  ( S i e g e l ,  2 0 0 3 ) .  T h e  s i g n  t e s t  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  d a t a  s e t  i s  a  r a n d o m  s a m p l e  f r o m  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t  a n d  i s  a  t w o - t a i l e d  t e s t .  T o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  t w o  s a m p l e s  a r e  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t ,  t h e  s i g n  t e s t  u s e s  a  r a n k i n g  s y s t e m  b a s e d  o n  a  m o d i f i e d  s a m p l e  o f  t h e  d a t a .  
T h e  r a n k s  f o r  t h e  s i g n  t e s t  a r e  i n c l u d e d  i n  T a b l e  3 .
T h e  p r o c e d u r e  f o r  t h e  s i g n  t e s t  i s  a s  f o l l o w s 2:
1 )  F i n d  t h e  m o d i f i e d  s a m p l e  s i z e ,  m ,  b y  c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  s u m  o f  d a t a  v a l u e s  t h a t  c h a n g e  
b e t w e e n  t h e  f i r s t  a n d  s e c o n d  c o l u m n s .
2 )  E s t a b l i s h  t h e  l i m i t s  f o r  m .
3 )  C o u n t  t h e  d a t a  v a l u e s  t h a t  w e n t  u p  a n d  c o m p a r e  t o  t h e  l i m i t .
4 )  I f  t h i s  c o u n t  f a l l s  o u t s i d e  t h e  l i m i t s ,  t h e n  t h e  t w o  s a m p l e s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t .  
I f  t h e  c o u n t  f a l l s  w i t h i n  t h e  l i m i t ,  t h e  t w o  s a m p l e s  a r e  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t .
2 Andrew Siegel, “Practical Business Statistics” McGraw-Hill (2003)
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Sign Test -  Graduate Students
T h e  g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t  g r o u p  c o n t a i n e d  2 0  p a r t i c i p a n t s ;  h o w e v e r  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  d a t a  v a l u e s  
t h a t  w e n t  e i t h e r  u p  o r  d o w n  i s  1 8 ,  t h u s  t h e  m o d i f i e d  s a m p l e  s i z e  i s  1 8 .  I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  i t  
d o e s  n o t  m a t t e r  i f  a  t e s t  s c o r e  d e c r e a s e d  f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  w h e n  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  
m o d i f i e d  s a m p l e  s i z e .  B e c a u s e  a b s o l u t e  v a l u e s  a r e  a s s i g n e d ,  i t  o n l y  m a t t e r s  t h a t  t h e  s c o r e s  a r e  
d i f f e r e n t .  T h e  l i m i t s  f o r  t e s t i n g  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l  a t  a  m o d i f i e d  s a m p l e  s i z e  o f  1 8  a r e  4 . 9  a n d  1 2 . 1 ,  
a s  s h o w n  i n  T a b l e  3 .  T h e  g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t  g r o u p  h a d  1 7  p a r t i c i p a n t s  w i t h  h i g h e r  t e s t  s c o r e s  o n  t h e  
s e c o n d  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t ,  w h i c h  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  
b e t w e e n  t h e  t e s t  s c o r e s .  T h u s  t h e  c o m p u t e r  p r o g r a m  w a s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h e l p f u l  i n  
i m p r o v i n g  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s .
S i g n  t e s t s  w e r e  a l s o  c o n d u c t e d  o n  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  q u e s t i o n s  ( c a l c u l a t i o n  b a s e d ,  
c o n c e p t u a l  b a s e d ,  a n d  a p p l i c a t i o n  b a s e d )  t o  d e t e r m i n e  i f  t h e r e  a r e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e s e  a r e a s  o f  
l e a r n i n g .  T h e  m o d i f i e d  s a m p l e  s i z e  f o r  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  i s  1 8  a n d  t h e  l i m i t  f o r  t h i s  
s a m p l e  s i z e  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l  i s  t h e r e f o r e  5  a n d  1 3 .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  t e s t  s c o r e s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  
t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  f o r  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  i s  1 5 .  T h u s ,  t h e r e  i s  a  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  f r o m  T e s t  # 1  t o  T e s t  # 2  i n  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s .
T h e  m o d i f i e d  s a m p l e  s i z e  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  w a s  1 6  a n d  t h e  l i m i t  f o r  t h i s  
s a m p l e  s i z e  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l  i s  t h e r e f o r e  4 . 5  a n d  1 1 . 5 .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  t e s t  s c o r e s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  
f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  i s  1 4 .  T h u s ,  t h e r e  i s  a  
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  f r o m  T e s t  # 1  t o  T e s t  # 2  i n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s .
T h e  m o d i f i e d  s a m p l e  s i z e  f o r  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  w a s  1 1  a n d  t h e  l i m i t  f o r  t h i s  
s a m p l e  s i z e  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l  i s  t h e r e f o r e  2 . 5  a n d  8 . 5 .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  t e s t  s c o r e s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  
f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  f o r  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  i s  8 .  T h u s ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e  f r o m  
T e s t  # 1  t o  T e s t  # 2  i n  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  i s  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t .  H o w e v e r ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  
n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  p a r t i c i p a n t s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  s c o r e s  i s  c l o s e  t o  t h e  u p p e r  l i m i t  o f  8 . 5 .
Sign Test -  Farm Producers
T h e  f a r m  p r o d u c e r  t e s t s  w e r e  a l s o  e x a m i n e d  t o  d e t e r m i n e  i f  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t e s t  s c o r e s  f r o m  
T e s t  # 1  t o  T e s t  # 2  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t .  T h e  f a r m  p r o d u c e r  g r o u p  c o n t a i n e d  2 0  p a r t i c i p a n t s ;  h o w e v e r  
t h e  n u m b e r  o f  d a t a  v a l u e s  t h a t  w e n t  e i t h e r  u p  o r  d o w n  i s  1 5 ,  t h u s  t h e  m o d i f i e d  s a m p l e  s i z e  i s  1 5 .  
T h e  l i m i t s  f o r  t e s t i n g  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l  a t  a  m o d i f i e d  s a m p l e  s i z e  o f  1 5  a r e  4 . 1  a n d  1 0 . 9 ,  a s  s h o w n  
i n  T a b l e  3 .  T h e  f a r m  p r o d u c e r  g r o u p  h a d  1 3  p a r t i c i p a n t s  w i t h  h i g h e r  t e s t  s c o r e s  o n  t h e  s e c o n d  
c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t ,  w h i c h  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  
t h e  s c o r e s  o n  t h e  t w o  t e s t s  f o r  t h i s  g r o u p .
S i g n  t e s t s  w e r e  a l s o  c o n d u c t e d  o n  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  q u e s t i o n s  ( c a l c u l a t i o n  b a s e d ,  
c o n c e p t u a l  b a s e d ,  a n d  a p p l i c a t i o n  b a s e d )  f o r  t h e  f a r m  p r o d u c e r s .  T h e  m o d i f i e d  s a m p l e  s i z e  f o r  t h e  
c a l c u l a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  i s  1 5  a n d  t h e  l i m i t  f o r  t h i s  s a m p l e  s i z e  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l  i s  t h e r e f o r e  4 . 1  
a n d  1 0 . 9 .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  t e s t  s c o r e s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  f o r  t h e  
c a l c u l a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  i s  1 3 .  T h u s ,  t h e r e  i s  a  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  f r o m  T e s t  # 1  t o  
T e s t  # 2  i n  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s .
T h e  m o d i f i e d  s a m p l e  s i z e  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  i s  1 0  a n d  t h e  l i m i t  f o r  t h i s  
s a m p l e  s i z e  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l  i s  t h e r e f o r e  2 . 1  a n d  7 . 9 .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  t e s t  s c o r e s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  
f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  i s  8 .  T h u s ,  t h e r e  i s  a
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s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  f r o m  T e s t  # 1  t o  T e s t  # 2  i n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s .  T h e  
m o d i f i e d  s a m p l e  s i z e  f o r  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  i s  1 2  a n d  t h e  l i m i t  f o r  t h i s  s a m p l e  s i z e  a t  
t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l  i s  t h e r e f o r e  2 . 9  a n d  9 . 1 .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  t e s t  s c o r e s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  t h e  f i r s t  t e s t  
t o  t h e  s e c o n d  f o r  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  w a s  9 .  T h u s ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e  f r o m  T e s t  # 1  t o  T e s t  # 2  
i n  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s  i s  n o t  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  H o w e v e r ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  
t h e  n u m b e r  o f  p a r t i c i p a n t s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  s c o r e s  i s  c l o s e  t o  t h e  u p p e r  l i m i t  o f  9 . 1 .
Conclusions
T h e  m o d e r n  f a r m  b u s i n e s s  m a n a g e r  m u s t  f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  c r i t i c a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  o f  
g e n e r a l  m a n a g e r ,  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n d  h a v e  a n  o v e r a l l  l o n g - t e r m  a n d  
s t r a t e g i c  m a n a g e m e n t  f o c u s .  T h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  w a s  t o  h e l p  p r o d u c e r s  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  
i m p a c t s  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p r o d u c t i o n ,  p r i c i n g ,  c o s t  c o n t r o l  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  o n  t h e i r  f a r m s  
f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r m a n c e .  T h i s  o b j e c t i v e  i s  a c c o m p l i s h e d  b y  d e v e l o p i n g  a  c o m p u t e r - b a s e d  f i n a n c i a l  
a n a l y s i s  t r a i n i n g  a n d  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o o l  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  h e a l t h  o f  f a r m  
b u s i n e s s e s .  T h e  t o o l  w a s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  D u P o n t  F i n a n c i a l  A n a l y s i s  M o d e l  f o r  a s s e s s i n g  
d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r m a n c e .  T h e  c o m p u t e r  s o f t w a r e  i s  s t r u c t u r e d  i n t o  
t w o  m a i n  s e c t i o n s :  a  t u t o r i a l  a n d  a n  a n a l y s i s  a p p l i c a t i o n .  T h e  t u t o r i a l  w a s  d e v e l o p e d  t o  f a m i l i a r i z e  
u s e r s  w i t h  t h e  D u P o n t  m o d e l  a s  w e l l  a s  h o w  t o  o p e r a t e  t h e  s o f t w a r e .
T h e  c o m p u t e r - b a s e d  e d u c a t i o n a l  t o o l  w a s  t e s t e d  i n  t w o  p r e - t e s t / p o s t - t e s t  e x p e r i m e n t s ;  o n e  
w i t h  2 0  g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t s  a n d  o n e  w i t h  2 0  f a r m  p r o d u c e r s .  T h e  f i n a n c i a l  t e s t  u s e d  f o r  t h e  
e x p e r i m e n t s  c o n s i s t e d  o f  1 0  m u l t i p l e  c h o i c e  q u e s t i o n s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  3  a r e a s  o f  l e a r n i n g :  
a p p l i c a t i o n ,  c a l c u l a t i o n ,  a n d  c o n c e p t u a l .  T h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  t w o  e x p e r i m e n t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  
c o m p u t e r  s o f t w a r e  w a s  e f f e c t i v e  f o r  t e a c h i n g  t e c h n i q u e s  o f  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  c o n t a i n e d  w i t h i n  
t h e  D u P o n t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  m o d e l .  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t  g r o u p  a n d  t h e  f a r m  
p r o d u c e r  g r o u p  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  i m p r o v e m e n t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  t e s t  s c o r e s  i s  
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  q u e s t i o n s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  b o t h  t h e  g r a d u a t e  
s t u d e n t  g r o u p  a n d  t h e  p r o d u c e r  g r o u p  h a d  a  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p r o v e m e n t  i n  t e s t  s c o r e s  f o r  
t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  a n d  a p p l i c a t i o n  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s ,  b u t  d i d  n o t  h a v e  s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p r o v e m e n t s  i n  t e s t  
s c o r e s  f o r  c o n c e p t u a l  b a s e d  q u e s t i o n s .
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F i g u r e  1 .  D u P o n t  F i n a n c i a l  A n a l y s i s  M o d e l  ( V a n  V o o r h i s )
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Figure 2. Level I DuPont Analysis Software Screenshots
Panel A. Input Data
P a n e l  B .  A n a l y s i s  R e s u l t s
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Figure 3. Level II DuPont Analysis Software Screenshots
Panel A. Input Data
171
Panel B. Analysis Results
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Figure 4. Level III DuPont Analysis Software Screenshot.
Panel A Input Data
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Panel B. Analysis Results
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T a b l e  1 .  R e s u l t s  f r o m  G r a d u a t e  S t u d e n t  G r o u p
Overall Calculation Application Conceptual Concepts Computer
Test #1 Test #2 Test #1 Test #2 Test #1 Test #2 Test #1 Test #2
Average 4.25 6.65 1.30 2.35 0.80 1.85 2.15 2.50 2.25 3.85
Std Dev. 1.74 1.79 0.92 0.93 0.77 1.23 0.93 0.83 1.07 0.59
Mn 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
Mx 7 10 3 3 2 4 3 3 4 5
Mdian
Increases
4 6
17
1 3
15
1 2
14
2 3
8
2 4
T a b l e  2 .  R e s u l t s  f r o m  t h e  F a r m  P r o d u c e r  G r o u p
Overall Calculation Application Conceptual Concepts Cbmputer
Test #1 Test #2 Test #1 Test #2 Test #1 Test #2 Test #1 Test #2
Average 3.68 5.21 1.50 2.20 0.45 1.00 1.80 1.95 2.37 3.11
Std Dev. 1.95 2.02 0.89 0.83 0.60 1.08 1.06 0.83 1.12 1.05
Min 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Max 8 9 3 3 2 3 3 3 4 5
Median
Increases
4 5
13
2 2
13
0 1
8
2 2
8
2 3
T a b l e  3 .  R a n k s  f o r  t h e  S i g n  T e s t *
10% T e s t  L e v e l
S i g n  T es t  is Si g n i f i c a n t
i f  N u m  be r  is Ei t he r :
M o d i f i e d Le s s M ore
S am ple S i ze,  m t h a n  or t ha n
6 0.5 5.5
7 0.9 6.1
8 1 .3 6.7
9 1 .7 7.3
10 2.1 7.9
1 1 2.5 8.5
12 2. 9 9.1
13 3.3 9.7
14 3.7 10.3
1 5 4.1 10.9
16 4.5 1 1 .5
17 4. 9 12.1
1 8 5.3 12.7
19 5.7 13.3
20 6.1 13.9
*Adapted from Andrew Siegel, “Practical Business Statistics” McGraw-Hill (2003)
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Sustainable growth, measured by the sustainable growth rate, represents the maximum 
rate at which a firm can expand its sales without depleting its financial resources (Higgins 2001). 
If a firm grows at a rate greater than its sustainable growth rate then it must source capital from 
other sources, such as increased borrowing or the sale of assets. When growth in sales falls short 
of the sustainable growth rate, assets are being underutilized and cash will generally be 
accumulated in unproductive ways.
Financial leverage in agriculture has been of considerable interest to a wide range of 
stakeholders for over 20 years. The financial crises of the late 1980’s and market instability in 
the late 1990’s has exemplified the need to continually investigate models that aid in 
understanding farm debt decisions. For many, the expected utility-mean-variance approach to 
modeling farm financial structure decisions has provided considerable insights into the financial 
leveraging process (Collins; Barry and Robison; Barry, Baker and Sanint). Studies that have 
investigated the relationship between reductions in business risk and increased financial 
leverage include Collins, and Escalante and Barry who examine risk balancing in general;
Turvey and Baker who examine relationships between leverage and hedging; Featherstone, et al. 
who examine various issues in agricultural finance and price support policies; Moss, Ford and 
Boggess who examine capital gains deductions; and Ahrendsen, Collender and Dixon who 
examine depreciation and investment tax credits.
Sustainable or balanced growth examines the same issue except from an operating and 
accounting point of view. It decomposes the returns to equity into four components; profit 
margin, retention (owner withdrawals), asset turnover and leverage. A decrease in any one of 
these ratios will lower the sustainable growth rate, and increase the likelihood that financial 
leverage will be required to sustain the farm. In contrast to the risk-balancing strategy derived in 
mean-variance models, the sustainable growth rate is proscriptive, as well as explanatory, and 
can provide insights into farm operating and financial decisions based on readily available 
accounting information. Furthermore, analyses of financial risk, as per the root model of Barry, 
Baker and Sanint, and Collins, take the variability of the return on assets or equity as given and 
do not ordinarily examine the operating factors that give rise to such volatility in the first place. 
The advantage of exploring a sustainable growth rate paradigm is that the paradigm possesses 
such insights. We are unaware of any previous studies that have explored the sustainable growth 
rate model in the context of agricultural finance, and we believe that this paradigm is a 
complement to previous studies.
The purpose of this paper is to first introduce the sustainable growth rate model as a 
conceptual paradigm and then to use the model to measure the sustainable growth rate in U.S. 
agriculture. A cross-sectional analysis is used so that all states and regions are covered. As a 
positivist approach to understanding financial leverage in agriculture, the use of sustainable 
growth in explaining debt is more than pragmatic. If sustainable growth rates fall relative to 
growth in sales, working capital shortfalls are inevitable. The model benefits the farm sector in 
three ways. First, from a business perspective, this inevitability principle provides a useful yet 
simple approach to explaining financial leverage and working capital strategies to farmers; 
Second, from a policy perspective, the inevitability principle provides some guidance as to how
Sustainable Growth Trends in U. S. Agriculture
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public policy can impact leverage decisions at the farm level; and third, from an academic 
perspective, this paper introduces as new, a tool that has been used by financial practitioners in 
the non-farm sector since the 1970’s (e.g. Higgins 1972).
The next section describes the principles behind the sustainable growth model. This is 
followed by an analysis of sustainable growth in the U.S. farm sector. The results are then 
discussed and the paper is concluded.
The Sustainable Growth Model
The sustainable growth rate equation is given by
(1) g
or
NI 1 1 §
 _1 " R " r a  i
R NI A Eb
beg
( 2 ) g s =
NT
~R
NI -  W 
NI
" R"
A 1 +
D
beg
where NI is net income, R is revenue or sales, W is owner withdrawals, A is assets, D is debt and 
Ebeg is the beginning of period equity. From left to right, the bracketed terms in the right hand 
sides of (1) and (2) represent the profit margin, retention ratio, asset turnover, and financial 
leverage, respectively. The relationship between sustainable growth and the return on equity 
(ROE) is given by the last term, which uses the beginning of period equity rather than the end of 
period equity. That is
(3) ROE " N  R
NI -  W 
NI
R
A 1 +
D "
E
Assuming growth in equity is positive (i.e. Ebeg < E), and all other things being equal, a 
comparison of (2) and (3) indicates that the sustainable growth rate is marginally higher than the 
ROE. Furthermore, all other things being equal, E - Ebeg > 0 can only be attributed to increases in 
sales and if E = Ebeg then the change in sales will be zero. It is through this mechanism that the 
sustainable growth rate is linked to the percentage change in sales. The sustainable growth 
equation also includes as part of its product the return on assets (ROA). That is
(4) ROA
r n i  i 1 § i _1 r r  i
R _ NI _ A
indicating that the difference between the ROE and ROA is that the latter measures profitability 
on assets regardless of capital structure. To complete the relationships we can write
(5) g s ROA 1 +
D
beg
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T h e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  s h o w  h o w  i n c r e a s e s  i n  s a l e s  m u s t  b e  m a n a g e d .  
B a l a n c e d  g r o w t h  o c c u r s  w h e n  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  i n  s a l e s  f r o m  o n e  p e r i o d  t o  t h e  n e x t  i s  e q u a l  
t o  t h e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e .  I f  t h i s  h a p p e n s ,  t h e n  n o  a d j u s t m e n t s  n e e d  t o  b e  m a d e  t o  t h e  p r o f i t  
m a r g i n ,  o w n e r  w i t h d r a w a l s ,  t u r n o v e r  o r  l e v e r a g e .  W e  r e f e r  t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  g r o w t h  
i n  s a l e s  a n d  t h e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e  a s  t h e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  c h a l l e n g e  ( S G C ) .  I f  s a l e s  
i n c r e a s e  f a s t e r  t h a n  t h e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e ,  t h e  S G C  i s  p o s i t i v e  a n d  o p e r a t i n g  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  
a d j u s t m e n t s  n e e d  t o  b e  m a d e  i n  o r d e r  t o  r e s t o r e  a n  a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  o p e r a t i n g  b a l a n c e .  A n  
i n c r e a s e  i n  s a l e s  m u s t  b e  s u p p o r t e d  b y  a n y  o r  a l l  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
( d e c r e a s e  i n  c o s t s ) ,  a  d e c r e a s e  i n  o w n e r  w i t h d r a w a l s ,  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  a s s e t  t u r n o v e r ,  o r  a n  i n c r e a s e  
i n  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  i f  t h e  S G C  i s  n e g a t i v e ,  s a l e s  g r o w t h  i s  l o w e r  t h a n  t h e  
s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e ,  c a s h  s u r p l u s e s  i n c r e a s e  a n d  e i t h e r  s a l e s  m u s t  d e c r e a s e ,  o w n e r  
w i t h d r a w a l s  i n c r e a s e ,  a s s e t  t u r n o v e r  d e c r e a s e s ,  o r  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  i s  r e d u c e d .
T h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e s ,  o p e r a t i n g  l e v e r a g e  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  
l e v e r a g e  i s  d e p i c t e d  i n  F i g u r e  1 w i t h  t h e  g r o w t h  i n  s a l e s  o n  t h e  v e r t i c a l  a x i s  a n d  t h e  R O A  o n  t h e  
h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s .  T h r e e  b a l a n c e d  l i n e s  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  f o r  0 %  d e b t ,  D /  E beg  =  0 . 2 5  a n d  D /  E beg  =
0 . 5 0 .  C o n s i d e r  p o i n t  A ,  w h i c h  r e p r e s e n t s  a n  u n l e v e r e d  f a r m  w i t h  6 %  R O A  a n d  s a l e s  g r o w t h  o f  
6 % .  T h e  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n  i s  t o  i n c r e a s e  o u t p u t  a n d  s a l e s  b y  3 %  t o  9 % .  S i n c e  9 %  i s  h i g h e r  t h a n  
t h e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e  o f  6 % ,  c a s h  d e f i c i t s  w i l l  o c c u r  u n l e s s  s o m e  a c t i o n s  a r e  t a k e n  t o  b r i n g  
s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  i n t o  b a l a n c e .  I f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i s  t o  m a i n t a i n  o u t p u t  a n d  s a l e s  l e v e l s ,  u n l e v e r e d  
a c t i o n s  w i l l  h a v e  t o  b e  t a k e n  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  R O A  t o  9 %  ( a t  p o i n t  B )  a s  w e l l .  T h i s  c a n  o n l y  b e  
a c h i e v e d  b y  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  p r o f i t  m a r g i n ,  d e c r e a s i n g  w i t h d r a w a l s ,  o r  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  a s s e t  
t u r n o v e r  r a t i o .  I f  t h e  a s s e t  b a s e  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  f i x e d  i n  t h e  s h o r t  r u n  t h e n  e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a l e  m u s t  
b e  a c h i e v e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  p r o f i t  m a r g i n  g r o w s .  F a i l i n g  t h a t ,  t h e  g r o w t h  c a n  o n l y  b e  
f i n a n c e d  t h r o u g h  m i n i m i z a t i o n  o f  o w n e r  w i t h d r a w a l s .  B u t  i f  g r o w t h  i n  s a l e s  w a s  a c h i e v e d  b y  
e x p a n d i n g  t h e  a s s e t  b a s e  t h e n  t h e  a s s e t  t u r n o v e r  r a t i o  c o u l d  i n  f a c t  d e c r e a s e ,  p u t t i n g  e v e n  g r e a t e r  
p r e s s u r e  o n  t h e  p r o f i t  m a r g i n  a n d  r e t e n t i o n  r a t i o  a s  m e a n s  t o  m a n a g e  g r o w t h .  F o r  m o s t  f a r m e r s  i n  
c o m p e t i t i v e  m a r k e t s  t h i s  w o u l d  b e  d i f f i c u l t .  P o i n t  C  i n  f i g u r e  1 s h o w s  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r a t e g y .  
H o l d i n g  t h e  R O A  c o n s t a n t ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  s a l e s  c a n  b e  b a l a n c e d  b y  i n c r e a s i n g  d e b t  t o  5 0 %  o f  
b e g i n n i n g  e q u i t y .  I n  r e a l i t y ,  i n c r e a s e d  g r o w t h  w i l l  m o s t  l i k e l y  b e  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  c h a n g e s  t o  
R O A  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e ,  e . g .  p o i n t  D  i n  F i g u r e  1 w i t h  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  d e b t  t o  2 5 %  o f  e q u i t y  
a n d  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  R O A  f r o m  6 %  t o  a b o u t  7 . 2 % .
I t  h a s  l o n g  b e e n  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  f a r m  s i z e  h a s  b e e n  j u s t i f i e d  b a s e d  o n  
e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a l e  w h i c h  r e d u c e  c o s t s  o n  a  p e r  u n i t  b a s i s .  I f  o u t p u t  i n c r e a s e s  a t  a  l o w e r  p e r  u n i t  
c o s t ,  t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  p r o f i t  m a r g i n  w o u l d  i n c r e a s e .  H o l d i n g  a l l  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  c o n s t a n t ,  e c o n o m i e s  
o f  s c a l e  c a n  b e  u s e d  t o  j u s t i f y  a  b a l a n c e d  g r o w t h  s t r a t e g y  w i t h  i n c r e a s e d  s a l e s .  T h a t  i s ,  i f  f a r m  
e x p a n s i o n  c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  i n c r e a s e d  s a l e s  ( a c t i v e  g r o w t h )  w i t h o u t  a c h i e v i n g  e c o n o m i e s  o f  s c a l e  
( a c t u a l  g r o w t h  e x c e e d s  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h )  t h e n  t h e  b a l a n c e  c a n  o n l y  b e  m a i n t a i n e d  b y  
d e c r e a s i n g  h o u s e h o l d  c o n s u m p t i o n ,  i n c r e a s i n g  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e ,  o r  i n c r e a s i n g  a s s e t  t u r n o v e r .  
T h i s  l a t t e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  h a s  a l s o  b e e n  t h e  f o c u s  o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
f i n a n c e  l i t e r a t u r e .  I f  s a l e s  c a n  i n c r e a s e  w i t h o u t  h a v i n g  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  a s s e t  b a s e ,  e v e n  i f  p r o f i t  
m a r g i n s  r e m a i n  c o n s t a n t ,  t h e n  i n c r e a s e d  s a l e s  g r o w t h  c a n  b e  b a l a n c e d  w i t h  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h .
T h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  h i g h  y i e l d i n g  o r  g e n e t i c a l l y  m o d i f i e d  c r o p s  i s  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  h o w  
s u c h  e c o n o m i e s  c a n  e m e r g e .  H o w e v e r ,  i f  t h e  a s s e t  b a s e  i s  i n c r e a s e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f
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l a n d  o r  o t h e r  c a p i t a l ,  a n d  i n f l a t e d  o n  s p e c u l a t i v e  p r i c e s ,  t h e n  t h e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e  c a n  f a l l  
a s  t h e  a s s e t  t u r n o v e r  d e c l i n e s .  I f  i n c r e a s e d  p r o f i t  m a r g i n s  a r e  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  o f f s e t  l o w e r  a s s e t  
t u r n o v e r ,  t h e n  t h e  g r o w t h  i n  s a l e s  w i l l  e x c e e d  t h e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e .  U l t i m a t e l y ,  c a s h  
s h o r t a g e s  w i l l  a r i s e  a n d ,  e i t h e r  h o u s e h o l d  c o n s u m p t i o n  w i l l  h a v e  t o  d e c r e a s e  o r  f i n a n c i a l  
l e v e r a g e  w i l l  h a v e  t o  i n c r e a s e .
F r o m  a n  a c c o u n t i n g  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  b a l a n c e d  g r o w t h  c a n  a i d  i n  m a k i n g  s t r a t e g i c  d e c i s i o n s  
t h a t  c a n  h e l p  e x p l a i n  o b s e r v a b l e  p a t t e r n s  o f  c o n s u m p t i o n ,  i n v e s t m e n t  a n d  l e v e r a g e .  S u c h  a n  
a s s e s s m e n t  h a s  n o t  p r e v i o u s l y  b e e n  d o n e .  I n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n ,  w e  e x a m i n e  h i s t o r i c a l  f a r m  
a c c o u n t i n g  d a t a  t o  m e a s u r e  a c t i v e  v e r s u s  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e s  a n d  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  o r  
n o t  o b s e r v a b l e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  U . S .  f a r m  s e c t o r  c o n f o r m  t o  a  b a l a n c e d  g r o w t h  p a r a d i g m .
Data and Measurement Issues
O u r  e s t i m a t e s  o f  s u s t a i n a b l e  a n d  a c t u a l  b u s i n e s s  g r o w t h  r a t e s  w e r e  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  t h e  
f a r m  b a l a n c e  s h e e t  a n d  i n c o m e  s t a t e m e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o m p i l e d  b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  D e p a r t m e n t  
o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  ( U S D A )  a t  t h e  s t a t e  l e v e l  f o r  t h e  y e a r s  1 9 8 0  t o  2 0 0 1 .  S u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e s  
w e r e  d e r i v e d  f r o m  m e a s u r e s  o f  f a r m  e q u i t y  r e t u r n s ,  c a l c u l a t e d  u s i n g  n e t  w o r t h  v a l u e  a t  t h e  
b e g i n n i n g  o f  e a c h  c a l e n d a r  y e a r ,  a n d  t h e  f a r m  b u s i n e s s '  e a r n i n g s  r e t e n t i o n  r a t e  f o r  t h e  y e a r .  T h e  
l a t t e r  m e a s u r e  i s  m e r e l y  e s t i m a t e d  s i n c e  t h e  U S D A ' s  r e p o r t i n g  f o r m a t  u s e s  o n l y  a g g r e g a t e  
f i n a n c i a l  m e a s u r e s  a n d  l e a v e s  o u t  d e t a i l s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  i n f l o w s  a n d  o u t f l o w s  t o  t h e  f a r m  e q u i t y  
a c c o u n t  s u c h  a s  n o n - f a r m  i n c o m e s  g e n e r a t e d ,  f a m i l y  l i v i n g  w i t h d r a w a l s  a n d  b o t h  u n r e a l i z e d  a n d  
r e a l i z e d  c a p i t a l  g a i n s  f r o m  p r o p e r t y  a p p r e c i a t i o n  a n d  s a l e s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  W e  t h e r e f o r e  u s e d  a n  
a p p r o x i m a t i o n  o f  t h e  e a r n i n g s  r e t e n t i o n  r a t e  u s i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  n e t  f a r m  i n c o m e  r e a l i z e d  f o r  
t h e  y e a r  a n d  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  a n d  e n d i n g  l e v e l s  o f  f a r m  n e t  w o r t h .  T h e s e  a p p r o x i m a t e d  r a t e s  o f  
s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  a r e  t h e n  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  l e v e l s  o f  f a r m  r e v e n u e  g r o w t h  t o  g e n e r a t e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  t h e  S G C  r a t e s .
National and Regional Rates of Sustainable Growth Challenge
F i g u r e  2  p r e s e n t s  a  p l o t  o f  a c t u a l  g r o w t h ,  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  a n d  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  S G C  r a t e s  
f o r  U .  S .  f a r m s  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 8 1 - 2 0 0 1 .  T h e  t r e n d s  i n d i c a t e  a  t e n d e n c y  f o r  f a r m s  t o  
e x p e r i e n c e  p o s i t i v e  S G C s  i n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s .  I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  t h e  f a r m  s e c t o r  w a s  p l a g u e d  w i t h  d e c l i n i n g  
c o m m o d i t y  p r i c e s  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  a l t h o u g h  f a r m e r s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  r e c e i v e  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o u n t e r ­
c y c l i c a l  s u b s i d i e s  f r o m  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  H o w e v e r ,  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  p o s i t i v e  S G C s  c a n  b e  l a r g e l y  
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  l o w e r  r a t e s  o f  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h ,  i n s t e a d  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r y ’ s  c a p a c i t y  t o  g e n e r a t e  
h i g h e r  a c t u a l  r e v e n u e s ,  f o r  t h e  f a r m  s e c t o r  d u r i n g  t h e s e  y e a r s .  T h i s  i s  a  d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  r a p i d  
d e p l e t i o n  o f  f a r m  e q u i t y ,  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  t h e  s e v e r e  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s e s  e x p e r i e n c e d  b y  m o s t  f a r m  
b u s i n e s s e s  a t  t h a t  t i m e .  A s  f a r  b a c k  a s  t h e  m i d  t o  l a t e  1 9 7 0 s ,  t h e  f a r m  s e c t o r ’ s  l o a n  t o  v a l u e  
r a t i o s  h a v e  i n c r e a s e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  t h u s ,  e n a b l i n g  f a r m e r s  t o  i n c r e a s e  a s s e t  h o l d i n g s  e v e n  w i t h  
l e s s  e q u i t y  c o m m i t m e n t .  D u r i n g  t h i s  t i m e ,  f a r m e r s  w e r e  a b l e  t o  m o n e t i z e  t h e i r  u n r e a l i z e d  c a p i t a l  
g a i n s  a s  t h e  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  l a n d  v a l u e s  a l l o w e d  f a r m e r s  t o  b o r r o w  b e y o n d  t h e  f a r m ’ s  a c t u a l  
r e p a y m e n t  c a p a c i t y .  T h e  d r a m a t i c  d e c l i n e  o f  l a n d  v a l u e s  i n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  h o w e v e r ,  u s h e r e d  i n  a
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p e r i o d  o f  s e v e r e  f i n a n c i a l  s t r e s s  a s  t h e  r e a l  c o n c e r n  f o r  d e b t  r e p a y m e n t  c a p a c i t y  s u r f a c e d  f o r  
f a r m  b o r r o w e r s  t h a t  i n c u r r e d  d e b t s  b e y o n d  t h e  a f f o r d a b l e  l i m i t .
I n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s ,  r e f o r m s  a n d  c o n s e r v a t i v e  c r e d i t  p o l i c i e s  i m p l e m e n t e d  b y  l e n d e r s  d e m a n d e d  
f a r m e r s  t o  m a k e  m o r e  c a u t i o u s  b o r r o w i n g  d e c i s i o n s .  A s  b u s i n e s s  e x p a n s i o n  p l a n s  w e r e  m o r e  
s y n c h r o n i z e d  w i t h  a c t u a l  f a r m  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  t h e  S G C  v a l u e s  i n  t h e  e a r l y  
t o  m i d - 1 9 9 0 s  i n  F i g u r e  2  b o r d e r  a l o n g  t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s ,  s u g g e s t i n g  o n l y  s l i g h t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
b e t w e e n  r e a l i z e d  a n d  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e s .  N o t a b l y ,  t h e  S G C  v a l u e s  h a v e  b e e n  n e g a t i v e  
f r o m  1 9 9 8 - 2 0 0 1 ,  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  s t e a d y  p l u n g e  o f  f a r m  c o m m o d i t y  p r i c e s  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d .  
M o r e o v e r ,  r a d i c a l  c h a n g e s  i n  f e d e r a l  p o l i c y  t o w a r d s  a g r i c u l t u r e  i n v o l v e  a  s h i f t  f r o m  m a r k e t -  
b a s e d  t o  f i x e d ,  d e c o u p l e d  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  p r i c e  s u p p o r t  p a y m e n t s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  f e d e r a l  
g o v e r n m e n t  l a t e r  d i s b u r s e d  l a r g e  a d - h o c  f a r m  i n c o m e  s u b s i d y  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s ,  m o s t  f a r m s  
a c t u a l l y  r e a l i z e d  l o w e r  b u s i n e s s  g r o w t h  r a t e s  d u e  t o  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  i n c r e a s e d  i n c o m e  v o l a t i l i t y  
a n d  u n c e r t a i n t y .
T a b l e s  1 ,  2  a n d  3  r e p o r t  a c t u a l  f a r m  r e v e n u e  g r o w t h  r a t e s ,  e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  r a t e  o f  
s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  a n d  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  S G C  r a t e s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  f o r  t h e  t e n  p r o d u c t i o n  r e g i o n s  i n  t h e  
c o u n t r y .  T h e  U S D A  h a s  a c t u a l l y  i n t r o d u c e d  a  n e w e r  s c h e m e  f o r  c l a s s i f y i n g  c o u n t i e s  i n  e a c h  
s t a t e  i n t o  m a j o r  f a r m  r e s o u r c e  r e g i o n s ,  h o w e v e r ,  s i n c e  o u r  d a t a  s e t  a r e  a g g r e g a t e d  a t  t h e  s t a t e -  
l e v e l  w e  h a d  t o  r e s o r t  t o  t h e  o l d e r  f a r m  p r o d u c t i o n  r e g i o n a l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  s y s t e m .  H e n c e ,  t h e  
r e g i o n s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n c l u d e  t h e  N o r t h e a s t ,  L a k e  S t a t e s ,  C o r n  B e l t ,  N o r t h e r n  P l a i n s ,  A p p a l a c h i a n ,  
S o u t h e a s t ,  D e l t a  S t a t e s ,  S o u t h e r n  P l a i n s ,  M o u n t a i n s  a n d  t h e  P a c i f i c .  T h e s e  g r o u p i n g s  w e r e  
b a s e d  o n  s t a t e  b o u n d a r i e s ,  w i t h  a  r e g i o n a l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  a s s i g n e d  t o  n e i g h b o r i n g  s t a t e s  w i t h  
s i m i l a r  p r o d u c t i o n  p r a c t i c e s  a n d  r e s o u r c e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
T a b l e  4  p r e s e n t s  s t a t i s t i c a l  m e a s u r e s  f o r  e a c h  r e g i o n  t o  a n a l y z e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  S G C  
p a t t e r n s  a t  c e r t a i n  t i m e  p e r i o d s .  T h e  s u m m a r y  i n d i c a t e s  o v e r a l l  p o s i t i v e  m e a n  S G C  r a t e s  a c r o s s  
a l l  r e g i o n s  i n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  w i t h  m e a n  S G C  r a t e s  r a n g i n g  f r o m  1 . 5 2 %  f o r  t h e  N o r t h e a s t e r n  s t a t e s  t o  
8 . 7 0 %  f o r  t h e  D e l t a  S t a t e s .  T h e  r e l a t i v e  v a r i a b i l i t y  i n d i c a t o r s  ( c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  v a r i a t i o n )  a r e  
c o n s i d e r a b l y  s m a l l ,  w i t h  a  h i g h  o f  3 . 2 8 %  f o r  t h e  N o r t h e a s t e r n  s t a t e s  a n d  a  l o w  o f  0 . 6 7 %  f o r  t h e  
M o u n t a i n  s t a t e s .
I n  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 8 0 s ,  p o s i t i v e  S G C  r a t e s  a r e  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  f l u c t u a t i n g  a c t u a l  r e v e n u e  g r o w t h  
r a t e s  ( T a b l e  1 )  a n d  ( a l m o s t  c o n s i s t e n t l y )  n e g a t i v e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e s  ( T a b l e  2 ) ,  e x p e r i e n c e d  
e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  C o r n  B e l t ,  A p p a l a c h i a n ,  L a k e ,  N o r t h e r n  P l a i n s  a n d  t h e  S o u t h e a s t  r e g i o n s  w h e r e  
g r a i n  p r o d u c e r s  h a v e  b e e n  m o s t  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  r a d i c a l  d e c l i n e  o f  f a r m l a n d  v a l u e s .  D u r i n g  t h i s  
p e r i o d ,  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a n d  d e c l i n i n g  e x p o r t  d e m a n d  l e d  t o  a  n a t i o n w i d e  3 1 %  d r o p  i n  f a r m  
r e a l  e s t a t e  v a l u e s  a n d  c o m p o u n d e d  d e b t  r e p a y m e n t  p r o b l e m s  f o r  h i g h l y  l e v e r a g e d  p r o d u c e r s .  
I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  t h e  l i v e s t o c k  p r o d u c e r s  i n  t h e  N o r t h e a s t  r e a l i z e d  p o s i t i v e  r a t e s  o f  g r o w t h  a n d  
s u s t a i n a b i l i t y  f o r  m o s t  o f  t h i s  p e r i o d  a s  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  l o w  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  p a s t u r e l a n d  t o  s u d d e n  
m a r k e t  a d j u s t m e n t s  o f  l a n d  v a l u e s  s p a r e d  t h e s e  p r o d u c e r s  f r o m  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  
b o o m - b u s t  c y c l e  o f  t h e  7 0 s  a n d  8 0 s .
I n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  f a r m  i n c o m e  r i s k  d u e  t o  g r e a t e r  m a r k e t  u n c e r t a i n t y  
a n d  t h e  c h a n g i n g  s t r u c t u r e  o f  f e d e r a l  p o l i c y  t o w a r d s  a g r i c u l t u r e  a r e  r e f l e c t e d  i n  m i x e d  r e s u l t s
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o b t a i n e d  f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  r e g i o n s .  T h e  h e t e r o g e n e i t y  o f  r e g i o n a l  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o f i l e s  a c c o u n t  f o r  
d i v e r g e n t  t r e n d s  i n  S G C  l e v e l s .
D u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5  w h e n  f e d e r a l  p a y m e n t s  p r o v i d e d  i n c o m e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
b e n e f i t s ,  t h e  c o r n  a n d  s o y b e a n  p r o d u c e r s  i n  t h e  C o r n  B e l t  a n d  L a k e  S t a t e s ,  w h o  l a r g e l y  b e n e f i t e d  
f r o m  s u c h  s u b s i d i e s ,  w e r e  a b l e  t o  b u i l d  u p  e x c e s s  p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t i e s  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  s t r o n g e r  
e q u i t y  p o s i t i o n s  a n d  d e b t  s e r v i c i n g  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  H e n c e ,  t h e s e  f a r m s  r e a l i z e d  n e g a t i v e  a v e r a g e  
S G C  r a t e s ,  w i t h  l o w e r  r e l a t i v e  v a r i a b i l i t y ,  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d .
E l s e w h e r e  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  t h e  g a p  b e t w e e n  a c t u a l  a n d  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e s  w a s  l o w e r  
w h e n  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  w i d e r  d i s p a r i t y  o f  g r o w t h  r a t e s  r e a l i z e d  i n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s .  C o t t o n  a n d  p e a n u t  
f a r m e r s  i n  t h e  S o u t h e a s t  a n d  D e l t a  s t a t e s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  r e c e i v e  f e d e r a l  s u p p o r t ,  a l t h o u g h  n o t  b y  a s  
m u c h  a s  t h e  s u b s i d i e s  a p p r o p r i a t e d  f o r  t h e  g r a i n  p r o d u c e r s .  T h e  d a i r y ,  c a t t l e ,  h o g  a n d  b r o i l e r  
f a r m e r s  i n  t h e  N o r t h e a s t ,  N o r t h e r n  P l a i n s ,  M o u n t a i n  s t a t e s  a n d  S o u t h e r n  P l a i n s  r e l i e d  o n  
m a r k e t i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  a l l i a n c e s  t o  e n h a n c e  f i n a n c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  r e s u l t i n g  i n  g r e a t e r  
a c c e s s  t o  m o r e  s o u r c e s  o f  c a p i t a l .
A s  f e d e r a l  f a r m  s u p p o r t  v e e r e d  a w a y  f r o m  a  m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d  t y p e  o f  s u b s i d y  a n d  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  c o m m o d i t y  p r i c e s  d e c l i n e d  s t e a d i l y  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  t h e  1 9 9 0 s ,  m e a n  S G C  r a t e s  
s t i l l  r e m a i n e d  c l o s e  t o  1 a l t h o u g h  r e l a t i v e  v a r i a b i l i t y  i n c r e a s e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y  i n  6  o f  1 0  r e g i o n s .
Preliminary Analysis of Balanced Growth Strategies
T h i s  s e c t i o n  p r e s e n t s  a  c u r s o r y  a n a l y s i s  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e t w e e n  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  l e v e l s  o f  
S G C  r a t e s  a n d  s e v e r a l  v a r i a b l e s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  p a r a d i g m .  F i g u r e  3  p r e s e n t s  
t h e  t r e n d s  i n  t h e  S G C  r a t e s  a n d  d e b t - t o - a s s e t  r a t i o s ,  d e c o m p o s e d  i n t o  l o n g - t e r m  a n d  n o n - l o n g ­
t e r m  c o m p o n e n t s ,  f o r  a l l  U S  f a r m s  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 8 1  t o  2 0 0 1 .  T h e  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  r a t i o s  
w e r e  d e r i v e d  f r o m  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  b a l a n c e  s h e e t s  c o m p i l e d  b y  t h e  U S D A - E R S  f o r  a l l  U .  S .  f a r m s  
d u r i n g  t h e  2 1 - y e a r  p e r i o d .  T h e  l o n g - t e r m  l e v e r a g e  m e a s u r e s  w e r e  c a l c u l a t e d  a s  t h e  r a t i o  o f  t o t a l  
f a r m  r e a l  e s t a t e  d e b t  t o  t h e  t o t a l  m a r k e t  v a l u e  o f  f a r m  r e a l  e s t a t e  a s s e t  h o l d i n g s  f o r  e a c h  y e a r .
T h e  s h o r t e r - t e r m  m e a s u r e s  w e r e  c a l c u l a t e d  b y  d i v i d i n g  t h e  t o t a l  l e v e l s  o f  i n t e r m e d i a t e  a n d  s h o r t ­
t e r m  l o a n s  b y  t h e  s u m  o f  t h e  t o t a l  v a l u e  o f  n o n - r e a l  e s t a t e  a s s e t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  c r o p  a n d  l i v e s t o c k  
i n v e n t o r i e s ,  m a c h i n e r i e s  a n d  e q u i p m e n t ,  p u r c h a s e d  i n p u t s  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s .
I n  o r d e r  t o  d i s c e r n  c l e a r  p a t t e r n s  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e t w e e n  t h e  m e a s u r e s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  
F i g u r e  3 ,  a  s u m m a r y  i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  T a b l e  5  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  b a s i c  c o r r e l a t i o n  a n a l y s i s  p e r f o r m e d  
o n  p a i r s  o f  v a l u e s  o f  S G C  r a t e s  a n d ,  a m o n g  o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s ,  v a l u e s  o f  e a c h  o f  t h e  t w o  l e v e r a g e  
m e a s u r e s  o v e r  c e r t a i n  t i m e  f r a m e s .  T h e  g r a p h s  a n d  d e r i v e d  c o r r e l a t i o n  m e a s u r e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
b o t h  l o n g -  a n d  n o n - l o n g  t e r m  m e a s u r e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  a r e  p o s i t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  
c h a n g e s  i n  S G C  r a t e s  o v e r  t h e  e n t i r e  2 1 - y e a r  p e r i o d ,  d i f f e r i n g  i n  m a g n i t u d e  o f  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  b y  o n l y  5  p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t s  a t  0 . 4 9 7 6  a n d  0 . 4 4 7 6 ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  S i g n i f i c a n t  
d e v i a t i o n s  i n  c o r r e l a t i o n  r e s u l t s  a r e  o b t a i n e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  w h e n  d i f f e r e n t  ( s h o r t e r )  t i m e  p e r i o d s  a r e  
c o n s i d e r e d .  I n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s ,  p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  b o t h  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  m e a s u r e s  a n d  
S G C  i s  m a i n t a i n e d ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  s h o r t e r - t e r m  m e a s u r e  h a s  a  h i g h e r  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  a t  
0 . 3 2 6 9  ( v e r s u s  0 . 2 0 9 5  f o r  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  v a r i a b l e ) .  A s  n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  f a r m e r s  e x h i b i t e d  a n
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a g g r e s s i v e  b o r r o w i n g  b e h a v i o r  i n  t h e  1 9 8 0 s  a s  f a r m l a n d  v a l u e s  a p p r e c i a t e d .  V i e w e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  
t h e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  p a r a d i g m ,  f a r m s  i n  g e n e r a l  r e s o r t e d  t o  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g i n g  a s  a  m e a n s  o f  
i n c r e a s i n g  l i q u i d i t y  a n d  p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y  b u i l d - u p  d u r i n g  s u c h  p e r i o d ,  w i t h  a  g r e a t e r  t e n d e n c y  
t o  r e s o r t  t o  i n t e r m e d i a t e -  a n d  s h o r t - t e r m  l o a n s  v i s - a - v i s  l o n g e r - t e r m  l o a n s .  T h e  l a t t e r  r e s u l t  c o u l d  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  s h o r t - t e r m  l i q u i d i t y ,  i n s t e a d  o f  f i x e d  a s s e t  a c c u m u l a t i o n ,  w a s  a  m o r e  p r e s s i n g  
c o n c e r n  a m o n g  f a r m  b u s i n e s s e s  a t  t h a t  t i m e  a n d  f a r m s  r e l i e d  o n  s h o r t -  a n d  i n t e r m e d i a t e - t e r m  
l o a n s  t o  a d d r e s s  t h i s  n e e d .
I n  t h e  n i n e t i e s ,  t h e r e  w a s  a  d i m i n i s h i n g  r e l i a n c e  o n  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g i n g  t o  b o o s t  
s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  p o t e n t i a l ,  g i v e n  t h e  l o w  a n d  n e g a t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  r e s u l t s  ( T a b l e  5 )  f o r  n o n ­
l o n g - t e r m  a n d  l o n g - t e r m  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  m e a s u r e s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  D u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  t h e  
p r o p e n s i t y  t o  i n c u r  l o a n s  a m o n g  f a r m e r s  h a s  b e e n  r e g u l a t e d  b y  s t r i c t e r  c r e d i t  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t  a n d  
c r e d i t  r a t i o n i n g  p o l i c i e s  b y  l e n d e r s .  T h u s ,  m o r e  c a u t i o u s  b o r r o w i n g  d e c i s i o n s  w e r e  m a d e .  T h e  
r e s u l t s  a l s o  i m p l i e d  t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g i n g  c o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  a v o i d e d  b y  s o m e  f a r m e r s  w h e n e v e r  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  i m p l e m e n t  a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  t o  i m p r o v e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e s  w e r e  
a v a i l a b l e .
T h e  o t h e r  c o r r e l a t i o n  r e s u l t s  i n  T a b l e  5  a n d  t h e  p l o t s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  F i g u r e  4  f o r  h i s t o r i c a l  
l e v e l s  o f  n e t  p r o f i t  m a r g i n  ( N F I R A T )  a n d  a s s e t  t u r n o v e r  ( A T O )  r a t i o s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  d u r i n g  t i m e s  
o f  r e s t r i c t i v e  c r e d i t  e n v i r o n m e n t s  t h e  f a r m e r s  r e s o r t e d  t o  o t h e r  s t r a t e g i e s  t o  i n c r e a s e  s u s t a i n a b l e  
g r o w t h  p o t e n t i a l s .  I n  t h e  e i g h t i e s  w h e n  f a r m e r s  r e l i e d  m o r e  o n  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g i n g  t o  i n c r e a s e  
s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e s ,  N F I R A T  a n d  A T O  p r o d u c e d  n e g a t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  S G C .  D u r i n g  
t h i s  t i m e ,  i n c r e a s e d  f i n a n c i a l  a n d  o p e r a t i n g  i n e f f i c i e n c y  r e s u l t e d  i n  p r o f i t  m a r g i n  s q u e e z e s  w h i l e  
t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  e x c e s s  p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t i e s  t h r o u g h  b u i l d i n g  u p  i n v e n t o r i e s  o f  i d l e ,  o b s o l e t e  
a n d  u n p r o d u c t i v e  a s s e t s  b r o u g h t  d o w n  t h e  f a r m  s e c t o r ’ s  A T O  r a t e s .
I n  t h e  n i n e t i e s  p r o f i t  m a r g i n s  a n d  a s s e t  p r o d u c t i v i t y  b e c a m e  i m p o r t a n t  t o o l s  f o r  a t t a i n i n g  
h i g h e r  r a t e s  o f  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  a s  t h e  N F I R A T  a n d  A T O  w e r e  f o u n d  t o  b e  h i g h l y  c o r r e l a t e d  
w i t h  S G C  r a t e s  a t  0 . 7 3 0 2  a n d  0 . 5 8 1 8 ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  M o r e  f a v o r a b l e  m a r k e t  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  
e a r l y  p a r t  o f  t h e  d e c a d e ,  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t  p r o d u c t i o n  t e c h n o l o g i e s  ( i . e .  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  G M O s ) ,  a n d  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  r i s k - r e d u c i n g  m a r k e t i n g  p l a n s  a l l  c o n t r i b u t e d  
t o  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  m o r e  a c c e p t a b l e  p r o f i t  m a r g i n s .  T h e  p r e v a l e n c e  o f  r e a l  e s t a t e  a n d  e q u i p m e n t  
l e a s i n g  c o n t r a c t s  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  m o r e  p r u d e n t  a s s e t  m a n a g e m e n t  s t r a t e g i e s  
a i m e d  a t  e l i m i n a t i n g  i d l e  p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y  d i d  n o t  o n l y  r e s u l t  i n  i m p r o v e d  A T O  r a t i o s  b u t  a l s o  
p r o v i d e d  a d d i t i o n a l  l i q u i d i t y - e n h a n c i n g  m e c h a n i s m s  f o r  s o m e  f a r m s  t h r o u g h  c a s h  p r o c e e d s  f r o m  
a s s e t  l i q u i d a t i o n  a n d  t h e  m o r e  f a v o r a b l e  e x p e n s e  d i s b u r s e m e n t  s c h e m e s  a v a i l a b l e  u n d e r  c e r t a i n  
l a n d  l e a s i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s .
W h i l e  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  d o e s  n o t  i n c l u d e  t h e  l i q u i d i t y  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  c h a n g e s  i n  e q u i t y  
w i t h d r a w a l s  f o r  f a r m  h o u s e h o l d  c o n s u m p t i o n  d u e  t o  d a t a  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  i t  c a n  b e  c l e a r l y  s e e n  t h a t ,  
o v e r  t h e  t i m e  f r a m e  c o n s i d e r e d ,  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e / i n s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  s t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  i n v o l v e  f i n a n c i a l  
l e v e r a g i n g ,  i n c o m e  e f f i c i e n c y  a n d  a s s e t  p r o d u c t i v i t y  a l t e r n a t e l y  c o m p l e m e n t  e a c h  o t h e r  t o  
m o d i f y  a  f a r m ’ s  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  p o t e n t i a l  i n  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  b a l a n c e d  g r o w t h .
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Conclusions
T h i s  p a p e r  h a s  p r e s e n t e d  a  d i f f e r e n t  a p p r o a c h  t o  e x a m i n i n g  c e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e  
f i n a n c e  b y  i n t r o d u c i n g  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  a s  p r e s e n t e d  b y  H i g g i n s  ( 1 9 7 2 ,  2 0 0 1 ) .  
T h e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  m o d e l  r e q u i r e s  a  b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  i n c r e a s e d  s a l e s  a t  t h e  f a r m  l e v e l  a n d  
c h a n g e s  i n  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  a c c o u n t i n g  m e a s u r e s  s u c h  a s  p r o f i t  m a r g i n ,  o w n e r  w i t h d r a w a l s  o r  
b u s i n e s s  r e t e n t i o n  r a t e s ,  a s s e t  t u r n o v e r ,  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e .  W e  a r g u e  t h a t  t h i s  p a r a d i g m  c a n  
b e  u s e d  t o  e x p l a i n  o b s e r v e d  f i n a n c i a l  a n d  o p e r a t i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w e  
n o t e  t h a t  w h e n  f a r m  r e v e n u e s  i n c r e a s e  a b o v e  a  m e a s u r e d  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e ,  t h e r e  i s  a l s o  a  
t e n d e n c y  f o r  f a r m  d e b t  t o  i n c r e a s e ,  a n d  w h e n  r e v e n u e s  f a l l ,  t h e r e  i s  a  t e n d e n c y  f o r  f a r m  d e b t  t o  
d e c r e a s e .  B u t  t h e  r o l e  o f  d e b t  i s  n o t  s o  s i m p l y  r e l a t e d  t o  i n c r e a s e s  i n  s a l e s .  H o u s e h o l d  
c o n s u m p t i o n  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  o w n e r  w i t h d r a w a l s ,  a l s o  p l a y  a  r o l e .  A s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  
i n c r e a s e  d u e  t o  i n f l a t i o n ,  t h e  r e t e n t i o n  r a t i o  a n d  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  f a l l s ,  r e l a t i v e  t o  s a l e s .  T h i s  
c o n d i t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o n  c a s h  f l o w  a n d  i n c r e a s e d  u s e  o f  d e b t .  L i k e w i s e ,  i n  p e r i o d s  o f  
i n f l a t i o n a r y  l a n d  v a l u e s ,  a s  t u r n o v e r  f a l l s  a n d  i f  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  f a l l s  r e l a t i v e  t o  s a l e s ,  c a s h  
s h o r t a g e s  n e e d  t o  b e  a b s o r b e d  t h r o u g h  e i t h e r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  h o u s e h o l d  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o r  i n c r e a s e d  
u s e  o f  d e b t .
T h i s  s t u d y  h a s  p r o v i d e d  e s t i m a t e s  o f  a c t u a l  a n d  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  r a t e s  f r o m  1 9 8 1  t o  
2 0 0 1  f o r  t h e  s e v e n  p r o d u c i n g  r e g i o n s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  d i s c u s s e s  t h e s e  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  
o f  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r e  e c o n o m y .  O u r  a n a l y s e s  s h o w  a  g e n e r a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  s u s t a i n a b l e  g r o w t h  
p a r a d i g m .
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T a b l e  1 .  A v e r a g e  R a t e s  o f  A c t u a l  R e v e n u e  G r o w t h  o f  U . S .  F a r m s  ( P e r c e n t ) ,  B y  R e g i o n ,  1 9 8 1 - 2 0 0 1
Y e a r A P L 1 C B 2 D S 3 L S 4 M T N S 5 N E 6 N P L N S 7 P C F C 8 S E 9 S P L N S 10 A l l  S t a t e s
1 9 8 1 1 4 . 4 6 1 0 . 9 8 1 6 . 2 0 7 . 9 8 - 0 . 1 5 1 2 . 6 3 1 6 . 9 0 2 . 0 6 1 6 . 5 3 1 3 . 1 6 1 1 . 4 2
1 9 8 2 - 1 . 3 7 - 3 . 9 0 - 2 . 5 6 0 . 1 4 - 1 . 8 1 4 . 4 9 4 . 3 8 4 . 3 8 - 1 . 2 7 0 . 9 2 - 1 . 3 1
1 9 8 3 - 8 . 4 7 - 1 5 . 5 3 - 4 . 3 0 - 6 . 8 2 1 . 7 2 1 . 6 7 - 3 . 9 4 8 . 8 6 - 4 . 6 6 - 4 . 6 0 - 6 . 2 7
1 9 8 4 1 2 . 3 4 2 1 . 2 9 8 . 3 3 7 . 6 7 - 0 . 5 8 1 . 6 2 9 . 8 4 - 1 . 0 1 9 . 0 5 - 0 . 2 4 9 . 1 8
1 9 8 5 - 9 . 2 8 - 2 . 1 0 - 9 . 3 4 - 5 . 1 8 - 6 . 1 6 - 1 . 2 0 - 1 . 4 8 - 3 . 1 0 - 6 . 9 8 - 2 . 4 1 - 4 . 0 2
1 9 8 6 - 4 . 8 4 - 6 . 7 6 - 9 . 2 9 - 3 . 4 9 2 . 2 7 0 . 3 9 - 4 . 0 9 6 . 9 5 - 5 . 0 1 - 0 . 8 7 - 3 . 1 5
1 9 8 7 7 . 7 0 4 . 0 1 1 7 . 6 1 5 . 4 9 1 0 . 9 0 5 . 0 1 5 . 4 8 6 . 6 9 1 3 . 2 6 9 . 9 6 7 . 8 6
1 9 8 8 8 . 4 8 1 . 7 2 1 6 . 6 3 - 1 . 5 6 9 . 5 0 5 . 7 1 1 . 8 2 6 . 1 7 1 2 . 1 4 1 1 . 4 4 5 . 6 4
1 9 8 9 7 . 8 9 1 2 . 8 2 1 . 3 0 1 7 . 3 4 7 . 1 4 4 . 7 1 3 . 9 5 4 . 7 5 1 2 . 9 9 1 . 8 9 7 . 8 5
1 9 9 0 3 . 8 6 0 . 0 8 - 0 . 1 1 - 1 . 0 8 4 . 5 8 2 . 8 9 1 1 . 3 0 2 . 9 5 - 8 . 3 6 7 . 6 0 3 . 2 2
1 9 9 1 - 0 . 6 8 - 7 . 8 3 2 . 5 1 - 5 . 0 5 - 0 . 2 6 - 3 . 4 6 - 5 . 6 6 - 2 . 0 4 7 . 2 5 - 1 . 2 4 - 3 . 0 9
1 9 9 2 7 . 0 3 1 1 . 9 9 5 . 6 7 0 . 0 3 - 2 . 6 5 5 . 5 3 7 . 7 6 1 . 3 5 - 1 . 1 0 - 0 . 4 0 4 . 5 0
1 9 9 3 2 . 7 9 - 3 . 6 1 2 . 0 5 - 1 . 0 6 1 3 . 9 5 - 1 . 1 7 - 2 . 4 5 9 . 9 0 2 . 3 6 6 . 9 6 2 . 2 2
1 9 9 4 5 . 7 0 8 . 8 8 9 . 1 7 1 0 . 7 2 - 3 . 9 3 4 . 3 5 7 . 0 1 4 . 5 4 8 . 8 9 1 . 8 4 5 . 3 6
1 9 9 5 - 1 . 7 7 - 7 . 4 3 - 3 . 0 0 - 1 . 5 6 2 . 3 8 - 2 . 6 0 - 7 . 8 4 0 . 5 9 - 0 . 9 9 - 5 . 7 0 - 2 . 4 5
1 9 9 6 7 . 1 9 2 0 . 9 9 1 6 . 6 5 9 . 5 5 4 . 7 6 7 . 0 2 2 2 . 6 5 7 . 8 9 9 . 5 8 - 0 . 5 8 1 1 . 8 6
1 9 9 7 1 . 6 6 0 . 7 4 - 5 . 0 6 - 1 . 2 2 6 . 9 2 - 3 . 3 2 - 6 . 8 2 3 . 0 4 2 . 1 5 1 3 . 4 9 1 . 0 0
1 9 9 8 0 . 2 0 - 6 . 7 5 - 4 . 7 3 1 . 8 9 - 0 . 0 3 2 . 1 0 3 . 5 5 - 3 . 1 5 - 0 . 4 4 - 7 . 1 0 - 2 . 5 3
1 9 9 9 - 3 . 6 2 - 4 . 9 7 5 . 4 7 1 . 1 7 3 . 7 5 - 0 . 6 3 - 0 . 3 5 1 . 4 0 2 . 1 8 1 2 . 4 7 1 . 0 2
2 0 0 0 1 2 . 4 8 9 . 3 5 - 6 . 9 0 - 1 . 8 6 2 . 9 4 3 . 4 2 6 . 3 6 4 . 3 7 - 0 . 9 0 - 2 . 5 5 3 . 0 9
2 0 0 1 - 2 . 7 6 1 . 9 7 7 . 5 8 2 . 6 4 4 . 3 4 0 . 6 6 0 . 1 6 - 0 . 5 0 6 . 5 2 1 . 9 7 1 . 9 9
N o t e s :  ( 1 )  T h e  A p p a l a c h i a n  s t a t e s  i n c l u d e  K e n t u c k y ,  N o r t h  C a r o l i n a ,  T e n n e s s e e ,  V i r g i n i a  a n d  W e s t  V i r g i n i a ;  ( 2 )  T h e  C o r n  
B e l t  s t a t e s  i n c l u d e  I l l i n o i s ,  I n d i a n a ,  I o w a ,  M i s s o u r i  a n d  O h i o ;  ( 3 )  T h e  D e l t a  S t a t e s  a r e  A r k a n s a s ,  L o u i s i a n a  a n d  M i s s i s s i p p i ;  
( 4 )  T h e  L a k e  S t a t e s  a r e  M i c h i g a n ,  M i n n e s o t a  a n d  W i s c o n s i n ;  ( 5 )  T h e  M o u n t a i n  S t a t e s  a r e  A r i z o n a ,  C o l o r a d o ,  I d a h o ,  
M o n t a n a ,  N e v a d a ,  N e w  M e x i c o ,  U t a h ,  a n d  W y o m i n g ;  ( 6 )  T h e  N o r t h e a s t  R e g i o n  i n c l u d e s  C o n n e c t i c u t ,  D e l a w a r e ,  M a i n e ,  
M a r y l a n d ,  M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  N e w  H a m p s h i r e ,  N e w  J e r s e y ,  N e w  Y o r k ,  P e n n s y l v a n i a ,  R h o d e  I s l a n d  a n d  V e r m o n t ;  ( 7 )  T h e  
N o r t h e r n  P l a i n s  i n c l u d e s  K a n s a s ,  N e b r a s k a ,  N o r t h  D a k o t a  a n d  S o u t h  D a k o t a ;  ( 8 )  T h e  P a c i f i c  R e g i o n  i n c l u d e s  A l a s k a ,  
C a l i f o r n i a ,  H a w a i i ,  O r e g o n  a n d  W a s h i n g t o n ;  ( 9 )  T h e  S o u t h e a s t  R e g i o n  i n c l u d e s  A l a b a m a ,  F l o r i d a ,  G e o r g i a  a n d  S o u t h  
C a r o l i n a ;  a n d  ( 1 0 )  T h e  S o u t h e r n  P l a i n s  i n c l u d e s  O k l a h o m a  a n d  T e x a s .
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T a b l e  2 .  A v e r a g e  R a t e s  o f  S u s t a i n a b l e  G r o w t h  o f  U . S .  F a r m s  ( P e r c e n t ) , B y  R e g i o n ,  1 9 8 1 - 2 0 0 1
Y e a r A P L 1 C B 2 D S 3 L S 4 M T N S 5 N E 6 N P L N S 7 P C F C 8 S E 9 S P L N S 10 A l l  S t a t e s
1 9 8 1 - 2 . 0 6 - 9 . 9 8 - 4 . 4 4 - 3 . 3 6 0 . 5 2 1 . 2 8 - 0 . 8 9 3 . 2 7 - 6 . 5 8 2 . 4 5 - 2 . 0 3
1 9 8 2 - 2 . 0 4 - 1 0 . 3 3 - 9 . 6 4 - 5 . 7 3 - 5 . 1 2 - 2 . 4 7 - 5 . 7 9 0 . 5 7 - 3 . 6 9 - 2 . 1 1 - 5 . 5 1
1 9 8 3 - 0 . 6 6 - 3 . 3 4 0 . 5 3 - 3 . 6 5 0 . 5 4 1 . 4 9 - 3 . 7 0 0 . 0 2 - 3 . 3 8 1 . 1 7 - 0 . 4 6
1 9 8 4 - 7 . 7 5 - 2 2 . 5 4 - 8 . 9 6 - 1 5 . 9 9 - 9 . 4 3 0 . 5 6 - 1 9 . 3 8 - 7 . 4 8 - 5 . 7 6 - 8 . 4 6 - 1 1 . 8 4
1 9 8 5 - 2 . 6 4 - 1 0 . 3 0 - 1 3 . 1 5 - 1 3 . 2 4 - 1 1 . 4 8 2 . 5 9 - 1 1 . 5 1 - 5 . 2 4 - 2 . 8 1 - 1 4 . 4 8 - 1 0 . 2 7
1 9 8 6 - 1 . 0 5 - 5 . 4 7 - 1 2 . 7 7 - 8 . 8 1 - 2 . 5 3 4 . 5 7 - 6 . 0 8 - 8 . 8 5 0 . 9 8 - 6 . 2 6 - 4 . 5 9
1 9 8 7 - 0 . 4 4 5 . 4 3 3 . 5 1 8 . 2 1 0 . 8 4 5 . 5 3 7 . 6 6 - 0 . 2 2 5 . 7 3 3 . 1 2 6 . 5 9
1 9 8 8 2 . 8 4 3 . 7 4 1 . 8 1 3 . 9 6 1 . 4 6 5 . 9 2 5 . 3 5 4 . 3 3 6 . 0 1 0 . 9 5 6 . 0 4
1 9 8 9 3 . 0 6 2 . 9 1 - 0 . 5 9 6 . 1 2 0 . 4 8 1 . 9 1 3 . 9 5 5 . 3 1 6 . 3 6 0 . 1 3 4 . 2 7
1 9 9 0 - 0 . 2 7 3 . 8 9 2 . 5 9 6 . 2 6 4 . 1 0 - 1 . 7 7 2 . 7 7 5 . 2 3 1 . 4 1 0 . 3 9 3 . 8 6
1 9 9 1 2 . 5 1 0 . 7 0 - 2 . 7 4 0 . 5 5 0 . 1 9 - 0 . 7 1 - 2 . 0 9 - 0 . 8 7 0 . 1 5 0 . 4 6 0 . 3 3
1 9 9 2 4 . 7 1 3 . 4 7 2 . 8 1 3 . 2 2 - 4 . 2 4 6 . 4 7 2 . 1 0 1 . 6 7 3 . 9 4 4 . 5 2 3 . 3 7
1 9 9 3 2 . 3 3 2 . 8 8 2 . 8 1 - 0 . 0 5 6 . 7 8 - 0 . 7 9 3 . 9 3 2 . 6 9 3 . 9 7 2 . 9 8 5 . 2 8
1 9 9 4 5 . 1 3 3 . 5 7 3 . 4 3 2 . 1 8 2 . 7 4 0 . 0 5 1 . 8 7 0 . 5 4 5 . 0 7 1 . 1 3 2 . 7 0
1 9 9 5 3 . 1 3 2 . 3 6 2 . 6 6 3 . 2 8 2 . 5 9 - 0 . 1 2 1 . 1 4 1 . 7 3 1 . 8 9 - 2 . 1 3 3 . 4 3
1 9 9 6 2 . 9 7 5 . 3 3 0 . 2 1 3 . 2 6 2 . 4 2 0 . 1 3 4 . 9 4 2 . 1 9 1 . 7 2 2 . 4 5 3 . 9 2
1 9 9 7 2 . 8 8 4 . 9 3 4 . 1 9 1 .7 1 3 . 1 3 - 1 . 7 6 3 . 7 9 0 . 8 1 3 . 7 1 4 . 8 2 4 . 6 1
1 9 9 8 0 . 6 2 2 . 6 6 4 . 1 6 3 . 5 7 0 . 0 6 2 . 2 4 - 0 . 2 9 2 . 4 1 2 . 9 0 0 . 2 1 2 . 7 8
1 9 9 9 2 . 9 6 1 . 9 6 4 . 1 8 4 . 5 5 3 . 4 9 - 2 . 4 9 5 . 1 2 0 . 7 3 2 . 5 0 3 . 1 2 5 . 0 7
2 0 0 0 5 . 5 3 2 . 6 5 1 . 2 9 2 . 6 3 2 . 4 3 3 . 7 8 3 . 3 3 1 . 5 5 5 . 9 1 4 . 8 8 4 . 9 8
2 0 0 1 2 . 1 5 2 . 2 2 1 . 7 8 1 . 8 9 1 . 1 6 2 . 8 2 1 . 3 4 1 . 2 0 5 . 3 9 4 . 3 4 3 . 5 9
N o t e s :  ( 1 )  A p p a l a c h i a n ;  ( 2 )  C o r n  B e l t ;  ( 3 )  D e l t a  S t a t e s ;  ( 4 )  L a k e  S t a t e s ;  ( 5 )  M o u n t a i n  S t a t e s ;  ( 6 )  N o r t h e a s t ;  
( 7 )  N o r t h e r n  P l a i n s ;  ( 8 )  P a c i f i c ;  ( 9 )  S o u t h e a s t ;  a n d  ( 1 0 )  S o u t h e r n  P l a i n s .
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T a b l e  3 .  A v e r a g e  R a t e s  o f  S u s t a i n a b l e  G r o w t h  C h a l e n g e  o f  U . S .  F a r m s  ( P e r c e n t ) , B y  R e g i o n ,  1 9 8 1 - 2 0 0 1
Y e a r A P L 1 C B 2 D S 3 L S 4 M T N S 5 N E 6 N P L N S 7 P C F C 8 S E 9 S P L N S 10 A l l  S t a t e s
1 9 8 1 1 6 . 5 2 2 0 . 9 6 2 0 . 6 3 1 1 . 3 4 - 0 . 6 7 1 1 . 3 5 1 7 . 7 9 - 1 . 2 1 2 3 . 1 1 1 0 . 7 2 1 3 . 4 5
1 9 8 2 0 . 6 8 6 . 4 3 7 . 0 9 5 . 8 7 3 . 3 1 6 . 9 6 1 0 . 1 7 3 . 8 1 2 . 4 2 3 . 0 3 4 . 2 0
1 9 8 3 - 7 . 8 1 - 1 2 . 2 0 - 4 . 8 3 - 3 . 1 7 1 . 1 8 0 . 1 8 - 0 . 2 4 8 . 8 4 - 1 . 2 8 - 5 . 7 8 - 5 . 8 1
1 9 8 4 2 0 . 0 9 4 3 . 8 4 1 7 . 2 9 2 3 . 6 6 8 . 8 5 1 . 0 6 2 9 . 2 2 6 . 4 7 1 4 . 8 0 8 . 2 3 2 1 . 0 2
1 9 8 5 - 6 . 6 4 8 . 2 0 3 . 8 2 8 . 0 5 5 . 3 3 - 3 . 8 0 1 0 . 0 3 2 . 1 4 - 4 . 1 6 1 2 . 0 7 6 . 2 5
1 9 8 6 - 3 . 7 9 - 1 . 2 9 3 . 4 9 5 . 3 2 4 . 8 1 - 4 . 1 8 1 . 9 9 1 5 . 8 0 - 5 . 9 8 5 . 3 9 1 . 4 5
1 9 8 7 8 . 1 4 - 1 . 4 1 1 4 . 0 9 - 2 . 7 1 1 0 . 0 6 - 0 . 5 2 - 2 . 1 7 6 . 9 1 7 . 5 4 6 . 8 4 1 . 2 7
1 9 8 8 5 . 6 4 - 2 . 0 3 1 4 . 8 2 - 5 . 5 2 8 . 0 4 - 0 . 2 1 - 3 . 5 3 1 . 8 4 6 . 1 2 1 0 . 4 9 - 0 . 4 1
1 9 8 9 4 . 8 3 9 . 9 1 1 . 8 8 1 1 . 2 2 6 . 6 6 2 . 8 0 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 5 6 6 . 6 4 1 . 7 6 3 . 5 8
1 9 9 0 4 . 1 3 - 3 . 8 1 - 2 . 7 1 - 7 . 3 4 0 . 4 8 4 . 6 6 8 . 5 3 - 2 . 2 8 - 9 . 7 8 7 . 2 1 - 0 . 6 4
1 9 9 1 - 3 . 1 9 - 8 . 5 2 5 . 2 5 - 5 . 6 0 - 0 . 4 5 - 2 . 7 6 - 3 . 5 7 - 1 . 1 8 7 . 1 0 - 1 . 7 0 - 3 . 4 1
1 9 9 2 2 . 3 2 8 . 5 3 2 . 8 6 - 3 . 1 8 1 . 5 9 - 0 . 9 4 5 . 6 6 - 0 . 3 2 - 5 . 0 4 - 4 . 9 3 1 . 1 3
1 9 9 3 0 . 4 5 - 6 . 4 9 - 0 . 7 5 - 1 . 0 1 7 . 1 8 - 0 . 3 8 - 6 . 3 8 7 . 2 1 - 1 . 6 1 3 . 9 8 - 3 . 0 6
1 9 9 4 0 . 5 8 5 . 3 1 5 . 7 4 8 . 5 4 - 6 . 6 6 4 . 2 9 5 . 1 5 4 . 0 0 3 . 8 1 0 . 7 1 2 . 6 6
1 9 9 5 - 4 . 9 0 - 9 . 7 9 - 5 . 6 6 - 4 . 8 5 - 0 . 2 1 - 2 . 4 8 - 8 . 9 8 - 1 . 1 4 - 2 . 8 8 - 3 . 5 7 - 5 . 8 8
1 9 9 6 4 . 2 3 1 5 . 6 5 1 6 . 4 4 6 . 2 9 2 . 3 3 6 . 8 8 1 7 . 7 1 5 . 6 9 7 . 8 7 - 3 . 0 4 7 . 9 4
1 9 9 7 - 1 . 2 2 - 4 . 1 9 - 9 . 2 6 - 2 . 9 3 3 . 7 8 - 1 . 5 6 - 1 0 . 6 1 2 . 2 4 - 1 . 5 6 8 . 6 8 - 3 . 6 1
1 9 9 8 - 0 . 4 2 - 9 . 4 1 - 8 . 8 9 - 1 . 6 8 - 0 . 0 8 - 0 . 1 5 3 . 8 5 - 5 . 5 6 - 3 . 3 3 - 7 . 3 2 - 5 . 3 1
1 9 9 9 - 6 . 5 8 - 6 . 9 3 1 . 3 0 - 3 . 3 8 0 . 2 6 1 . 8 6 - 5 . 4 6 0 . 6 7 - 0 . 3 2 9 . 3 6 - 4 . 0 5
2 0 0 0 6 . 9 6 6 . 7 0 - 8 . 1 9 - 4 . 4 8 0 . 5 2 - 0 . 3 6 3 . 0 3 2 . 8 2 - 6 . 8 1 - 7 . 4 3 - 1 . 8 9
2 0 0 1 - 4 . 9 1 - 0 . 2 4 5 . 8 0 0 . 7 5 3 . 1 8 - 2 . 1 7 - 1 . 1 8 - 1 . 6 9 1 . 1 4 - 2 . 3 7 - 1 . 6 0
N o t e s :  ( 1 )  A p p a l a c h i a n ;  ( 2 )  C o r n  B e l t ;  ( 3 )  D e l t a  S t a t e s ;  ( 4 )  L a k e  S t a t e s ;  ( 5 )  M o u n t a i n  S t a t e s ;  ( 6 )  N o r t h e a s t ;  
( 7 )  N o r t h e r n  P l a i n s ;  ( 8 )  P a c i f i c ;  ( 9 )  S o u t h e a s t ;  a n d  ( 1 0 )  S o u t h e r n  P l a i n s .
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Table 4. Summary Statistics for SGC Rates, By Region, Selected r4me Periods, in Percent
Time
Period
APL1 CB2 DS3 LS4 MTNS5 NE6 NPLNS7 PCFC8 SE9 SPLNS10 All
States
1981-2001
Mean 1.67 2.82 3.82 1.68 2.83 0.98 3.38 2.59 1.80 2.49 1.85
Std. Dev. 7.25 12.90 8.91 7.77 3.96 3.95 9.75 4.77 7.76 6.42 6.52
C. V. 4.34 4.57 2.33 4.64 1.40 4.03 2.88 1.84 4.31 2.58 3.52
1980-1989
Mean 4.18 8.05 8.70 6.01 5.28 1.52 7.03 4.89 5.47 5.86 6.29
Std. Dev. 9.75 16.36 8.41 9.12 3.56 4.97 10.90 5.32 9.24 5.60 6.83
C. V. 2.33 2.03 0.97 1.52 0.67 3.28 1.55 1.09 1.69 0.96 1.09
1990-1995
Mean -0.10 -2.46 0.79 -2.24 0.32 0.40 0.07 1.05 -1.40 0.28 -1.53
Std. Dev. 3.38 7.61 4.58 5.70 4.43 3.28 7.28 3.73 6.08 4.64 3.17
C. V. -33.24 -3.09 5.82 -2.55 13.84 8.23 107.24 3.56 -4.35 16.38 -2.07
1996-2001
Mean -0.33 0.26 -0.47 -0.91 1.67 0.75 1.22 0.69 -0.50 -0.35 -1.42
Std. Dev. 5.19 9.42 10.35 3.95 1.65 3.31 9.72 3.92 4.93 7.56 4.79
C. V. -15.91 35.68 -22.13 -4.36 0.99 4.40 7.95 5.65 -9.83 -21.49 -3.37
N o t e s :  ( 1 )  A p p a l a c h i a n ;  ( 2 )  C o r n  B e l t ;  ( 3 )  D e l t a  S t a t e s ;  ( 4 )  L a k e  S t a t e s ;  ( 5 )  M o u n t a i n  S t a t e s ;  ( 6 )  N o r t h e a s t ;  ( 7 )  
N o r t h e r n  P l a i n s ;  ( 8 )  P a c i f i c ;  ( 9 )  S o u t h e a s t ;  a n d  ( 1 0 )  S o u t h e r n  P l a i n s .
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T a b l e  5 .  C o r r e l a t i o n  o f  S G C  R a t e s  a n d  R e l e v a n t  F i n a n c i a l  M e a s u r e s ,  U .  S .  F a r m s ,  S e l e c t e d  T i m e  P e r i o d s
F i n a n c i a l  M e a s u r e  p a i r e d  w i t h  S G C C o r r e l a t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t s
1 9 8 1 - 2 0 0 1 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 - 2 0 0 1
N e t  F a r m  I n c o m e  R a t i o - 0 . 2 4 6 5 - 0 . 0 5 2 6 0 . 7 3 0 2
A s s e t  T u r n o v e r  R a t i o 0 . 0 5 1 7 - 0 . 0 5 9 8 0 . 5 8 1 8
L o n g - T e r m  D e b t - F i x e d  F a r m  A s s e t  R a t i o 0 . 4 9 7 6 0 . 2 0 9 5 0 . 0 7 4 6
N o n - L o n g - T e r m  D e b t - N o n - F i x e d  F a r m  A s s e t  R a t i o 0 . 4 4 7 6 0 . 3 2 6 9 - 0 . 2 1 5 8
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Figure 2. Rates of Actual Growth, Sustainable Growth and Sustainable Growth
Challenge, U. S. Farms, 1981-2001 
(Financial Data from the USDA-ERS)
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Evaluating USDA Forecasts of Farm Assets: 1986-2002
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Evaluating USDA Forecasts of Farm Assets: 1986-2002
Introduction
Short-term USDA balance sheet forecasts include six different asset categories (real estate, 
livestock and poultry, machinery and motor vehicles, crops stored, purchased inputs, and financial 
assets). The USDA forecast of farm sector total assets is the sum of its forecasts for these six 
different asset categories. We evaluate the USDA forecasts of farm sector total assets from the 
perspective of forecast consumers of the USDA’s monthly Agricultural Outlook. More 
specifically, we test whether:
• forecast accuracy of farm sector total assets improved over 1986-2002;
• the updating processes result in more accurate predictions;
• past forecast errors provide a basis to issue better future forecasts; and
• the reliability of the USDA forecasts’ exceeds that of forecasts issued by a CPI-based model.
How Accurate are USDA Forecasts?
Previous research on USDA forecast accuracy has emphasized forecasts of farm 
commodities. USDA evaluation of its own forecasts has generally concluded their forecast 
models are inefficient, with mixed results regarding forecast bias. As time progresses towards the 
date of the forecasted event, the number of unknown factors declines. Hence updating forecasts 
over time reflecting new information and improved data should result in better forecasts.
Updating forecasts by the USDA has been shown to improve forecast accuracy. Surls and 
Gajewski found wheat forecasts the most accurate of the USDA’s domestic grain production 
forecasts. Forecasts of domestic production were unbiased while forecasts of foreign coarse grain 
production were generally biased. They found dramatic improvements in forecast accuracy as 
forecasts were updated on a monthly basis. Forecasts of U.S. agricultural exports, although 
unbiased, experience a larger forecast error than forecasts of U.S. agricultural production. This is 
unsurprising given that forecasts of exports depend on predictions of exchange rates and the 
politically-drive decisions of many different countries. USDA forecasts of ending stocks, a 
residual between forecasts of production and use, have the largest forecast error. Denbaly et al. 
showed that monthly forecasts of seven components of the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s food CPI 
series generated from an ARIMA model were more accurate than forecasts computed by the 
USDA.
Research in the academic community has generally arrived at similar conclusions as the 
USDA. Gunnelson, Dobson, and Pamperin found the USDA tends to underestimate annual crop 
size when forecasting potatoes, winter wheat, and spring wheat. They found USDA’s first 
forecasts were superior to a naive forecast and that updating forecasts improved accuracy. Baur 
and Orazem found the USDA’s forecasts of orange production to be unbiased and efficient from 
1973-1992. Irwin, Gerlow, and Te-ru Liu found no meaningful difference between the accuracy 
of forecasts issued by the USDA for livestock or those based on the futures price from 1980 
through 1991. Kastens, Schroeder, and Plain found extension forecasts to be more accurate than 
USDA forecasts for livestock but not crops from 1983-1995. Forecasts from the American 
Agricultural Economics Association’s (AAEA) Annual Outlook Survey are more accurate than 
USDA forecasts for both livestock and crops. Bailey and Brorsen found that the USDA
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u n d e r e s t i m a t e d  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  s u p p l y  f o r  b e e f  a n d  p o r k  f r o m  1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 9 .  D u r i n g  1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 6  t h i s  
b i a s  d i s a p p e a r e d  a n d  f o r e c a s t  v a r i a n c e  d e c l i n e d  s u c h  t h a t  U S D A  f o r e c a s t s  i n  t h e  l a s t  f e w  y e a r s  o f  
t h e  s t u d y  p e r i o d  w e r e  d e e m e d  a s  o p t i m a l  f o r e c a s t s .  H o w e v e r ,  S a n d e r s  a n d  M a n f r e d o  f o u n d  t h a t  
U S D A  f o r e c a s t s  q u a r t e r l y  f o r e c a s t s  o f  b e e f ,  p o r k ,  a n d  p o u l t r y  p r o d u c t i o n  o v e r  1 9 8 2  t h r o u g h  2 0 0 0  
d i d  n o t  i m p r o v e  o v e r  t i m e ,  f a i l e d  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n t a i n e d  i n  p a s t  f o r e c a s t s ,  a n d  w e r e  
i n e f f i c i e n t .  T h e y  d i d  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  t h e  U S D A  f o r e c a s t s  a r e  u n b i a s e d  a n d  m o r e  a c c u r a t e  t h a n  t h o s e  
p r o d u c e d  b y  a  s i m p l e  a u t o r e g r e s s i v e  t i m e - s e r i e s  m o d e l .  E g e l k r a u t  e t  a l .  f o u n d  t h e  U S D A ’ s  
f o r e c a s t  e r r o r s  r e g a r d i n g  m o n t h l y  c o r n  p r o d u c t i o n  a r e  u n b i a s e d  a n d  g e n e r a l l y  s m a l l e r  t h a n  t h o s e  
f o r  t w o  p r i v a t e  f o r e c a s t  a g e n c i e s  f r o m  1 9 7 1 - 2 0 0 0 .  R e s u l t s  w e r e  m i x e d  f o r  s o y b e a n  p r o d u c t i o n .  
U p d a t i n g  f o r e c a s t s  i m p r o v e d  t h e  U S D A ’ s  f o r e c a s t  a c c u r a c y  a s  t h e  c r o p  y e a r  p r o g r e s s e d .
Data
Estimates or Actuals: Initial and Revised
T h e  U S D A  i s s u e s  i t s  f i r s t ,  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  o f  t o t a l  f a r m  s e c t o r  a s s e t s  f o r  D e c e m b e r  3 1 st o f  
e a c h  y e a r  a b o u t  a  y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  d a t e  b e i n g  e s t i m a t e d .  T h e  l a g  b e t w e e n  t h e  D e c e m b e r  3 1 st d a t e  
b e i n g  e s t i m a t e d  a n d  t h e  a c t u a l  d a t e  t h e  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  i s  i s s u e d  ( i . e . ,  p u b l i s h e d  i n  Agricultural 
O u t l o o k )  r a n g e d  f r o m  4  t o  2 5  m o n t h s  f r o m  1 9 8 6 - 2 0 0 1 ,  a v e r a g i n g  a b o u t  1 3  m o n t h s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  
t h e  U S D A ’ s  f i r s t  o r  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  o f  f a r m  s e c t o r  t o t a l  a s s e t s  f o r  D e c e m b e r  3 1 ,  2 0 0 1  w a s  i s s u e d  
i n  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 2 .  F o l l o w i n g  t h e  i s s u a n c e  o f  i t s  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  o f  t o t a l  f a r m  a s s e t s ,  t h e  U S D A  
c o n t i n u e s  t o  i s s u e  r e v i s e d  e s t i m a t e s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  a s  m o r e  a n d  b e t t e r  d a t a  b e c o m e  a v a i l a b l e .  W e  
c o n t r a s t  b o t h  t h e  U S D A ’ s  i n i t i a l  a n d  m o s t  r e c e n t l y  r e v i s e d  e s t i m a t e s  o f  a c t u a l  t o t a l  f a r m  a s s e t s  a s  
o f  D e c e m b e r  3 1 st f o r  e a c h  y e a r  f r o m  1 9 8 6 - 2 0 0 1  a g a i n s t  t h e  U S D A ’ s  t i m e  s e r i e s  o f  p r e d i c t i o n s .  
Agricultural Outlook c e a s e d  p u b l i c a t i o n  i n  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 2 .
Predictions: Forecasts and Backcasts
T h e  U S D A  i s s u e s  i t s  f i r s t  p r e d i c t i o n  i n  t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f  t h e  f o r e c a s t e d  y e a r .  P r e d i c t i o n s  
a r e  u p d a t e d  o v e r  t i m e  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  f o r e c a s t e d  y e a r  a n d  u s u a l l y  c o n t i n u e  w e l l  i n t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
y e a r ,  e n d i n g  j u s t  b e f o r e  t h e  U S D A  p u b l i s h e s  i t s  f i r s t  o r  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e .  W e  r e f e r  t o  p r e d i c t i o n s  
m a d e  b e f o r e  t h e  D e c e m b e r  3 1 st d a t e  o f  t h e  p r e d i c t e d  y e a r  a s  f o r e c a s t s .  P r e d i c t i o n s  i s s u e d  a f t e r  t h e  
D e c e m b e r  3 1 st d a t e  a r e  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  t h e  p a p e r  a s  b a c k c a s t s .
F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  f i r s t  p r e d i c t i o n  f o r  t h e  t o t a l  f a r m  s e c t o r  a s s e t s  f o r  D e c e m b e r  3 1 , 2 0 0 1  w a s  
p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  W o r l d  A g r i c u l t u r a l  O u t l o o k  F o r u m  i n  l a t e  F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 1  a n d  p u b l i s h e d  i n  
A g r i c u l t u r a l  O u t l o o k  i n  M a r c h  2 0 0 1 .  T h i s  p r e d i c t i o n  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  o u r  p a p e r  a s  t h e  f i r s t  
f o r e c a s t .  D u r i n g  2 0 0 1  t h e  U S D A  i s s u e d  t h r e e  m o r e  f o r e c a s t s  f o r  t o t a l  a s s e t s  f o r  D e c e m b e r  3 1 ,  
2 0 0 1  ( i n  J u n e ,  S e p t e m b e r ,  a n d  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 1 ) .  T h e  i n i t i a l  p r e d i c t i o n  a n d  t h e  t h r e e  u p d a t e d  
p r e d i c t i o n s  i s s u e d  d u r i n g  2 0 0 1  f o r  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t o t a l  f a r m  a s s e t s  f o r  D e c e m b e r  3 1 ,  2 0 0 1  a r e  
r e f e r r e d  a s  f o r e c a s t s .  D u r i n g  2 0 0 2 ,  t h e  U S D A  i s s u e d  t h r e e  m o r e  p r e d i c t i o n s  i n  A p r i l ,  A u g u s t ,  a n d  
S e p t e m b e r  f o r  t o t a l  f a r m  a s s e t s  f o r  D e c e m b e r  3 1 ,  2 0 0 1 .  T h e s e  t h r e e  p r e d i c t i o n s  i s s u e d  i n  2 0 0 2  
a f t e r  t h e  f o r e c a s t e d  d a t e  ( D e c e m b e r  3 1 ,  2 0 0 1 )  a r e  b a c k w a r d - l o o k i n g  p r e d i c t i o n s  o r  b a c k c a s t s .  I n  
D e c e m b e r ,  2 0 0 2 ,  t h e  U S D A  i s s u e d  i t s  f i r s t  o r  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  o f  t o t a l  f a r m  a s s e t s  f o r  D e c e m b e r  3 1 ,  
2 0 0 1 .
T h u s  7  p r e d i c t i o n s  f o r  t o t a l  f a r m  a s s e t s  o n  D e c e m b e r  3 1 ,  2 0 0 1  w e r e  i s s u e d  o v e r  a  2 - y e a r  
p e r i o d .  T h e  f i r s t  4  p r e d i c t i o n s  w e r e  i s s u e d  i n  M a r c h ,  J u n e ,  S e p t e m b e r ,  a n d  D e c e m b e r  o f  2 0 0 1 .  
T h e s e  f o u r  p r e d i c t i o n s  a r e  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  forecasts. T h e  l a t t e r  3  p r e d i c t i o n s  f o r  t o t a l  f a r m  a s s e t s  o n  
D e c e m b e r  3 1 ,  2 0 0 1  w e r e  i s s u e d  i n  A p r i l ,  A u g u s t ,  a n d  S e p t e m b e r  o f  2 0 0 2 .  T h e s e  l a t t e r  3  a r e
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referred to as backcasts, in that they were issued after the forecasted date (December 31, 2001) but 
before the USDA issues its first estimate during December 2002.
From 1986 through 2001, 11 of the 16 first forecasts are issued in January of the forecast 
year, with a total of 14 being issued by March. The other two first forecasts were issued in June 
and October of the forecasted year. Predictions issued after the December of the forecast year are 
referred to in our paper as backcasts. The final backcast is usually issued late in the following 
year but still prior to the USDA’s issuance of its initial estimate for the previous year. Two of the 
final 16 backcasts are issued in the first half of the following year. The other fourteen are issued 
in the latter half of the following year.
The USDA made as many as 8 forecasts for a particular year (1986) to as few as 4 
forecasts for a particular year. There were a total of 91 forecasts made for the 16 different years 
from 1986-2001. About half of the 91 predictions are issued prior to December of each year 
(thereby being classified as forecasts) while the other half are issued after December of the year of 
the forecast (thereby being classified as backcasts).
Both the forecasts and estimates are obtained from various issues of the USDA’s 
Agricultural Outlook from 1986 through 2002.
Evaluating Forecast Accuracy
Forecast Error (E) is defined as the difference between the USDA’s estimate of actual total 
assets (A) and the USDA’s prediction (F) of total farm assets; E = A - F. Forecast errors are 
calculated using both the initial estimate and a recent revised estimate of farm sector total assets.
Four statistics are used to measure the USDA’s out-of-sample forecast performance of 
farm sector total assets: the mean error (ME), the mean absolute error (MAE), the root mean 
squared error (RMSE), and the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE). The larger these 
measures of forecast evaluation, the greater the model’s typical forecast error and the less accurate 
and reliable is the model’s forecasts.
The CBO uses mean error ME, the arithmetic average of all the forecast errors, to measure 
statistical bias in its forecasts. ME is likely to be small since positive and negative errors tend to 
offset each other. While ME indicates if there is systematic under- or over-forecasting, it indicates 
little about the size of the typical forecast error.
The CBO uses MAE and the RMSE to measure the accuracy of its forecasts. The MAE is 
the average of forecast errors without regard to arithmetic signs. The MAE measures the average 
distance between forecasts and actual values or estimates without regard to whether the forecasts 
are too high or too low. The RMSE is the square root of the arithmetic average of the squared 
errors. The RMSE also shows size of forecast error without regard to sign, but it gives a larger 
weight to larger forecast errors.
Each of the above statistics is a measure of accuracy whose size is affected by the scale of 
the data. This creates problems when making comparisons across different time periods. This 
problem in making comparisons over time can be handled by using the mean absolute percentage 
error (MAPE) measure. Both RMSE and MAPE are measures of dispersion of the forecast error 
and are the most commonly used criteria in forecast evaluations (Makridakis; Armstrong and
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Collopy). RMSE is the most commonly used criteria in the agricultural economics literature 
(Allen).
Another means of evaluating a forecaster is the informational efficiency of its forecasts. If 
additional information at the forecaster’s disposal when the forecast was made could have been 
used to improve the forecast, then the forecaster is regarded as informationally inefficient. For 
example, if an alternative model issues superior forecasts to Model X, then Model X can be said to 
be inefficient.
A commonly used means of measuring informational efficiency is to contrast the accuracy 
of forecasts issued by the forecast model of concern to those issued by other forecast models. For 
example, the Congressional Budget Office contrasts the bias and accuracy of its forecasts to those 
issued by the Blue Chip Forecasts and the Administration’s forecasts. Another approach is to 
contrast forecasts issued by the model of concern to those issued by a naive model. A naive no­
change model is one which assumes the best expectation of the next unknown value is the 
currently known value.
Econometric and univariate forecast models often do badly when contrasted to naive 
models (Allen). Mechanical forecast models like the naive model or various rules-of-thumb issue 
low-cost forecasts that do not require an expert’s advice. A minimum criterion for expert 
forecasters is that they issue forecasts which are more accurate than those issued by a naive 
forecaster.
Evaluating USDA Forecasts of Farm Assets
Tomek notes that data provided by government agencies are subject to frequent revision. 
He suggests that models should be run with both the original and revised data sets to see what role, 
if any, data revisions play in appraising results. Following Tomek’s suggestion, we test the 
accuracy of the USDA’s forecasts using both the USDA’s initial estimate and the most recently 
revised USDA estimates of total farm assets from 1986-2002.
We trisect the times series of estimates and forecasts into three periods (1986-1989; 1990­
1995; and 1996-2001) in order to determine if the USDA has improved forecast accuracy over 
time. We compare USDA forecast accuracy to its backcast accuracy to determine if updating 
USDA predictions results in more accurate predictions. We use a rolling measure of bias in the 
USDA’s forecasts to see if this information can be used to improve future USDA forecasts.
We contrast the USDA forecasts to the forecasts issued by a naive model that assumes 
each year’s farm sector assets is equal to the most recently observed initial estimate of farm sector 
assets plus an inflation premium. The inflation factor represents the change in the CPI expected to 
occur between the two initial estimates of farm assets. The most recent one-, two-, or three-year 
change in the CPI that would have been known to the USDA forecasters at the time the naive 
model makes its forecast is used as the expected inflation premium. The naive model issues its 
forecasts in January of the forecasted year. Due to the USDA lag between the date of the 
forecasted event and the date the initial estimate is published, there is at least a two-year difference 
between the most recently observed initial estimate and the forecasted estimate. For example, in 
January of 1990 the naive model uses the initial estimate for 1988 in its forecast for the December, 
31, 1990 estimate of total assets. In January of 1990, the most recently observed two-year 
percentage change in the CPI is used to convert the 1988 initial estimate to obtain the naive 
model’s forecast for 1990. In 5 of the 14 forecasted years, there is a two-year lag. In seven of the
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1 4  f o r e c a s t e d  y e a r s ,  t h e r e  i s  a  t h r e e - y e a r  l a g .  I n  t h e  7  y e a r s  t h a t  u s e  a  t h r e e - y e a r  l a g g e d  i n i t i a l  
e s t i m a t e  t o  i s s u e  i t s  f o r e c a s t ,  t h e  f o r e c a s t  i s  u p d a t e d  l a t e r  i n  t h e  y e a r  w h e n  t h e  n e w e r ,  t w o - y e a r  
l a g g e d  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  i s  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  U S D A .  T h e  n a i v e  m o d e l ’ s  f o r e c a s t s  f o r  t h e  i n i t i a l  
e s t i m a t e s  a r e  t h e  s a m e  a s  f o r  t h e  r e v i s e d  e s t i m a t e s .  B e c a u s e  o f  t h e  l a g  b e t w e e n  t h e  d a t e  o f  t h e  
f o r e c a s t e d  e v e n t  ( D e c e m b e r  3 1 st o f  e a c h  y e a r )  a n d  t h e  U S D A  i s s u i n g  t h e  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e ,  f o r e c a s t s  
a r e  f o r  t h e  y e a r s  1 9 8 8 - 2 0 0 1 .
W e  a l s o  c o n t r a s t  t h e  U S D A ’ s  b a c k c a s t s  t o  b a c k c a s t s  i s s u e d  b y  a  n a i v e  m o d e l .  T h i s  n a i v e  
m o d e l ’ s  b a c k c a s t s  f o r  t o t a l  f a r m  a s s e t s  a r e  i s s u e d  i n  F e b r u a r y  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r  a n d  a r e  
u p d a t e d  o n l y  t w i c e ,  o n c e  i n  1 9 9 4  ( S e p t e m b e r )  a n d  a g a i n  i n  2 0 0 0  ( M a r c h ) .  I n  1 9 9 4  a n d  2 0 0 0 ,  t h i s  
o n e - y e a r  l a g g e d  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  w a s  n o t  y e t  a v a i l a b l e ,  h e n c e  t h e  f i r s t  b a c k c a s t  i s  t h e  i n i t i a l  
e s t i m a t e  t w o  y e a r s  b e f o r e  t h e  b a c k c a s t e d  y e a r  p l u s  t h e  t w o - y e a r  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e .  W h e n  t h e  i n i t i a l  
e s t i m a t e  f o r  t h e  y e a r  p r e c e d i n g  t h e  b a c k c a s t e d  y e a r  b e c o m e s  k n o w n  l a t e r  i n  t h e  y e a r ,  t h e  b a c k c a s t  
i s  u p d a t e d  b y  s u b s t i t u t i n g  t h e  o n e - y e a r  l a g g e d  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  a n d  a  o n e - y e a r  i n f l a t i o n  p r e m i u m  i s  
a d d e d .
F o r  1 3  o f  t h e  1 5  b a c k c a s t s ,  t h e  f i r s t  b a c k c a s t  b y  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  i n i t i a l  
e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  y e a r  p r e c e e d i n g  t h e  b a c k c a s t e d  y e a r  p l u s  t h e  a c t u a l  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  ( w h i c h  i s  k n o w n  
b y  t h e  d a t e  o f  t h e  b a c k c a s t )  b e t w e e n  t h o s e  y e a r s .  S e v e n t e e n  f o r e c a s t s  i n  a l l  a r e  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  n a i v e  
m o d e l  o v e r  1 9 8 7 - 2 0 0 1  w i t h  t h e  i n i t i a l  b a c k c a s t  o c c u r r i n g  i n  F e b r u a r y  f o r  1 9 8 8 - 2 0 0 1  a n d  i n  M a r c h  
f o r  1 9 8 7 .
Results
USDA Forecast Accuracy 1986-2002
T a b l e  1 a  s h o w s  t h e  f o u r  f o r e c a s t  c r i t e r i a  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  p e r i o d s  w h e r e  t h e  r e v i s e d  e s t i m a t e  o f  
f a r m  s e c t o r  t o t a l  a s s e t s  i s  o u r  f o r e c a s t e d  “ a c t u a l . ”  T h e  c o l u m n  h e a d i n g  “ F O R ”  g i v e s  t h e  n u m b e r  
o f  f o r e c a s t s  e v a l u a t e d  i n  e a c h  o f  t h e  t h r e e  p e r i o d s .  A  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  f o r e c a s t  e v a l u a t i o n  s c o r e s  
i n d i c a t e s  a n  i m p r o v e m e n t  i n  f o r e c a s t  a c c u r a c y  o v e r  t i m e .
T h e  f o u r  s t a t i s t i c a l  e v a l u a t i o n  r e s u l t s  d o  n o t  i n d i c a t e  a n  i m p r o v e m e n t  i n  f o r e c a s t  
p e r f o r m a n c e  o v e r  t i m e .  T h e  b e s t  p e r i o d  f o r  a l l  f o u r  f o r e c a s t  c r i t e r i a  w a s  1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5 .  H o w e v e r ,  
t h e  M A P E  ( 4 . 5 )  f o r  1 9 9 6 - 2 0 0 1  i s  s m a l l e r  t h a n  t h e  M A P E  ( 4 . 9 5 )  f o r  1 9 8 6 - 1 9 8 9 ,  i n d i c a t i n g  s o m e  
i m p r o v e m e n t  o v e r  t i m e  w h e n  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  t o t a l  a s s e t s  o v e r  t i m e  i s  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t .
T a b l e  1 b  s h o w s  t h e  s a m e  p a t t e r n s  e x i s t s  w h e n  t h e  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  o f  f a r m  s e c t o r  t o t a l  a s s e t s  
i s  u s e d  a s  o u r  “ a c t u a l . ”  T h e s e  s c o r e s  a r e  l o w e r  t h a n  t h e i r  e q u i v a l e n t  s c o r e s  i n  T a b l e  1 a ,  i n d i c a t i n g  
t h a t  t h e  U S D A  f o r e c a s t s  a r e  a  m o r e  a c c u r a t e  i n d i c a t o r  o f  t h e  U S D A ’ s  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  t h a n  i t s  l a t e r  
r e v i s e d  e s t i m a t e .
Updating USDA Forecasts
T a b l e s  2 a  a n d  2 b  i n d i c a t e  w h e t h e r  u p d a t i n g  f o r e c a s t s  i m p r o v e s  f o r e c a s t  a c c u r a c y .  A n  
i m p r o v e m e n t  i n  f o r e c a s t  a c c u r a c y  i s  i n d i c a t e d  w h e n  “ B a c k c a s t s ”  s h o w  l o w e r  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  s c o r e s  
t h a n  “ F o r e c a s t s . ”  T a b l e  2 a  s h o w s  t h e  f o u r  f o r e c a s t  e v a l u a t i o n  s c o r e s  f o r  f o r e c a s t s  a n d  b a c k c a s t s  
f o r  t h e  r e v i s e d  e s t i m a t e  a n d  2 b  f o r  t h e  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e .  A l l  f o u r  m e a s u r e s  o f  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  a r e  
r e l a t i v e l y  l o w e r  f o r  t h e  U S D A  b a c k c a s t s .
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USDA Forecast Bias
F o r e c a s t  b i a s  i s  e v i d e n c e d  w h e n  t h e  a v e r a g e  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r s  d i f f e r s  f r o m  
z e r o ;  i . e . ,  M E  =  0 .  T h e  m e a n  e r r o r s  ( M E )  i n  T a b l e s  1 a  a n d  1 b  a r e  p o s i t i v e  a n d  l a r g e  i n  m a g n i t u d e  
f o r  a l l  t h r e e  p e r i o d s  e x c e p t  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d  i n  T a b l e  1 b .  A  p o s i t i v e  M E  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  f o r e c a s t s  
a r e  o n  a v e r a g e  t o o  l o w .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  M E  =  2 7 . 5 9  i n  T a b l e  1 a  m e a n s  t h a t  f r o m  1 9 9 6 - 2 0 0 1  t h e  
U S D A ’ s  f o r e c a s t  f o r  t h e  r e v i s e d  e s t i m a t e  f r o m  1 9 9 6 - 2 0 0 1  w a s  o n  a v e r a g e  $ 2 7 . 5 9  b i l l i o n  t o o  l o w .  
G i v e n  t h a t  f a r m  s e c t o r  t o t a l  a s s e t s  a v e r a g e d  o v e r  $ 1 . 1  t r i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  o v e r  1 9 9 6 - 2 0 0 1 ,  t h i s  m e a n s  
t h a t  t h e  U S D A  b i a s  w a s  o n l y  a b o u t  2 . 5  p e r c e n t  b e l o w  a v e r a g e .
Does Accounting for Bias Improve USDA Forecast Accuracy?
W e  t e s t  w h e t h e r  p a s t  b i a s  c a n  b e  u s e d  t o  i m p r o v e  U S D A ’ s  f u t u r e  p r e d i c t i o n s .  E a c h  t i m e  a  
n e w  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  i s  i s s u e d ,  t h e  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  i s  u p d a t e d ,  c r e a t i n g  a  r o l l i n g  m e a s u r e  o f  t h e  
U S D A ’ s  a v e r a g e  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  o r  b i a s  a c r o s s  t i m e .  N o t e  t h a t  f o r  t h i s  t e s t  w e  c a n n o t  u s e  
p r e v i o u s l y  e s t i m a t e d  b i a s  t o  f o r e c a s t  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r  ( 1 9 8 6 ) ,  s i n c e  i t  h a s  n o  p r e v i o u s  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  b y  
w h i c h  t o  a d j u s t  t h e  U S D A  f o r e c a s t .  H e n c e  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d  r e p r e s e n t s  1 5  b i a s - a d j u s t e d  f o r e c a s t s  
m a d e  f r o m  1 9 8 7 - 1 9 8 9 .
I n  o r d e r  t o  b e t t e r  c o n t r a s t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  f o r e c a s t  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  m o d e l s  w i t h  a n d  w i t h o u t  
t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  f o r  b i a s ,  T a b l e s  3 a  a n d  3 b  p r e s e n t  t h e  r a t i o s  o f  t h e  f o r e c a s t  e v a l u a t i o n  s c o r e s  w i t h  
a d j u s t m e n t  f o r  b i a s  t o  w i t h o u t  a d j u s t m e n t  f o r  b i a s .  A  r a t i o  l e s s  t h a n  u n i t y  i n d i c a t e  a d j u s t i n g  f o r  
b i a s  r e d u c e s  e r r o r  i n  t h e  U S D A  f o r e c a s t s .  A  r a t i o  g r e a t e r  t h a n  u n i t y  i n d i c a t e s  a d j u s t i n g  f o r  b i a s  
i n c r e a s e s  e r r o r  i n  U S D A  f o r e c a s t s .  A  r a t i o  e q u a l  t o  u n i t y  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  b i a s  a d j u s t m e n t  h a s  n o  
e f f e c t  o n  t h e  U S D A  f o r e c a s t  p e r f o r m a n c e .
T a b l e  3  s h o w s  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  u s i n g  t h e  b i a s  o r  a v e r a g e  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  i n c u r r e d  i n  e a r l i e r  
p e r i o d  f o r e c a s t s  t o  a d j u s t  f o r e c a s t s  f o r  t h e  n e x t  e s t i m a t e .  R a t i o s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  u n i t y  f o r  f o r e c a s t s  o f  
b o t h  t h e  r e v i s e d  ( T a b l e  3 a )  a n d  i n i t i a l  ( T a b l e  3 b )  e s t i m a t e  o f  f a r m  s e c t o r  t o t a l  a s s e t s  i n d i c a t e  e a r l y  
a d j u s t m e n t s  f o r  b i a s  i n c r e a s e  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  n o  a d j u s t m e n t  f r o m  1 9 8 7 - 1 9 8 9 .
H o w e v e r ,  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  p e r i o d  ( 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5 )  t h e  r a t i o  b e g i n s  t o  f a l l  b e l o w  1 . 0 ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  
a d j u s t i n g  t h e  U S D A ’ s  f o r e c a s t s  f o r  p r e v i o u s l y  o b s e r v e d  b i a s  s l i g h t l y  i m p r o v e d  f o r e c a s t  
p e r f o r m a n c e .  B y  t h e  t h i r d  p e r i o d  ( 1 9 9 6 - 2 0 0 1 )  t h e  r a t i o s  a r e  b e l o w  u n i t y  a n d  e v e n  s m a l l e r  t h a n  t h e  
s e c o n d  p e r i o d .  F o r e c a s t  a c c u r a c y  i n c r e a s e s  a s  w e  i n c r e a s e  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r s  u s e d  t o  
c a l c u l a t e  t h e  U S D A ’ s  b i a s - a d j u s t m e n t  f a c t o r .  T h e  r e s u l t s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  f u t u r e  f o r e c a s t s  b y  t h e  
U S D A  m a y  b e n e f i t  b y  a d j u s t i n g  f o r  s y s t e m a t i c  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  o b s e r v e d  i n  e a r l i e r  p e r i o d s .
Forecasting the Initial Estimate: USDA versus CPI-Based Model
T a b l e  4 a  c o n t r a s t s  U S D A  f o r e c a s t s  t o  C P I - b a s e d  f o r e c a s t s  f o r  t h e  U S D A  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  o f  
t o t a l  f a r m  s e c t o r  a s s e t s .  U S D A - I  r e p r e s e n t  o n l y  t h e  U S D A  f i r s t  f o r e c a s t  f o r  t h e  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e .  
T h e s e  f i r s t  f o r e c a s t s  a r e  i s s u e d  a s  e a r l y  a s  J a n u a r y  o f  t h e  f o r e c a s t  y e a r  a n d  n o  l a t e r  t h a n  M a r c h .  
E l e v e n  f i r s t  f o r e c a s t s  w e r e  i s s u e d  i n  J a n u a r y ,  o n e  i n  F e b r u a r y ,  a n d  t w o  i n  M a r c h .  N a i v e - I  
r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  f i r s t  f o r e c a s t  i s s u e d  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  b y  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l .  T h e  f i r s t  f o r e c a s t  
i s s u e d  b y  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l  f o r  D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 8  w a s  i n  M a r c h  1 9 8 8  w h i l e  a l l  s u b s e q u e n t  1 3  f i r s t  
f o r e c a s t s  f o r  e a c h  s u b s e q u e n t  y e a r  f r o m  1 9 8 9 - 2 0 0 1  a r e  i s s u e d  i n  J a n u a r y  o f  t h e  f o r e c a s t e d  y e a r .
203
T h e  f i r s t  t w o  r o w s  i n  T a b l e  4 a  s h o w  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  f o r e c a s t s  f r o m  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l  
o u t p e r f o r m  f o r e c a s t s  m a d e  b y  t h e  U S D A .  T h e  R M S E  f o r  t h e  U S D A - I  i s  5 6 . 8 3  w h e r e a s  i t  i s  4 6 . 2 8  
f o r  N a i v e - I .  M A P E  f o r  t h e  U S D A - I  m o d e l  i s  4 . 4 7  w h e r e a s  i t  i s  o n l y  3 . 7 0  f o r  t h e  N a i v e - I .
U S D A - I I  r e p r e s e n t s  a l l  f o r e c a s t s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  f o r e c a s t  y e a r  m a d e  p r i o r  t o  t h e  D e c e m b e r  
3 1  d a t e .  U p d a t e s  a r e  i s s u e d  a s  e a r l y  a s  A p r i l  a n d  a s  l a t e  a s  D e c e m b e r .  T h e  a v e r a g e  u p d a t e  i s  
i s s u e d  a b o u t  A u g u s t .  A  t o t a l  o f  f o r t y  f o r e c a s t s ,  1 4  f i r s t  a n d  2 6  u p d a t e s ,  w e r e  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  U S D A  
f r o m  1 9 8 8 - 2 0 0 1 .  N a i v e - I I  i s s u e s  u p d a t e d  f o r e c a s t s  o n l y  i n  t h o s e  y e a r s  i n  w h i c h  a  n e w e r  i n i t i a l  
e s t i m a t e  i s  m a d e  b y  t h e  U S D A  l a t e r  d u r i n g  t h e  f o r e c a s t  y e a r .  T h i s  o c c u r s  i n  s e v e n  o f  t h e  f o u r t e e n  
y e a r s .  U p d a t e s  a r e  i s s u e d  a s  e a r l y  a s  A p r i l  a n d  a s  l a t e  a s  N o v e m b e r ,  w i t h  t h e  a v e r a g e  u p d a t e  i n  
t h e  y e a r s  w i t h  u p d a t i n g  o c c u r r i n g  i n  A u g u s t .  H e n c e  a  t o t a l  o f  2 1  f o r e c a s t s ,  1 4  i n i t i a l  a n d  7  
u p d a t e s ,  a r e  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l  f r o m  1 9 8 8 - 2 0 0 1 .
T h e  l a s t  t w o  r o w s  i n  T a b l e  4 a  s h o w  t h a t  w h i l e  b o t h  t h e  U S D A  a n d  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l  
i m p r o v e  w i t h  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  u p d a t i n g  f o r e c a s t s ,  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l  ( N a i v e - I I )  o u t p e r f o r m s  t h e  
U S D A  m o d e l  ( U S D A - I I ) .  T h e  n a i v e  m o d e l  w i t h o u t  a n y  u p d a t i n g  ( N a i v e  I )  o u t p e r f o r m s  t h e  
U S D A ’ s  c o m b i n e d  f i r s t  a n d  u p d a t e d  f o r e c a s t s  ( U S D A  I I ) .
Backcasting the Initial Estimate: USDA versus CPI-Based Model
T a b l e  4 b  c o n t r a s t s  b a c k c a s t s  b y  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l  t o  t h o s e  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  U S D A  f o r  t h e  
i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e .  T h e  n a i v e  m o d e l  o u t p e r f o r m s  t h e  U S D A  f o r e c a s t e r  f o r  e a r l y  b a c k c a s t s .  U S D A - I  
a n d  N a i v e - I  i n  T a b l e  4 b  s h o w  t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  b a c k c a s t s  m a d e  w i t h i n  t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f  t h e  y e a r  
( e x c e p t  f o r  2 0 0 0  w h e n  t h e  U S D A  i s s u e d  i t s  f i r s t  f o r e c a s t  i n  A p r i l ) .  T h e  R M S E  a n d  M A P E  f o r  t h e  
U S D A  I  f o r e c a s t e r  a r e  3 2 . 2 4  a n d  2 . 3 4  p e r c e n t  v e r s u s  t h e  h u r d l e  m o d e l ’ s  3 0 . 3 2  a n d  2 . 2 3  p e r c e n t .
H o w e v e r ,  w h e n  a l l  o f  t h e  b a c k c a s t s  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  U S D A  a r e  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  a l l  o f  t h e  
b a c k c a s t s  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l ,  t h e  U S D A ’ s  b a c k c a s t s  a r e  m o r e  r e l i a b l e .  T h e  R M S E  a n d  
M A P E  f o r  t h e  U S D A  ( U S D A  I I )  a r e  2 7 . 7 5  a n d  1 . 8 2  p e r c e n t  v e r s u s  3 0 . 0 9  a n d  2 . 2 7  p e r c e n t  f o r  t h e  
n a i v e  f o r e c a s t e r .  T w e n t y  f o u r  o f  t h e  U S D A ’ s  4 0  b a c k c a s t s  ( 6 0  p e r c e n t )  a r e  m a d e  a f t e r  A p r i l .  O n l y  
o n e  m o r e  b a c k c a s t  i s  i s s u e d  b y  t h e  h u r d l e  m o d e l  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r .  T h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  t h e  m o r e -  
i n f o r m e d ,  l a t e r  b a c k c a s t s  b y  t h e  U S D A  a r e  t h e  r e a s o n  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  s c o r e s  f o r  t h e  U S D A ’ s  o v e r  
t h e  f u l l  y e a r  ( U S D A - I I )  a r e  s u p e r i o r  t o  t h e  h u r d l e  m o d e l ’ s  ( H u r d l e  I I ) .  T h i s  m a y  r e f l e c t  t h a t  t h e  
U S D A  i s  n o w  m a k i n g  u p d a t e d  f o r e c a s t  b a s e d  o n  s o m e  o f  t h e  a c t u a l  d a t a  w h i c h  i t  w i l l  u s e  t o  m a k e  
i t s  e s t i m a t e s  o f  t o t a l  f a r m  s e c t o r  a s s e t s .  W h i l e  t h e  U S D A  m a n a g e s  t o  r e d u c e  a n d  e v e n  e l i m i n a t e  
t h e  f o r e c a s t  g a p  b e t w e e n  i t s e l f  a n d  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l  o v e r  t i m e ,  i t  i s  n o t  u n t i l  l a t e  i n  t h e  y e a r  
f o l l o w i n g  t h e  f o r e c a s t e d  d a t e  t h a t  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l ’ s  s u p e r i o r i t y  i s  o v e r c o m e .
Predicting the Revised Estimate: USDA versus CPI-Based Model
T a b l e s  5 a  a n d  5 b  s h o w  t h e  s a m e  t e s t  m o d e l s  r u n  o n  f o r e c a s t s  o f  t h e  r e v i s e d  e s t i m a t e .
T a b l e  5 a  s h o w s  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l  o u t p e r f o r m s  t h e  U S D A  b o t h  w i t h  a n d  w i t h o u t  u p d a t e d  f o r e c a s t s  
i n c l u d e d .  R M S E  a n d  M A P E  s c o r e s  a r e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  l o w e r  f o r  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l  f o r  b o t h  t h e  e a r l y -  
y e a r  f o r e c a s t s  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  f u l l - y e a r  f o r e c a s t s .  T a b l e  5 b  a g a i n  s h o w s  t h e  s a m e  o c c u r s  f o r  t h e  
b a c k c a s t s  a s  w e l l .  U n l i k e  t h e  b a c k c a s t s  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  ( T a b l e  4 b ) ,  u p d a t i n g  b a c k c a s t s  o f  t h e  
r e v i s e d  e s t i m a t e  d o e s  n o t  i m p r o v e  t h e  U S D A ’ s  r e l i a b i l i t y  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  n a i v e  m o d e l .  
I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  k n o w l e d g e  o f  s o m e  o f  t h e  d a t a  u s e d  t o  m a k e  t h e  U S D A ’ s  i n i t i a l  e s t i m a t e  d o e s  n o t  
i m p r o v e  U S D A  f o r e c a s t  a c c u r a c y  v i s - a - v i s  a  n a i v e  m o d e l  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  f u t u r e  r e v i s e d  d a t a .
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Conclusions
B a s e d  o n  o u r  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  U S D A ’ s  f o r e c a s t s  o f  t h e  f a r m  s e c t o r ’ s  t o t a l  a s s e t s  f r o m  1 9 8 6 ­
2 0 0 2  a s  p u b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  U S D A ’ s  A g r i c u l t u r a l  O u t l o o k :
(1) USDA predictive accuracy has not improved over time
F o u r  d i f f e r e n t  s t a t i s t i c a l  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  c r i t e r i o n  ( r m s e ,  m a e ,  m a p e ,  a n d  m e a n  e r r o r )  i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  U S D A  f o r e c a s t  a c c u r a c y  d i d  n o t  i m p r o v e  f r o m  1 9 8 6 - 2 0 0 2 .  P r e v i o u s  r e s e a r c h  h a s  s h o w n  
s i m i l a r  r e s u l t s  f o r  o t h e r  p r i v a t e  a n d  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  a g e n c i e s ’ f o r e c a s t s  o f  o t h e r  e c o n o m i c  a n d  
f i n a n c i a l  v a r i a b l e s .
(2) Updating improves USDA predictive accuracy
O n e  t e s t  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n a l  e f f i c i e n c y  i s  t h a t  a s  t i m e  p r o g r e s s e s  t o w a r d  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  
f o r e c a s t e d  a c t u a l  n u m b e r ,  f o r e c a s t  a c c u r a c y  s h o u l d  i m p r o v e .  T h a t  t h e  U S D A  i m p r o v e s  i t s  
a c c u r a c y  w h e n  i t  u p d a t e s  i t s  e a r l i e r  f o r e c a s t s  i n d i c a t e s  t h e r e  a r e  i n f o r m a t i o n a l  g a i n s  t o  U S D A  
f o r e c a s t  c o n s u m e r s  f r o m  i t s  u p d a t i n g  p r o c e s s .
(3) USDA predictions could benefit somewhat by incorporating past errors
P a s t  r e s e a r c h  s h o w s  t h a t  m e a s u r i n g  a n d  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  p a s t  b i a s  r a r e l y  t r a n s l a t e s  i n t o  b e t t e r  
f u t u r e  f o r e c a s t s .  H o w e v e r ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  U S D A  p r e d i c t i o n s  o f  f a r m  s e c t o r  t o t a l  a s s e t s ,  w e  s h o w  a  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  f u t u r e  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  w o u l d  h a v e  o c c u r r e d  i f  t h e  U S D A  a d j u s t e d  i t s  p r e d i c t i o n s  b y  t h e  
b i a s  ( m e a n  e r r o r )  i n  i t s  e a r l i e r  f o r e c a s t s .  W h i l e  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  f o r e c a s t  e r r o r  w a s  m a r g i n a l ,  i t  
i n c r e a s e d  o v e r  t i m e .
(4) USDA prediction errors exceeds those of a CPI-based model
O u r  r e s e a r c h  s h o w e d  t h e  U S D A  c o u l d  h a v e  i m p r o v e d  i t s  f o r e c a s t  a c c u r a c y  h a d  i t  
a c c o u n t e d  f o r  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  f r o m  1 9 8 6 - 2 0 0 2 .  H o w e v e r ,  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h  w o u l d  b e  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  t h e  u s e  o f  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  w o u l d  h a v e  s h o w n  t h e  s a m e  
i m p r o v e m e n t s  i n  e a r l i e r  p e r i o d s .
F o l l o w i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  f u t u r e  f o r e c a s t  m o d e l s  o f  f a r m  s e c t o r  t o t a l  
a s s e t s  m i g h t  c o n s i d e r  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n t a i n e d  i n  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  T h e  
a c c u r a c y  o f  C P I - b a s e d  f o r e c a s t s  i s  a  u s e f u l  m i n i m u m  h u r d l e  f o r  a n y  e c o n o m i c  m o d e l  u s e d  t o  
f o r e c a s t  n o m i n a l  v a l u e s .  F u r t h e r  i m p r o v e m e n t s  i n  f o r e c a s t  a c c u r a c y  m i g h t  a l s o  b e  a c h i e v e d  
t h r o u g h  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  a c c u r a c y  o f  p r e d i c t i o n s  o f  t h e  s i x  d i f f e r e n t  a s s e t  c a t e g o r i e s  t h a t  c o m p r i s e  
f a r m  s e c t o r  t o t a l  a s s e t s .
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Table 1a
Scores for USDA Predictions of Revised Estimates of Total Farm Assets
Period ME MAE RMSE MAPE PREDS
1996-2001 27.59 52.04 61.65 4.5 32
1990-1995 15.44 21.26 25.64 2.36 32
1986-1989 32.35 38.53 42.90 4.95 27
Table 1b
Scores for USDA Predictions of Initial Estimates of Total Farm Assets
Period ME MAE RMSE MAPE PREDS
1996-2001 28.63 42.94 54.52 3.71 32
1990-1995 11.70 17.89 23.39 1.98 32
1986-1989 -2.10 18.14 24.95 2.44 27
Notes:
ME: mean error 
MAE: mean absolute error 
RMSE: root mean squared error 
MAPE: mean absolute percentage error
PREDS: number of quarterly predictions evaluated for the period
Source: Agricultural Outlook; Economic Research Service/U.S. Department of Agriculture.
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Table 2a
Predictive Accuracy Scores for Revised Estimates of Total Farm Assets 1986-2002
ME MAE RMSE MAPE PREDS
Backcasts 17.31 30.26 36.09 3.16 45
Forecasts 31.98 44.00 53.92 4.58 46
Table 2b
Predictive Accuracy Scores for Initial Estimate of Farm Assets 1986-2002
ME MAE RMSE MAPE PREDS
Backcasts 6.22 17.81 26.64 1.83 45
Forecasts 20.70 35.54 46.04 3.60 46
Notes:
ME: mean error 
MAE: mean absolute error 
RMSE: root mean squared error 
MAPE: mean absolute percentage error
PREDS: number of quarterly predictions evaluated for the period
Source: Agricultural Outlook; Economic Research Service/U.S. Department of Agriculture.
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Table 3 a
Ratios of Scores for Revised Estimates with and without Adjustment for Bias
Period ME MAE RMSE MAPE PREDS
1996-2002 0.61 0.94 0.94 0.95 32
1990-1995 0.56 0.99 1.00 0.99 32
1987-1989 1.17 1.16 1.17 1.16 15
Table 3b
Ratios of Scores for Initial Estimates with and without Adjustment for Bias
Period ME MAE RMSE MAPE PREDS
1996-2002 0.63 0.97 0.96 0.97 32
1990-1995 0.91 0.98 0.99 0.98 32
1987-1989 2.36 1.37 1.22 1.38 15
Notes:
ME: mean error 
MAE: mean absolute error 
RMSE: root mean squared error 
MAPE: mean absolute percentage error
PREDS: number of quarterly predictions evaluated for the period
Ratio = score with adjustment for bias divided by score with unadjusted USDA prediction 
Source: Agricultural Outlook; Economic Research Service/U.S. Department of Agriculture.
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Table 4a
USDA and Naive Forecasts on Revised Estimates of Total Farm Assets 1988-2002
ME MAE RMSE MAPE PREDS
USDA - I 30.29 49.89 62.05 5.00 14
Naive -  I 24.55 37.05 46.88 3.75 14
USDA -  II 32.60 45.91 55.98 4.64 39
Naive -  II 23.98 34.51 43.48 3.55 21
Table 4b
USDA and Naive Forecasts on Initial Estimates of Total Farm Assets 1988-2002
ME MAE RMSE MAPE PREDS
USDA - I 24.79 45.52 56.83 4.47 14
Naive -  I 19.05 37.62 46.28 3.70 14
USDA -  II 25.48 38.24 48.59 3.76 39
Naive -  II 17.36 32.45 41.72 3.20 21
Note 1:
ME: mean error 
MAE: mean absolute error 
RMSE: root mean squared error 
MAPE: mean absolute percentage error
PREDS: number of quarterly predictions evaluated for the period 
Note 2
USDA I is the initial forecast issued by the US Department of Agriculture for total farm assets at 
the beginning of the year. USDA II represents all forecasts issued by the USDA in the year of the 
forecast date. Naive I is the initial forecast issued by the CPI-adjusted model for total farm assets 
at the beginning of the year. Naive II represents all forecast issued by the CPI-adjusted model in 
the year of the forecast date.
Source: Agricultural Outlook; Economic Research Service/U.S. Department of Agriculture.
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Table 5 a
USDA and Naive Backcasts on Initial Estimates of Total Farm Assets 1987-2002
ME MAE RMSE MAPE PREDS
USDA -  I 8.04 23.24 32.24 2.34 15
Naive -  I 12.5 23.33 30.32 2.23 15
USDA -  II 8.64 18.4 27.75 1.82 39
Naive - II 14.29 23.84 30.09 2.27 17
Table 5b
USDA and Naive Backcasts on Revised Estimates of Total Farm Assets 1987-2002
ME MAE RMSE MAPE PREDS
USDA -  I 16.66 35.39 41.38 3.62 15
Naive -  I 27.07 25.49 35.46 2.52 15
USDA -  II 16.20 31.14 37.26 3.14 39
Naive - II 22.57 28.29 36.05 2.81 17
Note 1
ME: mean error 
MAE: mean absolute error 
RMSE: root mean squared error 
MAPE: mean absolute percentage error
PREDS: number of quarterly predictions evaluated for the period 
Note 2
USDA I is the initial backcast issued by the US Department of Agriculture for total farm assets at 
the beginning of the year following the forecast date. USDA II represents all backcasts issued by 
the USDA in the year following the forecast date. Naive I is the initial backcast issued by the 
CPI-adjusted model for total farm assets at the beginning of the year following the forecast date. 
Naive II represents all forecast issued by the CPI-adjusted model in the year following the forecast 
date.
Source: Agricultural Outlook; Economic Research Service/U.S. Department of Agriculture.
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District Portfolio
(in M illions)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Loan Volume $13,529 $15,144 $15,876 $17,318 $17,047 $18,512 $19,949 $22,229
Adverse $ 851 777 721 856 861 925 864 792
Adverse % 6.3 5.1 4.5 4.9 5.1 5.1 4.3 3.8%
Nonaccrual $ 280 188 187 341 312 195 214 192
Nonaccrual % 2.1 1.2 1.2 2.0 1.8 1.1 1.1 0.9%
Nonaccrual % of 
Adverse Dollars 32.9 24.2 25.9 39.8 32.2 21.1 21.1 24.3
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District Loan Distribution By Commodity
(As of December 31, 2002)
Other Crops, 22%
Sugar, 1% 
Tobacco, 2% 
Wheat, 1% 
Soybeans, 3%
Other Livestock, 4%
Cash Grains, 4%
Hogs, 5%
Poultry, 5%
Beef Cattle, 6%
Others, 23%
Corn, 13%
Dairy, 11%
AgriBank Loan Portfolios
(as of December 31, 2002)
Volume MM % of Portfolio
Wholesale 18,365 94.8
C om m ercial Lending 515 2.7
Capital M arkets 323 1.6
OFIs 140 0.7
RAU & NAS 36 0 2
AgriBank 19,370 100.0%
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Credit Information Disclosure
Today
• Accrual/nonaccrual
• Performing/nonperforming
• Restructured volume
• Type of loan—operating, IT, mortgage
• Commodity diversification
• Loan size stratifications/concentrations
• Credit quality
-  % Adverse
Disclosure Drivers 
Future
• Enron, WorldCom, TYCO
• Transparency:
— AICPA SOP Allowance for losses
— Moodys and S & P
— Disclosure—Fannie, Freddy, SEC
— Farm Credit System SEC?
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Credit Information Disclosure
• Credit quality — How should information 
be disclosed?
— Full time, part time, commercial ?
— By size ?
— By primary commodity ? i.e. corn
— By geographic area produced, or sold?
— Allowance for losses disclosure should align 
with credit quality disclosure
Credit Information Disclosure
• Allowance should reflect estimated charge-off 
exposure in the portfolio—not forward looking.
-  Allowance information must be relevant, objective, 
and measurable.
-  What have been the charge-offs?
-  What criteria exists that will drive charge-offs over 
time?
• Charge-offs to credit risk in the portfolio
-  Today— Uniform classification system
-  Future— Risk rating system or other ??
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Credit Information Disclosure
• Changing risk rating system
-  Each institution may have distinct rating system
-  Basel II requires less than 30% of dollars in any 
one risk rating category
-  Producer credits vs. commercial credits or one 
set of definitions
-  Current risk rating system incorporates both 
Probability of Default and Loss Given Default. 
Basel II separates the two.
-  Future— risk rating = Probability of default , not 
expected loss
Use of Internal Probability of 
Default (PD) Ratings
• Credit approval authorities and limits
• Evaluation of loan pricing
• Analysis of the Bank’s capital adequacy, 
allowances, and profitability
• Performing stress tests to assess capital 
adequacy
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Alternatives from Basel
• Basel 1—most assets risk weighted 100%
• Standardized Approach-some assets 
rated more than 100%
• Internal Ratings Based—may be used by 
only the very largest banks, but concepts 
reflect some of the most advanced thinking 
in risk management
Risk Weights
Standardized Approach -Corporates
Credit
Assess
AAA
to
A+ to 
A-
BBB 
to BB-
Below
BB-
Unrate
d
Risk 20% 50% 100% 150% 100%
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System Risk Management 
Objectives:
-  Develop a tool to assist in growing and managing the total 
loan portfolio.
-  Develop a common framework to assess risk within the 
System.
-  Establish uniform language and definitions to maximize 
effective communication within and among institutions in the 
System.
-  Establish definitional compatibility with regulation for the 
designation of special mention and classified loans.
-  Establish definitions that support agribusiness/commercial 
loans, as well as production loans.
-  Provide a tool to improve disclosure of System credit risk to 
investors in System debt.
System Risk Management 
Objectives: (Cont):
-  Establish a risk rating model that complies with the 
guidelines in the Basel II Accord regarding sufficient 
granularity.
-  Establish definitions and objective criteria that are highly 
predictive over the business cycle and longevity of predictive 
power
-  Establish definitions that result in grade consistency across 
sub-portfolios.
-  Develop definitions and a model that have a low cost to 
administer.
-  Establish that definition of probability of default is indicated 
by 90 days past due or nonaccrual over a one-year 
timeframe.
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Next Steps-Risk Rating
• Obtain PPC endorsement this fall
• Provide education—video, guidebook w/100 loan examples
• Determine if loan systems have right fields, if not, modify 
systems to store data
• Develop and validate initial PDs by risk rating, including 
standard deviations
• Develop objective criteria per risk rating to drive consistency
• Develop and validate LGDs
• Implement a national “Peer Review” process to ensure 
consistency
Exam ple 6 O b jective  C rite ria
C ontract S w in e /B ro ile r
4 5 6 7 8 9
WC/AGI
C urren t Ratio 1.35:1 1.30:1 1.25:1 1.20:1 1.0:1 1.00:1
S o lvency >40% >35% >30% >25% >25% >20%
CDRC >150% >140 >125% >120% >115% >105%
CDRC >20% >20% >17% >15% >12% >10%
M argin/AG I
M anagem ent Very Strong Above Average M ino r Some
C haracte r S trong Average Concern W eakness
Perform ance
Trends
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• Probability of Default PD
— One year PD
— Minimum of 3 BPS (0.03%)
— Average PD per grade, not a PD for each 
borrower
• Bank’s actual experience (based upon 
minimum observation period of 5 years)
• Mapping to external data
• Use of statistical default models
Two Dimensional
Risk Rating Model
Two Dimensional 
Risk Rating Model
• Probability of Default PD
-  Issues
• Do you measure PD based upon number of 
borrowers, loan numbers, or loan volume?
• How big of a database do you need to be 
statistically reliable ?
• How many years of data do you have?
• What objective criteria is most useful in asset 
placement?
• S & P’s concerns about cycles and sufficiency 
of capital even w/stress testing
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• Probability of Default
A default is considered to have occurred with regard to a 
particular obligor when one or more of the following events 
have taken place:
— It is determined that the obligor is unlikely to pay its debt 
obligations (principal, interest, or fees) in full;
— A credit loss event associated with any obligation of the 
obligor, such as a charge-off, specific provision, or 
distressed restructuring involving the forgiveness or 
postponement of principal, interest, or fees;
— The obligor is past due more than 90 days on any credit 
obligation; or
— The obligor has filed for bankruptcy or similar protection from 
creditors.
Two Dimensional
Risk Rating Model
Mapping Model
Combined System Existing
Seventh
Producer
Model
Existing
CoBank
RMA
1 Highest 1 1
2 Superior 2 2
3 Exceptional 1 3 3
4 Excellent 1 1 4 4
5 Strong 2 2 4 minus 4
6 Good 3 3 5 5
7 Average 3 4 5 minus 5
8 Adequate 4 5 6 6
9 Minimally
Accpt.
4 6 6 minus 6
10 OAEM 5 7 7 7
11 S-Viable 6 8 8 8
12 S-Nonviable 7 8N 8 8
13 Doubtful 8 9 9 9
14 Loss 9 10 10 10
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Mapping Model
Combined Seventh Moodys Stand Moodys Standar Operatin Ag Rural Term
System District One-Year ard One- d and g Mortgag Home
5.29 Default and Year Poors eRates Poors Default AgriBank
1 Aaa,Aa AAA, 0% 0%
AA
2 Aa, A AA-A .08% .01%
3 1 A A .01% .04% .38% .35% .25% .57%
4 2 Baa1, BBB+ .12% .02% .67% .67% .42% .80%
Baa2 ,BBB
5 2 Baa2,Baa3 BBB, .12% .26% .67 .67% .42% .80%
BBB-
6 3 Ba1 BB+ .78% 1.25% 1.1% 1.01% 1.44
7 3 Ba2 BB+, .65% 1.12% 1.25% 1.1% 1.01% 1.44
BB %
8 4 Ba3 BB, 2.93% 5.17 3.49% 5.29% 4.09
BB- %
9 4 Ba3, B1
CDCD 7.71% 6.06% 5.17 3.49% 5.29 4.09
10 5 CCC 13.66% 25.22%
11 6
12 7
13 8
14 9
4-Borrowers of Excellent Quality
• Leverage very low relative to industry standards with very strong 
liquidity. Long history of quality earnings. Interest coverage and 
cash flow is strong. Strong debt capacity. Where size allows, the 
borrower has ready access to national or regional debt markets. 
Alternative financing is available at all times. Management is highly 
regarded and has demonstrated industry experience and 
expertise. These are very strong assets.
• Placement Guidance
Rated companies in this category would include those typically 
rated BBB+ or BBB (S&P) or Baa1 or Baa2 (Moodys). Would 
typically include the highest quality agricultural production loans 
and local agribusiness accounts. Would include loans with Farmer 
Mac standby purchase commitment.
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7-Borrowers of Average Quality
• Average leverage and acceptable liquidity based on peers in the 
industry. Adequate earnings, cash flow, and debt service. Trends are 
positive but may not be consistently stable. Typically operations are 
profitable, but losses may periodically occur due to a difficult economic 
environment. Borrowers have sufficient strength and financial flexibility 
to offset these events. These operations are somewhat vulnerable to 
prolonged adverse industry conditions. Readily able to refinance debt 
with other financial institutions on similar terms. Management and 
owners have unquestioned character.
• Placement Guidance
Rated companies typically include those in the BB+ and BB (S&P) or 
Ba1 and Ba2 (Moodys) range.
9-Borrowers of 
Minimally Acceptable Quality
• More leveraged than peers in the industry and/or liquidity is weak 
or unstable. Earnings may be marginal, but cash flow, and debt 
service are sufficient but may be deteriorating, exhibiting signs of 
strain, are inconsistent or reliant on projections. Prone to 
deterioration in difficult economy. Limited access to alternative 
lenders. Heavy reliance on debt financing. Borrower may have 
difficulty in obtaining similar rates and terms. Performance record 
is usually satisfactory. Lender relationship satisfactory. 
Management is either unproven or less than average. Assets are 
acceptable but have conditions that could bring deterioration more 
quickly than other acceptable loans.
• Placement Guidance
Loans with deteriorating trend but still with cash flow coverage. 
Might have temporary setbacks to profitability. Rated companies 
typically in the BB- and B+ (S&P) or Ba3 and B1 (Moodys) range. 
Would include loans guaranteed by federal agencies (FSA, etc).
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Loss Given Default Definitions
• Default: Earlier of nonaccrual or 
90 days past due
• Economic Loss: Principal plus interest at 
date of default (plus any 
unpaid fees less the present 
value of subsequent cash 
flows
• Discount rate: Loan rate at time of 
default
Loss Given Default
• Minimum of 7 years of data (either internal or 
external)
• Represent entire business cycle
• Issues:
— D oes historical data reflect m odern assets? i.e. 
are hog facilities today = hog facilities in 1990
— D o we have accurate data on actual costs 
incurred?
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• Loss Given Default: LGD
— Applied to facility/transaction, not borrower.
— LGD needs to be analyzed at each institution 
as the institution’s policies and procedures will 
impact LGD.
— Average expected loss for each LGD grade
• Seniority of position
• Amount and nature of collateral
• Loan covenants
Two Dimensional
Risk Rating Model
Two Dimensional 
Risk Rating Model
• Loss Given Default: LGD
— Economic costs
• Advances
• Charge-offs
• Recoveries
• Legal fees
• Staff costs
• Collection fees
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Loss Given Default
LGD Code Range LGD
Terminology % %
Low L 0-15 3
Well secured W
Moderate M 15-25 20
Adequately A
secured
High H 25-50 50
Marginally secured M
Severe S 50+ 75
Under secured U
Loss Given Default 
Grades and Characteristics
• Low Range: 0-15% LGD : 3%
-  Loans that have a substantial positive collateral 
margin
-  Loans with FSA or other guarantor with unquestioned 
financial strength (absent any loan servicing issues)
-  Loans to customers that may have a short term cash 
flow problem, but have other financial strengths
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Loss Given Default 
Grades and Characteristics
• Medium Range: 15-25% LGD: 20%
-  Loans where collateral is positive, but the margin is limited.
-  Loans that are secured by assets that may not be easily 
converted to cash, may decline in value rapidly, or may 
disappear.
-  Loans where the operation/asset is not typical for the region.
-  Loans where collateral is marginal and where an unsecured 
guarantee may exist.
-  Loans that may be positively collateralized but where a lengthy 
shutdown period may be required, generating operating losses 
that may erode the collateral margin.
Loss Given Default 
Grades and Characteristics
• High Range: 25-50% LGD: 50%
-  Senior unsecured loans.
-  Loans where total legal obligation greatly exceeds the NRV of 
collateral.
-  Loans to entities where inventory represents work-in-process 
and further processing is necessary to make the assets 
marketable.
-  Loans where branded products represent a significant part of 
the inventory.
-  Loans secured by assets that represent economically obsolete 
technology, either in size, design, location, or utility.
-  Loans to entities where the diversion of collateral or collateral 
proceeds is high, possibility of fraud is high, or where 
commodities are traded and internal controls are limited.
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Loss Given Default 
Grades and Characteristics
• Severe Range: >50% LGD: 75%
-  Unsecured loans that are legally and contractually 
subordinated to other facilities.
-  Loans on special purpose facilities.
-  Loans to entities funding accounts receivable with 
characteristics in terms of size, location, and state 
laws that make the collection uneconomic.
-  Loans on assets where regulatory problems exist 
(EPA, DNR, USDA) which may restrict the sale or use 
of the asset.
-  Loans secured by legal documents that are deficient 
or not perfected.
Two Dimensional 
Risk Rating Model
• Exposure at Default ED
-  100% of drawn plus 75% of undrawn 
commitments
-  100% of direct credit substitutes such as letters of 
credit or guarantees
-  20% of short-term self-liquidating trade-related 
exposures such as documentary credits
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• Maturity: M
— Under foundation approach, all loans are 
assumed to have an average maturity of 3 years
— Under IRB approach, the greater of 1 year or:
• Nominal maturity of the instrument
• Weighted maturity of the remaining 
contractual principal payments
• Cap of 7 years
Two Dimensional
Risk Rating Model
Retail Exposure Characteristics
• Specific product types
• Loan to person or persons
• Large pool of loans
• Each individual exposure has low value
• What loans in our portfolios are “Retail?”
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Recovery Rates
• Operating
• IT
• Scorecard
• Mortgage >50% L/AV
• Mortgage <50% L/AV
• Rural Home
Primary Issues
• Change.... lender mind set =
— Today
• RR = PD * LGD
— Future
• RR = PD
• Loss = LGD
• Expected loss = PD * LGD
• Do I have to risk rate more loans?
• 14 vs. 10 categories
• Best producer loans are not A1s
• Combining producer and capital market loans into one grid
• Placement of FSA guarantees
• Placement of Farmer Mac stand-bys
• Consistency of implementation
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Multi-State Efforts to Evaluate Alternative 
Farm Savings Account Programs
Presented by Brent Gloy* 
Cornell University 
Annual Meeting of NCT-194 
10-6-03
*This work is the product of a number of individuals
Background: The People
■ Collaborators:
o Economic Research Service -  Durst, Dismukes, 
Monke
o Kansas State -Williams, Schurle, Langemeier 
o North Dakota State -Swenson 
o Illinois -  Ellinger, Schnitkey 
o Cornell -  LaDue, Gloy
o Please forgive any omission of other 
collaborators at these institutions
■ Funding and guidance -- RMA
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The Task
■ O b jec tives :
o  Estim ate farm  incom e variab ility  and 
assess producers ’ abilities to accum ulate  
and use savings fo r risk m anagem ent
o Provide a risk m anagem ent tool that w ill 
assist farm ers in making decisions about 
savings, including the use o f subsid ized  
savings accounts
Savings Accounts
■ Idea has appeal -  encourage farmers to 
save when times are good
■ Assist farmers in managing revenue risk
■ The amount and type of encouragement 
varies
o Tax deferral 
o Government matching 
o Both
■ Various implementation schemes
o All based on tax measures of income
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Savings Accounts
■ Subsidy component of programs differs
■ Policy aimed at market failure?
o Is savings constrained? Do farmers systematically 
under-save?
o I don’t know
o If these (and most other) programs are evaluated 
in this context they probably perform poorly
■ Can/should we ask/insist that farmers to save 
the assistance that the government provides 
them in good times?
o These programs provide incentives to do this
Savings Accounts
■ Problem: We know relatively little 
about the extent/magnitude of variation 
annual farm income at the farm level
■ Problem: We know relatively little 
about the extent to which savings 
accounts might impact this situation
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Savings Accounts Precedent: 
Canada’s NISA Program
■ Deposits based on net value of production
o Farmer deposits were not tax deductible
o Matched deposits
■ Withdrawn when net income falls below 5 
year average or when income falls below a 
minimum level ($20,000)
■ Results:
o Substantial balances
o Farmers negotiated ad hoc assistance in bad 
times
o NISA being revised/modified
Source: Presentation given by Greg Strain, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 
at the Farm Savings Accounts and the Farm Safety Net Workshop, Washington, 
D.C. June 2, 2003
Savings Accounts Precedent: Australia’s 
Farm Management Deposits
■ Tax deferral incentive
o Cannot make taxable farm income negative 
o Cannot build balance in excess of 300,000AUD 
o Cannot be used as collateral 
o Provided some “exceptional circumstance” 
withdrawals, i.e., put the money in and take off 
your taxes, take it out tax free
o About 10% of farms utilize
Source: Presentation given by Trish Gleeson, Principal Economist Agricultural 
Commodities, abareconomics, at the Farm Savings Accounts and the Farm 
Safety Net Workshop, Washington, D.C. June 2, 2003
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The Programs
1. Farm and Ranch Risk Management 
(FARRM) Accounts
o Recent support for the idea 
o Tax deferral incentives
2. Counter-Cyclical Accounts
o Recent support
o Direct government support program
3. Individual Risk Management Accounts 
(IRMA)
o Alternative savings account program 
o Blends aspects of CC and FARRM
Details: FARRM Accounts
■ Eligibility: positive net income
■ Deposits: 20% of net income
■ Income tax on deposits is deferred, earnings on 
deposits are taxable
■ Considered two types of withdrawal rules:
o Not specified in proposed program -  conducted some 
analyses on movement within tax brackets 
o This benefit appears to be modest in NY (Cornell)
■ Basic analyses examined withdrawals
o If gross income falls below 90% of 5 year average, 
withdrawal = min(balancei, 90%*5yrAve -  incomei) 
o Used same rules for all three types of accounts
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Details: CC Accounts
■ Eligibility: 5 year average gross income 
over $50,000
■ Deposits: 2% of gross income, up to $5,000 
plus government match
■ Only earnings on deposits are tax deferred
■ Basic analyses examined withdrawals
o If gross income falls below 90% of 5 year 
average,
w ithdrawal = m in(balance j , 90%*5yrAve -  income i)
IRMA: The General Idea
■ Place crop insurance premiums in a 
tax-deferred interest bearing account
■ Instead of subsidizing crop insurance 
premiums, USDA matches the 
producer’s contribution
■ Generates a whole-farm revenue 
insurance plan rather than commodity 
by commodity insurance
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Details: IRMA
■ Eligibility: Positive net income
■ Deposits: 2% of gross income, with a high income 
kicker
o If income > 110% of 5 year average, contribute 25% of the 
gross income amount over 110%
Government Match of 2% of gross farm revenue (likely high) 
Maximum cumulative balance is 150% of 3 year average 
gross revenue
■ Income tax on deposits and earnings are deferred
■ Basic analyses examined withdrawals
o If gross income falls below 90% of 5 year average, 
withdrawalj = min(balancej, 90%*5yrAve -  incomei)
Background: Method and Data
■ Partner institutions use farm record 
data to develop comparable panel data 
sets
o Begin with records for 1997 to 2001
o Each institution needed to standardize 
the records
o Provide variability with respect to 
enterprise and geographic region
o ERS to use IRS data
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Background: Method and Data
■ Proposed programs based primarily on tax 
records so each institution was required to 
develop measure that correspond to taxes
■ Developed a standard approach for 
evaluating each program and measures of 
variability
■ Each institution summarized the basic 
aspects of this data
Tasks
■ Analysis begins with basic questions 
o Income variability
o Eligibility
o Basic withdrawal rules
■ Expanded analysis will examine 
o “Behavioral” based rules
o Cash flow and financial situation 
considerations
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NY Farms with Positive Tax Liability
□  No S D & P E  D W i t h  S D & P E
Preliminary Results
Illinois, Kansas, New York, North Dakota
Paul Ellinger, Brent Gloy, 
Andrew Swenson, Jeffery R. Williams
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Research Stages
■ Phase I -E R S /R M A
o Measure the variability of farms with farm records panel 
data
o Estimate the impact of 3 alternative proposals 
o Identify issues
■ Phase II -E R S /R M A
o Risk management tool
■ Phase III and beyond -  research group
o Customized -  hybrid program
o Evaluate savings tools in combination w/risk management 
tools (ex. Crop insurance) 
o Accounting issues related to farm variability 
o Consideration of financial condition 
o Behavioral cash rules
General Program Design
■ Establish criteria for depositing funds 
and withdrawing funds.
o Typically, current year income (net or 
gross) relative to historical average
■ Benefits to producers are typically tax 
deferral and governmental match
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Research Issues
■ Previous research suggests benefits to size
■ Measures of variability
o net v gross 
o cash v accrual
■ Moving average calculations
■ Time frame
■ Changes in farm size and structure
■ Producer withdrawals
■ Cash flow issues
■ Data discrepancies
Output Tables
■ Descriptive statistics
■ CDFs of variability relative to min and max
■ Deposit and withdrawal patterns by size of 
farm
o FAARM accounts 
o Counter-cyclical 
o IRMA
■ Sensitivity analysis to withdrawal rules
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Descriptive Data^
" K a n s a s ^ " Illlin o is N e w  Y o rk N o rth  D a k o ta
N u m b e r o f  fa rm s 6 9 9 1 ,7 1 6 142 2 5 8
A v e ra g e  G ro s s  In c o m e  (1 9 9 7 ) $ 2 3 5 ,7 2 5  $ 2 5 6 ,8 1 1 $ 7 1 8 ,6 7 5 $ 2 3 9 ,7 6 4
A v e ra g e  G ro s s  In c o m e  (2 0 0 1 ) 2 2 7 ,4 3 4 2 6 2 ,4 8 2 1 ,0 8 1 ,0 1 8 3 1 5 ,1 2 7
%  G ro s s  In c o m e  fro m  L iv e s to c k  (1 9 9 7 ) 3 4 .3 0 % 1 5 .8 0 % o v e r  9 0 % 2 4 .0 0 %
%  G ro s s  In c o m e  fro m  L iv e s to c k  (2 0 0 1 ) 3 2 .9 0 % 1 2 .3 0 % o v e r  9 0 % 2 5 .0 0 %
A v e ra g e  N e t In c o m e  (1 9 9 7 ) $ 4 6 ,5 6 3  $ 4 4 ,3 3 2 $ 2 4 ,0 3 9 $ 2 8 ,4 6 0
A v e ra g e  N e t In c o m e  (2 0 0 1 ) 3 2 ,6 3 2 3 6 ,6 6 8 6 4 ,3 5 3 4 2 ,7 2 5
D is tr ib u t io n  o f  F a rm s  (2 0 0 1 )
G ro s s  In c o m e
L e s s  th a n  $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 2 9 % 2 5 % 2 9 % 9 %
$ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  - 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 4 0 % 4 5 % 4 0 % 3 9 %
G re a te r  th a n  $ 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 3 1 % 3 0 % 3 1 % 5 2 %
P ro p o rt io n  o f  G ro s s  In c o m e  F ro m  L iv e s to c k
L e s s  th a n  2 5 % 5 2 % 8 3 % 5 2 % 6 5 %
2 5 %  to  5 0 % 1 8% 6 % 18% 1 0%
5 0 %  to  7 5 % 1 4% 7% 14% 9 %
G re a te r  th a n  7 5 % 1 7% 5% 17% 1 6%
N e t In c o m e
le s s  th a n  $0 2 1 % 1 7% 2 1 % 1 2%
1 to  $ 5 0 ,0 0 0 5 3 % 6 1 % 5 3 % 5 7 %
G re a te r  th a n  $ 5 0 ,0 0 0 2 6 % 2 2 % 2 6 % 3 1 %
Revenue From Livestock
1 0 0 %
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Kansas Illlinois New York North Dakota
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Gross Revenue and Net Farm Income, 1997
$800,000
$700,000
$600,000
$500,000
$400,000
$300,000
$200,000
$100,000
$-
Kansas Illlinois New York North Dakota
Gross Revenue and Net Farm Income, 2001
$1,200,000
$1,000,000
$800,000
$600,000
$400,000
$200,000
$-
Kansas Illlinois New York North Dakota
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Farm Size Distribution
100% n
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Kansas Illlinois New York North Dakota
Average Revenue and Net Income
New York
$1,200,000
$1,000,000
$800,000
$600,000
$400,000
$200,000
$-
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
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Income Descriptive Statistics
Gross Income Net profit/loss Gross Income Net profit/loss
Illinois New York
Average
1997 $ 256,811 $ 44,332 $ 718,675 $ 24,039
1998 237,558 35,526 862,279 65,057
1999 245,035 38,528 940,063 | 86,286
2000 256,006 38,638 894,245 36,090
2001 262,482 36,668 1,081,018 64,353
Proportion W ith Low Year In
1997 16% 15% 87% 49%
1998 28% 24% 1% 9%
1999 22% 18% 1% 6%
2000 15% 17% 8% 19%
2001 18% 25% 2% 16%
Proportion W ith High Year In
1997 34% 31% 1% 3%
1998 9% 15% 7% 23%
1999 12% 18% 20% 42%
2000 17% 18% 1% 8%
2001 28% 18% 70% 23%
Minimum relative to 5-year average
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
a
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Minimum Relative to 5 yr Ave
Minimum Relative to 5 yr Ave
247
$1,000
$800
$600
o
o
5  $400
<D
E
$0
-$200
-$400
-$600
Minimum, Maximum, and Average Net Schedule F Income, 
142 New York Dairy Farms, 1997-2001
CD CD CD O O O CM CM CM
Farm Number
$200
Minimum, Maximum, and Average Gross Schedule F Income,
Farm Number
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Average Ending Account Balances
All Farms
300,000
250,000
200,000
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□ FAARM 
□  Countercyclical 
■  IRMA
Kansas Illinois New York North Dakota
Average Ending Account Balances
Large Farms (> 250,000)
400.000
350.000
300.000
250.000
200.000
150.000
100.000 
50,000
Kansas Illinois New York North Dakota
FAARM 
Countercyclical 
■  IRMA
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Farms Eligible to Contribute FAARM
Positive income
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Farms Eligible to Contribute FAARM
Gross Revenue > 50,000
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Farms Eligible to Withdraw
90% Gross Revenue
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Withdrawal Rules: Gross v Net
New York
100%
90%
80%
70%E
« 60%
°  50%o
'■g 40%
Q.
30%
Q_
20%
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Cash v Accrual
Net Farm Income 
Accrual Cash
Gross Income 
Accrual Cash
1997 58,837 46,563 243,918 256,811
1998 15,934 48,828 205,889 237,558
1999 39,537 37,698 231,704 245,035
2000 55,225 39,150 257,050 256,006
2001 33,721 32,632 245,672 262,482
Average 40,651 40,974 236,847 251,578
Std Dev 17,345 6,644 19,499 10,066
CV 0.43 0.16 0.08 0.04
Cash v Accrual
Gross Revenue
I Accrual a Cash
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5 Year
Variability below average by growth
Illinois Grain Farms Only
Income Threshold 80%
___________ A t least 1 year_______________1 in 5 years______________ 2 in 5 years
Negative Growth 49.6% 35.5% 10.1%
Low Growth 25.8% 21.6% 3.4%
Positive Growth 38.6% 29.9% 7.6%
5 Year
Variability above average by growth
Illinois Grain Farms Only
Income Threshold 120%
A t least 1 year 1 in 5 years 2 in 5 years
Negative Growth 42.0% 35.9% 5.4%
Low Growth 29.9% 25.9% 3.5%
Positive Growth 55.9% 38.6% 14.6%
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IRS Data: 2000
■ Landlords
■ Farm partnerships
■ Subchapter S corps
■ Sole proprietors (1.8 million returns)
C rop  In s u ra n c e S a la r ie s S e lf  E m p lo y m e n t T a xe s
G o v e rn m e n t p a y m e n ts  D iv idend  In co m e E d u c a tio n  C re d its
D e p re c ia tio n C a p ita l G a in s /L o s s e s M e d ic a l C re d its
M o rtg a g e  In te re s t IR A  C o n tr ib u tio n s T ax b ra c k e ts
G ro s s  &  N e t In co m e K e o u g h  C o n tr ib u tio n s  
A d ju s te d  G ro s s  In co m e
Summary
■ Report of baseline analysis: Phase I
■ Sensitivity to deposit / withdrawal rules
■ Issues
o What are the incentives? 
o Accounting for changes in size and
structure
o Deposits: adequate cash flow 
o Gross revenue or net
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